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NON V DAMES II CORTES; May 20,1990

NATURE Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction

FACTS - Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. - Petitioners filed a petition in the trial court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition relying on the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, et al. v Philippine School of Business Administration, et al to the effect that a college student, once admitted by the school, is considered enrolled only for one semester and, hence, may be refused readmission after the semester is over, as the contract between the student and the school is deemed terminated. - Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied. In addition to the termination of contract doctrine, it held that it being a mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or reenrolled, respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school - Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition

ISSUE WON petitioners may be refused readmission by the respondent by virtue of the “termination of contract doctrine”

HELD NO - In Alcuaz v PSBA, it was said that: -a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. - It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. - The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students - This is not a simple case of a school refusing readmission or re-enrollment of returning students. Undisputed is the fact that the refusal to readmit or re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school authorities as a reaction to student mass actions directed against the school. - This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-a-vis the right of school officials to discipline them. - Central to the democratic tradition which we cherish is the recognition and protection of the rights of free speech and assembly. Thus, our Constitution provides: Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.(Art. III) - The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available to students -While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the rights to free speech and assembly, this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are virtually powerless to discipline students -Disciplinary sanctions may be imposed but procedural due process must be observed, and the penalty must be proportionate to the offense -The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions - Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools - The "termination of contract" theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis - Paragraph 137, subsumed under Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees, which in its totality provides: 137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire school year for elementary and secondary courses, and for the entire semester for collegiate courses. A student who transfers or otherwise withdraws, in writing, within two weeks after the beginning of classes and who has already paid the pertinent tuition and other school fees in full or for any length of time longer than one month may be charged ten per cent of the total amount due for the term if he withdraws within the first week of classes, or twenty per cent if within the second week of classes, regardless of whether or not he has actually attended classes. The student may be charged all the school fees in full if he withdraws anytime after the second week of classes. However, if the transfer or withdrawal is due to a justifiable reason, the student shall be charged the pertinent fees only up to and including the last month of attendance. - In no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be enrolled for only one semester, and that after that semester is over his re-enrollment is dependent solely on the sound discretion of the school. On the contrary, the Manual recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it. Thus, Paragraph 107 states: Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting its specific requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case of academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is presumed to be qualified for enrolment for the entire period he is expected to complete his course without prejudice to his right to transfer. - This presumption" has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the "Education Act of 1982." Section 9 of this act provides: Sec. 9. Rights of Students in School. 2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations. - Respondent judge, in his order dated February 24, 1989, stated that "respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school” -The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of the equal protection clause - To justify the school’s action, respondents alleged that of the 13 petitioners, 8 have incurred failing grades -Clearly, the 5 students who did not incur failing marks were refused re-enrollment without just cause and, hence, should be allowed to re-enroll. - On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process - It appears from the pleadings that the decision to refuse petitioners re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student mass action conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by petitioners. - As to the students who incurred several failing grades, it is not clear from respondents' enumeration whether the failures were incurred in only one semester or through the course of several semesters of study in the school. Neither are the academic standards of respondent school, from which we can gauge whether or not these students are academically deficient, alleged by respondents. Thus, while the prerogative of schools to set academic standards is recognized, we cannot affirm respondent school’s action - However, these should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary action could have been taken against petitioners for breach of discipline if the facts had so warranted - But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions have become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or re-enrollment and who have been effectively excluded from respondent school for four (4) semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass actions. Disposition petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated August 8, 1988 and February 24, 1989 are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED to readmit and to allow the re- enrollment of petitioners, if they are still so minded, without prejudice to its taking the appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it is shown by their records (Form 137) that they have failed to satisfy the school's prescribed academic standards (This case overturned the “termination of contract” doctrine)

UP BOR V LIGOT-TELAN ROMERO; October 12, 1993

NATURE Petition for review of the Court of Appeal's decision

FACTS - The Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP) was established to expand the coverage of government educational subsidies so as to include the deserving in the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder. - Applicants were required to accomplish a questionnaire where they state the amount and source of the annual income of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. At the end of the application form, they are required to sign a sworn statement which includes the following phrase I understand that any willful misinformation and/or withholding of information will automatically disqualify me from receiving any financial assistance or subsidy, and may serve as ground for my expulsion from the University. Furthermore, is such misinformation and/or withholding of information on my part is discovered after I have been awarded tuition scholarship or any form of financial assistance, I will be required to reimburse all financial benefits plus the legal rate of interest prevailing at the time of the reimbursement without prejudice to the filing of charges against me. - In the early stages of the STFAP, a random sampling scheme of verification of data was implemented. One of those investigated was Ramon Nadal, a law student. - After the investigation, it was found that Nadal failed to declare her mother’s income and that he has been maintaining a 1977 Corolla. Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial rates." - Nadal claims that her mother migrated to the US in 1981 and has not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment." He also stated that her mother was shouldering the expenses of the college education of his 2 brothers. - The Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) rendered a decision exculpating Nada of the charge of deliberately withholding in his STFAP application form information that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. However, they found him guilty of withholding information regarding her mother’s income. The SDT rendered him the penalty of explusion and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received. - The Executive Committee affirmed the SDT’s decision. Nadal appealed before the Board of Regents (BOR). - On March 28, 1993, the BOR affirmed the SDT’s decision but reduced the penalty to 1-year suspension plus reimbursement of all the benefits from the STFAP. They also decided against giving Nadal, a certification of good moral character. - At the meeting of the BOR, Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of verifying the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU). According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter. The votes after the meeting of the BOR are as follows: four (4) voted guilty; three (3) voted not guilty; and three (3) gave conditional votes pending the verification of Nadal’s ADMU scholarship. - The next day, ADMU released a certification that Nadal indeed received a scholarship. That evening, the BOR met again and found Nadal guilty (6 guilty, 3 not guilty, 3 abstained). They imposed the penalty of 1 year suspension to Nadal and non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits - Nadal filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili. He prayed that the BOR’s decision. The RTC ruled issued a TRO.

ISSUES Procedural WON the petitioners have standing - YES Substantive 1. WON Nadal was denied of due process – NO 2. WON respondent judge gravely abused her discretion - YES

HELD Procedural - U.P. Board of Regents has an interest to protect inasmuch as what is in issue here is its power to impose disciplinary action against a student who violated the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline. - Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as respondents in the petition for mandamus that he filed below, Nadal is now estopped from questioning their personality to file the instant petition. Moreover, under Sec. 7 of the U.P. Charter (Act 1870) and Sec. 11 of the University Code "all process" against the BOR shall be served on "the president or secretary thereof'. As the Court has time and again held, an action may be entertained, notwithstanding the failure to include an indispensable party where it appears that the naming of the party would be but a formality Substantive 1.  Nadal asserts that he has been denied due process when he was not given notice to the last 2 BOR meetings - University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. - Nadal also claims that he was not given due process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon which he was again convicted was not the same as the original charge." Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on March 28, i.e., whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. Carpio, on the other hand testified that it was exactly on the same charge. They only sought additional insights into the character of Nadal through the information that would be obtained from the AdeMU. 2. By virtue of the writ, the University's exercise of academic freedom was peremptorily curtailed. It is an inherent power of the school to impose and implement their rules. Disposition   Petition granted

PHILCOMSAT V ALCUAZ REGALADO; December 18, 1989

NATURE The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law.

FACTS - This case is posed as one of first impression in the sense that it involves the public utility services of the petitioner Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT, for short) which is the only one rendering such services in the Philippines. - By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals." - Philcomsat established different provisional earth stations in Pinugay, Rizal and Clark Field for different international telecommunications uses such as full-color TV broadcast, telephony, fax, telegrams etc. Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to different companies such as PLDT, Philippine Global Communications, Eastern Telecommunications, etc. - Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor. - Soon after, Philcomsat filed with NTC an application for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same, to continue providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. - On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for six (6) months from the date of said order. When said provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended for another six (6) months, or up to September 16, 1988. - The NTC order further extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months, counted from September 16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates based on initial evaluation by the Rates Regulation Division of the Common Carriers Authorization Department of the financial statements of Philcomsat.

ISSUE 1. WON the enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers 2. WON the exercise of the rate-fixing power of the NTC, by reducing Philcomsat rates, constitutes a violation of A. procedural and B. substantive due process

HELD 1. No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power a. Delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. b. NTC is empowered, among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates c. NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. 2A. Yes there is a violation of procedural due process a. Order was issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing b. had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to respondents c. Function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of due process d. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. e. The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. f. respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. g. An order of respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during the prescribed period. 2B. Yes there is a violation of substantive due process a. There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a legislative franchise which is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires. Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination of the operation of said utility is required by the common good. b. The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the general power of management incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. c. A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals that the rate reduction is solely and primarily based on the initial evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner, contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it has several other sources of information without, however, divulging such sources. Furthermore, it did not as much as make an attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily declared that based on the financial statements, there is merit for a rate reduction without any elucidation on what implications and conclusions were necessarily inferred by it from said statements. Nor did it deign to explain how the data reflected in the financial statements influenced its decision to impose a rate reduction. d. On the other hand, petitioner may likely suffer a severe drawback, with the consequent detriment to the public service, should the order of respondent NTC turn out to be unreasonable and improvident. The business in which petitioner is engaged is unique in that its machinery and equipment have always to be taken in relation to the equipment on the other end of the transmission arrangement. Any lack, aging, acquisition, rehabilitation, or refurbishment of machinery and equipment necessarily entails a major adjustment or innovation on the business of petitioner. e. we hold that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates provided therein, being violative of the due process clause is void and should be nullified. Respondents should now proceed, as they should heretofore have done, with the hearing and determination of petitioner's pending application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity and in which proceeding the subject of rates involved in the present controversy, as well as other matter involved in said application, be duly adjudicated with reasonable dispatch and with due observance of our pronouncements herein. Disposition the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents, dated September 2, 1988, in NTC Case No. 87-94 is hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued under our resolution of September 13, 1988, as specifically directed against the aforesaid order of respondents on the matter of existing rates on petitioner's present authorized services, is hereby made permanent.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V ERMITA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1, 2005

NATURE This is a consolidated version of various petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of the Revised Expanded Value Added Tax Law (Republic Act 9337). Petitioners anchor their challenge on various grounds: (1) that the law is constitutionally infirm for being an invalid delegation of legislative power to the Secretary of Finance; (2) that the process of passing the law violated the "no amendment after three reading rule" and "exclusive origination clause," (3) the law is violative of the equal protection clause and due process clause;  (4) the law is violative of the constitutional requirement of progressivity and uniformity of taxation.

FACTS - In the petition for prohibition filed on June 29, 2005, by the Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al., the following provisions of RA 9337 were challenged: 1) Section 8, amending Section 110 (A)(2) of the NIRC, requiring that the input tax on depreciable goods shall be amortized over a 60-month period, if the acquisition, excluding the VAT components, exceeds One Million Pesos (P1, 000,000.00); 2) Section 8, amending Section 110 (B) of the NIRC, imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited against the output tax; and 3) Section 12, amending Section 114 (c) of the NIRC, authorizing the Government or any of its political subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including GOCCs, to deduct a 5% final withholding tax on gross payments of goods and services, which are subject to 10% VAT under Sections 106 (sale of goods and properties) and 108 (sale of services and use or lease of properties) of the NIRC. - Petitioners contend that these provisions are unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive, excessive, and confiscatory. They premise their argument on the constitutional right of non-deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. According to petitioners, the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax that may be claimed. Petitioners also argue that the input tax partakes the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without due process of law. Petitioners further contend that like any other property or property right, the input tax credit may be transferred or disposed of, and that by limiting the same, the government gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is no profit or value-added. - Petitioners also believe that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as the limitation on the creditable input tax if: (1) the entity has a high ratio of input tax; or (2) invests in capital equipment; or (3) has several transactions with the government, is not based on real and substantial differences to meet a valid classification. - Respondents however, refute petitioners’ argument that the increase to 12%, as well as the 70% limitation on the creditable input tax, the 60-month amortization on the purchase or importation of capital goods exceeding P1,000,000.00, and the 5% final withholding tax by government agencies, is arbitrary, oppressive, and confiscatory, and that it violates the constitutional principle on progressive taxation, among others. Respondents explained that R.A. No. 9337 is the anchor of the government’s fiscal reform agenda. A reform in the value-added system of taxation is the core revenue measure that will tilt the balance towards a sustainable macroeconomic environment necessary for economic growth.

ISSUES 1. WON the Expanded EVAT violates the due process clause of the Constitution 2. WON the law violates the equal protection clause insofar as it classifies businessmen, which will be affected by the law

HELD 1. Ratio A statute shall not be deemed to have violated the due process clause in the absence of clear proof  of arbitrariness or unreasonableness that might ensue upon its implementation. Reasoning - The doctrine is that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail. - Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 110(B) of the NIRC imposes a limitation on the amount of input tax that may be credited against the output tax. It states, in part: “[P]rovided, that the input tax inclusive of the input VAT carried over from the previous quarter that may be credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: …” Input Tax is defined under Section 110(A) of the NIRC, as amended, as the value-added tax due from or paid by a VAT-registered person on the importation of goods or local purchase of good and services, including lease or use of property, in the course of trade or business, from a VAT-registered person, and Output Tax is the value-added tax due on the sale or lease of taxable goods or properties or services by any person registered or required to register under the law. - Petitioners claim that the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax that may be claimed. In effect, a portion of the input tax that has already been paid cannot now be credited against the output tax. Petitioners’ argument is not absolute. It assumes that the input tax exceeds 70% of the output tax, and therefore, the input tax in excess of 70% remains uncredited. However, to the extent that the input tax is less than 70% of the output tax, then 100% of such input tax is still creditable. More importantly, the excess input tax, if any, is retained in a business’s books of accounts and remains creditable in the succeeding quarter/s. This is explicitly allowed by Section 110(B), which provides that “if the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters.” In addition, Section 112(B) allows a VAT-registered person to apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund for any unused input taxes, to the extent that such input taxes have not been applied against the output taxes. Such unused input tax may be used in payment of his other internal revenue taxes. - The non-application of the unutilized input tax in a given quarter is not ad infinitum, as petitioners exaggeratedly contend. Their analysis of the effect of the 70% limitation is incomplete and one-sided. It ends at the net effect that there will be unapplied/unutilized inputs VAT for a given quarter. It does not proceed further to the fact that such unapplied/unutilized input tax may be credited in the subsequent periods as allowed by the carry-over provision of Section 110(B) or that it may later on be refunded through a tax credit certificate under Section 112(B). Therefore, petitioners’ argument must be rejected. 2. Ratio A statute shall not be deemed to have transgressed the equal protection clause when the classification it makes rests on substantial distinctions and said distinctions are germane to its lawful objectives. Reasoning - The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness. - Petitioners point out that the limitation on the creditable input tax if the entity has a high ratio of input tax, or invests in capital equipment, or has several transactions with the government, is not based on real and substantial differences to meet a valid classification. The argument is pedantic, if not outright baseless. The law does not make any classification in the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection. Petitioners’ alleged distinctions are based on variables that bear different consequences. While the implementation of the law may yield varying end results depending on one’s profit margin and value-added, the Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down and interfere with the affairs of business. - The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. - Petitioners brought to the Court’s attention the introduction of Senate Bill No. 2038 by Sens. S.R. Osmeña III and Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. – Madrigal on June 6, 2005, and House Bill No. 4493 by Rep. Eric D. Singson. The proposed legislation seeks to amend the 70% limitation by increasing the same to 90%. This, according to petitioners, supports their stance that the 70% limitation is arbitrary and confiscatory. On this score, suffice it to say that these are still proposed legislations. Until Congress amends the law, and absent any unequivocal basis for its unconstitutionality, the 70% limitation stays.

UNITED STATES V TORIBIO CARSON; January 26, 1910 (rach mayuga)

NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bohol convicting the defendant for violating Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147

FACTS - Toribio slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption the carabao described in the information. - This was done without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Act No. 1147 (An Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle) - The animal was slaughtered in the town of Carmen, in the province of Bohol, where there is no municipal slaughterhouse. - Appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasurer. - Relevant provisions are as follows: SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the municipal treasurer. Before issuing the permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production of the original certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the person applying for the permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has been requested. SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a permit be given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not fit for human consumption. SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption or killing for food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. - Appellant contends that proper construction limits prohibition to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle for human consumption in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer.

ISSUES 1. WON the prohibition contained in Sec. 30 is limited to slaughter of large cattle for human consumption in a municipal slaughterhouse 2. WON Sections 30-33 of Act No. 1147 are unconstitutional and violative of the Due Process Clause a) WON provisions constitute taking of property for public use in the exercise of right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of the owners b) WON it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power

HELD 1. No, prohibition refers to slaughter of large cattle anywhere. Ratio Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. Reasoning The prohibition refers to (1) the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit. - Primary purpose of Act 1147: to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen - To achieve this, it provides an elaborate and compulsory system of identification. Had the contested provisions been interpreted otherwise, it would defeat purposes of the Act. - One of secondary purposes of Act 1147: to prevent the slaughter for food of carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for human consumption. - Not essential for an explanation to be found for express prohibition of the "killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse". But it is not improbable that it is specifically mentioned to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding. 2.a) No. Ratio The restraint placed by the law on the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property interests to a "public use," and is not within the principle of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain. It is a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be detrimental to the public welfare. It is an exercise of the State’s police power. Reasoning In a civil society, every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation. (Com v. Alger) 2.b) No. Ratio To justify the State in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. (Lawton v. Steele) Reasoning The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection. For several years prior to the enactment of the statute: - An infectious disease had threatened the total extinction of carabaos in the Islands. This was detrimental to the country’s material welfare since agriculture was the principal occupation of the people. - Production of rice fell off to the extent that people were compelled to spend millions in its importation. - Efforts were also made by gov’t to increase supply of animals by importation. According to official reports, such animals should be conserved and redistributed throughout the country. - Coincident with the sudden rise in the price of cattle, the crime of cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the enactment of a special law penalizing theft of carabaos. - It must be assumed from the legislative authority found that the general welfare of the Islands necessitated the enactment of special provisions for the branding and registration of large cattle, and supervision and restriction of their slaughter for food. - Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the right of the Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and penalizing what would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of rights of ownership and control of the private property of the citizen. - Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co: this "general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.” - Cooley in his “Constitutional Limitations”: A particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of circumstances, and without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable has now become a public nuisance, endangering the public health or the public safety. Disposition Judgment affirmed.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATIONS ASS'N., INC., V CITY MAYOR OF MANILA FERNANDO; July 31, 1967 (bry san juan)

NATURE APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila granting an action for prohibition on the ground that Ordinance 4760 is unconstitutional.

FACTS - On July 5, 1963 Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Assoc., a non-stock corporation dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels" assails the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4760 (approved on June 14, 1963). The grounds adduced were: (1) unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P14,500.00 for second class motels and prohibit 18 year-olds from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. (2) invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination because it requires clients to fill up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together. - The lower court sustained the challenge and held it ultra vires for the City of Manila to have enacted such ordinance. Hence this appeal.

ISSUES 1. WON the lower court erred in not indulging the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the ordinance especially in the absence of clear reasons, which would show its unconstitutionality 2. WON the lower court erred in holding the ordinance as violative of due process

HELD 1. Ratio YES. The Judiciary shall not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation Reasoning. Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity. . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation." 2. Ratio YES. An ordinance or statute enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power pursuant to a valid state objective (e.g., in this case, safeguarding public morals) shall not be deemed to have violated the due process clause in the absence of clear and convincing evidence. Reasoning - There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrillseekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the license fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it. - Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, firstclass motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and secondclass motels, P4,500 yearly. In the leading case of Lutz V. Araneta, this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purpose, just and uniform.

BALACUIT V CFI OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE GANGAYCO; 1988 (ice baguilat)

NATURE Petition for Review

FACTS Balacuit questions the constitutionality of Ordinance 640 which requires any person, group of persons, entity or corporation in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require children between the ages of 7 and 12 years of age to charge half of the said ticket, penalties are given to those who break the said ordinance. Petition was denied in the lower courts hence this case.

ISSUE WON such ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power

HELD Yes, to invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It should not be arbitrary, unusual and an unnecessary restriction. Such was not proven by the Municipal Council. Such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be reasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. Proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away. Disposition Decision of trial court reversed and set aside. Ordinance 640 is declared unconstitutional and null and void.

SANGALANG V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT SARMIENTO; August 25, 1989 (athe odi)

NATURE Petitions to review the motions for reconsideration

FACTS - Alarmed by the worsening traffic congestions in Makati, then Mayor Nemesio T. Yabut instructed the Municipal Engineer’s Office to conduct studies on the feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air Village, particularly Jupiter and Orbit Streets, to alleviate the traffic jam in that area. - Bel-Air Village Assn (BAVA), through its representative, purportedly agreed on the opening of the said streets during the meeting with them. Therefore, backed up with the Ordinance, the gate of BAV was removed and demolished. Thus, this complaint. Petitioner’s Claims According to BAVA, the opening of the Orbit Street was unjustified for the following reasons: They never agreed on the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets. The Torrens titles covering these streets do not contain annotation that they are subject to encumbrances. Their properties should not be deprived without due process of law and without just compensation. Respondent’s Comments In response, private respondent argued that: The Deed of Donation executed by Ayala Corporation covering Jupiter and Orbit streets contains provision that the said streets shall be used, under certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general public. Unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for just compensation. The demolition of the gate and the opening of the streets are valid acts of police power. BAVA were properly notified of the demolition. Such notice is compliance enough with due process.

ISSUE WON the Mayor acted arbitrarily in opening Jupiter and Orbit Streets to vehicular traffic

HELD NO. Ratio If the act of state is warranted by the demands of common good, the state may exercise its police power. Police Power - “State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” - It is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty - plenary power of the State “to govern its citizens.” (Marshall) Disposition DENIED with finality

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY V PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK CRUZ; December 10, 1990 (bri bauza)

NATURE Petition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Br. 34.

FACTS - This involves the constitutionality of a presidential decree which, during the Marcos regime, was at that time regarded as sacrosanct. - PD No. 1717 ordered the rehabilitation of the AGRIX Group of Companies to be administered mainly by the National Development Company. Section 4(1) thereof provides that “all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished. - Earlier, AGRIX had executed in favor of private respondent Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over three parcels of land in Los Banos, Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage, AGRIX went bankrupt. - Pursuant to the decree, private respondent filed a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee for the payment of its loan credit. In the meantime, petitioners herein, invoking Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba, Laguna for the cancellation of the mortgage lien. Private respondent took steps to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage, prompting petitioners to file a second case in the same court to stop the foreclosure. - The trial court annulled not only the challenged provision, but the entire PD No. 1717 on the grounds that: 1) The presidential exercise of legislative power was a violation of the principle of separation of powers; 2) the law impaired the obligation of contracts; and 3) the decree violated the equal protection clause. - Petitioners claim that private respondent is estopped from contesting the validity of the decree. They cite Mendoza v AGRIX Marketing where the Court, after noting that petitioners filed claims with the AGRIX Claims Committee, dismissed the petition on the ground of estoppel.

ISSUES 1. WON petitioners are estopped from contesting the validity of the decree 2. WON the exercise of police power is applicable in this case

HELD 1) Ratio Estoppel is not applicable in a situation (like the Marcos regime) where the only feasible option was to conform. Reasoning The Court points out that, in the case at bar, the filing of the claim pursuant to the decree was done in 1980, when President Marcos was the absolute ruler of this country and his decrees were absolute law. Private respondent was aware of that reality and knew that it had no choice under the circumstances but to conform. The Court also differentiates this case from Mendoza in that in the latter, the petitioners received settlement after filing their claims whereas in the present case, private respondent has not been paid a single centavo on its claim. Moreover, the petitioner in Mendoza limited itself to the question of estoppel and did not challenge the validity of the claim. 2) Ratio A legislative act based on police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject (the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify the interference of the state) and a lawful method (the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.) Reasoning The indispensable link to the welfare of the greater number has not been established. On the contrary, the decree only favors a special group of investors who have been preferred over the legitimate creditors of AGRIX. The decree also demonstrates oppressiveness patent on its face. The right to property in all mortgages, liens, interests, penalties and charges owing to the creditors of AGRIX is arbitrarily destroyed. [impairment of obligation of contracts] No consideration is paid for the extinction of the mortgage rights, interests and other charges. [deprivation of life, liberty and property] The decree also lumps secured creditors with unsecured creditors and places them on the same level in the prosecution of their respective claims. [equal protection clause…] Moreover, New Agrix Inc. (not a government owned or controlled corporation) was created by special decreenotwithstanding the provision of Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, that: Sec. 4, The Batasang Pambansa shall not, except by general law, provide for the formulation, organization or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Pres. Decree No. 1717 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The temporary restraining order dated August 30, 1988, is LIFTED. Costs against the petitioners.

Agustin v Edu FERNANDO; February 2, 1979 (cha mendoza)

NATURE ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

FACTS -On Dec. 2, 1974, President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, which was in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals ratified by the Philippine Government under PD No. 207, which requires all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles to have with them at least 1 pair of triangular, collapsible reflectorized early warning device in red and yellow, to be used whenever stalled/disabled/parked for 30+ minutes on any street or highway, to be installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle stalled, and that the Land Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices (EWD) to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15% of the acquisition cost and that he shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order. -On November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 which now allows the motor vehicle owner to procure from any source the EWD. -Respondent Edu issued the implementing rules and regulations but these were not enforced as Pres. Marcos suspended the installation of the EWD. The suspention was lifted through Letter of Instruction7 and the immediate implementation directed. Through the Memorandum Circular No. 32, respondent Edu issued the implementing rules and regulations for the installation of the EWD. -the petitioner was an owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as wen as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Oder No. I issued by the Land Transportation Commission.” He prayed for the declaration of the Letters of Instructions and the Memorandum Circular as void and unconstitutional and for a temporary restraining order. -The court granted the restraining order and required the respondents to reply within 10 days from notice, which the respondent did (through Sol-Gen) upon 2 motions for extensions which were granted Petitioner’s contention The said Letter of Instruction No. 229 and Memorandum Circular No. 32 (1) clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power; thus violating the provisions on due process and equal protection of law; (2) an oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of New Society, being compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device or a better substitute to the specified set of EWDs; (3) is infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel, and unconscionable to the motoring public; and (4) one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because it will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy the EWD Respondent’s Contention The respondents denied the petitioner’s allegations, stating that the (1) mid allegations are without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer." Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation. the Answer, (2) in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v. Williams,19 Morfe v. Mutuc,20 and Edu v. Ericta.21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs. and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified.22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny.

ISSUES 1. WON the Letter of Instruction was issued in the exercise of the Police powers of the State 2. WON the petitioner had rebutted the presumption of validity of the exercise of police powers with the issuing of the Letter of Instruction and Memorandum Circular 3. WON the imposition of possession of EWDs oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory 4. WON the premises of the petitioner could be used as grounds for ruling the unconstitutionality of the said orders 5. WON there was undue delegation of legislative power 6. WON the Vienna Convention could be used as a basis for the said orders 7. WON the orders were unconstitutional for violating the Equal Protection of the Law

HELD 1. YES. (defined Police Powers)*** focus of the case**** Ratio The police power is a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfares Other Definitions - CJ Taney: “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty” -Calalang v. Williams: “…identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.” -J. Malcolm: 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.” -J. Cardozo: : 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.'

2. NO, it would be a rare occurrence for the court to invalidate a legislative or executive act clearly intended for public safety, and without sufficient factual basis for support. Ratio The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute." Reasoning Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: 'Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here"

3 NO, the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes -Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. -All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and administrative order.

4. NO, the petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. Ratio The Court does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern. As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary.' Reasoning The Justices 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions.

5. NO, The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of nondelegation of legislative power is equally without any support wellsettled legal doctrines. - To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifical. ly. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. -the principle of non-delegation has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption. within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practicaly all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.

6. YES, the Philippines ratified the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and should comply with it. Ratio It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality. Reasoning Incorporation Doctrine

7. NO, the court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt on the part of petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical. Ratio the constitutionality of a law will not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon. and adequately argued. Reasoning "Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts.

Disposition WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

OPLE V TORRES PUNO; July 23, 1998

NATURE Original petition in the SC

FACTS - on December 12, 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued AO No. 308 directing the establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. - petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople subsequently filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of the administrative order.

ISSUES 1. WON petitioner has standing to challenge AO No. 308 2. WON the issue is ripe for adjudication 3. WON AO No. 308 violates separation of powers 4. WON AO No. 308 violates the right to privacy

HELD 1. Ratio YES. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. 2. Ratio YES. The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Reasoning Petitioner assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent SSS caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National ID card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. 3. Ratio YES. A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. A.O. No. 308 does not merely implement the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Reasoning An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. 4. Ratio YES. A.O. No. 308 is broad and vague; if implemented, it will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. Reasoning The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquet of options available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless. A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions. Disposition Petition granted. AO No. 308 declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

SEPARATE OPINION

ROMERO [concur] With the overarching influence of common law and the recent advent of the Information Age with its high-tech devices, the right to privacy has expanded to embrace its public law aspect. The Bill of Rights of our evolving Charters, a direct transplant from that of the United States, contains in essence facets of the right to privacy which constitute limitations on the far-reaching powers of government. So terrifying are the possibilities of a law such as Administrative Order No. 308 in making inroads into the private lives of the citizens, a virtual Big Brother looking over our shoulders, that it must, without delay, be "slain upon sight" before our society turns totalitarian with each of us, a mindless robot.

VITUG [concur] Administrative Order No. 308 appears to be so extensively drawn that could, indeed, allow unbridled options to become available to its implementors beyond the reasonable comfort of the citizens and of residents alike. The subject covered by the questioned administrative order can have far-reaching consequences that can tell on all individuals, their liberty and privacy, that, to my mind, should make it indispensable and appropriate to have the matter specifically addressed by the Congress of the Philippines, the policy-making body of our government, to which the task should initially belong and to which the authority to formulate and promulgate that policy is constitutionally lodged.

PANGANIBAN [concur in the result] I concur only in the result and only on the ground that an executive issuance is not legally sufficient to establish an all-encompassing computerized system of identification in the country. The subject matter contained in AO 308 is beyond the powers of the President to regulate without a legislative enactment. Let it be noted that this Court, as shown by the voting of the justices, has not definitively ruled on these points. The voting is decisive only on the need for the appropriate legislation, and it is only on this ground that the petition is granted by this Court.

KAPUNAN [dissent] There is nothing in the whole breadth and length of Administrative Order No. 308 that suggests a taint of constitutional infirmity. The new identification system would tremendously improve and uplift public service in our country to the benefit of Filipino citizens and resident aliens. It would promote, facilitate and speed up legitimate transactions with government offices as well as with private and business entities. Experience tells us of the constant delays and inconveniences the public has to suffer in availing of basic public services and social security benefits because of inefficient and not too reliable means of identification of the beneficiaries. - Being the "administrative head," it is unquestionably the responsibility of the President to find ways and means to improve the government bureaucracy, and make it more professional, efficient and reliable, specially those government agencies and instrumentalities which provide basic services and which the citizenry constantly transact with, like the GSIS, SSS and NSO. The project, therefore, relates to, is an appropriate subject and falls squarely within the ambit of the Chief Executive's administrative power under which, in order to successfully carry out his administrative duties, he has been granted by law quasi-legislative powers. - It is premature for the Court to determine the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the National Computerized Identification Reference System. It is not the new system itself that is intended to be implemented in the invitation to bid but only the manufacture of the I.D. cards. Biometrics Technology is not and cannot be used in the I.D. cards as no guidelines therefor have yet been laid down by the IACC. Before the assailed system can be set up, it is imperative that the guidelines be issued first. - There is nothing in A.O. No. 308 to serve as sufficient basis for a conclusion that the new system to be evolved violates the right to privacyWithout the concomitant guidelines, which would spell out in detail how this new identification system would work, the perceived violation of the right to privacy amounts to nothing more than mere surmise and speculation. The majority laments that as technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. That may be true. However, courts should tread daintily on the field of social and economic experimentation lest they impede or obstruct the march of technology to improve public services just on the basis of an unfounded fear that the experimentation violates one's constitutionally protected rights. - On the issue of funding, The budget for the national identification system cannot be deemed a transfer of funds since the same is composed of and will be implemented by the member government agencies. Moreover, these agencies particularly the GSIS and SSS have been issuing some form of identification or membership card. The improved ID cards that will be issued under this new system would just take place of the old identification cards and budget-wise, the funds that were being used to manufacture the old ID cards could now be utilized to fund the new cards. Hence, what is envisioned is not a transfer of appropriations but a pooling of funds and resources by the various government agencies involved in the project.

MENDOZA [dissent] I cannot find anything in the text of Administrative Order No. 308 of the President of the Philippines that would warrant a declaration that it is violative of the right of privacy. All that is contemplated is an identification system based on data which the government agencies involved have already been requiring individuals making use of their services to give. The issue in this case is not really whether A.O. No. 308 violates the right of privacy formed by emanations from the several constitutional rights cited by the majority. The question is whether it violates freedom of thought and of conscience, whether the establishment of the Identification Reference System will not result in the compilation of massive dossiers on individuals which, beyond their use for identification, can become instruments of thought control. So far, the text of A.O. No. 308 affords no basis for believing that the data gathered can be used for such sinister purpose. As already stated, nothing that is not already being required by the concerned agencies of those making use of their services is required by the Order in question. - A.O. No. 308 is no more than a directive to government agencies which the President of the Philippines has issued in his capacity as administrative head. It is not a statute. It confers no right; it imposes no duty; it affords no protection; it creates no office. - There is no basis for believing that, beyond the identification of individuals, the System will be used for illegal purposes. Nor are sanctions lacking for the unauthorized use or disclosure of information gathered by the various agencies constituting the System. - At all events, at this stage, it is premature to pass on the claim that the Identification Reference System can be used for the purpose of compiling massive dossiers on individuals that can be used to curtail basic civil and political rights since, if at all, this can only be provided in the implementing rules and regulations which have yet to be promulgated. We have already stated that A.O. No. 308 is not a statute. Even in the case of statutes, however, where implementing rules are necessary to put them into effect, it has been held that an attack on their constitutionality would be premature. - Given the fact that no right of privacy is involved in this case and that any objection to the Identification Reference System on the ground that it violates freedom of thought is premature, speculative, or conjectural pending the issuance of the implementing rules, it is clear that petitioner has no cause of action and, therefore, no standing to bring this action. PEOPLE V DE LA PIEDRA KAPUNAN; January 4, 2001

NATURE Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga

FACTS - Carol Dela Piedra was caught in a police entrapment in Zamboanga and was charged with illegal recruitment committed in a large scale and was sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay 100,000. - Dela Piedra denied involvement claiming that she was just visiting the house of Jasmine Alejandro’s house, where the entrapment happened. And that the evidence against her was planted. Petitioner’s claim - Dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining “recruitment and placement” is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause. She further argues that the acts that constitute “recruitment and placement” suffer from overbreadth since by merely “referring” a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment. - She also claims that she was denied the equal protection of the laws. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even received payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro remained scot-free. Appellant concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboangueña, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.

ISSUES 1. WON Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code is void for vagueness 2. WON the acts that constitute “recruitment and placement” suffer overbreath 3. WON the accused-appellant was denied equal protection of the laws 4. WON the accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment 5. WON the illegal recruitment was committed in a large scale

HELD 1. NO - A criminal statute that “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,” or is so indefinite that “it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,” is void for vagueness. - As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”  It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. - However, the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction - The Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a “perfectly vague act” whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness. 2. NO - That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as “ labor or employment referral”  (“referring” an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently, appellant misapprehends concept of overbreadth. - A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute. - In Blo Umpar Adiong v Commission on Elections, for instance, we struck down as void for overbreadth provisions prohibiting the posting of election propaganda in any place – including private vehicles – other than in the common poster areas sanctioned by the COMELEC. We held that the challenged provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the use of his property but also deprived the citizen of his right to free speech and information. The prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights and, hence, void for overbreadth. In the present case, however, appellant did not even specify what constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the definition of “recruitment and placement” that would render the same constitutionally overbroad. 3. NO - The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. - The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of “clear and intentional discrimination.” Appellant has failed to show that, in charging appellant in court, that there was a “clear and intentional discrimination” on the part of the prosecuting officials. 4. YES - Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur. First, the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either any activity within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code. In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the accused commits said acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. - In this case, the first element is present. The certification of POEA Officer-in-Charge Macarulay states that appellant is not licensed or authorized to engage in recruitment and placement. - The second element is also present. Appellant is presumed engaged in recruitment and placement under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Both Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that appellant promised them employment for a fee. Their testimonies corroborate each other on material points. 5. NO - A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group. In this case, only two persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by appellant. The third person named in the complaint as having been promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez, was not presented in court to testify. - It is true that law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial; nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. In this case, evidence that appellant likewise promised her employment for a fee is sketchy. The only evidence that tends to prove this fact is the testimony of Nancy Araneta, who said that she and her friends, Baez and Sandra Aquino, came to the briefing and they filled up application forms. - Because the prosecution was able to prove that appellant committed recruitment and placement against two persons only, she cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale, which requires that recruitment be committed against three or more persons. Appellant can only be convicted of two counts of “simple” illegal recruitment Disposition The decision of the regional trial court MODIFIED. Appellant declared guilty of illegal recruitment on two (2) counts and is sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

GSIS V MONTESCLAROS CARPIO; July 14, 2004

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA

FACTS - Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros married Milagros Orbiso. Nicolas was 72, widower. Milagros was 43. - Nicolas filed w/ GSIS an application for retirement benefits. He designated wife as sole beneficiary. GSIS approved Nicolas’ application for retirement effective 2/17/84 granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first 5 yrs and a monthly annuity thereafter. Nicolas died 4/22/92. Milagros filed a claim for survivorship pension. - GSIS denied claim bec under Sec 18 of PD 1146, surviving sp has no right to pension if they contracted marriage w/in 3 yrs before pensioner qualified for the pension. - Milagros filed civil action questioning validity of Sec 18 - Trial court held that retirement benefits are onerous acquisitions. Since they are property acquired by pensioner through labor, such benefits are conjugal prop. It held that Sec 18 is deemed repealed bec of the Family Code. - Milagros later informed Court that she accepted GSIS’ decision and that she no longer has an interest in pursuing the case. However Court will still decide for other surviving sps who might be similarly situated.

ISSUE WON Sec 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional for violation of due process and equal protection clauses

HELD YES - Considering the mandatory salary deductions fr govt employees, govt pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving sp w/o giving him/her opportunity to be heard. - Sometimes, statutes require that the sp shld have married the employee for a certain period before the employee’s death to prevent sham marriages contracted for money. - There are requirements for a valid and reasonable classification: - substantial distinction - germane to the purpose of law - must not be limited to existing conditions only - must apply equally to all members of the same class - The proviso does not satisfy these requirements. - There is no reasonable connection bet the means and the purpose. If the purpose is to prevent deathbed marriages, then Court does not see why proviso reckons 3-yr prohibition fr date of pensioner qualification for pension and not fr the date the pensioner died. Worse, it lumps all marriages contracted w/in 3 yrs before pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience. - This is probably the reason why Congress deleted the proviso in RA 8291 or Govt Svc Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD 1146) Disposition Petition is denied.

MIRASOL V CA QUISUMBING; FEBRUARY 1, 2001 (athe odi)

NATURE Petition for Review on certiorari

FACTS - The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. They produce sugar for export. - Private respondent PNB financed the Mirasol’s sugar production venture for crop under a crop loan financing scheme. Under that scheme, the Mirasols signedCredit Assignments, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB as the petitioners’ atty-in-fact to negotiate and to sell the latter’s sugar. - Then President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 579 with the following provisions: authorized Phil Exchange Co. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export to the USA and to other foreign markets. The price and quantity was determined by the Sugar Quota Administration, PNB, the DTI and by the Office of the President. It authorized PNB to finance PHILEX’s purchases. It decreed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize from sales of sugar abroad was to be remitted to a special fund of the national gov’t. - PNB continued to finance the sugar production of the Mirasols, still secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. However, since PNB failed to do an accounting of the proceeds of the sale, the Mirasols accrued higher withdrawals from the bank than their income. PNB then asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts, which the Mirasols failed to do. Therefore, PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. - The Mirasols asked again for the accounting of the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar insisting that, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations with the bank. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under PD 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from export sales of sugar pertained to National Government and were subject to the disposition of the President of the Philippines for public purposes. - The Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB and PHILEX.

ISSUES 1. WON the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court. 2. WON PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional. 3. WON the Honorable CA committed manifest error in not applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil between respondents PNB and PHILEX. 4. WON  the Honorable CA committed manifest error in upholding the validity of the foreclosure on petitioners property and in upholding the validity of the daccion en pago  in this case. 5. WON the Honorable CA committed manifest error in not awarding damages to petitioners grounds relied upon the allowance of the petition

HELD 1. NO. Ratio  Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order but in assailing their constitutionality, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory. 2. NO. Ratio  The courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy can be settled on other grounds. Reasoning a.  Issue of constitutionality is not the lis mota of the case. It is primarily a case demanding for accounting and specific performance. b. presumption of constitutionality of statute (doctrine of separation of powers) 3. NO. Ratio  Findings of the CA are conclusive and binding upon this Court unless said findings are not supported by the evidence. SC is limited only to reviewing questions of law and factual issues are not within its province. 4. NO. Ratio  Both the TC and CA found that the Mirasols admitted that they were indebted to PNB. Findings of the CA are conclusive and binding upon this Court unless said findings are not supported by the evidence. 5. NO. Ratio  Absent showing of bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded. Petitioner failed to show malice or bad faith on the part of PNB in failing to render accounting.

PEOPLE V CAYAT MORAN; May 5, 1939

NATURE APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio

FACTS - Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. - On appeal to the Court of First Instance, the following information was filed against him: "That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, illegally received, acquired, and had in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639." - At the trial, accused admitted all the facts alleged in the information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. - The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency - Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read: "SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe. "SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court." Petitioner’s Claim - challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds: (1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws; (2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution; and (3) That it is an improper exercise of the police power of the state. - Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said that as these less civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of their rights in a democracy," any attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled" will meet with their instant challenge.

ISSUES 1. WON Act No.1639 is unconstitutional 2. WON the provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution 3. WON the Act is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.

HELD 1. Ratio It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. Reasoning –examining and resolving the issue in the light of the policy of the government towards the non-Christian tribes adopted and consistently followed from the Spanish times to the present: As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards these inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in so-called "reducciones" (communities) had been persistently attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life. This policy had not been deflected from during the American period. Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the problem of determining "those practicable means of bringing about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity." And to complement this policy of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must be understood and applied. - The classification rests on real or substantial distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." - That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. - The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. - Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application. 2 Ratio To constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases. Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class. Reasoning A person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in violation of law may be confiscated or when the property constitutes corpus delicti. 3. Ratio The Act is not an improper exercise of the police power of the state. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity is a legitimate exercise of the police power, and unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld. Reasoning - Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. - In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by a certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation. Disposition Judgment is affirmed

ICHONG V HERNANDEZ AND SARMIENTO LABRADOR; May 31, 1957

FACTS - Injunction and Mandamus - The Legislature enacted RA 1180 entitled ”An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” It prohibits aliens and associations, partnerships, or corporations, which are not wholly owned by citizens, to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. In effect it nationalizes the retail business. - Procedure Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations, and partnerships adversely affected by RA 1180 filed a petition for Injunction and Mandamus against Jaime Hernandez, Secretary of Finance and Marcelino Sarmiento, City Treasurer of Manila. - Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved A. Police Power - the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable - necessary esp. in a modern democratic framework B. Equal Protection Clause - against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality; it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions - is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. - Criteria for Test of EPC 1. presence of public interest and welfare 2. existence of reasonable relation between purposes and means 3. existence of reasonable basis for distinction and classification made C. Due Process clause - has to do with reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power - Questions for test: 1. Is there is a public interest/purpose? 2. Is the Act is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature’s purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? 3. Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used or is it merely an unjustified interference with private interest?

ISSUES 1. WON RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws. 2. WON RA 1180 deprives alien residents of their liberty and property without due process of law. 3. WON the title of the Act is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill, which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. 4. WON RA 1108 violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

HELD 1. NO - The act does not transcend the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution if there is a question of public interest involved or pursued and the classification or distinction used by the legislature, in this case between nationals and aliens, is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded. Reasoning a. Based on experience of the country, alien retailer has shown disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Aliens lack spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the country. Alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by intolerable practices like the ff: - hoarding essential commodities - violating price control laws - boycotting honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands - believed to have evaded tax laws - bribing public officials b. Economic reason – alien retailer never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth since the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country’s economy and increase national wealth. c. precedents Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, Gibbon vs. Ongden Commonwealth vs. Hana, Anton vs. Van Winkle, Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners - Essentially held that the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. Takahashi vs. Fish and game Commission, Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley - held that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not valid because the laws were found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued. 2. NO - There is due process if the laws passed are seen to have reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Reasoning a. legitimacy of the purpose of the law - Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life\ - Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. b Nationalistic protective policy laid down in the Constitution - Section 8 of Article XIV provides that “no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines” c. Provisions of law not unreasonable - The legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not in excess of the legislative power.

3. NO - The provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title. The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of the bill and the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law. Reasoning a. The term regulate is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term regulation. 4. No treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

VILLEGAS V HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO FERNANDEZ; November 10, 1978

NATURE Petition for certiorari to review decision of CFI Mla declaring Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void

FACTS - Ordinance No. 6537 (“An ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade, business or occupation within the City of Manila without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila; and for other purpose”) was passed by the Municipal Board of Mla on Feb. 22, 1968 and signed by petitioner Mayor Villegas on Mar. 27. - Section 1 of the ordinance sets out the following requirements for aliens: (a) Secure employment permit; (b) Pay fee of P50. But some aliens are exempted from the provisions of the ordinance, i.e. those employed in diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries. - Violation of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than 3 months to 6 months or fine of not less than P100 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. Case History - On May 4, 1968, respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the CFI praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. - Hiu Chiong argues that: 1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation 2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers 3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution - On May 24, 1968, CFI issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on Sept. 17, 1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. - Hence, Mayor Villegas filed this present petition. Petitioners' Claim - Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature. ISSUES WON Ordinance No. 6537 is unconstitutional in that it violates the – 1. Rule of uniformity of taxation 2. Equal protection clause 3. Principle against undue designation of legislative power 4. Due process clause

HELD 1. YES Ratio The ordinance is a revenue measure under the guise of regulation.

Reasoning - The first part of Sec. 1 requiring that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits. Therefore, this is regulatory in character. BUT the second part requiring the payment of P50 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. 2. YES Ratio Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. Reasoning - The P50 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. The same amount of P50 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. 3. YES Ratio Where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of (building) permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. (People v Fajardo) Reasoning - Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. - Chinese Flour Importers Association v Price Stabilization Board: Where a law granted a government agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the SC ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled. - Primicias v Fugoso: “The authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.” 4. YES Ratio While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. (Kwong Sing v City of Manila) Reasoning Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. Disposition Decision appealed from is affirmed.

SEPARATE OPINION

TEEHANKEE [concur] - The employment of aliens within the country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the national government officials and agencies concerned and not to local governments. - The national policy on the matter has been determined in the statutes enacted by the legislature (the various Philippine nationalization laws, which on the whole recognize the right of aliens to obtain gainful employment in the country with the exception of certain specific fields and areas). Such national policies may not be interfered with, thwarted or in any manner negated by any local government or its officials since they are not separate from and independent of the national government. - Phil. Coop. Livestock Ass'n. v Earnshaw: "The City of Manila is a subordinate body to the Insular Gov’t. When the Insular (National) Gov’t adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at naught the action of the superior authority." - With more reason are such national policies binding on local governments when they involve our foreign relations with other countries and their nationals who have been lawfully admitted here.

DUMLAO V COMELEC MELENCIO HERRERA;1980

NATURE Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction

FACTS - This is a case filed by Patricio Dumlao and Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan who seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53. Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Viscaya while Igot is a tax payer, as well as Salapantan. - Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as it is discriminatory and contrary to the constitutional clause on Equal Protection. The provision disqualifies retired elective provincial, city, or municipal officials who have already received their retirement benefits who are aged 65 or older at the time of the commencement of the term of office. Igot and Salapantan on the other hand, questions the validity of Provisions on Sec. 7 and 4 of the BP No. 52 which disqualifies candidates for any office or their participation in political activities when they commit acts of disloyalty to the state (subversion, insurrection, or other similar crimes) given that a judgment of conviction shall be a conclusive evidence and filing of charges after preliminary investigations shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.

ISSUES Procedural 1. WON it is an actual case 2. WON the petitioners are proper parties in the case 3. WON the review of constitutionality is the lis mota of the case 4. WON it should be heard Substantive 1. WON Sec. 4 of BP No. 52 is unconstitutional 2. WON Sec. 7 of BP No. 52 is unconstitutional

HELD Procedural 1. No, it is not. Dumlao is not adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition has yet been filed before the COMELEC to disqualify Dumlao. What the petrition does then is to simply seek an advisory opinion. 2. No, neither Igot nor Salapantan fall under the requisite criteria for disqualification. They are not adversely affected through which there are no personal nor substantial interest at stake. Neither is it a taxpayer’s suit for it does not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. 3. No, Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan are without any cause of action. 4. Yes, because the case is of paramount public interest for the elctions are to be held a few days away. Substantive 1. No. Classification is reasonable and is based upon substantial distinctions. It is not arbitrary and unreasonable. The disqualification is not based solely on age but also about the retirement of the person in office. 2. Yes. The provision places an accused on the same level as that of the convicted. It becomes a step on the assumption of innocence of the accused. Although it is but prima facie evidence, time constraints affect the accused from disproving such charges. Disposition 1st paragraph of Sec. 4 of BP No. 52 is valid while the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 4 of BP No. 52 is null and void.

ORMOC SUGAR CO. V TREASURER OR ORMOC CITY BENGZON; February 17, 1968

NATURE This is an appeal from the judgment of CFI of Leyte which upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance passed by the Ormoc City Municipal Board imposing an export tax on centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Co.

FACTS - The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance no. 4 (series of 1964) imposing a municipal tax (equal to 1% per export sale tax to the US and other foreign countries) on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc., in Ormoc City. Ormoc Sugar complied and paid a total of P12, 087.50 albeit under protest. - June 1, 1964: Ormoc Sugar Co. filed a complaint before the CFI of Leyte against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor. Petitioner’s claims 1. Ordinance no. 4 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Art.III Sec. 1) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Art.VI Sec. 22[1]) 2. The tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under Sec. 15-kk of its charter and under Sec. 2 of R.A. 2264 (The Local Autonomy Act), is authorized to impose 3. The tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Sec. 2 of R.A. 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar. - Defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that it did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. - CFI of Leyte rendered a decision upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter. - This decision was subsequently brought to the Supreme Court by Ormoc Sugar Co. for appeal, alleging the same statutory and constitutional violations.

ISSUE 1. WON Ordinance no. 4 infringes upon the constitutional limits on the power of taxation specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation. 2. WON defendant Municipal Board has authority to levy such an export tax

HELD 1. Ratio The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated. It does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation. A classification is reasonable when (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. Reasoning The questioned ordinance does not meet these requisites. It taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. Although it is true that at the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, for the classification to be reasonable, it should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. 2. Ratio Doctrine of Stare decisis. The Court held in Nin Bay Mining Co. v Municipality of Roxas that Sec. 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the power to impose an export tax was subsequently repealed by Sec. 2 of R.A. 2264, effective June 19, 1959, which gave chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees. And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects that municipal export or import taxes or licenses will have on the national economy, due to Sec. 2 of R.A. 2264, We stated that there was no other alternative until Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable results. Disposition decision appealed from is reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are ordered to refund the P12, 087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No. costs.

TABLARIN V GUTIERREZ. FELICIANO; July 31, 1987 (apple maramba)

NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the RTC of Manila

FACTS -The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education (public respondent) and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (private respondent). -On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. -The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. -The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled - Petitioners filed this Special Civil Action for Certiorari with this Court

ISSUES Procedural WON a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative order Substantive WON Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 constitute undue delegation of power? WON the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process WON the portion of MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 which provides that "the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges” is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution

HELD Procedural Ratio NO. A court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. Reasoning In the case at bar, the petitioners invoked a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2391, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, a. 1985. The provisions invoked are: (a) Article II, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect of human rights." (b) Article II, Section 13: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs." (c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote total human liberation and development." (d) Article XIV, Section 1: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all." (e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." -Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail collide with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. -They have not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them to rebut the presumption of constitutionality. Petitioners have not made their case, even a prima facie case. - Regarding Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision - Section 1 when read in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV would tell one that the State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." Substantive Ratio 1. The general principle of non delegation of legislative power, which both flows from and reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great departments of government, must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our present day world 2. The sovereign has the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority to secure and promote all the important interests and needs-in a word, the public order-of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. 3. Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those years. Reasoning The principle of non-delegation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modem government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of 'subordinate legislation.' Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts. -	The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract -	The Court believes that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act 2. The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. - The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine - The NMAT is reasonably related to the government objective of protecting the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. 3. The appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; the number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the average score attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may well result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change. Disposition We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

LIM V PACQUING PADILLA; January 27, 1995

FACTS - The case actually consists of two separate complaints (Lim v Pacquing and Guingona v Reyes). - It was held in the trial court that Judge Pacquing did not manifest abuse of discretion or lack/excess of jurisdiction in issuing the following orders: 1. an order directing Mayor Lim of Manila to issue the permit or license to operate the jai-alai in favor of ADC (Associated Development Corporation) 2. an order directing Lim to explain why he should not be cited in contempt 3. another order directing Lim to issue the permit to operate to ADC immediately - Guingona, in his position as executive secretary, issued a directive to the chairman of the Games and Amusement Board president Sumulong to hold the grant of authority in abeyance until the following issues were resolved: 1. WON PD 771 (revoked all existing jai-alai franchises issued by the government) is unconstitutional 2. Assuming that the city of Manila has the power to grant franchises, WON the franchise is valid since there is no duration and the franchise appears to be granted in perpetuity 3. WON the city of Manila has the power to issue franchises for jai-alai in view of EO 392 which transferred the power to regulate jai-alai from the local governments to the GAB. - The pertinent laws in this case involve the following: - The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949. Section 18 provides that the Municipal Board will include, among its powers “to tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting by the public” on certain sports and games. - Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB) - Congress enacted Republic Act No. 954, entitled "An Act To Prohibit Certain Activities In Connection With Horse Races and Basque Pelota Games (Jai-Alai), And To Prescribe Penalties For Its Violation." - Ordinance No. 7065 by Manla government officials entitled "An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A jai alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms and Conditions And For Other Purposes." - Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos ntitled "Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, JaiAlai Or Basque Pelota, And. Other Forms of Gambling. - President Aquino, by virtue of Article XVIII, Section 6, of the Constitution, which allowed the incumbent President to continue exercising legislative powers until the first Congress was convened, issued Executive Order No. 169 expressly repealing PD 810 and revoking and cancelling the franchise granted to the Philippine JaiAlai and Amusement Corporation. Petitioners’ Claims - Republic Act No. 954 effectively removed the power of the Municipal Board of Manila to grant franchises for gambling operations. - The term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954 is used to refer to franchises issued by Congress. - The term "legislative powers" is used in Rep. Act No. 409 merely to distinguish the powers under Section 18 of the law from the other powers Of the Municipal Board, but that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954 refers to a franchise granted solely by Congress. - The government contends that PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the State. Respodents’ Comments - Manila Ordinance No. 7065 which purported to grant to ADC a franchise to conduct jai-alai operations is void and ultra vires since Republic Act No. 54, approved on 20 June 1953, or very much earlier than said Ordinance No. 7065 (approved 7 September 1971) in Section 4 thereof, requires a legislative franchise, not a municipal franchise, for the operation of jai-alai. - ADC's franchise was nonetheless effectively revoked by Presidential Decree No. 771, issued on 20 August 1975, Sec. 3 of which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued by local governments. - Republic Act No. 409 (Manila Charter) gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board to grant franchises, and since Republic Act No. 954 does not specifically qualify the word "legislative" as referring exclusively to Congress, then Rep. Act No. 954 did not remove the power of the Municipal Board under Section 18(jj) of Republic Act No. 409 and consequently it was within the power of the City of Manila to allow ADC to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila. - Executive Order No. 392 dated 01 January 1951 transferred the power to regulate jai-alai from the local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB), a national government agency. - ADC argues that PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection and non-impairment provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUES 1. WON intervention by the Republic of the Philippines at this stage of the proceedings is proper 2. Assuming such intervention is proper, WON ADC has a valid and subsisting franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai 3. WON there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the aforementioned' temporary restraining order. (later, writ of preliminary injunction) 4. WON or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the aforementioned writ of preliminary mandatory injunction

HELD 1. NO - the intervention of the Republic of the Philippines is proper at this stage of the proceedings Ratio The Court ruled in case of Director of Lands v CA that a denial of the motions for intervention would "lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their successor-in-interest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors' claim be proven to be true." Reasoning - This issue should no longer be belabored since counsel for respondent ADC agreed to the suggestion that this Court once and for all settle all substantive issues raised by the parties in these cases. - It will undoubtedly be a grave injustice to both parties in this case if this Court were to shirk from ruling on the issue of constitutionality of PD No. 771. Such issue has, in our view, become the very lis mota in resolving the present controversy, in view of ADC's insistence that it was granted a valid and legal franchise by Ordinance No. 7065 to operate the jai-alai. - Results: - There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers). The law has always been assumed valid and constitutional unless ruled otherwise. 2. ADC’s franchise is no longer valid because PD 771 has revoked the franchise granted to ADC. Ratio A franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is, more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare. Reasoning - Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to franchise." What was regulated was the power to to “license, permit or regulate.” This means that a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by the national government to so operate. - This power to license, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed from local governments, including the City of Manila, and transferred to the GAB by Executive Order No. 392. - The authority to grant franchises is with Congress but the power to regulate is with the GAB. - The RPC punishes gambling and betting unless otherwise provide by law. The ADC has not shown any special law which has allowed jai-alai. - If ADC's arguments were to prevail, the Court would likewise declare Section 18(jj) of the Revised Charter of Manila unconstitutional for the power it would delegate to the Municipal Board of Manila would give the latter the absolute and unlimited discretion to render the penal code provisions on gambling inapplicable or inoperative to persons or entities issued permits to operate gambling establishments in the City of Manila. - The relevant provisions of Rep. Acts Nos. 409 and 954 and Ordinance No. 7065 should be taken together and it should then be clear that the legislative powers of the Municipal Board should be understood to be regulatory in nature and that Republic Act No. 954 should be understood to refer to congressional franchises. - The purpose of PD 771 is clearly stated in the “whereas” clause which states the need to control and regulate gambling for the good of the state. - There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree revoked all franchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the equal protection clause simply because it was the only one affected by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the government, ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. 3. There was grave abuse of discretion committed by Judge Reyes in issuing the TRO (later converted to a writ of preliminary injunction). Ratio Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. While ADC could allege these grounds, respondent judge should have taken judicial notice of Republic Act No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. These laws negate the existence of any legal right on the part of ADC to the reliefs it sought so as to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Since PD No. 771 and Republic Act No. 954 are presumed valid and constitutional until ruled otherwise by the Supreme Court after due hearing, ADC was not entitled to the writs issued and consequently there was grave abuse of discretion in issuing them.

SISON V ANCHETA FERNANDO; July 25, 1984

NATURE Petition to review the decision of the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue

FACTS - The success of the challenge posed in this suit for declaratory relief or prohibition proceeding on the validity of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 135 (BP 135) depends upon a showing of its constitutional infirmity. The assailed provision further amends Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents on (a) taxable compensation income (b) taxable net income (c) royalties, prizes, and other winnings (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar arrangements (e) dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership (f) adjusted gross income - Petitioner Antero Sison Jr. as taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof, "he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers." He characterizes the above section as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character. For petitioner, therefore, there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.

ISSUE WON the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived from business or profession than on compensation is constitutionally infirm (or WON Sec.1 of BP 135 is unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation)

HELD No. Ratio A bare allegation a tax statute (in this case BP 135) which sets different income tax schedules for fixed income tax earners and business or professional income earners, is arbitrary does not suffice to invalidate said tax statute.

Reasoning The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure the performance of vital state functions. It is the lifeblood of the government as it is source of the bulk of public funds. The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty. It is the strongest of all the powers of government. It is, of course, to be admitted that for all its plenitude, the power to tax is not unconfined. There are restrictions. The Constitution sets forth such limits. The person injured by such tax power must prove such invasion or violation of private rights of individuals, and the arbitrariness of the tax statute. The lack of factual foundation to show the arbitrary character of the assailed provision makes petition without merit. Ratio Where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail Reasoning [a] On Due Process. It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse of power. It then becomes the duty of this Court to say that such an arbitrary act amounted to the exercise of an authority not conferred. However, petitioner failed to show such arbitrariness that would constitute a violation of due process. [b] On Equal Protection. It is settled rule that equal protection means that laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Corollary to this is the view that the classification should be reasonable. The reasonableness of the distinction between compensation and taxable net income of professionals and businessmen certainly not a suspect classification. Moreover, in Lutz v Araneta, it was held that “at any rate, it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.'” Ratio “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable” shall mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. Reasoning Taxpayers may be classified into different categories. To repeat, it is enough that the classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that make real differences. In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in BP 135, the discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because they are n the same situation more or less. On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income. There is ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional and business income. Disposition Petition dismissed.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES V COMELEC MENDOZA; April 21, 1998 (maia rieza)

FACTS - Petitioners Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines (TELEBAP) and GMA Network, Inc. assail the validity of B.P. Blg. No. 881, sec.92, which requires radio and television broadcasters to give free time (to be known as COMELEC Time) to the COMELEC during the campaign period. The law reads: B.P. Blg. 881, (Omnibus Election Code) SEC. 90. Comelec space. - The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated. (Sec. 45. 1978 EC). SEC. 92. Comelec time. - The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign. - TELEBAP is suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. GMA is suing as an operator of radio and broadcasting stations under a franchise granted by Congress. - Grounds for assailing validity are: deprivation of property without due process of law and without just compensation (radio and TV companies allege lost profits from the requirement of giving free airtime), denial of radio and television broadcast companies of equal protection of laws (print media companies are entitled to compensation for COMELEC Space, while radio and TV companies are required to furnish COMELEC Time free of charge), and excessive power given to COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.

ISSUES Procedural WON petitioners have standing Substantive WON B.P. Blg. No. 881, sec.92 is a valid exercise of police power of the state a. WON it deprives broadcast companies of property without due process and just compensation b. WON the it invalidly amends the grant of franchise (through RA7252) to GMA c. WON there is unequal protection of laws d. WON requirement of COMELEC Time is a valid exercise of state’s power to regulate use of franchises

HELD Procedural Yes and no. TELEBAP do not have standing as citizens, taxpayers, or registered voters. As citizens, members of TELEBAP have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation of the law. As registered voters, the law does not concern their right to suffrage. As taxpayers, the case does not involve the exercise by the congress of its taxing or spending power. The mere fact that the TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of the affected companies. On the other hand, GMA has the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. As an operator of radio and television stations, they are substantially affected by the enforcement of the said law.

Substantive Yes. a. No. Radio and television broadcasting companies are not deprived of property without due process for they do not even own the airwaves and frequencies which they allege to be deprived of with the enforcement of the law. All broadcasting stations are licensed by the government, thus they are only operating their franchise as a privilege, hence subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good requires. The exercise of the privilege may be reasonably burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide free airtime to COMELEC. b. No. the questioned law antedates the franchise grant to GMA, thus it is deemed to have been incorporated with the franchise grant. Therefore, GMA is under the duty to render adequate public service time, to enable the government to communicate with the people on matters of public interest. The COMELEC Time is and should be considered as part of the public service time broadcast stations are required to furnish the government. In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, §92 is not an invalid amendment of petitioner's franchise but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner in accepting a public grant of privilege. c. No. the law does not give unequal protection between the radio and television companies on the one hand, and the newspaper and magazine companies on the other. The freedom of radio and TV companies is somewhat limited in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. Newspapers and books are found only in metropolitan areas and in municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. TV is also becoming universal. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance. Thus, the distinction between newspaper and print media companies, and radio and TV companies, is justified. d. Yes. First of all, what the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, among other things, is the use by media of information of their franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads. In other words, the object of supervision or regulation is different from the object of the prohibition. Secondly, the prohibition in §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 (ban on political ads) is only half of the regulatory provision in the statute. The other half is the mandate to the COMELEC to procure print space and air time for allocation to candidates. With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and program of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Broadcast companies are public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. To affirm the validity of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people's right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's duty to intervene for the common good. Disposition Petition dismissed.

SEPARATE OPINION

ROMERO [dissent] - Section 92 of BP 881, insofar as it requires radio and television stations to provide Comelec with radio and television time free of charge is a flagrant violation of the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation - while it is inherent in the state to appropriate property for public use, this has never been understood to include taking property without compensation - Section 9 Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads "No private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation," gives us two limitations on the power of eminent domain: (1) the purpose of taking must be for public use and (2) just compensation must be given to the owner of the private property. - Apparently, Sec 92 of BP 881 justifies expropriation under the guise of police power regulation which cannot be validly done. Police power must be distinguished from the power of eminent domain. In the exercise of police power, there is a restriction of property interest to promote public welfare or interest which involves no compensable taking. When the power of eminent domain, however, is exercised, property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, necessitating compensation therefor. -Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the right of the community - The fact that one needs a franchise from government to establish a radio and television station while no license is needed to start a newspaper should not be made a basis for treating broadcast media any differently from the print media in compelling the former to "donate" airtime to respondent Comelec - I vote to declare assailed provision of the law unconstitutional

VITUG [concur and dissent] - I assent in most part to the majority opinion, particularly in holding that TELEBAP does not have standing and that the assailed law is a valid exercise of the state’s police power - the assailed law has not failed in meeting the standards set forth for its lawful exercise, i.e., (a) that its utilization is demanded by the interests of the public, and (b) that the means employed are reasonably necessary, and not unduly oppressive, for the accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the law. - (dissent part) I cannot consider COMELEC Resolution No. 2983-A, particularly Section 2 thereof (wherein COMELEC will PAY for airtime, but is considered invalid by the majority for being contrary to BP No. 881), as being in contravention of B.P. No. 881. There is nothing in the law that prohibits the COMELEC from itself procuring airtime, perhaps longer than that which can reasonably be allocated, if it believes that in so opting, it does so for the public good.

PANGANIBAN[dissent] - provision is unconstitutional for it confiscates priate property without due process and without just compensation, and denies broadcast media equal protection of laws. -The State does not own the airwaves and broadcast frequencies. It merely allocates, supervises and regulates their proper use. Thus, other than collecting supervision or regulatory fees which it already does, it cannot exact any onerous and unreasonable post facto burdens from the franchise holders, without due process and just compensation. Moreover, the invocation of the "common good" does not excuse the unbridled and clearly excessive taking to a franchisee's property - Assuming arguendo that the State owns the air lanes, the broadcasting companies already pay rental fees to the government for their use. Hence, the seizure of air time cannot be justified by the theory of compensation. - Airwaves and frequencies alone, without the radio and television owners' humongous investments amounting to billions of pesos, cannot be utilized for broadcasting purposes. Hence, a forced donation of broadcast time is in actual fact a taking of such investments without due process and without payment of just compensation. - I vote to declare assailed provision unconstitutional

LACSON V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MARTINEZ; January 20, 1999

NATURE Petition for prohibition and mandamus

FACTS - During the course of the investigation of the Kuratong Baleleng rub-out/shoot-out case, charges were filed before the Sandiganbayan. Among those charged as principal is petitioner Panfilo Lacson. - On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused in the said case filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of RA 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the “principal accused” are govt. officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. - In a Resolution dated May 8, 1996, the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the RTC of Q.C. which has original jurisdiction under RA 7975 as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. - While these motions for reconsideration were pending, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up, House Bill no. 2299 and no. 1094 along with Senate Bill no. 844 were introduced in Congress, defining and expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975. The bills later came into law as RA 8249. The law is entitled, “AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” and took effect on Feb. 25, 1997. - Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 RA 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law “shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.” Petitioner’s claims 1. The questioned provision of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner’s cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 2. Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner’s cases were under, namely, that trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused to procedural due process. 3. The title of the law is misleading in that it contains “innocuous” provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title-one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. - Intervenors added that the introduction of Sections 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan. They further claimed that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under RA 7957. - The Office of the Ombudsman as well as the Solicitor General filed pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and prayed that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.

ISSUES 1. WON Sections 4 and 7 of RA 8249 violates the petitioner’s and intervenors’ right to equal protection of the law 2. WON the retroactive application of RA 8249 is unconstitutional being an ex-post facto law 3. WON the challenged law violates the one-title-one-subject provisions of the Constitution 4. Whether it is the Sandiganbayan or RTC which should have jurisdiction over the case against herein petitioners and intervenors

HELD 1. No, this is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. Ratio Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. Reasoning No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. 2. No. RA 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Ratio An ex post facto law generally prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws or those laws that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. Reasoning. RA 7975 which amended PD 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a law, the retroactive application of RA 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. 3. No, RA 8249 does not violate the one-title-one-subject provisions. Ratio The requirement that every bill must have only one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. Reasoning There is sufficient compliance with such requirement in this case, since the title of RA 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of PD 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. The Congress, in employing the word “define” in the title of the law, acted within its powers granted unto it under Art. VIII sec. 2 of the Constitution. 4. The case is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan Ratio The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. Reasoning The multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenor falls under Sec.4 of RA 8249. Sec.4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in his relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Art. XIII Sec.5 of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, “in relation to their office as may be determined by law.”  This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the 1987 Constitution when it declared in Sec. 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.” - Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders. Disposition the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is reversed. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the RTC of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over said cases
 * As regards the question of whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers, an intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties “must be alleged in the Information.” As held in the case of US v Karelsen, every crime is made up of certain acts and intent which must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances.  In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.” It is essential that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as “he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.”

SORIANO V COURT OF APPEALS QUISUMBING; March 4, 1999

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the decision order of the CA which upheld the trial court’s decision holding petitioner in contempt and in revoking his probation

FACTS - Petitioner was convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide, serious physical injuries, and damage to property on December 7, 1993. He applied for and was granted probabtion on March 8, 1994 subject to among others the following conditions which are laid down by statute: > he shall meet his family obligations > he shall devote himself to a specific employment… > he shall indemnify the heirs of victim in the amount of 	P98,560.00 - On April 26, 1994, Assistant Prosecutor Fadera filed a motion to cancel Soriano’s probation due to his failure to satisfy his civil liabilities and for the alledged commission of a crime. The Parole and Probation Office opposed the motion and instead proposed that Soriano be allowed to submit a program of payment of his civil liability. - The petitioner failed to submit such program of payments as directed by the court despite several orders having been received by him. - On October 4, 1944, the Court found him in contempt of court, revoked the grant of probation, and ordered his arrest. Petitioner’s claims - his non submission of the required payment program was due to his poor financial condition. He relies on his parents for his sustenance and as such cannot formulate any program - The requirement for him to satisfy his civil liability to continue to avail of the benefits of the probation program is a violation of the constitutional proscription against unequal protection of the law. Only rich people can be included in the probation program if this condition is imposed. - His inability to meet the requirements of the meeting his family responsibilities and to engage in gainful employment is not deliberate on his part. It is the result of his poverty and being unskilled. The fact that he has a criminal record makes it even harder for him to get a job.

ISSUE WON the revocation of the petitioner’s probation is lawful and proper

HELD Ratio Yes. Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege given at the discretion of the court. In the same vein, the court may take back this privilege in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances. In this case, Soriano admitted having violated the conditions of his probation. He cannot now question the ordered revocation.

Reasoning - Petitioner was given chances to submit a payment program which he ignored. While he claims that these were not intentional. The SC believes otherwise. - Contrary to petitioner’s claim that enforcement of payment of civil liabilities is in violation of his constitutional right against unequal protection, the payment of  said liabilities is not a condition to entering the probation program. It is however impossible to waive payment of the imposed liabilities as the imposition of said civil liabilities is by law. - He was asked to submit a payment program so that he can design such program in accordance with his circumstances. The court did not impose on him any payment schedule. Disposition petition is denied.

LOONG V COMELEC (SUPRA IN CONSTI1)

AGUINALDO V COMELEC QUISUMBING; June 21, 1999

NATURE Original Action to the Supreme Court, Petition for Prohibition, Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order

FACTS - Petitioners, at the time of the filing of the petition, were incumbent provincial or municipal officials in Cagayan. Petitioners seek to prevent the COMELEC from enforcing during the 1998 elections Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) “in accordance with its own tenor or as modified by paragraph 3 of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436.” Petitioners’ claims 1. Section 67, of the Omnibus Election Code is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as its classification of persons running for office is not a valid classification, following the guidelines laid down by the Court in People v Cayat,  since it is not based on substantial distinctions. - According to petitioners, candidates for elective office are classified into the following groups under Section 67: “(a) First classification: an incumbent elective official who runs for the same position as his present incumbency …(and) another incumbent elective official running for another position; [the reelectionist is given an undue advantage since he is able to use the resources, prestige, and influence of his position.] (b) Second Classification: an incumbent elective official who runs for president or vice-president(and) another incumbent elective [official] running for any other position (i.e., not his incumbency nor for president or vice president)…” [There is no basis for giving candidates “special privilege”] -the classifications result into “absurd or unwanted and difficult situations”, and that the provision did not get sufficient attention and analysis that would have brought out its constitutional infirmities.” 2. Petitioners also argue that Section 67 effectively shortens the terms of office of elected officials, in violation of Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution Respondent’s Claim 1. COMELEC: The classification embodied in Section 67 is reasonable and based on substantial distinction: incumbents running for the same position are not considered resigned because the intention of the law is to allow them to continue serving their constituents and avoid a disruption in the delivery of essential services; those running for different positions are considered resigned because they are considered to have abandoned their present position by their act of running for other posts. 2. Solicitor General: the issue regarding Section 67 had already been passed upon by the Court in the case of Dimaporo v Mitra, Jr. where the Court ruled that the provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

ISSUES Procedural WON the petition for prohibition is already Moot and Academic Substantive WON the assailed Sections violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution

HELD Procedural YES Ratio Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli. Reasoning - This present petition is one for prohibition which is a preventive remedy. The act sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished with the holding of the 1998 elections. Substantive NO Reasoning - Section 67 was crafted with the intention of giving flesh to the constitutional pronouncement that public service is a public trust. - Section 67 is not violative of the Constitution as it does not unduly cut short the term of office of local officials. The situation that results with the application of Section 67 is covered by the term “voluntary renunciation”. - the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office Disposition instant petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

DE GUZMAN V COMELEC PURISIMA; July 19, 2000

NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996".

FACTS - RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V Ramos on June 11, 1996. Section 44 thereof provides: "SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district." - COMELEC promulgated Resolutions for the implementation thereof. COMELEC issued several directives reassigning the petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to different stations. - Petitioners assail the validity of Section 44 of RA 8189: 1. that it violates equal protection clause 2. that it violates security tenure of civil service employees 3. that it constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law 4. that it undermines the constitutional independence of COMELEC and COMELEC’s constitutional authority to name, designate and appoint and reassign and transfer its officials and employees 5. that it contravenes the basic constitutional percept that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which must me expressed in the title 6. that it is void for failure to comply with the constitutional requirement of three readings on separate days and distribution of printed copies in final form before its passage ISSUE WON Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid and constitutional

HELD YES Reasoning - Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity, and the Court discerns no ground to invalidate it. - The classification under Section 44 of RA 8189 satisfies the requirements for valid classification. The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. Without the complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out. Moreover, to require the COMELEC to reassign all employees (connected with the registration of voters) who have served at least four years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot of administrative burden on the part of the COMELEC. - Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the security of tenure of petitioners nor unduly deprive them of due process of law. The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law. - Untenable is petitioners’ contention that Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the authority of COMELEC to appoint its own officials and employees. As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said section provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its authority over its officials and employees. - The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here. There is no impairment or emasculation of its power to appoint its own officials and employees. In fact, Section 44 even strengthens the COMELEC’s power of appointment, as the power to reassign or transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and domain. - Contention that Section 44 has an isolated and different subject from that of RA 8189 and that the same is not expressed in the title of the law, is equally untenable. Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related and germane to the subject matter stated in the title of the law. The title of RA 8189 is "The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein. Disposition  petition is DISMISSED; and the constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of RA 8189 UPHELD.