User:Alansplodge/sandbox/Second Battle of Tobruk

The Axis capture of Tobruk, also known as the Fall of Tobruk or the Second Battle of Tobruk (17–21 June 1942) was a battle of the Western Desert Campaign of the Second World War, fought in Libya between Axis forces (Germany and the Italy) of the Panzer Army Africa (Panzerarmee Afrika, which included the Afrika Korps) commanded by Generalleutnant) Erwin Rommel) and Allied (British Imperial and Commonwealth) forces (United Kingdom, Indian Empire, and South Africa) of the Eighth Army commanded by General Neil Ritchie).

The strategic port of Tobruk had previously withstood an eight month siege by Axis forces, the Siege of Tobruk, before being relieved in December 1941, and during that time had become a emblem of resistance. Because British commanders had previously decided not to defend Tobruk for a second time, the defences had become depleted and it was provided with a largely inexperienced garrison, although an immense stockpile of supplies of every description had been built up there for a planned British offensive. However, because of a successful Axis offensive, known as the Battle of Gazala which started 26 May 1942, the town had again come under threat. Following the intervention of British prime minister, Winston Churchill, who placed great store on the symbolic value of Tobruk, there was an exchange of ambiguous signals which resulted in the fortress town becoming isolated, rather than evacuated as had been planned. Once Rommel had deployed his forces around the perimeter, an armoured assault was launched, accompanied by a devastating air attack, which resulted in the capture of the town and 33,000 of its garrison, within twenty four hours. It was the second largest capitulation of British Empire forces in the war.

The sudden loss of Tobruk came as a severe blow to the British leadership and prompted a political crisis in Britain. Unexpectedly, sympathy for the British position by the United States created a closer bond between the Allies and prompted the dispatch of desperately needed modern weapons for British use in the theatre. Meanwhile, the Axis commanders believed that the additional supplies that they had captured and the disorganised state of the British forces, would enable them to occupy Egypt. Pursuing this objective entailed the postponement of a planned invasion of Malta; the failure to carry this out meant that the island was still able to interdict the Axis supply lines to North Africa. The Axis offensive into Egypt had been halted by the beginning of July 1942, meaning that no long term advantage had been gained by the capture of Tobruk.

Background
The strategic port of Tobruk in Italian Cyrenaica had been fortified by the Italians from 1935. Behind two old outlying forts, they constructed an innovative fortification, consisting of a double line of concrete-lined trenches 54 kilometres long, connecting 128 weapons pits protected by concealed anti-tank ditches. However, these defences lacked overhead protection and defence in depth.

Tobruk was captured by Australian forces in January 1941 during Operation Compass, the first large Allied military operation of the Western Desert Campaign. Following the arrival of the German Afrika Korps commanded by Erwin Rommel in Operation Sonnenblume in March, Axis forces retook much of the lost territory in Cyrenaica; Tobruk became isolated and was besieged between April and December 1941. Using the existing Italian defences, the initial attacks by Axis forces were not well organised and had been thrown back by the 30,000 strong Australian garrison (in September replaced by a British and Allied force), allowing time for the fortifications to be further enhanced. Kept supplied from the sea and able to resist later Axis assaults, Tobruk represented a threat to the Axis lines of communications and denied them the use of the port, as well as tying down four Italian divisions and three German battalions, a force twice the size of the garrison. During 1941, the defence of Tobruk became a symbol of the British Empire's war effort and it's relief the object of two unsuccessful offensives, code named Operation Brevity in May and Operation Battleaxe in June. Finally, fierce fighting in Operation Crusader during November and December 1942 ended the siege and forced Rommel and the Axis forces out of Cyrenaica into Tripolitania.

The pattern almost repeated itself early in 1942. Resupplied with more modern tanks, Rommel's second offensive saw him reoccupy western Cyrenaica, but this time he ran out of steam west of Gazala. This was followed by a lull in the fighting. The British build up their Gazala Line, actually a series of fortified positions known as "boxes", defended by extensive minefields, and both sides prepared for a new offensive. Rommel moved first, his offensive, known to the British as the Battle of Gazala, commenced on 28 May. Poorly armed and armoured British tanks and poor coordination allowed Rommel to defeat the Eighth Army armour piecemeal, and by 13 June, they had begun to retreat eastwards towards Egypt, eventually leaving Tobruk vunerable.

German plans
On 1st May 1942, a meeting of Axis leaders with Adolf Hitler and Albert Kesselring, the Wehrmacht Commander-in-Chief South, represnting Germany, and Benito Mussolini and Ugo Cavallero, the Chief of the Defence Staff representing Italy, was held at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden. It was decided that Rommel should start an offensive at the end of May codenamed Unternehmen Venezia ("Operation Venice"); the object of which was to capture Tobruk. If successful, Rommel was to go no further east than the Egyptian border and take up defensive positions while an invasion of Malta codenamed Operation Herkules was undertaken, scheduled for mid-July. The capture of Malta would secure the Axis supply lines to North Africa, before allowing Rommel to invade Egypt, with the Suez Canal as the final objective. Axis planning had been given considerable assistance after the Italian Military Information Service had broken the "Black Code" used by Colonel Bonner Fellers, the U.S. military attaché in Cairo, to send detailed and often critical reports to Washington of the British war effort in the theatre.

British plans for Tobruk
In a meeting held in Cairo on 4th February 1942, the Commanders-in-Chief of the British Middle East Command considered what their course of action should be in the event of a further successful Axis offensive, the front line at that time being only 30 miles west of Tobruk. The commanders knew how valuable the port would be to Axis forces, but decided against allowing it to endure another siege. General Sir Claude Auchinleck was reluctant to have a valuable division tied down as a garrison, especially as reinforcements might be urgently needed for Persia and Iraq; Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham could no longer risk the loss of shipping which had been incurred supplying the garrison during the first siege and Air Marshal Sir Peter Drummond (deputy to Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder), contended that it might prove impossible to provide fighter cover for the port. Accordingly, Auchinleck drafted orders for Lieutenant-General Neil Ritchie, the commander of Eighth Army, that in the event of being forced to make a further withdrawal, although he was to make every effort to prevent Tobruk from being taken, he was not to allow his forces to be surrounded there. If the fall of Tobruk was imminent, "the place should be evacuated and the maximum amount of destruction carried out in it", while a firm defence line should be established further east on the Egyptian border. This withdrawal arrangement was formalised as Operation Freeborn.

By 14 June, Rommel's offensive had forced Ritche to order the withdrawal of the units holding the Gazala positions, the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division and the 1st South African Infantry Division, towards the Egyptian border in accordance with Operation Freeborn. On the previous day, Auchinleck had confirmed to Ritchie that, if all else failed, the frontier should be "a rallying point". However, Auchinleck now began to reassess the Tobruk position. Neither he nor Ritchie wanted to lose the considerable stockpiles of fuel, munitions and other stores which had been built up at the port for the intended British offensive. Furthermore, on the morning of 14 June, he had received a message from Winston Churchill urging that "retreat would be fatal". Therefore, Auchinleck signalled ordering Ritchie to hold a line from Acroma to El Adem, which would screen Tobruk. The order was not received by Ritchie until two hours before his carefully organised night withdrawal was due to start; too late to alter the movement. The 50th and 1st South African divisions were saved from encirclement, but were irrevocably moving away from the line which Auchinleck intended them to hold. Ritchie informed Auchinleck that he would attempt to hold the Acroma-El Adem line with troops from XXX Corps, but warned that if this failed, Tobruk might either become "temporarily isolated" or be evacuated, and asked which option was to be taken. Auchinleck replied that "On no account will any part of Eighth Army be allowed to be surrounded in Tobruk and invested there", which Ritchie interpreted as meaning that he should evacuate Tobruk if there were an Axis breakthrough.

On the morning of 15 June, the situation was confused further by a message from Churchill which included the phrase: "Presume there is no question in any case of giving up Tobruk?". Auchinleck replied to Churchill that Ritchie had a sufficient garrison to hold Tobruk should it become isolated. Auchinleck then signalled to Ritchie that although Tobruk was "not to be invested", it could be "isolated for short periods" and that he should organise the garrison accordingly. In the meantime, it was becoming clear to Ritchie that an Axis breakthrough of the Acroma-El Adem line was imminent.

Tobruk isolated
The area around El Adem was held by 29th Indian Infantry Brigade under the command of Denys Whitehorn Reid. On 15 June, El Adem itself was attacked three times by the German 90th Light Infantry Division but were repulsed by the defenders. Simultaneously, an attack by 21st Panzer Division on a defended area called Point B 650 some 8 kilometres north of El Adem was defeated by the Indians and the 7th Motor Brigade; however a second attack succeeded later that evening. The attacks on El Adem were discontinued after further reverses, but the threat of being surrounded caused its evacuation on the night of 16/17 June. This left the airfields on the coast at RAF Gambut vulnerable, causing the Desert Air Force to withdraw eastwards, severely limiting the available air support. The last outpost of the defensive line was Belhamed, a hill adjacent to Sidi Rezegh, which was held by the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade, a new formation. On 17 June, 4th Armoured Brigade was ordered to attack, hoping to take the flank of the German armour, now supplemented by 15th Panzer Division, as it moved northwards towards the coast. The brigade had been hurriedly reformed after the Gazala battles and had about 90 tanks operated by a number of composite units, but lacked much of its artillery which had been detached to form harassing columns. After an engagement lasting most of the afternoon, the British brigade withdrew to refit and then towards Egypt having lost thirty two tanks. With no other support available, 20th Indian Brigade were ordered to withdraw during that night, but were caught as the German armour reached the coast at Gambut and two of its battalions were captured. The next morning, 18 June, Rommel was able to report to Berlin that Tobruk had been surrounded and was under siege.

British Empire
The main body of the Tobruk garrison was the 2nd South African Infantry Division under the command of Major General Hendrik Klopper. The division consisted of only two brigades, 3rd South African Infantry Brigade and 6th South African Infantry Brigade together with a number of other attached units. The 2nd Division was not highly experienced but had captured Bardia and Sollum during Operation Crusader in January. They had been based in Tobruk since the end of March, although Klopper had not taken command of the division until 14 May, having previously been a divisional staff officer. Klopper had taken command of all troops within the Tobruk perimeter on 15 June. On the following day, Lieutenant-General William Gott, commanding XIII Corps (United Kingdom) whose headquarters were still in the port, suggested that he should take command himself; however he was overruled by Ritchie and withdrew, leaving of his three staff officers to assist Klopper. The South African brigades held the west and southwest of the perimeter which had borne the brunt of the fighting in the previous siege.

Other formations in Tobruk were: 32nd Army Tank Brigade with about sixty serviceable infantry tanks, mostly Valentines with a few Matilda IIs; the 201st Guards Motor Brigade with three infantry battalions, only one of which was actually a Guards unit; and finally, the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade with three battalions, one of which was a Gurkha unit, and one was the experienced Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders; also attached to the brigade was a composite infantry battalion made up from various units in the 1st South African Division known as "Beergroup". The Indian brigade was deployed to the east and south of the perimeter.

Between these formations were three regiments of field artillery and two of medium artillery, the latter possessing sixteen 4.5-inch medium guns and sixteen M1918 155 mm howitzers between them. In the various anti-tank batteries in Tobruk there were fifteen new 6-pounders, thirty two of the older and less effective 2-pounders and eight Bofors 37 mm anti-tank guns. The total number of anti-aircraft guns was eighteen 3.7-inch heavy and a regiment of light guns.

Although many non-essential troops had been evacuated, there remained a number of administrative units under the command of a brigadier. Unnecessary shipping had also been evacuated, however some small coastal vessels and a shore-based Naval Establishment were retained. The fighter aircraft of 40 Squadron SAAF had been withdrawn from the airfield within the perimeter, but a forward air control unit, known as a "tentacle", remained. The combat squadrons of the Desert Air Force had been compelled to move to airfields at Sidi Barrani which put Tobruk beyond the range of all their fighters, with the exception of No. 250 Squadron RAF which operated Curtiss P-40D Kittyhawks, able to carry drop tanks.

State of the fortifications
Owing to the earlier decision not to allow Tobruk to endure another siege, little work had been done to maintain or repair Tobruk's defences since its relief. In many places, the trenches and the anti-tank ditch had collapsed or filled with drifting sand, and part of the ditch had been deliberately filled-in to allow the British armour to deploy during the December 1941 breakout. Large quantities of barbed wire and land mines had been removed to bolster the Gazala defences, while some of the old Italian mines which remained were found to be defective. Some work had been done by South African engineers to remedy the situation but there is conflicting evidence as to the actual condition of the defences at the start of the siege.

Axis
A plan for the rapid capture of Tobruk had been agreed between Kesselring and Cavallero on 10 June, consisting of an attack in stages from the south and west. Rommel favoured a plan which he had originally devised in October 1941, attacking from the southeast, where the ground was flatter than the gullied terrain in the southwest. He began to deploy his forces to their initial positions on 18 June.

On the western end of the line, was the Italian XXI Corps comprising, extending southwards from the coast, 7th Bersaglieri Regiment, the 60th Infantry Division Sabratha and the 102nd Motorised Division Trento. At the southwest corner of the perimeter was the German 15th Rifle Brigade. To the south was the Italian X Corps with the 27th Infantry Division Brescia forward and the 17th Infantry Division Pavia in reserve. In the southeast corner, the German 90th Light Infantry Division and the massed German and Italian artillery. On the eastern boundary was the Italian XX Motorised Corps with the 101st Motorised Division Trieste forward, while its two armoured divisions, 132nd Armoured Division Ariete was in the southwest at Bir er Reghem and the badly depleted 133rd Armoured Division Littorio was moving in behind it. The two Afrika Korps armoured formations, 15th Panzer Division and 21st Panzer Division, were in the east, on either side of the village Kambut.

Kesselring had warned that all Axis air assets had to be withdrawn by the end of June in preparation for the invasion of Malta, so an early result was imperative. There were about 150 bombers available of various types, mostly German, including 40 to 50 fighter bombers and 21 Junkers Ju 87 "Stuka" dive bombers. About 50 German and 100 Italian fighters were also within range. The recent capture of airfields close to the Tobruk perimeter allowed for rapid refuelling and rearming.

Initial dispositions
Wishing make swift use of the of the disorganisation amongst the British forces, Rommel issued his orders for the assault on 18 June and reconnaissance of the allotted deployment areas commenced early the next day. Starting in the afternoon of 19 June and through that night, the Afrikakorps armoured formations changed places with 90th Light Division, so that they were facing the southeastern corner of the perimeter, occupied by the inexperienced 2nd Battalion, 5th Mahratta Light Infantry. The 15th Panzer Division was on the left of the attack and 21st Panzer on the right, with a motorised infantry group (detached from 90th Division and commanded by Generalleutnant Erwin Menny) in the centre. The XX Italian Corps was to attack further to the left, followed by X Corps, which was tasked with occupying and holding the perimeter defences. In the west, XXI Corps was to make a feint attack to pin down the South African brigades, while in the east, 90th Division was tasked with fending off any attempt to relieve Tobruk by the main body of Eighth Army. When the combined German and Italian artillery forces arrived at their positions near El Adem, they found a stockpile of their ammunition which had been abandoned in November and had never cleared away.

Breakthrough
The assault opened at 5:20 am on 20 June with an intense air bombardment on the southeastern perimeter. The Luftwaffe flew 588 sorties on that day, the highest operational density achieved in the Mediterranean theatre, while the Regia Aeronautica flew 177. The total weight of bombs dropped was more than 365 tonnes. The "Menny" group began their attack at 7:00 am, which coincided with the opening of the artillery barrage, which had been delayed because the various batteries had been late arriving at their locations; a breach in the line between two strong points had made at 7:45. The German 900th Engineer Battalion were able to make crossings over the anti-tank ditch using prefabricated bridging equipment; the first German tanks were across the ditch by 8:30, by which time, several strong points had been taken by the infantry, creating a bridgehead two kilometres wide. The Mahrattas committed their reserves in an unsuccessful counter attack and although they had been given to understand that a tank battalion would be coming to their assistance, this never materialised. Meanwhile, the Ariete Division, the spearhead of XX Corps, had failed to penetrate the line held by 2nd Battalion, Cameron Highlanders, and so were redirected into the breach made by the Afrikakorps and then deployed westwards towards Fort Pilastrino.

Failed counterattack
At Klopper's headquarters, after initially believing the attack in the southeast to be a feint, it was thought that timely orders had been issued for a counter attack to be organised by 32nd Army Tank Brigade, supported by whatever elements of the Guards and Indian brigades they required. However, this intention was not understood at the tank brigade headquarters and only 4th Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) was ordered to attack; the assistance of a battlegroup from 3rd Coldstream Guards was declined through lack of orders. The counterattack might have succeeded if it had gone in with full force while the Axis armour was still making its way across the anti-tank ditch, but by the time first contact had been made, the Afrika Korps had been moving into the perimeter for an hour and a half, and the Ariete armoured division was established on their left. The other tank battalion in the British brigade, 7th RTR, moved up in support on their own initiative, but half were diverted to assist the Camerons. This allowed the Afrika Korps to defeat the British armour in detail, aided by constant attack from the air. The only British air raid that morning was called in by the forward control "tentacle" to bomb Axis vehicles moving through the southeast breach, and was carried out by nine Douglas Bostons escorted by long-range Kittyhawk fighters.

Consolidation
By 1:30 pm, the Afrikakorps had reached focus of their attack, the vital road junction known as "King's Cross" which was on the crest of the Pilastrino Ridge and overlooked the town of Tobruk some nine kilometres away to the north. From there, 21st Panzer headed directly for the town, in the process scattering the remaining tanks of 7th RTR. The last obstacle for the panzers was a mixed bag of various artillery units which put up a stiff defence, including the effective fire of several 3.7-inch anti-aircraft guns in the anti-tank role; Rommel later praised their "extraordinary tenacity". At 4:00 pm, General Klopper incorrectly thought that his headquarters to the southwest of the town was in danger of being overrun and ordered a hurried evacuation in which much of the communication equipment was destroyed; Klopper finally relocated to the headquarters of 6th South African Brigade in the northwest of the fortress at 6:30. The leading German units did not reach the outskirts of the town until 6:00 pm. At about the same time, British engineers and logistic troops began the task of destroying the immense quantities of fuel, water, ammunition and stores in the town along with the demolition of the port facilities. Meanwhile, 15th Panzer had begun to advance westwards along the Pilastrino Ridge, where elements of the 201st Guards Brigade had taken up exposed positions at short notice. When their brigade headquarters was overrun at about 6:45, most of the units either stopped fighting or withdrew to Fort Pilastrano towards the western end of the ridge; however, 15th Panzer ended their advance since they were under orders to cover the approach of 21st Panzer towards the town, which was reported taken at 7:00 pm. The final evacuation of small naval vessels had been carried out under fire; fifteen craft escaped but twenty-five, including a minesweeper, were sunk in the harbour or lost to air attacks on the passage to Alexandria.

British options
At last light, the Axis units halted for the night. The remnants of the British units in the eastern sector of the fortress prepared themselves for all-round defence, while the South African brigades had not been engaged except for some diversionary activity. From Klopper's new headquarters came a signal that all units should prepare for a mass breakout at 10:00 pm and a message to Eighth Army HQ that "Am holding out but I do not know for how long". The 8th Army staff suggested that the breakout should be on the following night (i.e. 21/22 June) and that it was essential that all the fuel stocks be destroyed. Although General Ritchie had ordered 7th Armoured Division to move north towards Sidi Rezegh which is southeast of the Tobruk perimeter, there is no evidence that they advanced very far or ever threatened the Axis cordon. There than followed a series of discussions between Klopper and his available brigadiers and staff officers, during which the various options were discussed in some depth. The chances of a successful breakout were impeded by the fact that the 2nd South African Division was not a motorised formation, and many of the vehicles they did possess were in the town and now in enemy hands. The option to stand and fight in the western sector was considered, but the main ammunition dumps had also been captured. At 2:00 am on 21 June, Klopper signalled to Eighth Army HQ that he would attempt a breakout that evening and in the meantime, would "fight to the last man and the last round".

Surrender
As dawn approached Klopper underwent a change of heart and concluded that further fighting would not be worth the cost in casualties. An exchange of signals at 6:00 am between Klopper and Ritchie elicited the response that "I cannot tell tactical situation and therefore leave you to act on your own judgement regarding capitulation". Shortly after this, German officers were invited to Klopper's headquarters to finalise the details. Orders to surrender were sent out and were received with astonishment by those units who had scarcely been engaged. Some units didn't receive the order at all; the 2nd Battalion, 7th Gurkha Rifles, on the eastern perimeter, fought on until that evening, while the Cameron Highlanders continued fighting until the morning of 22 June. Captain Sainthill of the Coldstream Guards with 199 of his officers and men, were able to breakout of the southwest perimeter in their battalion transport and rejoin the Eighth Army. A small group of the Kaffrarian Rifles escaped eastwards along the coast and reached El Alamein 38 days later.

Rommel had entered the town at 5:00 am and established his headquarters at the Hotel Tobruk. A meeting was arranged with Klopper, who surrendered personally to Rommel on the Via Balbia about 6 kilometres west of Tobruk town at 9:40 am on 21 June.

Analysis
It was the second largest capitulation of British Empire forces in the war after the fall of Singapore, and the biggest defeat in the history of the Union Defence Force. The Germans left the task of housing the prisoners to the Italians, who lacked the infrastructure to treat the prisoners in accordance with the Geneva Convention. The prisoners were crammed into open pens to await deportation and were left seriously short of food and water. Conditions improved after the prisoners had been transported in cargo ships to Italy. Many of them, especially South Africans, were subject to recriminations from other prisoners who felt that Tobruk had surrendered too easily. At the Italian armistice in September 1943, many prisoners escaped, including Klopper who was rescued by Major Vladimir Peniakoff, whose Popski's Private Army was operating nearby.

Despite efforts to destroy the fuel at Tobruk, the Axis recovered some 1,400 tonnes with a further 20 at Belhamed. Amongst the 2,000 vehicles recovered were 30 serviceable tanks and it has been estimated that Rommel was using some 6,000 captured British lorries by the end of that month. Also taken in Tobruk were 7,000 tonnes of water and 3 million rations of food, amounting to some 5,000 tonnes. Because of the tenuous supply line that Rommel depended on, his troops had been living on very short rations and the British supplies were enthusiastically received, especially chocolate, canned milk and vegetables. Even stores of shirts and socks were enthusiastically looted. The equally deprived Italian troops tended to be excluded from the plundering.

On 21 June, Churchill was in the White House in Washington conferring on the future direction of the war with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, a summit meeting known as the Second Washington Conference. An American aide arrived with the news of the Tobruk's surrender which he gave to the president, who then passed it to the prime minister. Churchill recalled in his memoirs: "I did not attempt to hide from the President the shock I had received. It was a bitter moment. Defeat is one thing; disgrace is another. Nothing could exceed the sympathy and chivalry of my two friends. There were no reproaches; not an unkind word was spoken. "What can we do to help?" said Roosevelt. I replied at once, "Give us as many Sherman tanks as you can spare, and ship them to the Middle East as quickly as possible.”"

- Winston S. Churchill

Roosevelt immediately asked the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General George Marshall, to see what could be done. Marshall's initial response was to order the US 2nd Armored Division, which was training with the new M4 Sherman tanks, to prepare to move to Egypt. However, when it became apparent that this new formation could not be made operational until the autumn, Marshall decided to send three hundred of their Shermans, together with a hundred M7 105 mm Self Propelled Guns, along with spare parts and one hundred and fifty instructors, in a fast convoy, the first shipment of which left the United States on 1 July.

General Alan Brooke, the British Chief of the General Staff, who was also in the room when the news broke, later wrote: "I always feel that the Tobruk episode in the President's study did a great deal towards laying the foundations of friendship and understanding built up during the war between the President and Marshall on the one hand and Churchill and myself on the other."

- Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke

On 25 June a by-election in Maldon, Essex was won by Tom Driberg, a left-wing journalist standing as an independent, who garnered sixty percent of the vote, heavily defeating the Conservative Party candidate. Churchill and others directly attributed the defeat to the loss of Tobruk only four days previously; however, Driberg himself denied this was a major factor, suggesting instead that it was part of a wider swing to the left and away from the established political parties.

In parliament, there was a growing feeling that Churchill was responsible for the muddle an lack of direction in the management of the war, despite his continued popularity with the public. Labour Party MP Aneurin Bevan attempted to force a parliamentary enquiry into Churchill's role in the defeats at Gazala and Tobruk, but was successfully opposed by Clement Atlee, the Labour Deputy Prime Minister in the wartime coalition. When a right-wing Conservative, Sir John Wardlaw-Milne, tabled a motion of no-confidence in the coalition government, there was speculation that it might go the way of the "Norway Debate" which had led to the resignation of the previous prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, after military failure in the Norwegian Campaign in May 1940. The debate opened on 1 July and the following day, Bevan attacked Churchill by saying that he "fights debates like a war, and war like a debate". Churchill replied with (according to Anthony Eden) "one of his most effective speeches", and the government won by 425 votes to 25.

The Nazi hierarchy shared Churchill's view of the symbolic importance of Tobruk, and Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Propaganda, made much of its capture. On 22 June, Hitler promoted Rommel to Generalfeldmarschall, making him the youngest field marshal in the German Army, much to the annoyance of senior Italian officers. Although Rommel undoubtedly considered it a great honour, he later confided to his wife that he would rather of been given another division. Mussolini was also jubilant and is said to have ordered that a suitable white horse be found for his triumphal entry into Cairo.

Casualties
The number of British Empire prisoners taken in the battle is not known precisely because all the British records were lost, but the estimate in the British official history, the History of the Second World War, is given below:

Axis casualty figures are not known either, but the total German casualties for the fighting since 26 May (including the Gazala fighting) were reported as 3,360 of whom 300 were officers, so the losses for 20-22 June would have been considerably less than that.

Rommel's drive into Egypt
In the afternoon of 21 June, Kesselring visited Rommel's headquarters and reminded him of the agreement that the invasion of Malta would follow the capture of Tobruk and that his air assets were already being returned to Italy for that purpose. The next day, a senior Italian staff officer arrived with orders from General Bastico to halt; Rommel, now a field marshal, was able to decline this "advice". He had in his possession the latest pessimistic report from Fellers in Cairo to Washington on the British dispositions, which concluded with the phrase; "If Rommel intends to take the Delta, now is the time". Furthermore, the supplies captured at Tobruk now made that possible.

On 22 June, Rommel short-circuited the existing chain of command by writing to Mussolini via the German attaché in Rome, Enno von Rintelen, requesting that the offensive be allowed to continue and that the Malta invasion be postponed to preserve his air support. Mussolini forwarded the letter to Hitler who had been harbouring doubts about the Malta operation; her replied the next day with an effusive letter which agreed with Rommel's suggestion and urged Mussolini not to let the opportunity slip away, stating that "the goddess of success passes generals only once".

The British retreat soon degenerated into a rout. Ritchie decided not to regroup at the border as planned, but further east at the fortified port of Mersa Matruh. At this juncture, Auchinleck relieved Ritchie of his command on 25 June, taking personal charge of Eighth Army and began a further withdrawal to a better position at El Alamein. On the next day however, Rommel arrived at the British positions at Matruh and broke through in the centre. The Battle of Mersa Matruh was another muddled disaster for the Eighth Army, but the Axis force was unable to prevent them from breaking out and falling back on El Alemein. Increasingly under attack by the Desert Air Force and moving further away from his own air support, Rommel hoped that a swift central attack on the new British positions might succeed in the same way as at Mersa Matruh, but the first three days of fighting in the First Battle of El Alamein was to represent the furthest advance eastwards of the Panzer Army Africa.