User:AVCI2/Commentary

Background / FOREWORD
The Code of Conduct was developed in 1992 and formerly adopted by the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) in 1994[i]. It currently stands at 300 signatories. It is hosted, but not managed, by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Secretariat in Geneva (International Federation).

This commentary was commissioned on the 10th anniversary of the Code of Conduct by the SCHR[ii] and the International Council for Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)[iii].

Purpose and target audience
Who is the Commentary intended for?

The Commentary is primarily intended for those who take programmatic or operational decisions for their organisations in order that such decisions are based on humanitarian principles rather than simply pragmatic reasoning.

[ Another of the key issues, then as now, was neutrality. While no written record exists about the issues debated when the Code was written, there seems to have been a number of reasons why neutrality was not included. First, as requested by the French Red Cross, the Code was intended for technological and natural disasters where neutrality is less important. Second, Oxfam GB ’ s thinking at the time was informed predominately by their justice work in Latin America, where they claimed to be "on the side of the poor", but also realised that this could not be always interpreted as neutral. Also, some people feel today that actually, not many NGOs worked in conflict situations during the Cold War, and at the time were just beginning to and didn ’ t yet understand the significance of neutrality. Moreover, people who were working in the church agency members of SCHR at the time feel that the main impetus came from them, influenced by liberation theology (the school of thought that demands the church concentrate its efforts to liberate people of the world from oppression and poverty).[iv]  ]  [ the problem here is that most of the information is really based on hearsay. Sure it is possible that the FRC were mainly thinking of natural disasters, but I can ’ t believe that those who had been involved in Biafra, Somalia, etc. entered into the drafting process just thinking of natural disasters—the text certainly indicated that complex emergencies were on their minds ]

The principles of the Code combine the core values of humanitarian action with practical lessons learnt over many years of disaster response. They provide guide to good practices By adhering to the principles, agencies can be more predictable in their respons which will help to promote confidence and trust of those involved in a humanitarian crisis. The principles of the Code can also serve to guide aid workers through dilemmas they encounter regularly in their work. Understanding that the humanitarian imperative comes first, that aid must be given without discrimination and in according to need can often help resolve difficult problems thus helping to guide decision-making and practical action.<nowiki

Text box: contexts in which the Code applies
Humanitarian principles must be applied according to the context where response is carried out.

Natural disasters are caused by the combination of vulnerability with natural geophysical hazards such as earthquakes, landslides, volcanoes or tsunamis; or by climate-related hazards such as cyclones, hurricanes, floods, droughts; or by other natural forces such as locust infestations. [ is this a standard definition?? ]

Armed conflict refers to disasters caused by international or non-international armed conflict

Complex emergencies or complex political emergencies are a disaster in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency[v]. It is possible that combinations of natural and human-created hazards will exist in a complex emergency.

Transitional environments or post-conflict environments exist after the disaster or conflict, but do not yet represent a situation of normalcy for the affected population, and where often the rule of law is not yet complete.

Text box: Different cultures, similar values.
Many cultures have values or codes that limit conduct in warfare. Values that limit conduct in warfare are linked to values that limit suffering caused by warfare. Many cultures have values that are very similar to those contained in the Code that apply in times of peace (and thus would be applicable in responding to natural disasters).

The Dinka tribe of Southern Sudan have an ethical code called cieng that governs behaviour, habit, and custom. At the core of cieng are such values as dignity, integrity, honour, respect, loyalty, piety and the power of persuasiveness. Good cieng is opposed to coercion and violence, for solidarity, harmony and mutual co-operation are more fittingly achieved voluntarily and through persuasion. " … among the ethical principles of warfare were that the enemy must not be ambushed or killed outside the battlefield and that a fallen warrior covered by a woman for protection (women accompany men in battle primarily to help the wounded) must be spared, as harming women and children in war was strictly forbidden."[vi]

Ubuntu is a word from the Nguni tribes of Southern Africa (Zulu, Swazi, Xhosa and Ndebele). It refers to the capacity to express compassion, justice, reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity in the interests of building, maintaining and strengthening the community. Compassion is a central part of ubuntu, and its philosophy is enshrined perhaps by the Zulu maxim "a person is a person through other persons"[vii].

Another example can be found in the concept of Rendo, meaning ’ humanitarian ’ as described by the Chinese scholar Sun Tzu, whose book The Art of War first appeared around 400 B.C. Animportant rules was that a soldier could not attack civilians or damage their property. During the Warring States Period in Chinese history (as outlined by Chunqiu Zhanguo, 453-221 B.C.(Check, he seems to have lived a long time! ] ) several more principles were added such as not to pursue defeated enemies, not to employ ruses in battle, and not to kill those who have already surrendered.

Attributed to Muhammad (570-632) in the Hadith: "The prophet said: the captive is your brother and your colleague and it is by the grace of Allah that he is in your hands. Since he is at your mercy, take care that as regards to food and clothing he is treated as you yourself are"[viii].

While IHL was borne from European traditions and the nation state, Islam has had an innovative influence on European laws and customs of war that stretches back as far as the Crusades. The Ottoman Empire, and the Persian Empire were both represented at early Red Cross International Conferences and negotiated precedents that impact IHL today. Islam continues to have a role in shaping modern IHL in this way, such that there is a substantial congruence between Islamic and IHL norms of conduct in armed conflict. These include the general protection of civilians (and specific rules on women, children and elderly persons)[ix].

Hippocrates (460-377 BCE) Greek physician, creator of the Hippocratic Oath, and early inspiration for present day medical ethics, which include the principle of alleviating suffering. The widespread existence of medical ethics globally contributes to the universality of humanitarian values.

Genesis of the Code
[ I find that this paragraph needs more reference than several telephone conversations—when did not disaster response organizations face "fluid" environments? I would write somethinglike the following: : ] By the early 1990s, the humanitarian community had been faced important ethical issues for at least more than two decades. Some examples include the use of humanitarian funds for military purposes during the Biafra war, cooperation with the military forces during the Vietnam war, working with armed groups in the refugee camps in Central America and along the Cambodian border. Huge refugee movements had been taking place placing strains on humanitarian resources and drawing in new organizations with their own different agendas. Thus here was a rapid expansion of available funding, and increased numbers of NGOs[x]. [ here I would use hard references to some statistics showing increase in number of humanitarian organizations and the funds available which I don ’ t have at my finger tips ]

During this period, major humanitarian agencies began to realize the need to work more closely with each other. Examples include at the international level, the formation of the SCHR in 1972, (some examples from ICVA and InterAction plus some national examples, i.e.CCSDPT in Thailand ]

Within this context, discussions were taking place about the need to look more closely at the ethical issues at the core of humanitarian response. In 1989 Oxfam began an internal discussion about an instrument which would explicitly address some of the ethical issues.In 1991 the French Red Cross (FRC) requested its International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to draft a code of conduct for natural and technological disasters. The Federation as the SCHR, of which it was a member to draw up a code of conduct. (For a more complete discussion of the genesis of the code, see Peter Walker—ref) [ reference to Peter ’ s article is a stronger reference than a phone conversation.—the reason given is too impressionistic. The competition was not new or particularly specific to the Armenian response. ]

The code project received a favorable response from the SCHR which felt that there was a strong need for NGO self-regulation. (It was often argued that if the NGOs didn ’ t regulate their own behavior, then there was a risk that governments would.

In 1994, the Code was published. It was submitted jointly by the ICRC and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to the Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement which endorsed the draft Code in 1993[xi].

It was later submitted as an annex to a resolution for adoption by the International Conference of Red Cross and Red Crescent in 1995. There, all members of the International Conference, including States, accepted the Code of Conduct as an Annex to Resolution IV of the Conference which addresses principles and action in international  humanitarian assistance and protection. The International Conference, composed of all States party to the Geneva Conventions and all components of the International Red Cross & Red Crescent Movement 1) took note and welcomed the Code of Conduct and 2) invited all States and National Societies to encourage NGO ’ s to both abide by and to consider registering their support for the Code.

Analysis - current status of the Code
OR: Accountability in Upholding/Adhering to the Principles?

Analysis - compliance with the code
[ I don ’ t really see the purpose of this para ]

For the purposes of discussion, let us consider four possible degrees of commitment to the Code of Conduct.


 * Signature to the Code implies a public statement that the organisation aspires to uphold the Code. Staff are aware of the existence of the Code, they might be able to explain its contents, and it might be included in agency publications.  This is the minimum an organisation can do.


 * Application or implementation of the Code means that it is considered a tool and used by staff in their work. This might also mean that the agency states that the Code will be a reference for its decision-making. While not yet systematic, this might include inductions, training, programme design and implementation, evaluations and so on.


 * Institutionalisation means that the organisation has systematically embedded the Code into its culture, and staff are clear how the Code relates to the organisation ’ s policies and procedures. This could include general policies, high-level strategies, human resources policies, program design procedures, or as part of standard terms of reference for all evaluations.


 * Compliance means that staff compliance to the Code is a contractual obligation, that the organisation has a mechanism for dealing with breaches of the Code, including disciplinary procedures. It also could imply the establishment of complaint mechanisms for people served by the organisation, and the use of organisational peer reviews or audits by independent external bodies to ensure compliance[xii].  It could also imply that the agency reports annually on how the Code has been applied, and the challenges encountered.

Almost 300 organisations have stated their commitment to the Code in public by "signing up to the Code" on the International Federation website. The International Federation acts as a custodian of this list of agency names, but does not vet its contents. Moreover, there is no monitoring, auditing or review mechanism associated with this list. The Code therefore is understood as a voluntary code

The Code today enjoys a peculiar status. It is a valued instrument with a widespread and marked influence, but amongst aid workers ’ in the field ’ the Code document itself is not often explicitly referred to. Most people familiar with the existence of the Code have a positive opinion about it. This view is based on two sources, an opinion survey conducted by Dorothea Hilhorst and research by the authors in four case study countries.

The opinion survey[xiii] and a 2004 conference in the Hague were organised to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Code in 2004 by a group of Dutch NGOs.

Respondents to the survey expressed a general opinion that the Code was useful, and provided a variety of examples of how the Code has been used by agencies. The examples include simple announcements on an agency ’ s website, incorporating the Code in reports of the organisation, andcreating agency policy about the Code. More robust examples include incorporating the Code in training curricula, using the Code as evaluation criteria, and including the Code as a condition in partnership agreements.

In addition, field-based research for this commentary was carried out with approximately one hundred interviews conducted in four different countries (Afghanistan, Sudan, Liberia and Haiti). In a majority of interviews, agency representatives were aware of the existence of the Code, while a minority of agency representatives used the Code explicitly. For example, several agencies use the Code as part of their local induction or training programmes. Also, the Code has found its way into local codes of practice, and other more recent international declarations such as the Sphere Project ’ s Humanitarian Charter. The Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC[xiv]) in the UK, systematically uses  the Code in its framework for evaluating the collective response of its membership in specific disasters.

In all field-based interviews, agency representatives were familiar with some of the principles of humanitarian action outlined in the Code.

The principles of the appear to be embedded in the general practice of organisations working in disasters and conflict.

[ This doesn ’ t really belong in the commentary ]

Text box: Jean Pictet and the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross & Red Crescent Movement
The drafting of the Code of Conduct was heavily influenced by the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.In 1875, Gustave Moynier (a co-founder of the ICRC with Henri Dunant, and author of the first Geneva Convention in 1864) suggested the Red Cross should observe four principles: foresight (preparation in advance); solidarity (mutual ties between Red Cross national societies); centralisation (one national society per country); and mutuality (assistance given to war wounded regardless of nationality)[xv]. After the First World War the first attempt was made to codify Red Cross doctrine, which until then resided in the minds and experience of its delegates. In 1921 the statutes of the ICRC were modified, and four fundamental principles were incorporated: impartiality; political, religious and economic independence; the universality of the Red Cross movement; and equality of its members. Later, 17 principles were adopted in 1952[xvi]. . These were reduced to 7 in 1965 and adopted at the 20th International Conference for the Red Cross[xvii] for the entire Movement.

A senior official of the ICRC (he was appointed Director in 1946 and Director General in 1966), Jean Pictet, was deeply involved in the formulation of humanitarian doctrine during his legal career at the ICRC. He worked on the development of the four Geneva Conventions in 1949 and the two additional protocols of 1977. Pictet wrote the first commentary on the principles in 1955, and in 1979 he wrote a second commentary on the seven fundamental principles. In his 1979 work he identifies a ’ hierarchy ’ of principles that expressly puts the act of humanity at the centre of Red Cross work. Pictet identifies four categories of principle – essential, substantive, derived and organic.

A substantive principle is one that expresses the core value or values of the organisation.

Derived principles are those that are needed to implement the substantive principles.

Organic principles have an institutional character and are learned from experience.

Jean Pictet wrote that the one substantive principle that stands above the others was that of humanity which expresses the essence of humanitarian work.. He stressed that an important element of the principle was to "assure respect for the individual." [ ref: 1-01-1979 ICRC Publication  by Jean Pictet: The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross : commentary

===Purpose

''This Code of Conduct seeks to guard our standards of behaviour. It is not about operational details, such as how one should calculate food rations or set up a refugee camp. Rather, it seeks to maintain the high standards of independence, effectiveness and impact to which disaster response NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement aspires. It is a voluntary code, enforced by the will of organisation accepting it to maintain the standards laid down in the Code.''

In the event of armed conflict, the present Code of Conduct will be interpreted and applied in conformity with international humanitarian law.

''The Code of Conduct is presented first. Attached to it are three annexes, describing the working environment that we would like to see created by Host Governments, Donor Governments and Intergovernmental Organisations in order to facilitate the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.''

Explanation of the Purpose
The purpose of the Code is clearly stated: it is to protect standards of behaviour and should be distinguished from standards or norms which are applied to operations.

The Code from the beginning was designed to be voluntary. While agencies signed up to the Code, it was clear that it was up to each individual agency to enforce and maintain their commitment to maintain the standards.

Even though the Code is not an international legal instrument, the drafters explicitly state the primacy of IHL in the midst of international conflict, thus avoiding any misunderstanding that the Code was an attempt to change international humanitrian law.

The purposes of the three annexes is clear. The role of the annexes will be addressed later in the commentary.

Legal status of the Code
The Code is not a legally binding document, although the fact that it was welcomed by States in the 1995 International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent implies a certain recognition of its principles. when compared to other voluntary instruments for humanitarian action.Some principles included in the Code of Conduct are recognized  in international lawFor instance, in 1986 the International Court of Justice held that "one essential feature of truly humanitarian aid is that it is given without discrimination of any kind".[xviii].

A number of governments, and inter-governmental bodies (i.e. the US Government and ECHO, require that all partners sign up to the Code.

The Principles

The principles of the Code of Conduct can be viewed as being presented in hierarchical order, and there are elements of hierarchy - most obviously the fact that the humanitarian imperative comes first. Nevertheless, in signing the Code, organisations sign all ten principles and all contain important practical guidance. We shall return to discuss questions of hierarchy in several places in the commentary, for the purposes of our introduction a simple analogy might be a useful illustration. Consider a lifeguard at a beach, who exists to protect swimmers from drowning. Yet even with this unambiguous mission, the lifeguard ’ s first responsibility is self-protection for they cannot save any lives if they are themselves drowning. Similarly, while the first principle of the Code unambiguously refers to saving lives, the subsequent principles help the organisation behave in a way that ensures it is able to meet its first principle. The latter principles in the Code are more about best practice, and quality. The first principles are to be implemented to the extent necessary, and the latter principles to the extent possible[xix].

Principle 1
The Humanitarian imperative comes first

''The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As members of the international community, we recognise our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need for unimpeded access to affected populations is of fundamental importance in exercising that responsibility.''

''The prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster. When we give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such.''

Summary
This principle is the essence of the humanitarian ethic and contains three core ideas; the prevention and alleviation of human suffering, the protection of human life and health, and respect for the individual.

These ideas come first, in priority over other considerations. The ability of aid workers to provide assistance is dependent on their access to the people who need help.

Access is in part granted according to the trust that powers in control have with aid agencies. This trust can be dependent on whether the aid agency is perceived to be taking sides in the conflict, or neutral. There has been a long running debate about how neutral it is possible to be.

A breach of this principle would involve placing other motives before the humanitarian imperative, such as profit, or a quest for political power. The biggest threat may come from placing organisational needs or interests above the humanitarian imperative.

Interpreting the principle
The core value for humanitarian organizations is the imperative to respond to and alleviate human suffering. This humanitarian vision is universal and is based upon the ideas of a common and shared humanity expressed in all of the world ’ s cultures.

The ’ humanitarian imperative ’ shares common origin with the Red Cross and Red Crescent principle of Humanity, which has three elements:


 * The prevention and alleviation of suffering;


 * the protection of life and health, and


 * the assuring of respect for the human being.

For Pictet, the principle of humanity is an essential one, from which all others are derived.

Looking at the contents of the principle of humanity, it becomes clear that humanitarian action is more than just a physical act aimed at saving life. The protection of life and health has also a preventative aspect. The respect for the human being to other elements than just physical survival and refers to

The question of why the principle of humanity was not sufficient for the authors of the Code remains open, but they transformed the principle of humanity into the humanitarian imperative. Although the foundation of the humanitarian imperative is not entirely clear, it has generally become part of the international vocabulary.

In writing about the humanitarian imperative, Hugo Slim makes a number of observations. He relates the humanitarian imperative to the Kantian notion of the "categorical imperative," which guides human behaviour to what is good. He also points to how NGOs view the humanitarian imperative as being absolutist. Earlier, he criticised this approach as it makes humanitarian action becomes non-negotiable, humanitarian imperative. The authors of the Code had given the principle of humanity and "imperative gloss and making it unreservedly a moral absolute, which always overrides the position of the warring parties in an armed conflict."

Clearly, international humanitarian law provides for the place of humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict by balancing humanitarian considerations and military necessity. The imperative is not absolutist as humanitarian action is always the outcome of negotiations, which, from the humanitarian point of view, should be informed by international humanitarian law rather than by what is politically feasible.

The Right to Receive and Offer Assistance
The subtext points to what the humanitarian imperative implies: it equals the principle of the right to receive and offer humanitarian assistance. Apparently, the authors wanted to assert that humanitarian assistance is a right, which cannot be denied.

In legal terms, it is not easy to find the right to receive humanitarian assistance in international legal instruments. International humanitarian law, applicable in armed conflict, contains many provisions with regards to humanitarian assistance, but is not written in a way that it provides for specific rights, including the right to receive humanitarian assistance. For situations other than armed conflict, international law does not (yet) cover the provision of humanitarian assistance in natural and technological disasters. It has been argued that the right to receive humanitarian assistance for victims of natural disasters does exist in customary international law.

Moreover, projects are underway, however, to develop new laws in this respect.

Although human rights law does not contain a specific right to humanitarian assistance, international human rights instruments include the right to life, which would be have no meaning if this right would not entail a right to receive assistance in situations of where the survival of the population is threatened. It also includes subsistence rights, including the right to essential food and potable water, basic shelter and housing, and essential medical services and sanitation. Taken together these services form the core part of humanitarian assistance. In this sense, the right to receive humanitarian is a necessary implication from fundamental rights.

The right to offer assistance is more directly found international humanitarian law. Common Article 3 of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 stipulates that: "an impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict." Obviously, such services can include the provision of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in the territory under control by one of the Parties. This article implies that such an offer can also be refused. International humanitarian law, however, provides strict limitations on when such refusals are within the law. In particular, if the survival of the population is threatened and a humanitarian organisation fulfilling the required conditions of impartiality and non-discrimination is able to remedy this situation, relief actions must take place.

Legally and semantically speaking, the subtext referring to "the right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle, which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries" is a strange sentence. Following human rights language, it should have read: "everyone affected by a disaster, has the right to receive humanitarian assistance (depending on need)." "The right to offer humanitarian assistance is a fundamental humanitarian principle."

Obligation
The Code talks of the obligation of members of the international community to provide humanitarian assistance. In fact, it is those who are signing up to the Code who are acknowledging their assumption of an obligation since as humanitarians they cannot stand idly by in the face of human suffering because of their commitment to the imperative. In this respect, for NGOs, it is a self-imposed obligation, while the Red Cross Movement has a mandate that brings with it a responsibility to act.

Access
Unimpeded access relates to the acceptance of the right to offer humanitarian assistance by the competent authorities. International humanitarian law provides that the parties to the conflict "shall allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded access of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel." This wording of Article 70 of the First Additional Protocol aims to avoid any harassment. It also implies the reduction of customs formalities as much as possible.

In natural disasters, sometimes physical access is the greatest challenge due to floods, collapsed or destroyed infrastructure, or due to the remoteness of the location of concern.

Access is often based upon a relationship of trust with those who control the territory. Trust is essential in negotiations, in building the space for humanitarian work. Trust is based on the perceptions of those involved in the conflict that humanitarians have no other agenda than alleviating human suffering.

However, it must be recognized that even that limited agenda can lead to actions, which can be confused with taking sides or other seemingly political actions. Thus the importance in the explicit principles discussed below.

[ True but doesn ’ t really belong here ] I AGREE

[ should be discussed later—more comments then on discussing neutrality ]

Using the principle in practice
[ practice in this section should be more tightly focussed on problems in operating on the basis of the rights to receive and give assistance, issues of access, and the need for maintaining peceptions of those involved of the humanitarian orgs. ] AGREE

In Sudan, during the 2004 Darfur crisis, the government and the United Nations proposed to create ’ safe zones ’ around camps of people displaced by the war. Some agencies feared this would mean that those people would end up living in the camps for years, and that those who had chased them from their homes and land would then confiscate it permanently. Aid agencies, by meeting short term life saving needs and helping people to live in those camps, found themselves participating in a process with an uncertain and possibly unattractive long-term outcome for the people who have been displaced.

Despite this, all agencies agreed that they could not let people die in these camps if they were not getting sufficient help. For them, the humanitarian imperative always came first; almost whatever the perceived consequences it was necessary to help those in dire need. At the same time, most of these agencies did not want to rush into this situation. "The humanitarian imperative comes first," one experienced aid worker observes, "but it shouldn ’ t be an excuse for mindless action".

This same dilemma was perhaps more acute in Burundi in 1998. The government had launched a counter-insurgency campaign in the rural province closest to the capital Bujumbura. The effect of this was to push hundreds of thousands of people into displaced camps. With the Burundian government unable to properly look after these people, they effectively held aid agencies hostage. Either they ensured these people survived, or they would probably die in large numbers. The humanitarian imperative prevailed and the agencies ensured that people did not die. They did so after a great deal of debate and with a fair amount of international denunciation. They also developed a set of ethics – a local code based partly on the Code of Conduct – to guide them in their work in such a challenging environment.

[ I don ’ t really think that this is the place to discuss the private sector etc. That is better under issues relating other principles. You could have a private sector organization which argued that competion and profits are the most efficient way of alleviating human suffering etc. I am not sure that "breaching" is the best way of dealing with problems of implementing the principle ]

Analysis

[ PUT PROTECTION AND OTHER THINGS MISSING INTO A SECTION(S) CALLED "MISSING FROM THE CODE" SO, FOR EXAMPLE, ALL TOGETHER IN THE MIDDLE OR IN VARIOUS PLACES UNDER THE TITLE "MISSING FROM THE CODE"


 * Raise issue about impact on neutrality/independence if engage in protection work and the challenge that such protection work can have on humanitarian action ]


 * Example of Darfur with USAID that wanted NGOs with protection activities to report to them on the protection information

[ I would certainly agree that protection doesn ’ t belong here—am still agnosic about a sections on things missing from the Code, which implies that the Code should be a tool for all things:

Indonesia 2002: The government was reluctant to allow aid agencies into the province of Aceh, where an independence movement was fighting a low-intensity conflict with the army. But demanding access to fulfil the humanitarian imperative, meant that some agencies risked poisoning existing relationships with the Indonesian government which might result in the cancellation of aid agency development programs..

Oxfam and Save the Children were working in the Luwero triangle during Uganda ’ s civil war in the mid-1980s. They were the only two agencies with access. By day they would bring in relief goods to the terrified population. By night armed groups would massacre civilians in reprisal for their perceived support of rebels. Oxfam and Save the Children did not speak out against these atrocities for fear of compromising their access, despite being the only agencies that knew what was occurring. With hindsight their former director felt they should have. "They were killing many more people than we were saving, and perhaps by speaking out we would have saved more lives."

[ better included in another section ] CARE International called upon the US government to intervene in Somalia in 1992 because they believed that intervention was the only way to end the suffering caused by the breakdown of the Somali State.

Principle 2
Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone

''Wherever possible, we will base the provision of relief aid upon a thorough assessment of the needs of the disaster victims and the local capacities already in place to meet those needs. Within the entirety of our programmes, we will reflect considerations of proportionality.''

''Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as precious in one part of a country as another. Thus, our provision of aid will reflect the degree of suffering it seeks to alleviate. In implementing this approach, we recognise the crucial role played by women in disaster prone communities and will ensure that this role is supported, not diminished, by our aid programmes.''

The implementation of such a universal, impartial and independent policy, can only be effective if we and our partners have access to the necessary resources to provide for such equitable relief, and have equal access to all disaster victims.

Summary [ Again, I am not sure that the summary is necessary ]
[ This doesn ’ t make sense—see discussion below. The core idea is pretty clear: need alone determines aid priorities. That is the commitment. Being impartial, i.e. not taking sides, follows from that. The same holds for non discrimination ]

Not only is humanitarian assistance based solely on need, but proportionality means that need will be evaluated based on the degree of suffering.

Proportionality is concerned with how aid is allocated: assistance is given in proportion to need. This can be achieved through a proper assessment.

Trying to be impartial can create dilemmas. For instance, can one provide assistance to the disaster-affected while ignoring people who might not be affected but are extremely poor and may be worse off? Another dilemma emerges when resources are inadequate: should every person affected get a little assistance, or should a few people get enough assistance?

Explanation of the principle
[ This is based on a miss-reading of Pictet ]

This principle has two parts: The first sentence establishes the principle of non-descrimination. The second establishes the only basis of making distinctions: the assessment of needs.

The principle of non-discrimination has a long history, expressed in various Geneva conventions, beginning in 1864, as well as in the field of medical ethics. Pictet quotes Louis Pasteur on the issue: "We do not ask a suffering man what country he comes from or what his religion is, but say simply that he is in pain, that he is one of our own and that we will give him relief."

Humanitarian response based on "needs alone" is clearly another way of elaborating the principle of non-discrimination. However, since it is often impossible to respond to all suffering, discrimination will have to be made based upon evaluated degrees of suffering. The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross refers to relieving "suffering, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress." [ I know that there is a body of literature, i.e. issues of triage in times of war, etc. I don ’ t know if this needs to be referred to. ]

{ The idea of need is simple, and yet often difficult to use. In the Code, need is taken to mean "in need of assistance to save life or prevent suffering". Human suffering must be alleviated wherever it is found.  Providing humanitarian assistance which is immediately life saving can be rather straight forward, defining and measuring suffering is more problematic. Suffering can be as much psychological as it is physical. Aid workers must use their common sense in such situations; the imperative is to prevent people from becoming ill or dying

Assessing needs is always a complex task. In many places there is a dilemma in distinguishing needs arising immediately from a humanitarian calamity and those such as extreme poverty of a more long term, endemic nature.

{ Conducting a proper assessment is a precondition for being able to give assistance on the basis of needs. Humanitarian agencies have invested a considerable amount in developing methods for assessing needs. } There have been a number of projects such as the Sphere Project that have developed standards and other tools for assessing the needs of an affected population.

Basing assistance on need alone means a proportional response, i.e. allocating assistance so that resources go to those in the most need. Proportionality has geographical implications. The situation where some humanitarian crises are overfunded, and others underfunded are clear signs of breaching the principle of proportionality and not basing response solely on the needs of the affected population. Such results are closely linked to funding and will be further discussed below with respect to independence.

Humantiarian response based on needs is somethimes wrongly juxtaposed to a rights-based approach to a humanitarian crisis. However, the latter is an explanation of: "why a humanitarian response," and the fomer is about how the humanitarian response is to be carried out. [ MORE NEEDED HERE ]

The accompanying text to Principle 2 refers to " a universal, impartial, and independent policy"

In this context, universal clearly refers to the idea non-discrimination. (It is perhaps confusing that the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross uses the term slightly differently: in Pictet ’ s words: the Red Cross vocation must : extend to all men in all countries." While the principles of humanity and non-discrimination imply that the humanitarian community must respond to allievate suffering everywhere, it is clear that few signatories to the Code are able to respond in all countries.)

The idea of impartiality is more problematic. This is the only mention of it in the body of the Code. (It does appear a number of times in the annexes.) It is also listed in the Guiding Principles annex to UN Resolution 46/182, but with no explanation. The Brahimi Report in fact confuses the issue further by narrowing the definition:

"Impartiality for United Nations operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter: where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil."

Pictet is helpful in understanding the idea of impartiality for humanitarian response although he applies it more to individual action: Summed up it can be seen as not taking sides while carrying out humanitarian action. Experience in the field while reinforcing the importance of impartiality also witnesses to the difficulty in applying it. Pictet writes: "Impartiality requires a precise, complete and objective examination of the problems facing us and an exact assessment of the values entailed. It calls for a sustained effort to ’ depersonalize ’ the charitable action – and will sometimes be the fruit of victory in a hard-fought struggle within oneself.

Finally, impartiality, rather than an end in itself is rather a necessary tool for applying the principles of non-discrimination and proportionality as well as the principle of humanity.

Impartiality is often confused with the concept of neutrality which it resembles. The guiding principles listed in the Annex to GA resolution 46-182 state: "Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality." Whether this is meant to apply to states or all humanitarian actors is not clear. There is no further elaboration or explanation of the concept.

Neutrality is one of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross. It reads: "In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Red Cross may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature." Enjoying the confidence of all is clearly an important condition for an impartial humanitarian response, and has a direct link with gaining access to the affected population. However, for the International Red Cross Movement, it is also a necessary condition to ensure the global unity of the movement.

In the Geneva Conventions, the concept of neutrality applies to states or territory, never to humanitarian organizations which are described as being impartial.

The principle of neutrality does not appear in the Code of Conduct. While impartiality means not taking sides while providing assistance, basing it only on the principles of humanity, non discrimination and proportionality, i.e. need alone, neutrality requires not taking sides in the middle of a conflict or even having well-established positions based on religion or ideology. Thus an organization which is not neutral may be impartial in its response to the victims of a conflict while taking an political or religious position opposing injustice. Such a stance may for example make access to those affected by conflict more difficult, but it can be consistent with a impartial response.

A number of NGOs involved in the drafting of the Code had well established positions based on religious or political ideologies with respect to justice and human rights. While they were willing to commit themselves to an impartial humanitarian response, they were unwilling or unable to commit themselves to neutrality. This is true today especially for organizations who have both humanitarian and development mandates. (ref. Slim art on dual mandates—I can find it on my computer!) [ Given that neutrality is not mentioned in the Code, I would think that this is enough said. ]

The issue of independence will be discussed below under Principle 4.


 * Not enough on impartiality as a whole – fair bit on the two components, but not enough on the concept itself


 * Not enough on global impartiality [ Not sure what is meant by this: is it proportionality??? ]

The last sentence of the text for principle 2 raises the obvious: clearly humanitarian response governed by Principle 2 requires adequate resources and access to the affected population. However, it does raise issues that require further discussion: 1) how the provision of resources can effect the application of humanitarian principles, and 2) the relationship between the humanitarian principles outlined in the Code and gaining access to the affected population. (see below)


 * While you need resources, also need to raise the issue about how agencies go about raising resources and how they decide to use them and where – the issue of global impartiality; how much they choose to follow the big emergencies instead of the forgotten one; etc.


 * Shouldn ’ t mix the issue of access and access to resources


 * How do external factors, such as government policy on NGOs, affect impartiality? Not only in the case of contracts with governments, but also legislation that affects NGOs in the country….

Using the principle in practice
Impartiality, or not taking sides, can often be one of the most difficult principles to practice, especially when one side in a conflict appears to disproportionately bear a burden. During the 1994 Rwanda crisis  a large number of refugees living in the camps in Zaire had been implicated in the Rwanda genocide. Assistance to those camps went indicriminately to genocidaires as well as those who were simply caught up in those horrific events.

In Kosovo in 1999 some humanitarian agencies found it difficult to work with Serb populations following the civil war there, as the Albanian population were widely seen as victims.

It doesn ’ t present itself as a good example without more explanation.In Liberia, in 2003, agencies were involved in both alleviating suffering and trying to help rebuild the country. With many communities deeply polarised by the effects of 30 years of civil war, there was often resentment when one community received assistance and another did not. Agencies were caught between providing assistance on the basis of need alone, and stirring up local animosities.

In Haiti in 2004, flash floods killed some 3,000 people. Humanitarian agencies rushed assistance to those affected. Many of the villages surrounding the affected town of Fonds-Verette were extremely poor however, and some of the people affected by the flooding were still better off economically than some of the poorest villagers who had hardly been affected by the floods. This led to dilemmas for agencies: should they assist those affected by flooding without also helping those with similar needs due to poverty rather than the disaster.

In 2004, in the Darfur region of Sudan the conflict caused huge numbers of people to flee their homes. The majority of people found their way to established camps where they felt comparatively safe and could receive assistance. Many agencies chose to work in the camps because they felt they could reach more people with their limited resources. Other agencies chose to work with those outside the camps because they felt they had the greater need, despite the fact that more logistic resources were required to reach fewer people.

Analysis
"In implementing this approach, we recognise the crucial role played by women in disaster prone communities and will ensure that this role is supported, not diminished, by our aid programmes."

Principle 3
''Humanitarian aid will be given according to the need of individuals, families and communities. Not withstanding the right of NGHAs to espouse particular political or religious opinions, we affirm that assistance will not be dependent on the adherence of the recipients to those opinions.''

We will not tie the promise, delivery or distribution of assistance to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.


 * Cross-reference with Principle 4 – independence


 * Bring neutrality in here (moved down the existing text from Principle 1)

Explanation of the principle
This principle re-emphasizes that the provision of humanitarian aid must be based on needs alone, thus totally separate from the religious or political viewpoints of those affected by calamity. Its importance is due to the fact that it singles out particular contempory issues such as proselytims, categorically forbidding the use of aid to gain support for a religion or political position.

Many of the humanitarian agencies have a religious basis. While humanitarian organisations have a right to hold religious or political viewpoints, they are not to use their assistance to promote these views. To use aid to convert recipients to a certain faith would be in breach of this principle, as would favouritism of one faith group over another when determining assistance.

[ I don ’ t think that this article is at all about independence, but really a re-assertion of impartiality plus further elaboration to preclude promotion ] Religion
[xx] The major religiously based [ I try to avoid the term faith-based as it is a term of the conservative Christians to give the impression that faith is only related to religion—in my experience the humanitarian responses of humanists is also based on a faith ] humanitarian organisations are committed to providing humanitarian relief on an impartial basis. While their humanitarian response is the result of their religious faith, most of them are also committed to not using humanitarian assistance for proselytising.

Overt proselytising is not the only way in which the humanitarian cause can be undermined however. The other issue is one of discrimination, whereby religious groups tend to favor assisting their own communities over others. This raises a difficult issue: Religious communities tend to be self-supporting and turn to each other in times of crisis. Thus it is only natural for those within a religious group to want to support their co-religionists in times of stress, and for those in stress to look to fellow believers for assistance.

Politics
Most of what is said above applies to political parties and groups. For politics, more so than religion however, the tendency is not for aid to be used as a crude form of coercion (although this obviously does happen), but as a propaganda tool, i.e. the extolling of one ideology against another.

Using the principle in practice
[ The following belongs more with the issue of independence and governments discussed under principle 4:  It seems to me to make a distinction between the two principles:  3 is really about the promulgation of beliefs whereas 4 is about working with power. However, this does mean that we need some examples, particularly how religiously based agencies have found themselves in difficult situations, and how some have breached the principles. Don ’ t need to name names, but there must be quotes around like that made by the then head of Samitan ’ s Purse about the "opportunity" offered by the crisis in Iraq for making new converts. I believe that was Issacs. later to pop up as head of OFDA ]

The Code of Conduct has played a positive role in relation to humanitarian work by religious agencies. All of the larger ones have used the Code internally and externally to reinforce the universal and non-discriminatory nature of humanitarian assistance. In Sudan the 2004 the combined programme of ACT/ Caritas (these networks encompassing most of the world ’ s Christian Churches ’ international relief work) required that all employees sign the Code of Conduct on taking up employment. In signing the Code of Conduct staff understood that they were responsible for ensuring aid is given solely according to need. This also acted as protection against allegations to the contrary – staff were able to demonstrate a written commitment to this ethic.

Humanitarian action is a non-political act with occasionally extreme political consequences
It could be construed as "political" to say, as the ICRC did in an October 2002 press release[xxi], urging the Israeli authorities "to take measures that will enable the civilian population living in the Occupied Territories to resume as normal a life as possible, and to respond to their humanitarian needs" and by pointing out "the harmful impact of the severe restriction of movements and curfews on the Palestinian population". It is within the realm of ICRC competence to speak about suffering, and as such this could also be taken as an opinion of a humanitarian rather than a political nature. Never the less, the statement would have certainly been taken up in the political arena.

This is an example of humanitarian action on behalf of the victims being construed as having political consequences. Thus we could argue that even if this principle is adhered to and the humanitarian action is non-political in its intent, it may have extreme political consequences.

Neutrality [ taken from Principle 1 – should be shortened and have references to other articles for further elaboration ]

 * Issue of local/national NGOs ’ independence/neutrality when working with them as partners (raised by Peter Walker in his recent Code piece)? Also should come up under Principle 6

[ I have already put in something about neutrality above and don ’ t believe that there is something to add from below. I feel that Peter ’ s piece is flawed in a number of ways. One example which does relate to neutrality is the statement: "The Convention makes it clear that the concept of neutrality is part and parcel of the post-Second World War definition of impartiality." This is absurd. The Geneva Conventions don ’ t even mention the concept vis a vis humanitarian organizations. Both the concept of neutrality and impartiality, are certainly concepts from the Red Cross Fundamental Principles and I do believe that Pictet ’ s commentary which is certainly post WWII are rather definitive. No question in my mind that it may be harder to convince some authorities that the humanitarian response of a non-neutral agency is impartial, neutrality is still not a necessary condition for impartiality. ]

Principle 4
We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy

''NGHAs are agencies which act independently from governments. We therefore formulate our own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy of any government, except in so far as it coincides with our own independent policy.''

We will never knowingly - or through negligence - allow ourselves, or our employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian, nor will we act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments.

We will use the assistance we receive to respond to needs and this assistance should not be driven by the need to dispose of donor commodity surpluses, nor by the political interest of any particular donor.

''We value and promote the voluntary giving of labour and finances by concerned individuals to support our work and recognise the independence of action promoted by such voluntary motivation. In order to protect our independence we will seek to avoid dependence upon a single funding source.''


 * Suggest that it should be about "government policy" = not just "foreign policy" as it would then be more applicable to national and local NGOs too


 * Bring in more on the issue of independence….cross-referencing may be necessary with Principle 3 - but bring in that this principle fails to bring in independence from the UN, as well as independence from your constituency


 * NGO-government relationship


 * NGO-UN relationship


 * NGO-constituency relationship


 * Issues around nationalism - "our" NGOs???


 * Issue about having difficulty in moving goods because of a donor (mercycorps US government issue) – but the challenge of having to fall under the laws of the country in which an NGO is registered – what if those laws force you to compromise your independence?


 * Issue about NGOs being used as force-multipliers in Afghanistan and Iraq.


 * Need independence in order to maintain impartiality and neutrality – not directly about trust, as currently put.

Summary
Independence is perhaps the most important means for implementing a policy of non-discrimination. It is the implementation of an impartial, non-discriminatory policy which gainst the trust required to access the people in need of help. [ I have put in one sentence for the Summary, it it is necessary—still not sure that the summaries help ]

Explanation of the principle
In a world of diverse and competing interests, a humanitarian agency must be independent if it is to respond in an impartial and non-discriminatory way. Independence follows directly from the humanitarian imperative. If they are not, how can they hope to stay true to the humanitarian imperative as the prime motivation for their work? Jean Pictet, writing with respect to the Red Cross Fundamental Principles, states that independence is essential "to inspire the confidence of all parties. It must be able to bring together all people of good will and not exclude any particular groups..

The Code makes this explicit. "''We therefore formulate our own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy of any government, except in so far as it coincides with our own independent policy." ''Humanitarian agencies must set their own agenda, and should not follow the instructions of governments or other external institutions.

Maintaining independence can be difficult. There are often practical (and legal) reasons for working with governments. Access issues as well as practical logistical problems are seldom solved without some sort of cooperation with authorities.

In the case of a natural disaster, there is often a coincidence of interest between governmental authorities and humanitarian agencies in a rapid response. However, the principle of indepencence is continually being challenged in many areas. One issue which is not directly covered in the Code relates to independence with respect to other bodies, particularly inter-governmental ones like the UN agencies. At about the same time the Code was being formulated, the UN GA passed resolution 46/182 which called for the stengthening of the UN ’ s coordinating role in a humanitarian crisis through the newly established Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

A coordinated humanitarian response is of upmost importance, and the Code, in article 6 stresses the need to give it a high priority. Good coordination can eliminate duplications and fill gaps in the provision of assistance. It can also result in greater speed of delivery and increase cost effectiveness. Coordination can lead to a more comprehensive analysis of a situation—particularly with respect to needs of the affected population, more powerful advocacy, and more effective resolution of complex issues such as assisting internally displaced persons (IDPs) or ensuring protection of civilians.

Effective coordination has often been difficult to implement. A number of plans have been drawn up to improve the coordination by the UN and other intergovernmental organizations. Coordination when implemented as facilitation, can create an enabling environment where independent and autonomous organisations can be more efficient and effective. International NGHAs while willing to coordinate with the UN, have been increasingly concerned that being coordinated by the UN can be a direct threat to their independence, thus compromising their ability to respond in an impartial way. More recent steps at the UN toward creating a more integrative humanitarian response have not reduced that concern. [ more up to date stuff will have to be added here ]

The authors of the Code of Conduct had seen humanitarian agencies manipulated by governments during the 1970s and 80s and the text of the article reflects these concerns. Of particular concern was the pressure from some governments to implement foreign or economic policies in the name of humanitarian response. The disposal of agricultural surpluses in the name of food assistance was particularly singled out, indicating some of the longer term priorities of agencies drafting the Code…The gathering of sensitive information is an obvious challenge to the perceptions of the receiving communities of humanitarian assistance as well those involved in conflict. However, does this apply to the collection of information by humanitarian agencies about human rights violations which are then passed on to human rights organizations ("other bodies") or governments. [ I would guess that somebody has stuff at their finger-tips which could be used to expand this idea. I am rather surprised that it isn ’ t dealt with. ]

A particular problem arises in the case of military occupation. Articles 55 and 56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention make it clear that it is the responsibility of the occupying power to provide food and medical supplies. In the case where an agency has a contract with the occupying power, in can hardly be said to have maintained its independence. In the case where the occupying power does not directly meet some or all of its obligations, a humanitarian agency may find it extremely difficult to maintain its independence so that it can provide the assitance in an impartial manner. This is particularly true where the occupying power attempts to use NGHAs as "force multipliers" for their so-called hearts and minds policies. A problem which NGOs faced already back during the Vietnam war. [ This clearly needs more development—I only have Manual Bessler ’ s piece on my computer—I believe there a paper from one of the Harvard centers that presents this and I am sure that the ICRC must have a note which would be helpful. ]

Situations of occupation can present special difficulties for humanitarian agencies where their own governments are the occupiers. When humanitarian agencies implement obligations of the occupying power, they are easily seen as agents of the occupiers even if they have acted independently. Some groups, particularly those in conflict with the occupiers, have often failed to distinguish between the military and humanitarian actors severely hindering the humanitarian response and creating a security problem for the humanitarians.

Where policy is the same
[ I have moved these paras below together with other examples ]

Voluntary service [ DIVIDE THIS SECTION INTO TWO – ONE ON VOLUNTARY SERVICE, THE OTHER ON PRIVATE DONATIONS ]
"We value and promote the voluntary giving of labour and finances by concerned individuals to support our work and recognise the independence of action promoted by such voluntary motivation. In order to protect our independence we will seek to avoid dependence upon a single funding source."


 * Emphasise more the need to get private donations so as to avoid becoming an instrument of governments

One of the major problems for humanitarian agencies to be independent is related to funding. Virtually internationa NGHAs rely in part on governments for their funding. The proportion of voluntary funds compared with government funds varies widely from organization to organization. Some are almost entirely funded from government sources. There is no doubt that the ability to maintain independence is related in general to the proportion of voluntary funds received. This enables a humanitarian agency to implement a policy which is at odds with donor government policies. Organizations have different ways of dealing with this issue. The more closely government funds are tied to a specific project, the harder it is to have an independent response if there are not alternative funds. The ICRC tries to maintain its independence by mainly receiving funds for its overall program. Thus the decision about how those funds are to be allocated is made by the ICRC, independently from specific donor government policies. [ This is off the top of my head—this is the sort of thing I would have expected Sean and Lewis to look into. There must be a number of examples where an NGO –i.e. MSF has used privately raised funds to implement a policy not support by its usual donors. ]

Using the principle in practice
In recent times the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided acute challenges to global humanitarian organisations and their independence. In both places humanitarian aid and the agencies that deliver it have come to be seen as part of a strategy of ’ western ’ occupation, and probably this is why so many aid workers have been attacked in those countries. The reasons for this targeting of humanitarian workers are vigorously debated. In part politicians and military leaders from leading nations within the occupying military coalition, probably for propaganda purposes, have encouraged an association between humanitarian aid and the military coalition. In part it may also be that by working in those contexts NGHA ’ s have become involved in nation-building projects that are seen as political by those in opposition to the military coalition.


 * THIS ISSUE OF OCCUPATION SHOULD COME EARLIER IN THE CHAPTER IN TERMS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN NGOs AND GOVERNMENTS OF THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

[ I have moved this para to above and edited it ] In the Darfur region of Sudan the civil war in 2004 led to mass population displacement and atrocity. Humanitarian agencies responded to human suffering on an enormous scale. They enlisted the support of many governments in pressuring for access to those most in need.

Many NGHAs held views that were similar to those held by European and American governments. There has been strong political pressure on the Government of Sudan to allow humanitarian agencies to work there. There has also been pressure to stop the war in Darfur and find a political solution. At least in the eyes of theGovernment of Sudan some of the international agencies were not independent of foreign governments even though they may have formulated their own polices independently of the governments.

Another example the problem of maintaining independence comes from the Sudan. The Sudanese Red Crescent Society had been distributing food from the World Food Programme in one of the IDP camps. They were told  to hand over the work to   another agency at therequest of a major donor government who wished to have its food donation distributed by one of its own national NGHAs.

There are many example of how authorities can compromise the independence of human responses.

{ A group in Haiti recalled the difficulty of delivering humanitarian assistance during the regime of ’ Papa doc ’ Duvalier in the 1960s. When they went to the airport to collect a shipment of relief supplies, they discovered that soldiers had unloaded the plane and taken the supplies. Later they saw their goods distributed on the streets of Port au Prince in the name of Duvalier.

There are often difficult choices when it comes to supporting the work of governments. When linked to a particular authority, humanitarian agencies often find themselves manipulated or losing the wider confidence of those they are seeking to assist.

To some extent this dilemma is one that can be resolved by good analysis. It also depends on circumstance. In Haiti in 2004 Action Contre la Faim worked with local authorities in the provision of safe drinking water. The political situation was fluid but their work stayed the same as different and opposing politicians came and went. They worked with technical staff of government and did not feel there was political benefit for ’ one side ’ in the work they did, despite the participation of the local authorities.

In Afghanistan in the same year, the situation was quite different. Engaged now in reconstruction, NGHAs, who had provided essential social services to the population, some for over a decade, were required to work within a government framework. There was no doubt of the need for their their services. The government did not have the capacity to run services, and was busy trying to build capacity. What made the situation especially difficult was that the government explicity linked their political project (i.e. to transform Afghanistan into a democracy) with the provision of aid throughout the country. Opponents of the government however perceived NGHAs who were implementing the government ’ s policies as taking the side of the government and therefore legitimate targets.

The aid operation in Afghanistan in 2004 is a good example of where humanitarian aid can become mixed with reconstruction and development aid. The transition period following open conflict presents many dilemmas for humanitarian agencies. Often such environments are quite politicised, leaving humanitarian agencies less space to behave independently and impartially.

{ Thus, the issue of maintaing independence from political and public authorities is one of the most difficult for humanitarian action. As the resources committed to humanitarian assistance grow, and as the humanitarian ethic continues to enjoy popularity, politicians and public authorities are tempted to manipulate it. Humanitarian agencies like any other must abide by the laws of the appropriate countries while ensuring that they are able to chose their own priorities actions based on humanitarian principlesl. Thus the issue is not if NGHAs should work with the relevant authorities, but how they should work with them.


 * Include issues around the coherence agenda/unity of action of the UN –but only briefly here, put more under Principle 4 }

{[ moved from principle 3 ] Content for the margins – place beside associated text
South Sudan, 1999: The SPLA ’ s Humanitarian Department devised a mandatory Memorandum of Understanding for humanitarian organisations which contained a number of troublesome clauses such as one which stated that vehicles and equipment were to be henceforth considered the property of the local authorities. Failure to sign the MOU would result in the withdrawal of operational permission. Organisations were caught in a dilemma, balancing the potential loss of effectivness resulting from the compromising of humanitarian independence, with the potential suffering that their withdrawal might create.

Afghanistan 2004: Humanitarian agencies have few things to differentiate themselves from the power and political interests in Afghanistan other than the absence of firearms. Consequently, many aid workers in that country feel that a clear breach of the Code is when aid workers carry guns. Yet the need for effective security for aid workers in high-risk environments such as Afghanistan is clear. Other aid workers believe that guns are an integral part of this effective security.

North Korea 1999: To obtain access to the civilian victims of famine, agencies had to establish relations whereby the government trusted them. The concerns of the North Korean regime about their sovereignty, and their management of the country ’ s food crisis at the time placed unique parameters on the operations of humanitarian agencies, such as the creation of severe restrictions on monitoring visits. The dilemma for agencies wishing to respond in that country was about accepting the government parameters and compromising humanitarian impartiality, or not accepting the parameters and not obtaining access. The sheer vastness of need for food in that country at the time, and the desire of the international political community to engage with the regime added a further layer of complexity for humanitarian agencies, who found that food aid was being used as a bargaining chip in international negotiations. Consequently, for the North Korean regime, it would be an easy mistake to make in linking the operations of humanitarian agencies to international politics We shall discuss independence from foreign policy in the next chapter. }

Independence
How independent can aid agencies be? To answer this question it is necessary to look at the various types of independence and the pressures that influence organisations.

Funding
Material independence is straightforward. Sufficient financial resources will enable an organisation to formulate plans and strategies without being "driven…by the political interest of any particular donor" in the words of the Code.

Material independence can be obtained through unrestricted private donations in sufficient quantities. It can also be obtained by sufficiently diversifying institutional donors so as to ensure that that none can impose their policies or dominate. Many NGOs do not enjoy material independence. . The Code explicitly warns against this''. "In order to protect our independence we will seek to avoid dependence upon a single funding source."''

The obvious question is how much is sufficient to enable independence? Should agencies set policies about a minimum percentage of unrestricted funding? The question is more complex than simply the type of funding that an agency obtains. The scope of the agency goals will also determine the degree to which the agency can retain material independence.

Both highly leveraged international NGOs and small local NGOs can be in positions where they do not have material independence. Can either organisation make independent choices? A recent trend in the grant making of some donors has seen private voluntary grants (which allow more operational flexibility) replaced by quasi-commercial contracts (which are more tightly controlled and results oriented). Such contracts may compromise independence, especially at a strategic level.

These dilemmas are heightened when these same donor governments are involved in conflict. The largest donors in the world contribute a large percentage of the total funds. The United States of America and the European Union and its member states are the world ’ s largest donors. When one or the other, or both, are involved in wars as belligerents this can make a stark choice – either refuse their funds and limit the work you are able to do, or take the funds and risk being seen as partisan.

Cultural/ Constituency
It is not only donor agencies and governments that influence how aid agencies act. A subtler, but equally important influence is the ’ constituency ’ of the organisation and its origins. One clear example of this is the faith-based organisations that often find themselves under tremendous pressure to ensure aid is given to communities of their faith before any others. Such pressure comes from those communities where the organisations act and from their supporters in the countries they come from. See principle 3 for more discussion.

Such pressure can be true of nationality more generally. Most organisations will retain some national characteristics and will often have a high public profile in their country of origin. When their country is not merely a passive bystander in a disaster or conflict, this too can mean pressure to act in a particular way, or support a certain group. Many aid groups reflect their national or ideological origins in other ways; some will instinctively lean towards particular political tenets or systems, others will champion causes that have extra meaning in their own nation or community.

[ I found the discussion of coordination very dense and have tried to take the most important factors and include them above. However, we need to check again to see if I have thrown the baby out with the bathwater. ]

Content for the margins
Afghanistan 2004: Aid workers interviewed for this commentary complained that US-led coalition forces dropped leaflets from aircraft over areas where Taliban insurgencies were occurring. The leaflets stated that unless the local population provided information that would lead to the arrest of insurgents to the coalition, the coalition would withhold humanitarian assistance. This leaflet stretched the truth obviously, but contributed to a view in the population that humanitarian assistance was not independent of the occupation.

Food aid dumping The emergence of new threats to humanitarian action does not mean, sadly that the ’ old ones ’ mentioned in the Code have completely vanished. In Haiti there was a large programme of food aid distribution throughout the 1990s carried out by NGHAs, funded by a large neighbour country. The perception is widespread amongst Haitians that the prime motivation for this assistance was to prevent economic migration by Haitians to their neighbour country. There is evidence[xxii] that some of this food aid has destroyed local agriculture, making these populations dependent on the food aid.

The new principles of humanitarian action
Articles one to four all have antecedents in the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, but articles five to ten do not have the same origins and this has led some to call them the ’ new humanitarian principles ’. Much of what they are about is practice, which is to say that they are about lessons learned from practice. Jean Pictet would describe principles as emerging organically from the practice of the agency.

The practical nature of these principles is only half the story however. There is also running through all of these latter principles the idea of respect for human dignity. This ideal is core to the work of all humanitarian organisations. For the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, it finds expression in the essential principle of humanity, which is partly defined as "to ensure respect for the human being".

Whilst much that is contained within these latter principles is common sense and good practice, there is debate over these latter principles. This is part of a wider debate around the essence of humanitarian action, and the scope of its ambition.

For some aid workers the Code of Conduct, in introducing the ’ new humanitarian principles ’ has in fact weakened the ability of humanitarian agencies to operate. Their objections centre on two issues – those of neutrality and of consequences. Essentially there are dilemmas that exist when trying to build local capacities or involve affected communities in the management of relief aid. Especially in conflict, such actions by aid agencies may be seen as partisan, or may allow interest groups to distort the objectives for assistance. The other concern is that agencies may hesitate to respond where they see suffering because they are worried about the consequences of their actions.

This debate finds its origins in the differing approaches taken by aid agencies. This can be crudely characterised as those who take a ’ classical ’ approach, based on a model where the humanitarian agency stands apart, its only role to give succour to the needy; and an approach based more in ideas of justice and solidarity, that emphasises the human rights of those affected and seeks in part to change their situation. Of course these characterisations are crude, and all aid agencies now subscribe to both a need to maintain independence and work impartially whilst also acknowledging their part in protecting and advancing human rights and reducing vulnerability. Where there are differences, they are of degree, not of substance. The Code of Conduct exemplifies this shift, and in adopting the ’ new ’ principles of humanitarian action it acknowledges the many valuable lessons that aid agencies have learned.

This is not to say that the concerns expressed above are not valid, or that all of the principles in the Code have equal importance. As with all decision-making, a good dose of common sense goes a long way. The humanitarian imperative comes first and must be prioritised over all other principles. To withhold assistance because of other concerns would be counter to this fundamental principle. Nevertheless, agencies sign all ten principles when they sign the Code and must endeavour to use their important, practical guidance in designing disaster relief programmes.

Principle 5
We shall respect culture and custom

We will endeavour to respect the culture, structures and customs of the communities and countries we are working in.


 * Appropriateness aid workers ’ behaviour, cultural sensitivity issue – needs to come out stronger.


 * Issues that arise in terms of setting up women ’ s committees, for example, without first understanding the way in which a society is set up – not just going in and setting up structures without first understanding the existing ones…Are local structures appropriate will be a question that will need to be asked?

Summary
It is important for humanitarian agencies to be aware of the culture and customs of the people they are serving for practical reasons – without acceptance by the local community it will be difficult for the agency to work.

Explanation of the principle
Culture and custom describe a prevailing set of rules and structures by which communities and nations live their lives. It is important for humanitarian organisations to be aware of these rules as contravening them could have negative consequences. Not respecting culture and custom can alienate the communities that agencies are working with, and in extreme cases can lead to aid workers being threatened.

Culture and custom are also important to understand because they can make the difference between programmes that are effective and programmes that aren ’ t. There are examples of where community taboos and customs have made attempts to save lives difficult until agencies understood local beliefs and were able to revise their approach.

Respecting local culture means does not mean following it at all costs. There will often be dilemmas when local culture or custom conflict with established human rights, causes  unnecessary suffering or is in direct conflict with humanitarian princiles.

Agencies need to incorporate cultural factors, particularly associated with food, shelter and clothing if the assistance is to be accepted and used. Taboos in the local culture,can prevent the use of relief items. Medical assistance may be hampered if local custom is ignored.

Using the principle in practice
In Malawi during the 2002 food shortages Concern Worldwide had started a therapeutic feeding programme but discovered they were getting lower numbers than they expected. They discovered that in the places they were working, kwashiorkor (a type of malnutrition) in children was associated with sexual infidelity and mothers were reluctant to identify their sickly infants for fear of social sanction. A campaign targeted through community leaders to explain the true causes overcame much of this reluctance and led to more children being treated.

Situations of population displacement create dilemmas for the aid worker. What happens in an IDP camp when the host population considers particular food choices as taboo and untouchable but the same food choice is the main diet of the IDPs? Whose culture comes first? The beneficiaries or the host?

Analysis - universalism and local practice [ THIS SECTION ON UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS NEEDS TO BE MUCH STRONGER ]
There are two major areas where dilemmas can arise for humanitarians related to observing of local customs: 1) where there is a conflict between local customs and humanitarian principles and 2) where there is a conflict between local customs and internationally recognized human rights. [ Here I am swimming a little, but one hopes that this is rare ] In the case of the former, an agency may have to choose between following local custom which is opposed for example to distribution based solely on need or not providing any assistance. Probably in both cases, a negotiated solution can be found which is acceptable to all.

[ In this case I am swimming even more as it raising issues about prioritizing conflicts that are acceptable and those which are not acceptable. At what point is the humanitarian ready to turn his or her back on the humanitarian imperative because to do so would be to condone or even participate in human rights violations. Can a distinction be made between condoning and particpating in violations. If prioritizing human rights is controversial, can we make and distinction between saving lives and alleviating suffering and human rights issues? One of you guys should be able to do something here ]

As with many dilemmas encountered in disaster relief work there is a delicate balance to be struck. On the one hand the good will of the majority is needed to carry out essential, life saving work. On the other, aid workers should not engage in practices that conflicts with their core values.

[ Deleted because it is too facile…. ]



Content for the margins
[ Not sure why these go in the margins—but this I suppose is a formatting issue which I am touching at this point. ]

[ but isn ’ t this an issue of consultation which I suppose is the only way in discovering which (or if all) trees are sacred or not.

[ There surely must be some discussion on this issue. I suppose that this issue would arise if for example MSF was asked to carry out FGM in their emergency clinics, but wouldn ’ t the issue be more of a problem for development programs? ]

In Afghanistan in 2004 representatives of local NGOs identified the personal behaviour of expatriate staff working for aid agencies as a critical issue. Loud parties, conspicuous consumption of alcohol, expensive lunches, big cars, and lavish receptions are viewed as offensive, and help create a negative image of NGOs, particularlyin the local media.

Principle 6
We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities

''All people and communities - even in disaster - possess capacities as well as vulnerabilities. Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies. Where possible, we will work through local NGHAs as partners in planning and implementation, and co-operate with local government structures where appropriate.''

''We will place a high priority on the proper co-ordination of our emergency responses. This is best done within the countries concerned by those most directly involved in the relief operations, and should include representatives of the relevant UN bodies.''

While the Code is directed at both national and international NGHAs, this focus of this principle is directed at the behavior of internationa NGHAs. In most disasters local people are the first to respond and usually provide the bulk of resources, both human and material. However, experience has shown that in many large emergencies, it is the international agencies which not only tend to have the higher international profile, but who have often neglected available local resources and local organizations. Thus we have the commitment in Principle 6 to change that situation.

There is little dout that working through local structures can be more efficient, both in terms of cost and speed. Local structures are often able to mobilise more people, far more quickly.

Local staff speak the language, know how to work in in the local terrain and have a better understanding of the context.

Employing local staff not only facilitates community self-help but can give a strong sense of local ownership to the work.

Purchasing local materials can benefit the local economy, stimulating trade and employment thus increasing the imact of the money being spent on assisting people.. This can be especially true with food aid. Imported food can depress prices, hurting farmers and rural economies. Buying local food can have the opposite effect, providing much needed work for disaster affected communities.

Buying locally can also mean that you get the most appropriate inputs. In south Sudan in 1998 NGOs imported sorghum seeds from the US to help farmers plant following a withering drought. Unfortunately the US seed variety was a short variety designed for machine harvesting, something the south Sudanese use only for thatching roofs. This created difficulties for the farmers and communities who had received the seeds.

Sometimes purchasing locally can have the opposite effect however. Buying scarce goods in a sellers market can drive prices up, hurting those least able to afford it. Purchasing from powerful local merchants can feed the ’ war economy ’, with profits ultimately used to continue war. In the case of buying large amounts of medicines locally there may be quality problems.

While international NGHAs have a long history of employing national and local staff, working with local organizations is not as wide-spread. The advantages are similar. The practical considerations in partnership with indigenous organisations are straightforward. Local organisations are likely to know the context better and therefore understand how to get things done. They often have a well-established rapport with the communities they work in, and as a result are able to mobilise volunteers or gain important permissions. They may also understand local sensitivities and markets well.

Working with governments
Governments, or public authorities have the primary responsibility for humanitarian response. In the case of natural disasters, most governments do not flinch from taking up that responsibility, often together with national and international NGHAs. In disaster prone countries there will often be well-established systems for response., Disaster reparedness is an important area where humanitarian agencies can work with governments to reduce risk and improve response systems. Working with local governments can contribute to stronger and more effective institutions that will help to reduce community vulnerability to disasters.

In some countries particularly in a complex emergency, humanitarian agencies have been reluctant to work with local governments who do not recognize humanitarian principles, however there are many places where such cooperation is essential for humanitarian response

Using the principle in practice
In Liberia during fighting in Monrovia in 2003 the local Red Cross Society provided much of the manpower to evacuate the wounded on the battlefield. A local barber gave up his shop for operations and a local tailor made makeshift Red Cross bibs. Market boys then used their wheelbarrows to find and transfer casualties to the nearby MSF clinic.

Community based therapeutic feeding is an interesting example. This is a method for treating children who have severe, acute malnutrition. It is based around a therapeutic food that allows for home treatment, but also relies heavily on using community networks to identify malnourished children. One of the problems with traditional, clinic based treatment of severe acute malnutrition has been that of coverage rates. Working with local capacities increases these coverage rates by using mothers to feed their children and community networks to identify children with potential malnutrition.

Save the Children (UK) have worked in the Darfur region of Sudan for over thirty years. One of the principle activities has been developing a famine early warning system. Their programme relied heavily on Sudanese staff, and on a close relationship with the Sudanese government. This was a conscious tactic as the early warning system was useless without a commitment from the Sudanese government to act when there were problems. When the conflict broke out in Darfur, Save the Children found it difficult to remake their relationship with the Sudanese authorities along a more independent and impartial line. Moreover, there was a perception that their staff were predominantly from one side on the conflict and that they had been slow to act as a result of this (this was not the case). Another problem for SC UK was that the ’ local capacity ’ they had carefully built throughout communities in Darfur was destroyed by the huge upheaval of mass displacement.

In Albania during the Kosovo crisis of 1999, one of the church networks worked through its local partner, of the same denomination. The network is commited to working through partnerships The local partner, however, wanted to us the assistance flowing into Albania to help rebuild its constituency, shattered by half a century of communism. The network faced a dilemma: – should they support the local partner in building organizational capacity thus breaking principle 3 of the Code (using aid to advance a religious standpoint), or should or should they refuse to work through that local partner. In the end, they decided that principle three was more important. This led to the operation being managed by international staff.

In northern Iraq during the 1990s, no longer under Saddam Hussein ’ s direct rule, local Kurdish leaders formed their own local NGOs. Their intent in doing so was clear – for personal prestige and to capture resources that were seen to be flowing through aid agencies. Humanitarian organisations declined to too closely with them, preferring instead to work with local organisations that who followed the humanitarian principles.

Analysis
While local capacities are crucial for disaster response there use can present serious problems. When communities become polarised by conflict it is often difficult to use local capacity while not giving the impression of favouring one side over the other. A bias may also be perceived when senior national staff are predominantly from one community, and they are primarily relied upon upon to gain access or to carry out programmes[xxiii].

The building of local capacity can creating other dilemmas. Local communities are not homogenous entities, devoid of power structures. The question always needs to be posed: whose capacity is being built, and to what end?

The importance of coordination has already been discussed under principle 4.

Content for the margins
Bosnia (Pale) mid 1990s: The President of the Republica Serbska Red Cross was Ms Karadic. Ms Karadic was the wife of Mr. Karadic who was a person wanted by the ICTY. Yet the National Society was also technically the best local implementing organisation in Bosnia, and thus local partner of choice. Organisations faced the dilemma of politically engaged local partners.

Sierra Leone 2002: Coordination between international and national NGOs consists of only information sharing, not joint projects

The formation of local Codes of Conduct can be a useful coordination exercise. In many countries agencies have sat together and discussed what principles they feel are important for their context. This discussion leads to a greater understanding of common principles and areas where agency values differ, and consequently more effective working relationships and improved interagency co-ordination.

Principle 7
Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid

''Disaster response assistance should never be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance programme. We will strive to achieve full community participation in our relief and rehabilitation programmes.''

Summary
This principle is about making programmes work and ensuring they actually help people in need, rather than merely satisfying the needs of outsiders. It is about dignity and respect and it is also about practical considerations of effectiveness and lasting rehabilitation. Participation is integral to helping people achieve their human rights, and at a pragmatic level improves efficiency of relief programs over the long term.

The dilemmas are similar to those discussed in principle six; who is being involved, and what is their agenda? Participation can be time consuming and in rapid onset situation may not be wholly achievable.

Another dimension to this principle is transparency, which can result in building trust between the agency and the communities where it works.

Explanation of the principle
[ It seems clear to me while the drafters believed in dignity and respect, the first sentence directly links with the second. I am not sure that we have many cases where assistance was forced on the recipients—perhaps it was done ineffectively and therefore we need the second sentence which refers to effectiveness ]

Principle 7 is straightforward: beneficiary participation leads to the most effective humanitarian response.

The importance of participation is commonly accepted in disaster relief.However, there are some circumstances where there are problems linked with involving people in programme design. Prevailing power structures main mean that certain groups might ’ control the aid in a way that prevents  assistance being distributed on the basis of need. Understanding local power dynamics and just who is participating is critical to getting programs right.

Transparency [ not sure that this is really true about transparency coming into play under this principle….maybe more under Principle 9 ]
Another reason for encouraging participation in programmes is that it can create a stronger sense of ownership. The participatory process doesn ’ t stop with the planning of a project, but extends to its impelementation. which is likely to be improved when there is a stronger sense ownership.

Practically of course, there will always be constraints in times of disaster or conflict. The most obvious of these is time. If lives are at stake there might not time for lengthy participation processes.

Using the principle in practice
There are many examples of where this has made a difference. The local community protected an MSF clinic in Jalalabad during the Afghan conflict in 2001 because they had participated in its design, building and running and they felt it to be theirs.

In El Fashir in Sudan the ICRC[xxiv] needed to move an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp that was in the middle of a seasonal river before the rains came. The people were reluctant to move however, as they were in the centre of town and the new site was on the outskirts. The ICRC managed to arrange the move to a more appropriate location through careful consultation with sheikhs and elders within the IDP community.

A project in Guinea aimed at improving mortality rates in childbirth employed an anthropologist to help them understand why training and equipping traditional birthing attendants (TBAs) wasn ’ t working. They found that only the younger TBAs were being sent from the villages and the older, more senior women did not attend. The older TBAs would not accept the new ideas from the younger, more junior women. It was only when the more senior women were engaged did the practice change. [ is this a humanitarian or development example ]

In Malawi during the food crisis of 2002, agencies introduced a method of food aid distribution called ’ community based targeting ’. Communities themselves listed those in need and largely did the distribution themselves. Elected committees selected those who would receive the food and used a transparent oversight system to monitor the distribution. Whilst the system took longer to implement, requireing a few weeks of preparation. It was much cheaper and more efficient as there is no need to employ people for distribution..

There are examples of the problems that can arise from involving beneficiaries in the management and implementation of aid. Aid can be held hostage to partisan interests, including from seizing aid for profit, or controlling it to promote a political agenda. One example can be found in the refugee camps in Goma, Zaire immediately following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The size and speed of the population displacement into Zaire overwhelmed humanitarian agencies who were attempting to establish refugee camps. To facilitate rapid initial distributions of food and shelter materials, agencies solicited the assistance of the village and commune leaders who were also refugees. These leaders knew the people who had come from their home areas, and were able to quickly establish systems of distribution.. Later agencies realized that some of leaders were implicated in the genocide, and their roles in aid distribution contributed to the continuation of their control over the population[xxv]. [ should be able to find a better reference than that. ]

The Malawi system in the example above was designed in part to tackle the problem of resources being hi-jacked by elites within communities, but still suffers from the problem that committees are either constituted from pre-existing elites or are set up in opposition to them. [ This should probably be moved up to the Malawi para ]

Recent evaluations have shown that ’ communities ’ do not necessarily agree with the criteria set out by external actors. Some communities ’ preferred to distribute food equally to everyone, however small this made the ration, rather than on the basis of need. There is clearly a conflict between the humanitarian principles of those carrying out humanitarian response and the beneficiaries whether or not they understand the consequences of their choices. Consultations between humanitarians and the beneficiaries is clearly required to resolve the issue.

[ a bit repetitive with above ]


 * Dilemma: deep engagement with local community can have an impact on neutrality. …but what does participation mean? When does the solidarity principle kick in? Is it really a delicate line? – it shouldn ’ t be, but the reason it was included here originally was because of the solidarity principle from development agencies. However, the fact that humanitarians have come to realise the value of community participation makes the line not so delicate….the multi-mandate issue again…. [ I agree that engagement with a local community can have an impact on neutrality, but it does not preclude a response based on principles of humanity, impartiality, and independence.  It may be that they will find it difficult to implement the principles because of their engagement, i.e. may have trouble getting access etc. ]

[ Not surprisingly, I don ’ t think that this belongs here at all. Whether such a right exists or not, the debate belongs in a different forum. I am not a lawyer, but have read enough to be rather uncomfortable with idea of "spirit of law" when I have a hard time finding the law which gives its "spirit." ] [ Don ’ t know what the hell that means, "humanitarian contract". Seems to me a commentary needs to clarify rather than muddy the waters. But next principle is accountability…. ]

Principle 8
Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs

''All relief actions affect the prospects for long-term development, either in a positive or a negative fashion. Recognising this, we will strive to implement relief programmes that actively reduce the beneficiaries ’ vulnerability to future disasters and help create sustainable lifestyles.''

''We will pay particular attention to environmental concerns in the design and management of relief programmes. We will also endeavour to minimise the negative impact of humanitarian assistance, seeking to avoid long-term beneficiary dependence upon external aid.''

Summary
Reducing people ’ s vulnerability can save many lives and alleviate much suffering, as the majority of the disaster-affected are the poor and marginalised. Preparing for disaster can often save more lives than responding to it.

Whilst humanitarian aid can affect long-term development both negatively and positively, this is not always the case. Humanitarian agencies must be sensitive to the negative effects of their operations on the environment, on the economy, on communities hosting those affected by disaster and so. Where such negative effects can be easily mitigated they should be.

The effect of humanitarian aid on conflict dynamics is more complicated. Assistance should not be withheld because there may be negative consequences. This is also true with avoiding dependence. Humanitarian agencies must not unthinkingly destroy livelihoods and make people dependent on their aid, but neither should they withhold aid because it may create dependency.

Explanation of the principle
[ such a statement requires some reference: how do you actually measureit. It is probably true, but so what. [ Surely a difficult statement to make after New Orleans ]

Human nature???

[ I don ’ t find the discussion so far very useful. It probably needs a couple of paragraphs from somebody who know more about mitigation. The discussion focuses on natural disasters, but future vulnerablilities are also about powerlessness as well as the lack of early warning systems and typhoon shelters. In some ways, there is also a conflict as earlier discussion of principles focussed on the meeting of basic needs. Principle 8 is mostly a rhetorical wish list, it seems to me. If we try and unpack it, we need to come up with some examples of 1) how all relief actions affect the propects for long term development. (the examples below are about how a natural disaster has affected development, but not about how relief actions have affected the prospects for long term development. 2) examples of relief programs which have actively reduced beneficiaries ’ vulnerability etc.. 3) examples of relief programs which have payed particular concern to environmental concerns, and 4) examples where program design etc endeavored to minimise the negative impact (that needs to have more of a description of negative impat—is it only long term dependency??? The text below doesn ’ t really address these issue.

[ I am afraid that I can think of the top of my head of as many examples that would illustrate the opposite ]. Some places that suffer regular disasters have over the years built up early warning systems of natural hazards like cyclones in Bangladesh, typhoons in Southeast and East Asia, and Tsunamis in Japan. Evacuation plans have been put into place and severe loss of life has been avoided. In some earthquake zones developed regions such as California strict regulations mean buildings can withstand all but the most extreme shocks.

Loss of life in natural disasters has often in poor countries people have built shantytowns in flood plains or other risky areas. When there are floods or mud slides, large numbers suffer loss of life and injury that could have been avoided.

In Haiti flash floods in the port city of Gonaives in 2004 killed over 3,000 people and effectively destroyed the economic life of the town. The flooding was as a result of tropical storm Jeanne, which later increased in strength to become a hurricane. When it hit neighbouring Florida it took under 30 lives. Gonaives suffered so dramatically because it was poor and badly governed.. Surrounding hillsides had been deforested removing the city ’ s natural flood barrier.The neglected drainage channels were blocked. There were no shelters, and no evacuation procedures – nor was there an early warning system despite the fact that there are annual storms in the Caribbean.

Principle eight derives from this concern, that an important way to reduce the loss of life in natural disasters is to reduce people ’ s vulnerability. Ultimately, reduction of vulnerability is connected to development.

Development is beyond the remit of a humanitarian response, and is a long-term endeavour (although the way disaster relief work is conducted can affect developmental processes—as I said above). [ I don ’ t believe that the Code "says" anything about saving of lives or dignity ]

[ unless we have some examples or references it ought to be left out.

It is also the case that some relief actions have positive effects. Introducing skills into countries that have suffered a drop in capacity due to protracted conflict, giving a boost to the local economy; just reminding people brutalised by war that humanity still exists. All these can be positive effects, some into the long term. Much of this is about approaches and it is entirely right that aid agencies should think about how they can maximise the effect of their assistance, learning from experience and adapting practice as new techniques are proven.

[ the best I could see would be to deal with issue of dependence on the basis of a proportional response base on need. ]

Using the principle in practice
One of the great successes of recent years has been the programme of disaster preparedness in the Bay of Bengal, and in Bangladesh in particular. In 1991 some 140,000 people died in a cyclone in Chittagong, Bangladesh. Earlier, in 1970 half a million people had died in a similar cyclone. Working with national and international relief and development agencies, and international donors the Government in Bangladesh set about putting in place a system of disaster preparedness to ensure that there would not be death on this scale again. This involves cyclone proof shelters, an early warning system and a community mobilisation system (to get people to shelters once the warning has been made). In recent cyclones of strength similar the loss of life has been less than a hundred. This example alone establishes as an important principle the idea that more lives can be saved by preparing for disaster than simply by responding. This is also true of conflict. Henry Dunant, in forming the Red Cross asked "would it not be possible, in time of peace and quiet, to form relief societies for the purpose of having care given to the wounded in wartime by zealous, devoted and thoroughly qualified volunteers?"[xxvi]

Another example of where preparation can save lives is in the development over recent years of famine early warning systems. In southern Africa in 2001 compelling early warning data that there were serious food shortages triggered an international response, saving many lives.


 * However, was not so effective in Niger…

In Tanzania during the Rwandan refugee crisis in 1995 the countryside surrounding the Ngara refugee camp was stripped of trees as the refugees chopped it down for firewood or charcoal. The resulting environmental degradation was severe. In addition, all of the indicators of health and development for the local population decreased during this period, almost certainly as a result of the proximity of the large refugee population. Crucially there was almost no thought given by the humanitarian agencies involved in the refugee operation on the effects on the local population.

Do no harm? [ this section could also be included under principle 1 – the humanitarian imperative ]
There are concerns that in come cases, the distribution of humanitarian aid can have a negative impact on the beneficiary by actually increasing their vulnerability. This can happen when the aid itself attracts the interest of one of the parties to a conflict. There are cases where not only aid, but logistical equipment have been seized by violence.

Concern for the long term impact of assistance should never get in the way of implementing the principle of humanity. A study of the impact of theories that aid can increase conflict has shown that in the Congo it may have led agencies to limit assistance[xxvii]. Humanitarian agencies became so concerned that their assistance might exacerbate conflict that they were paralysed and did not assist those in desperate need.

In interpreting the Code of Conduct a decade on then, what is safe to say is that "where relief actions can have obvious negative effects, humanitarian agencies should strive to reduce these." An important caveat however, is that this should not be to the detriment of alleviating suffering. The humanitarian imperative comes first – we respond to human suffering. To not respond because we are worried about future outcomes would be counter to this essential first principle of humanitarian action.

This does not mean aid should be distributed when it is obvious it is a target. In Sudan a group of major humanitarian agencies wanted to distribute general household items to a community affected by the war in West Darfur. The local community told them they were afraid local militias would attack them if they were seen to have goods worth looting. The agencies held off the distribution until all agreed it would be safe. "Principles do not stand in isolation," the head of the ICRC in Sudan noted during 2004 interviews for this commentary, "you have to use your judgement."

Principle 9
We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources

''We often act as an institutional link in the partnership between those who wish to assist and those who need assistance during disasters. We therefore hold ourselves accountable to both constituencies.''

''All our dealings with donors and beneficiaries shall reflect an attitude of openness and transparency. We recognise the need to report on our activities, both from a financial perspective and the perspective of effectiveness. We recognise the obligation to ensure appropriate monitoring of aid distributions and to carry out regular assessments of the impact of disaster assistance. We will also seek to report, in an open fashion, upon the impact of our work, and the factors limiting or enhancing that impact.''

Our programmes will be based upon high standards of professionalism and expertise in order to minimise the wasting of valuable resources.


 * The need to be accountable about the choices we make in terms of engagement, particularly with regards to locations and crises (e.g. why tsunami and not Congo?) – reference to earlier discussion on global impartiality, under Principle 2


 * Use Nick ’ s article about the importance and centrality of accountability, after asking…


 * Elaborate more on the issue of transparency, which includes sharing information – currently in last para of Conclusions, but needs more work and probably needs to be moved up

Summary
Accountability to public and institutional donors is an operational necessity, and agencies are increasingly transparent about their financial expenditures, and sophisticated in their audit and reporting practices. Accountability is also about the proper exercise of power, and aid agencies are usually in a position of considerable power with respect to the people who are affected by a disaster. Agencies are still learning how to be accountable to the beneficiaries of their work yet it is imperative that this learning continues. It has become clear that accountability to beneficiaries is also an operational priority in that it establishes effective relationships between the agency and the communities in which it works, which in turn lead to more effective work, and may lead to work that is conducted in an environment of improved security.

Explanation of the principle
Accountability was an underlying idea in drawing up the Code of Conduct. As aid agencies became larger and more numerous, it became clear that they would also be increasingly held to account for the resources they used. Concern about their reputations—important in fund raising--as well as the concern that governments might seek to regulate them if they did not do so themselves were important factors in deciding to create a code of conduct.

There has been much discussion about the meaning of the principle. , and actively responding to what it learns. Pierre Perin of ICRC describes accountability as focusing on the notion of responsibilities[xxviii] (i.e. being responsible for one ’ s acts towards others; being able to render account for one ’ s actions). Responsibility may be defined as consisting of three components: the action which binds the various actors; the normative framework serving to define the action; and the mechanisms which are responsible for monitoring and, if necessary, correcting the follow-up of the action, as well as establishing regulatory measures and sanctions applicable to those whose actions fail to comply with the standards. Hugo Slim suggest that the normative framework should include, the agency holding itself openly responsible for what it believes, what it does and what it does not do, in a way which shows it involving all concerned parties. [ I have changed this because the references do not really show an elusive understanding of the concept but more of a convergence. Perhaps that is not the case, but then different references need to be included and the text be moved to discussion of problems and analysis. ]

Thus while the principle represents a commitment to both donors and beneficiaries, immediate practice tended to focus on donors.

Those from whom we accept resources
Aid agencies have developed elaborate systems for reporting on funds spent, and regularly provide information on activities and impact. Donor agencies have also become more prescriptive in their demands.

More generally agencies have sought ways to be accountable to their public donors. Many produce newsletters, information leaflets and policy reports on a variety of issues. The larger agencies have sophisticated web sites with lots of information on approaches and activities. Aid agencies have also learnt to use the media both for lobbying and for informing the public about their work. In the UK the DEC promotes the results of independent evaluations of each response with the media, often provoking controversy within that body when critical reports are given widespread coverage.

Those we seek to assist
More limited progress has occurred with respect to beneficiaries who in the humanitarian sector are an extrememly diverse and heterogeneous category.

However, there are a number of reasons why accountability is important. 1) Aid agencies have real power in situations where they control resources. Accountability to beneficiaries can be an important way to prevent abuse of such power. 2) Accountability can improve communication between the organisation and its beneficiaries which will help improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response. In other words, accountability to beneficiaries establishes a "feedback loop" which helps the agency understand the effect of its actions. 3) Accountability can help improve relationships with communities, which will in turn improve the security of staff and improve access to those affected by the disaster.

Recent initiatives have made important progress in developing increasing accountability to beneficiaries.

Using the principle in practice
A decade on since the Code was written progress has occurred, particularly on the ’ professional ’ side of disaster relief. The SPHERE project has contributed to the normative framework by creating Minimum Standards for disaster response in the four life-sustaining sectors (food, shelter, health, water/sanitation) that are based on a Humanitarian Charter, itself informed by international human rights instruments. Much work has been put into improving assessments and in trying to understand the impact of work done. The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Practice (ALNAP) has developed best practice guidelines for monitoring. The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP-I) is an organisation with a membership of operational aid agencies that are committed to beneficiary accountability, and has developed a set of accountability principles.

The HAP-I group defines beneficiary accountability as the right to have a say, and the duty to respond[xxix]. Thus, they think about the implementation of beneficiary accountability with two types of mechanisms. First, mechanisms by which individuals, organisations, and States account for their actions and are held responsible for them. Secondly, mechanisms by which they may safely and legitimately report concerns, complaints, and get redress where appropriate. An inter-agency project (housed by ICVA) to develop the capacity of NGOs to investigate and respond to allegations of abuse and exploitation was started in 2004.

Implementation
Despite the difficulties involved in determining who to be accountable to, many agencies are experimenting with models of local accountability. Action Aid supported an Indian people ’ s tribunal following the Gujurat earthquake. This is a mechanism within Indian public life that is separate from the state, but allows for former judges to preside over a trial style hearing. Although it is not binding on the state such tribunals will often highlight failures that the public authorities and agencies are not keen to have exposed. Critically it provides a forum where ordinary people can air their grievances and talk about their experiences.

In Mutorashanga Zimbabwe, Save the Children (UK) improved accountability in its food distribution programme by establishing "Child Feedback Committees". These committees provide a forum for children to voice grievances and observations concerning the entire process of food aid distribution. Not only are they allowed to provide feedback safely, training workshops are also held to teach children about the food aid they receive and their rights as beneficiaries.

In Papua New Guinea following the tidal wave in 1996, a local NGO used the Code of Conduct as a ’ charter of rights ’ for beneficiaries. They displayed it in a public place in each of the villages they were assisting, translated into pidgin so that the public could have an idea of the basis on which assistance was being given.

The Iraqi Red Crescent from 1992-2002, in an innovative way of being accountable in a constrained environment, posted lists of those who received food aid assistance in public places

Who is accountable to whom for what?
While it is clear that the Code is talking about the accountability of the agency, of the signatory and is focussed on being accountable to the donors and beneficiaries, it is important to note that organisational aspects of accountability can be to a wide range of different stakeholders including governance structures; agency mandate or mission; donors; local authorities; and to beneficiaries. However, answering the question, "accountability for what" would include finances, impact as well as agency actions. Financial accountability is important if an agency wants to continue to receive donations. Accountability for impact and actions is generally less quantifiable than financial data creating issues for implementing such an approach.

Normative frameworks and measures of success
Some of the issues related to non-financial accountability are due to differing measurements of success. Disaster response organisations can be held accountable to their own ’ normative frameworks ’. Which can include: mandates strategic goals; international legal standards such as those outlined in the Geneva Conventions; or professional standards such as those found in medical ethics. The Sphere Project and the Code of Conduct are examples of efforts to create common normative frameworks for the entire humanitarian community.

Critical debate about accountability has centred on whether normative frameworks and standards are realistic. One argument is that global technical norms are impossible because every disaster context is different. Another position is that due to the extreme diversity in aid agency mandates it is impossible to establish a set of commonly applicable standards. Thus there no consensus yet on what humanitarian accountability looks like in practice.,

The importance of beneficiary accountability
The place of accountability in the hierarchy of principles still deserves consideration. Experience in is that security and access are based more on constant diplomacy, contacts, information and analysis; than on public understanding that humanitarian agencies are impartial and independent. Thus in those contexts where security and access are linked to accountability, accountability might be considered as important to upholding the humanitarian imperative as impartiality or independence.

Principle 10
In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects

''Respect for the disaster victim as an equal partner in action should never be lost. In our public information we shall portray an objective image of the disaster situation where the capacities and aspirations of disaster victims are highlighted, and not just their vulnerabilities and fears.''

While we will co-operate with the media in order to enhance public response, we will not allow external or internal demands for publicity to take precedence over the principle of maximising overall relief assistance.

We will avoid competing with other disaster response agencies for media coverage in situations where such coverage may be to the detriment of the service provided to the beneficiaries or to the security of our staff or the beneficiaries.

Summary
This principle focuses exclusively on the relationship between aid agencies and the media, acknowledging tremendous power the media exerts on how aid agencies behave. The dilemma is that pitiful and shocking images seem to generate a stronger reaction, manifesting in larger amounts of funding in an increasingly competitive fundraising environment. Yet the use of these images can influence the perception of agency integrity, particularly if the severity of the disaster is distorted by the images. Moreover, there is an ethical dimension to how agencies behave in promoting such images, touching on accountability, respect and dignity. This principle is as relevant now as it was when the Code was written, not least because developments in media and technology are revolutionising how information is being used during disasters.

Explanation of the principle
The tenth principle of the Code of Conduct deals with the way humanitarian agencies use the media as well as their relations with each other.

The media has become an powerful and important aspect of humanitarian work. Television in particular has the power to raise large amounts of funding and to provoke political action at the highest levels. Television coverage can trigger a major response to a disaster; lack of television coverage can mean the opposite – neglect and lack of funding. Called the ’ CNN factor ’ it refers to the pressure on governments when their citizens deem the suffering they see on their television screens unacceptable. In most cases, the more pitiful the images, the stronger the reaction. In an age when many stories are competing for airtime, and when many agencies are appealing for funds for a variety of causes the temptation is always to use the most graphic and pitiful images. At the extreme, agencies have been guilty of distorting a situation in order to maximize their fund raising.

However, principle 10 is an attempt to remind that humanitarian response is focussed on human beings and actions which dehumanize those affected by calamaty and conflict are not acceptable. Using images that portray them merely as objects of pity can deny their very humanity.

This principle is also about retaining the trust of both those giving funds and those humanitarian agencies wish to assist. In this case, trust is retained through a perception by all of integrity by those agencies appealing for funds and offering their services. If those same agencies are perceived to be distorting the situation to maximise their fund raising, they damage their image of integrity.

Using the principle in practice
The Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) in the UK appeals to the British public on behalf of fourteen NGHAs. There are often fierce debates within the DEC about the images they can use; on the one hand sufficiently explaining the gravity of the situation people face, and on the other not demeaning them. In 2002 the DEC launched an appeal for the Southern Africa drought which was a departure from the norm in that the appeal was as much about preventing a disaster than responding to a disaster. An independent evaluation[xxx] of the appeal found that the DEC agencies had overstated the case in some of their advertising and communication material[xxxi].

Analysis
Traditional media outlets are under tremendous pressure from competition that has emerged from new technologies that enable anyone to produce and globally distribute a news story with visual images. Real-time reporting is now expected from all major crises. The pressure on large media institutions to compete with small and inexpensive outlets, who can broadcast on the internet, is affecting the rigour and thoroughness that had traditionally accompanied the release of stories and images.The time pressure of real time media schedules where spokespeople are demanded to make on the spot assessments of complex crises and summarise them in 40 seconds often makes it difficult for a balanced and thoughtful response.

Competition for a media profile exists as well in the field. During the South Sudan crisis of 1998 one aid agency took a photographer to another agency ’ s feeding centre, bribing staff to wear their T-shirts and using the resulting pictures in their fund raising material[xxxii]. This story speaks volumes about the competition that exists for media profile, which can often lead directly to substantial fund-raising.

Humanitarian organisations must be alert to the potential for the media to divert their attention to high-profile crises. Global impartiality can suffer when organisations follow the media attention (and the resources it can generate), creating greater disparities between high profile disasters, and forgotten crises.

Yet the opportunities to use images and communication to enable people affected by disasters to speak for themselves have also greatly increased. Perhaps it is here where the dignity of those affected can be enhanced, not by using conscious images or language, but by giving those affected a voice in speaking through media to potential donors and decision-makers. We have just begun to understand the implications of rapid technological change and yet this principle remains as valid and relevant as when it was written.

Annexes
Annex I Recommendations to the governments of disaster-affected countries

1: Governments should recognise and respect the independent, humanitarian and impartial actions of NGHAs

NGHAs are independent, bodies. This independence and impartiality should be respected by host governments. 2: Host governments should facilitate rapid access to disaster victims for NGHAs

If NGHAs are to act in full compliance with their humanitarian principles, they should be granted rapid and impartial access to disaster victims, for the purpose of delivering humanitarian assistance. It is the duty of the host government, as part of the exercising of sovereign responsibility, not to block such assistance, and to accept the impartial and apolitical action of NGHAs. Host governments should facilitate the rapid entry of relief staff, particularly by waiving requirements for transit, entry and exit visas, or arranging that these are rapidly granted. Governments should grant over-flight permission and landing rights for aircraft transporting international relief supplies and personnel, for the duration of the emergency relief phase. 3: Governments should facilitate the timely flow of relief goods and information during disasters

Relief supplies and equipment are brought into a country solely for the purpose of alleviating human suffering, not for commercial benefit or gain. Such supplies should normally be allowed free and unrestricted passage and should not be subject to requirements for consular certificates of origin or invoices, import and/or export licences or other restrictions, or to importation taxation, landing fees or port charges. The temporary importation of necessary relief equipment, including vehicles, light aircraft and telecommunications equipment, should be facilitated by the receiving host government through the temporary waving of license or registration restrictions. Equally, governments should not restrict the re-exportation of relief equipment at the end of a relief operation. To facilitate disaster communications, host governments are encouraged to designate certain radio frequencies, which relief organisations may use in-country and for international communications for the purpose of disaster communications, and to make such frequencies known to the disaster response community prior to the disaster. They should authorise relief personnel to utilise all means of communication required for their relief operations. 4: Governments should seek to provide a co-ordinated disaster information and planning service

The overall planning and co-ordination of relief efforts is ultimately the responsibility of the host government. Planning and co-ordination can be greatly enhanced if NGHAs are provided with information on relief needs and government systems for planning and implementing relief efforts as well as information on potential security risks they may encounter. Governments are urged to provide such information to NGHAs. To facilitate effective co-ordination and the efficient utilisation of relief efforts, host governments are urged to designate, prior to disaster, a single point-of-contact for incoming NGHAs to liaise with the national authorities. 5: Disaster relief in the event of armed conflict

In the event of armed conflict, relief actions are governed by the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law.

Annex II - Recommendations to donor governments

1: Donor governments should recognise and respect the independent, humanitarian and impartial actions of NGHAs NGHAs are independent bodies whose independence and impartiality should be respected by donor governments. Donor governments should not use NGHAs to further any political or ideological aim. 2: Donor governments should provide funding with a guarantee of operational independence

NGHAs accept funding and material assistance from donor governments in the same spirit as they render it to disaster victims; one of humanity and independence of action. The implementation of relief actions is ultimately the responsibility of the NGHA and will be carried out according to the policies of that NGHA. 3: Donor governments should use their good offices to assist NGHAs in obtaining access to disaster victims Donor governments should recognise the importance of accepting a level of responsibility for the security and freedom of access of NGHA staff to disaster sites. They should be prepared to exercise diplomacy with host governments on such issues if necessary.

Annex III - Recommendations to intergovernmental organisations

1: IGOs should recognise NGHAs, local and foreign, as valuable partners NGHAs are willing to work with UN and other intergovernmental agencies to effect better disaster response. They do so in a spirit of partnership which respects the integrity and independence of all partners. Intergovernmental agencies must respect the independence and impartiality of the NGHAs. NGHAs should be consulted by UN agencies in the preparation of relief plans. 2: IGOs should assist host governments in providing an overall co-ordinating framework for international and local disaster relief NGHAs do not usually have the mandate to provide the overall co-ordinating framework for disasters which require an international response. This responsibility falls to the host government and the relevant United Nations authorities. They are urged to provide this service in a timely and effective manner to serve the affected state and the national and international disaster response community. In any case, NGHAs should make all efforts to ensure the effective co-ordination of their own services. In the event of armed conflict, relief actions are governed by the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law. 3: IGOs should extend security protection provided for UN organisations, to NGHAs

Where security services are provided for intergovernmental organisations, this service should be extended to their operational NGHA partners where it is so requested. 4: IGOs should provide NGHAs with the same access to relevant information as is granted to UN organisations IGOs are urged to share all information, pertinent to the implementation of effective disaster response, with their operational NGHA partners.

The annexes

 * Comment on the fact that the annexes have been superseded by other initiatives/things since then.

The Code of Conduct is a product of the environment in which NGHAs found themselves operating in the early 90s. It was created at a time when the sector was experiencing rapid change and expansion, and the established NGHAs needed to find a language to codify some of the experience they had accrued. As the introduction to this commentary has touched upon, the idea of a common set of principles originated in several places and reflected a sector wide need.

The disaster response ’ sector ’ when the Code was created consisted of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Non-Governmental Organisations, Governments and Inter-Governmental Organisations such as the United Nations. The Code was aimed primarily at the "aid givers" - the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the NGOs. The authors of the Code knew however, that others involved in the sector, notably governments and IGOs, heavily influenced their actions. The annexes were an attempt to create a tool by which NGHAs could influence them. In effect the message was "we wish to behave in this way, but you have to help us". There are three annexes to the Code of Conduct dealing with recommendations to respectively, host governments, donor governments and inter-governmental organisations.

DRAFT - A Commentary on the RC/RC/NGO Code of Conduct – Version of 2 March 2006 – page PAGE 74

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[i] The Code was sponsored by Caritas Internationalis, Catholic Relief Services, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Save the Children Alliance, the Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam, and the World Council of Churches (members of the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response at the time), together with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

[ii] The SCHR today is an “alliance for voluntary action” of: care international, caritas internationalis, international committee of the red cross, international federation of red cross and red crescent societies, international save the children alliance, lutheran world federation, médecins sans frontières, oxfam international and world council of churches

[iii] The SCHR and ICVA are both Geneva based networks of humanitarian agencies, and alongside InterAction in the US represent a significant proportion of NGHAs. The SCHR was responsible for the initial writing of the Code.

[iv] From correspondence with SCHR Executive Secretary Joel McClellan in June 2005

[v] This 1994 definition is from the IASC, provided in the OCHA orientation handbook on complex emergencies 1999

[vi] A World of the Dinka, by Francis Deng in: Traditions, Values and Humanitarian Action, Edited by Kevin M. Cahill M.D., Fordham University Press

[vii] Barbara Nussbaum in Resurgence Magazine issue 221, December 2003 www.resurgence.org

[viii] Many of these examples have been obtained from the catalogue of the International Red Cross Red Crescent Museum in Geneva, Switzerland. Copyright 2000. ISBN 2-88336-010-3

[ix] Islam and international humanitarian law: From a clash to a conversation between civilisations, James Cockayne; International Red Cross Red Crescent Review September 2002 Vol. 84, No 847

[x] This section based on telephone interviews conducted with Peter Walker, Tony Vaux and Angela Penrose in October 2004

[xi] For the International RC/RC Movement, the Code of Conduct is important but supplemental to its core seven Fundamental Principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality to which all members must adhere.

[xii] In 2000 the Sphere Project commissioned a short research study on what compliance to the Sphere standards might look like. The resulting paper provides some background to this discussion. http://www.sphereproject.org/about/account.htm

[xiii] Hilhorst, Dorothea (2004) A living document? The Code of Conduct of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. Research paper produced for the conference Ten Year Code of Conduct: Principles in Practice. Copyright Disaster Studies, Wageningen University

[xiv] DEC – Disasters Emergency Committee is a DEC is an umbrella organisation which represents 13 leading UK aid agencies. Its members are: ActionAid, British Red Cross, CAFOD, CARE International UK, Christian Aid, Concern, Help the Aged, Islamic Relief, Merlin, Oxfam, Save the Children, Tearfund and World Vision. It is a highly effective collective fundraising mechanism.

[xv] From the CDROM From principles to Action Copyright International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2005

[xvi] Pictet, J. (1956). Red Cross Principles. An ICRC publication

[xvii] We use the name of the Conference as it was at the time. It is now known as the International Conference of Red Cross and Red Crescent

[xviii] International Court of Justice judgement on the case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. 27 June 1986 in Nicaragua v. United States of America http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inus_ijudgment/inus_ijudgment_19860627.pdf

[xix] This idea of “as much as necessary” was drawn from a proposed humanitarian doctrine by Dorothea Hilhorst. See reference #24, page 8

[xx] We try to make a distinction between faith-based organisations, which provide humanitarian assistance as an expression of their religious beliefs; and religious organisations, that might be a Church, Temple or Mosque that provides disaster relief.

[xxi] See www.icrc.org for press release from Tel Aviv on 10th October 2002 quoting ICRC President Dr Jakob Kellenberger

[xxii] Internal reports quoted to one of the authors.

[xxiii] See Mary Anderson’s Do no harm for more discussion on this

[xxiv] Conveyed to the authors in research conducted for this commentary

[xxv] From the personal experience of the authors

[xxvi] Dunant, H. (1862). A memory of Solferino. ICRC, Geneva, 1986

[xxvii] This idea has been proposed by Nick Stockton in an article that was not formally published.

[xxviii] From an article by Pierre Perrin in Fleming, Sarah, Meddings, David, Perrin, Pierre (eds). Forum: war and accountability. ICRC Geneva April 2002 pp 22-27.

[xxix] The HAPi principles of accountability can be found on www.hapi.org

[xxx] A stitch in Time? Independent Evaluation of the DEC Southern Africa Crisis Appeal. Jan 2004. Valid International

[xxxi] The evaluation was contested, and some of the flamboyant coverage associated with this particular appeal was beyond the editorial control of the DEC members. The DEC board and staff did learn lessons from this particular appeal.

[xxxii] Witnessed by one of the authors.