User:Alaexis/RussianRoledraft

Russian role in the conflict
Although Russia offcially stayed neutral during the war it was involved in the conflict in several ways. It was the main source of weapons for both conflicting sides, it unoficially supported the Abkhaz side and finally Russia also carried out numerous humanitarian operations.

Arms used by Georgia were transferred to it under the bilateral agreements with Russia and included main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery and heavy mortars. The whole Akhaltsikhe motorised rifle division was turned over to Georgia on September 22, 1992. Some weapons were gained by local raids on Russian Army bases in Batumi, Akhalkalaki, Vaziani (near Tbilisi)and Poti by irregular Georgian paramilitary forces. After several attacks Russia declared it would defend its bases with force.

Abkhaz had very few heavy weapons at the beginning of the war although there was enough small firearms. The exact source of Abkhaz weapons prior to the conflict is unknown but apparently they could come only from Soviet/Russian forces. One of the sources was Gudauta Russian Army base which was raided in an effort to seize weapons. Corruption was also a reason behind the leakage of Russian arms to both sides.

From the outset of the hostilities Russia called upon both sides to negotiate and brokered several cease-fires which mostly proved ineffective.

The Russian attitude began to tilt futher in the Abkhaz side after the Russian Mi-8 helicopter (carrying humanitarian aid, according to Russian sources) was brought down by Georgians on October 27 which triggered retaliation from Russian forces. Furthermore another helicopter was shot down on December 14 in the Tkvarcheli district. The town of Tkvarcheli (Tkuarchal) had been besieged by Georgian forces and its population (mostly Abkhazians and Russians) suffered severe humanitarian crisis). Russian military helicopters supplied the city with food and medicine, as well as with "surface to surface" missiles and submachine guns.

This marked the turning point of the Russia's policy. At this period of the conflict Abkhaz obtained a large number of armor, tanks (T-72 and T-80) and heavy artillery. The question remains whether there were specific orders concerning the transfer of weapons to Abkhaz side and if there were whom they were issued by.

The most obvious example of Russian support to the Abkhaz side in 1993 was the bombing of Georgian-held Sukhumi by Russian fighter-bombers. The Russian Defence ministry consistently denied it but after Georgians succeeded in bringing down one SU-27 fighter-bomber and identified the dead pilot as Russian it became irrefutable. Nevertheless some equipment was turned over to Georgia according to the previous agreements in 1993.

On February 25, the Georgian Parliament appealed to the UN, European Council and Supreme Council of the Russian Federation demanding the withdrawal of Russian forces from Abkhazia and stating that Russia waged “an undeclared war” against Georgia.

Georgian Parliament adopted another resolution on April 28, 1993 which openly blamed Russia in political facilitation of ethnic cleansing and genocide against Georgians.



Some sources claim that such a complicated operation as the Sukhumi offensive (September 1993; it was undertaken by Abkhaz forces in three directions simultaneously) could not have succeeded without Russian help in logistics and supply. This offensive was launched in violation of the earlier cease-fire also mediated by Russia. As a reaction Russia cut off electricity and telephone service to Abkhazia, imposed sanctions on it and supported the UN declarations condemning Abkhaz side for breaching the cease-fire. Russian forces also returned to Georgians the essential artillery parts that had been turned over to them as a result of the cease-fire. However Russian forces on the Georgian-Abkhaz border who were supposed to police the cease-fire made no attempt to forestall the attack.

Humanitarian actions
In the beginning of the conflict (August, 1992) Russia evacuated many people from Abkhazian resorts by means of Black Sea fleet and Russian Airforce. As the war progressed Russia began to supply humanitarian aid to both sides; it also brokered numerous agreements concerning the exchange of prisoners-of-war. After the fall of Gagra Russia evacuated thousands of Georgians from there and allowed many more to cross the Russian border and return eventually to Georgia. In 1993 Russia continued to provide humanitarian aid to the town of Tkvarcheli besieged by Georgians. The landmines installed along the mountain highway to this town made helicopters the only safe means of transportation into it. After the fall of Sukhumi Russian Black Sea fleet participated in the evacuation of tens of thousands of Georgians from it.

Reaction
''The separatists with an aid of Russian troops were marinating geopolitical interests of Russian Federation that wanted to control the most part of Black sea coast in Caucasus. As the times went by the conflict turned into distinct war between Georgia and Russia. Georgians were driving away by Russian forces from their native territory to which people from Northern Caucasus, Russia and the Middle East were emigrating.''

"The Georgians had therefore to conclude that they had effectivelly lost not only the best part of their army during the fighting in 1993, but also control over Abkhazia: while this is not recognized internationally as an independent country, it is meanwhile de-facto established as an independent territory – to a large degree due to deployment of Russian Army “peacekeepers”, who ever since control the administrative border between Georgia and Abkhazia. To make matters worse, in the late 1990s the Russians improved their relations to Abkhazia, and Moscow meanwhile brought several new laws, enabling 'other countries' to become members of the Russian Federation."

This move was obviously undertaken as an offer to Abkhazia, and was considered as quite sarcastic by many in the West, given that simultaneously the Russians are undertaken whatever they can in order bring down Chechen separatism.

Russia's leaders, dismayed at Russia's loss of status as a superpower, seek to have Russia be at least a regional power. They have never given up their claim of authority over former U.S.S.R. territory and want to restore their authority in these areas. They want to maintain their power and military bases in the territory of the former U.S.S.R.

Oxford Professor S.N. MacFarlane, notes on the issue of Russian mediation in Abkhazia:
 * Notably, it is clear that Russian policy makers are uncomfortable with the idea of a prominent role being granted to external actors in dealing with conflict in the former Soviet space. More recently, this has been extended specifically to he activities of international organisations in the management of conflict. As one group of influential Russian foreign policy commentators and policy makers put it in May 1996, 'it is definitely not in Russia’ s interest to see outside mediation and peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union'. (511)
 * [...] Russia has clear hegemonic aspirations in the former Soviet space. Although a wide array of opinions is expressed on Russian policy in the newly independent states in the media and in parliament, a dominant consensus appears to have emerged among foreign policy influentials on the need for active presence and influence in the area. Such views have been widely expressed in official statements, influential statements by independent policy groups, and by advisers to the president, influential political figures, and the president himself. The hegemonic component of Russian policy in the ` near abroad’ is evident in its efforts to restore Russian control over the external borders of the former Soviet Union, to reassume control over the Soviet air defence network, to obtain agreements on basing Russian forces in the non-Russian republics, and by its obvious sensitivity to external military presences (including multilateral ones) on the soil of the former Soviet Union. To judge from Russian policy on Caspian Sea and Central Asian energy development, it extends beyond the political/security realm and into the economic one. Its sources are diverse, and include the Russian imperial hangover, but more practically the fate of the Russian diaspora, the lack of developed defences along the borders of the Russian Federation proper, concern over Islam, and discomfort with the spill-over effects of instability in the other republics. (521)

One of the main targets of Russia's claims was Georgia. The Russians allegedly provoked the South Ossetians into fighting for separatism from Georgia. Russia also helped to defeat Georgian forces in Abkhazia; with Georgia weakened, Russia was able to restore much of its influence in Georgia.

The civil war in Georgia was inspired, plotted, and provoked by forces from outside Georgia, particularly in Russia. Russian civilian and military intelligence organizations perpetuated the civil war. The Russians denied involvement and spoke of an Abkhazian navy and army, but how could 70,000 people acquire tanks and bombers. Russian Defense Minister Grachev went so far as to claim that Georgians had painted aircraft to look Russian and then bombed the port city of Sukhumi themselves. Professor Gachechiladze indicated that he thought that former Georgian leader Gamsakhurdia did not commit suicide, as was announced, but was killed.

Leonid Radzikhovsky is a political analyst and independent journalist:


 * The tangled and antagonizing history of relations between Georgia and Russia from 1991 through to 2004 awaits scrupulous analysis. Attempting any guess as to who is to blame is useless at the moment. It may have been Zviad Gamsakhurdia with his affected anti-Russian hysteria; Russian generals who helped the Abkhazians to fight with the Georgians; Shamil Basayev’s Abkhazian battalion engaged in the massacre of the Georgians, who believed that it was directed by Moscow; the U.S., convinced that a pro-American Georgia must preferably be anti- Russian; or the warlord Ruslan Gelayev and his gang that took hiding in the Pankisi Gorge. No one can draw a commonly shared opinion on all of these factors today. Moreover, it is unwise to build relations that are based on the balance sheet of past reciprocal offenses.


 * It seems to me that gaining new territories is precisely the thing that Russia does not need these days. Moreover, if it does need new territories, it is worthwhile seeking them in any other place, even on the North Pole, but not in the Caucasus. I dare say that Chechnya is quite enough for us now. To support foreign separatism means to throw stones at your neighbors while living in a glass house. Should we really do it even if we love our neighbors so dearly? Supporting the separatists may have played into our hands – we have something to bargain over. If our goal is to wipe out the terrorists in their backyards, then Russia must offer Georgia a compromise. The Georgians have an interest in restoring their territorial integrity. The Russians have an interest in building an alliance with Georgia to fight against terrorists.

On August 28, Senator Richard Lugar, then visiting Georgia's capital Tbilisi, joined the Georgian politicians in criticism of the Russian peacekeeping mission, stating that "the U.S. administration supports the Georgian government’s insistence on the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the conflict zones in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali district."