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The Battle of Fort Rupel occurred during the first stage of the German invasion of Greece in World War II, when the Wehrmacht launched its attack against the Metaxas Line. The defenders of Fort Rupel near the Greek-Bulgarian border managed to hold their positions from 6 to 10 April and surrendered only after the capitulation of the Greek Army capitulated.

Background
The German attack was undertaken by the 125th Infantry Regiment of the Wehrmacht, which was reinforced with a battalion of the 5th Mountain Division. Commander of the German regiment was Brigadier Wilhelm Schneckenburger, who had previous experience in the Battle of France and especially in the operations against the Maginot Line.

According to the plan the 18th Corps under Boehme was to break through the Greek frontier defences on both sides of the Rupel Pass. The 5th and 6th Mountain Divisions, together with the 125th Infantry Regiment together with heavy artillery support were thus to create a hole for Kleist’s 1st Armoured Group to drive through, and on to Thessaloniki.

At the same time the German 72nd Division was to advance from Nevrokop with an eye to penetrating the Doiran-Nestos Line between the 14th Greek Division and Major General Zoiopoulos’ 7th Greek Division, so that the Rupel Pass could be secured from the rear, in case the attacking troops failed to neutralized Greeks to their front.

Initial attack
The German units launched their attack on April 6. They came immediately under withering crossfire from the Greek forces as such the first waves of attacks were successfully pushed back. A German success to control the nearby hill of Karakitok proved short term since the Greek infantry reacted immediatelly and recaptured it by bayonet charge.

The strongest assault was, predictably, against Fort Rupel, whereas Fort Kali and Fort Karatas were subjected to bombardments only. The attack on Fort Rupel was made by Boehme’s independent 125th Infantry Regiment, rein-forced with a battalion from the 5th Mountain Division. Schneckenburger’s assault on Fort Rupel began with Stuka and artillery bombardment and at 6.00 a.m. motorised infantry, assault guns and motorcycle troops crossed the border and streamed straight for the fort while German direct fire weapons pounded the fort openings. By 11.00 a.m. German troops had pushed back the Greek outposts and were attacking Rupel itself. With the defenders under constant bombardment from the air, small numbers of Germans temporarily managed to reach the ‘Molon Lave’ [Come and take it] monument on the surface of the fort before being driven off.

Soon afterwards, a detachment of around 200 German paratroopers was dropped to the immediate south of fort Rupel. The Greeks reacted fast, intercepting and surrounding the Germans as they collected themselves and gathered their equipment. Around 170 paratroopers were killed in the ensuing skirmish, with the re-mainder taken prisoner. As the major frontal and airborne assaults were being repulsed, however, a German battalion managed to infiltrate between Forts Rupel and Karatas. From here, despite taking considerable casualties, it managed to take and hold a small village to the rear of the forts. Yet Fort Rupel fought on. A little to the right of the 14th Division’s position, in Karadag Sector, Major General Franz Mattenklott’s 72nd Division directed its attacks primarily against Fort Perithori, but pressure was also placed on Forts Maliaga and Babazora—all of which held out throughout 6 April.

By 9.00 p.m., 6 April, General Papagos at the Greek General Headquarters had a reasonable picture of the day’s developments on the Doiran-Nestos Line. The all-important Rupel Pass held but the defensive positions in the area (and across the Bulgarian frontier) had been battered. Bakopoulos begged for reinforcements. Papagos could only refuse him—there were not the troops, the time, nor the transport available to help. Above all, with little knowledge of the difficulties the defenders faced in southern Serbia, Papagos was concerned that the Yugoslavs had not attacked west of Beles as discussed. A strong Yugoslav attack on the flank of the German 2nd Armoured Division’s advance towards the Strumitsa Valley was all that might stop it. A liaison officer with such a request was despatched from Bakopoulos’ headquarters at once. He had no chance of success. Without Yugoslav help this western flank, however, already opening up as a result of infiltration by German mountain troops, faced the prospect of being turned completely. Papagos was trying desperately to plug the looming hole with a reserve, based on the 19th Greek Motorised Division, to be rushed into position east of Doiran—but it was a thin line with no prospect of reinforcement.

This was in spite of fierce and consistent bombardment by land and from the air. Aircraft of the 8th Air Corps and the 18th Corps’ artillery concentrated their bombard-ments on both sides of the Rupel Pass in order to achieve a breakthrough to the Struma valley, to open the way to Salonika. At same time the Luftwaffe attacked roads and installations to the rear of EMFAS. British air photo graphs revealed German batteries firing on almost every fort. Black smears of smoke darkened the entire Mt Beles ridge. Fort Rupel, in particular, was an inferno of shelling and bombs.

It was somewhat of a surprise, therefore, that even German observers were forced to conclude that their air attacks had ‘met with no result’. What is even more remarkable about the tenacity of the Greek forts was the fact that the defenders were older, poorly trained and equipped, and well aware of their predicament and negligible chances of success. The Greeks fought on for as long as they had the means to do so and the Germans had to win territory in close conflict. At the same time it is important to acknowledge the difficulties faced by the German attackers, which went beyond the determination of the Greek forts. On all avenues of its attacks the 18th Corps faced, for example, extreme difficulties imposed by terrain and mountains.

Perhaps the most important reason, however, for the German concentration on the Rupel Pass before and during the opening phases of the invasion was that German planners failed to foresee the relative ineffectiveness of their air attacks against the Greeks in the Doiran-Nestos Line. This in itself is an important issue, although the lack of surviving Luftwaffe records makes further investigation difficult. The experience of the Greek border forts provides the first, but by no means the last, piece of evidence against the often advanced notion of a decisive role for the Luftwaffe in Greece. Although the forts were pounded from the air for two straight days, in cooperation with substantial ground bombardment, the German air force achieved little. The difficulties of the terrain and of identifying targets contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Stuka attacks. Material damage from the air was negligible and the Greeks fought on.

The following day German artillery barrages and air strikes performed by Stuka dive bombers. Nevertheless, the German infantry was unable to approach due to mortar and gun fire coming from Rupel. The Germans withdrew to the nearby Goliama hill, while a Greek counterattack was partially successful there.

On April 7 the Germans managed to breach the Metaxas Line by entering Yugoslavia and moving south towards Thessaloníki. Attack on Rupel was resumed in April 8.

At April 8 To the east of the 18th Greek Division, the fight for the Rupel Pass still raged. Concerted German morning attempts to take Fort Rupel and Fort Karatas were again repulsed with heavy losses. However, German detachments which had the previous day taken up positions in the Goliama heights, in conjunction with the concurrent movement south of 5th Mountain Division into the Rodopolis valley, began to threaten the left flank of the 14th Greek Division.

April 9 On the left of the Doiran-Nestos Line, in the 18th Greek Division’s sector, throughout 9 April the Germans continued to mount a series of unsuccess-ful assaults against Fort Paleouriones. So too, although already bypassed by significant numbers of Germans, from dawn the forts in the 14th Greek Division’s defensive area continued to resist. Fort Rupel yet held fast against severe shelling, with its commander reputed to have answered German demands to capitulate: ‘Fortresses do not surrender until the enemy man-age to seize them.

Yet, after three days of vigorous German assaults, and despite the fact that east of the Struma River Greek forces had yielded little ground, Bakopoulos’ force was hopelessly isolated and in an untenable position. At 2.00 p.m., 9 April, the EMFAS formally capitulated when surrender documents were signed at the German Consulate in Salonika between Bakopoulos and Veiel. Greek officers kept their swords. At 4.00 p.m. Bakopoulos notified his units of the surrender terms and ordered a ceasefire. Over the next few hours the remaining Greek forts were ordered to lay down their arms and mutual cease-fires were arranged. At Fort Paleouriones a German battalion paraded at the fort the next morning to honour the surrender. The bat-talion commander addressed the Greek garrison and then led its garrison commander to inspect the paraded German unit. The German flag was hoisted only after the Greek garrison had departed. Similar ceremonies were conducted at Forts Rupel, Lisse, Pyramidoeides, Perithori, Echinos, Nimphaea, Istibei and Kelkayia. Many Greek accounts convey a sense of pride in the resistance offered by the forts and German recognition of the tenacity of their defence. Major General Mattenklott, of the 72nd Division, reportedly declared that he had seen no such effective resistance in Poland or France and that the Greeks were the first Allied troops not to panic at the sight and sound of German dive-bombers.

The sentiment was echoed after the war by Major Leo Hepp, a staff officer on List’s headquarters during the campaign, who described the fighting in the Doiran-Nestos Line as ‘unexpectedly difficult and costly’, while ‘the Greek Army had undoubtedly shown itself to be the strongest enemy that the German soldier had encountered in the course of the war till then’.

Richthofen was personally shocked about the lack of effects of Stuka attacks against the Greeks defending the Rupel Pass in the Doiran-Nestos Line. He re-corded in his diary how Greek prisoners taken in the border fortifications reported themselves much more afraid of artillery and flamethrowers than dive-bombing which apparently had ‘no effect at all on them’.

Some Greek units in the Rupel area made such spirited local counter-attacks even after news of the surrender that air attacks were needed to help German infantrymen disperse them.

On April 10 Rupel was completely isolated. On April 9 the defenders mowed down additional waves of German infantry attacks. The later being supported by Stukas airstrikes. At April 9, 3.00 pm the attacks ceased and the German emissaries informed Douratsos of the cease fire and the occupation of Thessaloniki. As such they concluded that any further resistance would be fruitless and their surrender was required.

Resistance
However, no Soviet aid was provided to ELAS. Also, the relationship of the Greek Communists with their Bulgarian comrades was strained by Bulgarian Communist continuation of the fascist Bulgarian government policy of annexation of parts of northern Greece.

3
EOKA was now stronger, more determined and better armed and moreover gained considerably from being the defender of the Greek Cypriot community against the Turks. The British found themselves once again confroting a guerilla offensive and were once more forced on the defensive. This time EOKA was more decentralised, operated more on local initiative and was increasingly ruthless.

Unable to retaliate effectivelly against the elusive gunmen and bombers who struck and disappeared, the British became increasingly brutal towards the Greek Cypriot community.

In October 3 an EOKA guman shot British service wives, killing on of them. In less than two hours Biritsh troops had rounded up 1,000 Greek Cypriot men. As aresult of the brutality used by the British over 250 Greek Cypriots required medical treatment, 16 were seriously injured and three were killed, one a 12-year old boy. A British seargent stated that: "wholesale rape, looting and murder".

Religion
Mainstream practice was dedicated to Diwei (Zeus), Di-u-ja (the goddess of femininity), E-ra (Hera), Po-se-da-o (Poseidon), the warlike A-ta-na Po-ti-ni-ja (Athena), A-re-jo e-nu-wa-ri-jo (Ares, the god of the war), Pa-ja-wo (an earlier form of Apollo), E-ma-a (Hermes), Ai-ki-wa-ro (Artemis), Di-wo-nu-so-jo (Dionysus), A-pa-i-ti-jo (Hephaestus)

arts and architecture
p. 230 One example is the art of cloisonné enamel, a very particular jewellers’ craft. Cloisonné involves using heat to fuse coloured glass into cells created by carving or wiring. The decoration on the Kourion sceptre is a fine example. There are also high-status sword and dagger hilts embellished in this lavish way. This technique was rediscovered by Byzantine goldsmiths two thousand years later. p. 231 The engineering projects included designing fortifications, building aqueducts such as the one bringing water into Pylos, building dams to divert rivers, and the huge scheme to reclaim Lake Copais. On a smaller scale, the Mycenaeans created terraces for agriculture, built level roads suitable for wheeled traffic, and designed bridges and culverts. A simple one was the relieving triangle, a device for spreading the weight of a wall sideways and down onto door jambs. It was a significant halfway-house between the lintel and the arch. It was used on a flamboyant scale in the doorway to the Treasury of Atreus, where it was used to take the weight off a massive lintel, and in a less obtrusive way in the ‘arches’ of bridges and culverts, which had the same triangular form. Even the small windows piercing the rubble walls of houses and shrines were triangular, and lined with three stone slabs. The Mycenaeans borrowed the downward-tapering Minoan pillar with its characteristic cushion capital, but refined and developed it. The typical Mycenaean pillar was taller, thinner, less tapering. These pillars were also used in rows to make colonnades, which created dazzling effects with alternating bars of light and shadow. p. 231 The typical Mycenaean pillar was taller, thinner, less tapering. These pillars were also used in rows to make colonnades, which created dazzling effects with alternating bars of light and shadow.