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The Bengal famine of 1943 (Bengali: Pañcāśēra manbantara) was a major famine in the Bengal province[A][B] in British India during World War II. A food crisis developed in late 1942 and became a serious famine by mid 1942, lasting until the December 1943 crop was harvested, though continuing famine relief was needed for the next few months. Estimates are that between 1.5 and 4 million people died of starvation, malnutrition and disease, half of them dying from disease after food became available in December 1943 out of Bengal’s 60.3 million population Millions were impoverished.

Bengal’s primarily agrarian economy was vulnerable to famine. For at least a decade before the crisis, between half and three fourths of those dependent on agriculture were already at near subsistence level. Underlying causes of the famine included inefficient agricultural practices, and peasants losing their land to moneylenders and landlords through usury and land grabbing, and becoming landless labourers. The proximate causes of the famine were firstly those that reduced the supply of food. The food situation in India was tight from the beginning of the Second World War with a series of crop failures and localized famines which were dealt with successfully under the Indian Famine Codes. In Bengal in 1940-41 there was a small-scale famine although quick action by the authorities prevented widespread loss of life. India imported 2 million tons of grain a year in previous years. In early 1942 Bengal lost its main source of rice imports of rice imports due to the Japanese occupation of Burma (modern Myanmar) Bengal’s winter 1942 ‘aman’ rice crop, the most important one, was well below average because of drought; and it was then hit by a disastrous rice crop disease. . Bengal was hit by a cyclone and three tidal waves on October 16, 1942. An area of 450 square miles were swept by tidal waves, 400 square miles affected by floods and 3200 square miles damaged by wind and torrential rain. This killed 14,000 to 40,000people. Reserve stocks in the hands of cultivators, consumers and dealers were destroyed. ‘The homes, livelihood and property of nearly 2.5 million Bengalis were ruined or damaged.’ The districts affected were normally an important supplier of food to Greater Calcutta. For reasons including the cyclone, the loss of Burma rice, and large exports from Bengal in 1942 it was believed that a lot less rice was carried over uneaten from 1942 to 1943 than was usual: this carryover, made for reasons of taste and commercial prudence, would usually provide a valuable extra supply in a famine year. It was believed that the amount of food available fell further because of hoarding – people increasing their private stocks of grain from December 1943, and refusing to sell them or give them away even when people were starving in the streets outside.

A second set of causes was an increase in the number of people to be fed. The population was increasing by about 1.25 million per year. There was an influx of perhaps 300,000 to 500,000 refugees from Burma in the first half of 1942. A large, well fed, army was stationed in the province.

A third set of factors related to changes in who could afford to buy food. It was believed that wartime inflation and speculation by traders pushed up prices but increased the purchasing power of some urban workers even more, so they then ate far more than usual leaving insufficient food for the rest, with two thirds of the population going hungry, and up to a quarter going very hungry indeed. It has been argued that special arrangements for feeding factory workers had a similar effect. Landlords and moneylenders bought rice from indebted peasants at prices set months before the crisis, and, ignoring their traditional Bengali obligations to their communities, sold it in the cities at high prices, so peasants and landless labourers starved. A scorched earth policy was carried out in coastal areas to make it difficult for Japanese troops when they invaded, which they were expected to do shortly. Seizure of boats capable of holding ten people - the main transport in these areas - and seizure of local rice stocks caused serious difficulties.

There was at the time, and there remains, a great difference of opinion on which of these factors were most important and what should therefore have been done to deal with the famine. Some politicians, officials, and traders stated from late 1942 that the cuts in food supply plus an increase in people to be fed were enough to cause a serious famine in 1943 inevitable. Other politicians and officials stated, and may have believed, that in spite of these factors, Bengal had plenty of food available to feed its population, and even to export. The Famine Inquiry Commission showed in detail that the Government of India, the Government of Bengal, the governments of surplus provinces and politicians stated that Bengal had plenty of food and did not require imports, and the problems observed were due mainly to hoarding, inflation and speculation which could be dealt with administratively. The Government of India and the Government of Bengal used propaganda to try to persuade people to sell their hoarded grain. The Government of Bengal attempted to drive rice paddy prices down through price controls which merely created a thriving black market. It attempted to force speculators and hoarders to release their stocks, by buying up grain, then dumping it on the Calcutta market, to push prices down and make speculation appear unprofitable, but it was bought up immediately, without reducing prices.

This view dominated the political and administrative decision-making up to mid 1943 at least, losing influence as the evidence accumulated that their assumptions were contradicted by observations on the ground, as their policies proved ineffectual, and as it became clear that a major famine was in progress. It was not until the new Viceroy, Archibald Wavell, who was a successful general, took office in August 1943, that substantial quantities of grain started to move to Bengal: half a million tons of grain were eventually shipped there, but there was never enough food available to provide the minimum relief specified in the Famine Code. . The UK War Cabinet did not agree to provide shipping for India to import grain until Wavell, the Secretary of State for India and the Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff demanded it.

The Government of Bengal, which was responsible for famine relief, had a Famine Code which had worked well in the past, but in 1942 and 1943 it was slow to supply humanitarian aid. Relief efforts in the form of gruel kitchens, agricultural loans and test works were both insufficient and ineffective through the worst months of the food crisis. Relief increased when significant amounts of rice started to reach Bengal in the second half of 1943, and Bengal in October 1943 the military took control of distribution in the countryside, which had been largely ignored by the Government of Bengal, The record rice harvest of December 1942 greatly improved the situation. Massive corruption at all levels, including politicians, traders, and others right down to the people who were supposed to be issuing rations, was said to have been a contributing factor.

WHO RAN INDIA
Most contemporary observers and later commentators would lay some of the blame for failure to address the famine, and even for causing the famine, on the actions, or failures to act, of one or even all of the following institutions: The UK Government (usually referred to as the British Government), the Government of India, the Government of Bengal, the governments of provinces with food surpluses, and the military. These had very different powers and responsibilities, and there were conflicts.

The UK decisions relevant to the famine were made by the Imperial War Cabinet, which dealt with all war matters, notably the allocation of shipping for transport. The UK government appointed a Viceroy for all India (including the 500 princely Indian States, which were fully self governing) who was also Governor General of British India (which included the provinces of Bengal, Punjab etc) He could not and did not interfere with the running of the popular government. He ran India with the elite Indian Civil Service, consisting of 1186, mainly Indian, officials, according to the Government of India Act 1935.

Under the Defence of India Act, 1939, the Government of India was given the power to make far-reaching decisions on food, food storage, rationing etc., most of which were delegated to the provinces. Lord Linlithgow was Viceroy until August 1943 when Field Marshal WavellArchibald Wavell, took over. Five different people held the Government of India food portfolio in 1943, including the Viceroy in person from February to May 1943, and three different civil servants ran the Department, so there was no continuity of policy or administration.

The provinces of British India, including Bengal, were democratically elected, self-governing states which had full responsibility for their own food and agriculture, as well as police, but defence and foreign policy were reserved to the Government of India. In the famine period there were two democratically elected Bengal governments, that of A. K. Fazlul Huq (December 1941 to March 1943) and of Khawaja Nazimuddin's Muslim League (April 1943 to March 1945). The new Viceroy, Wavell, had to request permission from the Bengal Government before he could send in the army to distribute food in August 1943.

The Government of India’s role was primarily to negotiate inter-Provincial trade, and to issue regulations on this, though a late stage it did arrange the despatch of food to Bengal. It did not order Provinces to act, but advised, ‘In only two cases were directions given by the Governor General to provincial governments in matters of food: to Bengal regarding rationing and to Sind regarding the price of wheat.’ However, the Bengal Government refused to implement the rationing programme ordered in 1942 until May 1944, though it had proved very successful in Bombay. Provinces could and did ignore pressure from the Government of India and other provinces, for instance “The Punjab representative at the Fourth Food Conference emphasized that some 50 per cent of the combatant ranks of the Indian Army at that time were drawn from the farming classes of the Punjab and that ‘grave administrative and political repercussions would follow if rationing, statutory price control and requisition of food grains were put into force”. Even when the Government of India decreed that there should be free trade in grain so that Bengal could import food from other provinces, politicians, civil servants, local government officers and police obstructed the movement of grain to famine areas. ‘But men like Bhai Permanand say that though many traders want to export food [to Bengal] the Punjab Government would not give them permits. He testified to large quantities of undisposed-of rice being in the Punjab’

The military consisted of the Indian army, navy and air force (the largest volunteer army in history), plus units of allied (mostly UK) units stationed in India. It was controlled by the UK high command, and, ultimately the War Cabinet. Its immediate objectives were the protection of India from invasion and then the removal of Japanese occupiers of Burma, Malasia and neighbouring countries. Commanders emphasized that it could not meet these objectives without the goodwill and support of the Indian army, so the famine, and other policies harming the soldiers and their families, were considered to be a military disaster. . The incoming Viceroy (Field Marshal Wavell), the Commander in Chief, India, the Secretary of State for India and the Chiefs of Imperial General Staff made the most extreme representations to the War Cabinet - stating that famine conditions existed, that industrial production was being hampered, that civil disturbances could could break out distracting the army, and that there would be problems with the army if their families were starving and that “unless appropriate help was received, the Government of India could not be responsible for the continuing stability of India, nor for her capacity to serve as a base against Japan next year.”

In August the new Viceroy, Field Marshall Wavell, got permission from the Bengal Government to send in the army to distribute food to the rural areas, which had been ignored. From mid 1942 the military appears to have procured all its grain from outside Bengal, but it did buy all the fish, meat, eggs, milk and vegetables it could obtain locally. As these protective foods amounted to perhaps a third of the 4000 calorie army ration, this procurement had a major effect on local markets, and perhaps national markets. It was rumoured that British and Indian soldiers gave away much of their own rations to the starving, and what they could steal from army stocks, to the extent that the ability of the army to deal with threats was compromised.