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http://www.ufrgs.br/ufrgsmun/2013/?page_id=20 The Tuareg People

The Tuareg are a people that have lived in northern Mali “as early as the fifth century BCE” [1] according to Herodotus. After establishing the city of Timbuktu in the 11th century, the Tuareg “traded, traveled, and conquered throughout Saharan” over the next four centuries, eventually converting to Islam in the 14th century, which allowed them to “gain great wealth trading salt, gold, and black slaves.” [2] This independence was swept away when the French colonized Mali when they “defeated the Tuareg at Timbuktu and established borders and administrative districts to rule the area until Mali declared independence in 1960.” [3] The Tuareg people have consistently wanted self-independence and in pursuit of such goals have engaged in a number of rebellions.

The first was in 1916 when, in response to the French not giving the Tuareg their own autonomous zone (called Azawad) as was promised, they revolted. The French violently quelled the revolt and “subsequently confiscated important grazing lands while using Tuaregs as forced conscripts and labor – and fragmented Tuareg societies through the drawing of arbitrary boundaries between Soudan [Mali] and its neighbors.”[4]

Yet, this did not end the Tuareg goal of an independent, sovereign state. Once the French had ceded Mali independence, the Tuareg began to push toward their dream of establishing Azawad once again with “several prominent Tuareg leaders [lobbying] for a separate Tuareg homeland consisting of northern Mali and parts of modern day Algeria, Niger, Mauritania. […] [However,] black politicians like Modibo Keita, Mali’s first President, made it clear that independent Mali would not cede its northern territories.” [5]

The First Tuareg Rebellion

In the 1960s, while the independence movements in Africa were ongoing, the Tuareg once again vied for their own autonomy, known as the Afellaga rebellion. The Tuareg were greatly oppressed by the government of Modibo Keita, which came into power after the French had left, as they “were singled out for particular discrimination, and were more neglected than others in the distribution of state benefits,” which may have been due to the fact that “most of the senior leadership of post-colonial Mali were drawn from the southern ethnic groups who were not sympathetic to the pastoral culture of the northern desert nomads.” [6]

In addition to this, the Tuareg felt that the government’s policy of ‘modernization’ was in reality an attack on the Tuareg themselves as the Keita government enacted policies such as “land reform that threatened [the Tuareg’s] privileged access to agricultural products.” [7] Specifically, Keita “had moved increasingly in the direction of [establishing a version of] the Soviet collective farm and had created state corporations to monopolize the purchase of basic crops.” [8]

In addition to this, Keita left customary land rights unchanged “except when the state needed land for industry or transport. Then the Minister of Rural Economy issued a decree of acquisition and registration in the name of the state, but only after publication of notice and a hearing to determine customary claims.” [9] Unfortunately for the Tuareg, this unchanging of customary land rights did not apply to the subsoil that was on their land. Instead, this subsoil was turned into a state monopoly due to Keita’s desire to ensure that no one became a capitalist based on the discovery of subsoil resources.

This had a major negative impact on the Tuareg as they had a pastoral culture and the subsoil helps to “determine what kind of crops can be grown in any area and, therefore, what livestock can be raised.” [10] Thus, by creating a state monopoly on subsoil, the Keita government was effectively in control of what the Tuareg would be able to grow and therefore in control of their very lives.

This oppression eventually boiled over and became the first Tuareg rebellion, which began with small hit-and-run attacks on government forces. However, it was quickly crushed due to the Tuareg lacking “a unified leadership, a well-coordinated strategy or clear evidence of a coherent strategic vision.” [11] In addition to this, the rebels were unable to mobilize the entire Tuareg community.

The Malian military, well-motivated and [well-equipped] with new Soviet weapons, conducted vigorous counterinsurgency operations. By the end of 1964, the government’s strong arm methods had crushed the rebellion. It then placed the Tuareg-populated northern regions under a repressive military administration. [12]

Yet while the Malian military may have won the battle, they failed to win the war as their heavy-handed tactics only alienated Tuareg who didn’t support the insurgency and not only did the government fail to follow through on promises to improve the local infrastructure and increase economic opportunity. To avoid the military occupation of their communities and also due to massive drought in the 1980s, many Tuareg fled to nearby countries such as Algeria, Mauritania, and Libya. Thus, the grievances of the Tuareg went unaddressed, only creating a situation in which a rebellion would once again occur.

The Second Tuareg Rebellion

The raging inferno that was the spirit of independence of the Tuareg people once again came back to life in 1990. It must be noted that Tuareg had greatly changed since the 1960s and moved from a socialist government to a military dictatorship that (due to massive pressure from the people) quickly changed to a transitional government with military and civilian leaders, finally fully becoming democratic in 1992. [13]

While Mali was transitioning to a democracy, the Tuareg people were still suffering under the boot of oppression. Three decades after the first rebellion, the occupation of Tuareg communities still had not ended and “resentment fueled by the harsh repression, continued dissatisfaction with government policies, and perceived exclusion from political power led various Tuareg and Arab groups to begin a second rebellion against the Malian government.” [14] The second rebellion was sparked due to “attacks on non-Tuareg Malians [at] the southernmost edge of the Tuareg regions [which led to] skirmishes between the Malian army and Tuareg rebels.” [15]

Yet it did not last long as the first major step to peace was made in 1991 by the transitional government and resulted in the Tamanrasset Accords, which was negotiated in Algeria between the military government of Lt. Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré (that had taken power in a coup on March 26, 1991) and the two major Tuareg factions, The Azaouad Popular Movement and the Arabic Islamic Front of Azawad, on January 6, 1991. In the Accords, the Malian military agreed to “disengage from the running of the civil administration and will proceed to the suppression of certain military posts,” “avoid zones of pasture land and densely populated zones,” to be “confined to their role of defense of the integrity of the territory at the frontiers,” [16] and created a ceasefire between the two main Tuareg factions and the government.

However, not all of the Tuareg factions signed onto the Accords as many rebel groups demanded “among other concessions, the removal of current administrators in the north and their replacement with local representatives.” [17] The Accords represented a political compromise in which more autonomy was granted to Tuareg communities and local and regional councils made up of local representatives were established, yet the Tuareg still remained a part of Mali. Thus, the Accords were not the end all be all of the situation as tensions remained between the Tuareg and the Malian government.

The transitionary government of Mali attempted to negotiate with the Tuareg. This culminated in the April 1992 National Pact between the Malian government and several Tuareg factions. The National Pact allowed for “integration of Tuareg combatants into the Malian armed forces, demilitarization of the north, economic integration of northern populations, and a more detailed special administrative structure for the three northern regions.” [18] After Alpha Konaré was elected president of Mali in 1992, he furthered the process of Tuareg autonomy by not only honoring the concessions made in the National Pact but by removing the structure of federal and regional governments and allowing authority to take hold at the local level. Yet, decentralization had a greater political purpose, as it “effectively co-opted the Tuareg by allowing them a degree of autonomy and the benefits of remaining in the Republic.” [19]

However, this attempt to deal with the Tuareg did not hold as the National Pact only renewed debate about the unique status of Tuareg people and some rebel groups, such as the Arabic Islamic Front of Azawad, did not attend the National Pact talks [20] and the violence continued, eventually resulting in the deaths of 6,000-8,000 people before an peace agreement was signed by all factions.

It must be noted that the introduction the Arabic Islamic Front of Azawad to the Tuareg rebellion is also the introduction of radical Islam to the Tuareg fight for independence. The emergence of radical Islam was greatly aided by the Gaddafi regime. During the 1970s many Tuareg had fled to Libya and other countries, mainly for economic opportunity. Once there, Gaddafi “welcomed them with open arms. He gave them food and shelter. He called them brothers. He also started training them as soldiers.” [21] Gaddafi then used these soldiers to found the Islamic Legion in 1972. The goal of the Legion was to “further [Gaddafi’s own] territorial ambitions in the African interior and advance the cause of Arab supremacy.” [22] The Legion was sent to fight the in Niger, Mali, Palestine, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. However, the Legion came to an end due to the price of oil declining in 1985, which meant that Gaddafi could no longer afford to recruit and train fighters. Coupled with the Legion’s crushing defeat in Chad, the organization was disbanded which left many Tuareg going back to their homes in Mali with large amounts of combat experience. The role of Libya played a role not only in the third Tuareg rebellion, but also in the current, ongoing fighting. [23]

The Third Tuareg Rebellion

The third rebellion was not so much a rebellion, but rather an insurgency that kidnapped and killed members of the Malian military.

The insurgency began in May 2006, when “a group of Tuareg army deserters attacked military barracks in Kidal region, seizing weapons and demanding greater autonomy and development assistance.” [24] The former general Amadou Toumani Toure had won presidential elections in 2002 and reacted to the violence by working with a rebel coalition known as the Democratic Alliance for Change to establish a peace agreement that solely restated that Malian government’s commitment to improving the economy in the northern areas where the rebels lived. However, many rebels such as Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, who was killed just last year, [25] refused to abide by the peace treaty and continued to terrorize the Malian military until the government of Mali deployed a large offensive force to eliminate the insurgency. [26]

Yet, the fight for Tuareg independence remains and leads us into the current, ongoing rebellion.

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The Crisis of North Mali and Possible Outcomes Dr. Sidi Ahmed Ould Ahmed Salem Last Updated: : Wednesday 16 January 2013  15:41 Mecca Under the influence of armed jihadist groups and Tuareg separatists, north Mali separated from the south in March 2012. But security and political problems are not contained within this region. The south is also facing a political stalemate which, if not dealt with, can lead to the collapse of the state in which case would make it impossible to regain the north. Indeed, to prevent a crisis and to preserve what is left of the south, it is important for the state to limit the control and influence of the military over political affairs in Bamako.

The collapse of the state and growing military influence

Mali presents a particularly complex political and security situation. Until March 2012, this West African country was a democratic state led by an elected president, with flourishing multiparty democracy and freedom of expression. But that democracy and pluralism became a thing of the past after the ousting of President Amadou Toumani Touré in a military coup led by Major Amadou Haya Sanogo, leader of the military council, who called on the National Committee for a democratic rescue and rehabilitation of the state.

At the beginning of 2012, the region of Azawad became a centre of conflict between Sanogo’s battalion and other Malian battalions, and the militant Tuareg recruits of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. Sanogo’s battalion withdrew as a result of attacks by Malian and Libyan Tuaregs who were active in Gaddafi’s military until his defeat, after which they crossed through Algeria and Niger into Mali with their ammunition and equipment. Upon their arrival in Mali, they found an inefficient, ill-prepared Malian army with a weak infrastructure and obsolete weapons from the 1970s. The army was quickly defeated by the militants and fled, leaving a region that makes up more than 66% of Malian territory in the hands of the Tuareg militants. Soon, the Jihadist Salafi groups also came to know of the Tuareg movement.

Since Mali’s independence from France in 1960, the north has often witnessed Tuareg rebellions. While many deals and treaties between the Malian government and the Tuareg were brokered by Algeria, this was the first time that the army withdrew completely from Azawad and left the area under the unrestricted control of armed groups.

Under external pressure, mainly in the form of sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Mali’s suspension from the regional body, Sanogo appointed Dioncounda Traoré, a parliamentary speaker, as interim president of the Republic of Mali on 6 April 2012. Dioncounda Traoré appointed Sheikh Modibo Diarra, who was associated with former president Moussa Traoré (1968-1991), as prime minister. But it seems the ‘handover’ to civilian rule was only a tactical measure to allow Sanogo’s revolutionaries to retain control over political affairs. The fact of the matter is that they seized power with the coup and remain in control of all political matters.

Prime Minister Diarra was overthrown on 11 December 2012 and replaced by Diango Cissoko, a move that was orchestrated by Sanogo and his fellow militants from their military base in the Bamako suburb of Kati. This move has come to be known as Sanogo's second coup and confirms the extent of the control that his group has on everything that happens in Bamako despite their seeming distance from public affairs.

Many international actors, especially the United States, believe that to avoid a crisis in southern Mali, multiparty elections must be held in April 2013. If successful, this could grant the political system constitutional legitimacy and prompt the army to return to its barracks in the north, thus freeing the newly elected government of the burden of dealing with that region.

This solution is not guaranteed and it may take longer than three months to implement. Meanwhile, the unstable situation in the south may attract further competition for influence between the military and the numerous civilian groups in Bamako. This means that the jihadi militants in the north will find more opportunities to consolidate their presence and grip on the Azawad territory. However, the centres of influence in Mali are distributed between several divergent and competing parties, including the military – which is the most powerful – and civilian parties. As long as the influential roleplayers remain divided, they will be unable to find a solution to the crisis in the north and the revolutionaries will continue to control every aspect of public affairs.

There is also disparity in the regional and international positions on the proposed solutions to the crisis, making the problem more complicated and the solution even more remote.

Resolving the crisis: Diplomacy or armed conflict?

It is clear that regional and international attitudes about the crisis in north Mali are divided between two approaches. The first is a diplomatic position seeking dialogue between the conflicting parties and includes the most influential countries in the region. Countries calling for this approach are Algeria, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and, to some extent, the United States.

The second position calls for a military resolution and wants to execute a ‘quick’ war that would, in theory, expel the jihadi militants from the north and restore full control over all Malian territory to the government. Some ECOWAS members and other countries are enthusiastic about this option including Niger, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, South Africa, Morocco and France.

The diplomatic approach does not discount the option of adopting a military strategy should dialogue fail. It is based on encouraging militant Tuareg organisations (Ansar Al-Din and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) to enter into direct negotiations with the government in Bamako within the framework of these organisations’ recognition of the legitimacy of the Malian state and negotiations for political and social solutions to the long unresolved issue of the injustices that the Tuareg have been subjected to since independence in 1960. Attempts to implement this approach began on 4 December 2012, when the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, representing ECOWAS as the mediator, gathered representatives of the Malian government, Ansar Dine and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad in Ouagadougou.

Jihadist organisations, including the Salafi Group for Call and Combat, which is linked to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, were absent from the Ouagadougou dialogue. The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa was also excluded although it was one of the first to call for such a dialogue in October 2011. Compaoré succeeded in gathering these groups, hoping to convince them of the need to put an end to the violence in Azawad. It is clear that the Ouagadougou process, which is still in its early stages, does not see the need to include Jihadists in the north and affiliated with Al Qaeda, making it likely that they will fail to reach a mutual understanding between all the concerned parties in the region.

This has reinforced the position in favour of a political solution and having the parties meet under UN Security Council Resolution 2085, which was adopted unanimously on 20 December 2012. While it allows for the deployment of African forces to Mali to help Malian authorities recover areas in the north, the resolution did not state how the force would be financed, leaving this up to voluntary contributions by member states. The resolution is also vague regarding its agenda, and allows the taking of "all necessary measures" in line with international law in order to regain control of north Mali. The resolution also encourages dialogue between Bamako, Ansar Dine and the National Movement and excludes other armed movements in Azawad. Furthermore, it stresses Algerian and Mauritanian involvement.

The United States has urged a diplomatic resolution as armed conflict may cause a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. The fighting has already resulted in the displacement of 370,000 people, including 167,000 internally displaced people within Mali. Thousands of Azawad refugees have also fled to Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and southern Algeria. In the event of war, the humanitarian situation will worsen and will increase the number of displaced persons both in and outside of Mali, a situation the Sahel states will not be able to tackle successfully.

In addition to seeking a swift diplomatic solution, ECOWAS, France and South Africa, seek to achieve decisive military action which would, if successful, regain the government's control of the rebellious north. To this end, ECOWAS held a summit in Abuja on 11 November 2012 to plan for military intervention, an agreement that would create a regional force of 3,000 troops and help the Malian army recapture the north. It is expected that western countries, especially France, will provide logistical support for the force and necessary strategic intelligence obtained by unmanned drones.

A successful and conclusive diplomatic solution seems unlikely as long as there is disunity among parties within Azawad and among its people with regard to restoring authority in the region to the government. Moreover, the ambiguity and lack of cogent strategy among the parties pushing for military intervention makes this a difficult option to implement. Countries supporting a military solution in north Mali have not disclosed the number of soldiers they would contribute or determined who will finance the war or lead the forces. The Malians want to assume leadership of the intervention forces while other ECOWAS states argue that each party should take charge of coordinating particular operations. In addition, the United Nations, which is supposed to contribute a large share of the material costs of the military plan, has not yet shown its willingness to enter the war.

Will ECOWAS be successful in expelling the jihadists?

The Chief of Staff in the Ivory Coast, General Soumaila Bakayoko, declared on 16 December 2012 that the leaders of the ECOWAS armies had finalised details of a coordinated military intervention in north Mali aimed at expelling what he called "terrorist groups." However, joint African and Malian forces will confront Jihadist groups that are familiar with the Azawad desert and mountains and have strong relations with the inhabitants of the region, making the task of the African military force very difficult. It is clear that Jihadist groups have benefited from the unstable situation in north Mali as rampant unemployment among Azawad youth enables armed groups to attract many to their ranks.

Stemming from the Salafi Group for Call and Combat, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is one of the oldest organisations in Azawad. Since late 2006, militants of the group, also known as the Emirate of the Desert, sought to make north Mali a haven for gathering western hostages who were abducted in the Sahel or Maghreb countries, a safe passage for convoys smuggling goods and drugs, and a rear base to put pressure on Algeria and Mauritania. Since the withdrawal of the Malian army, militants within Emirate of the Desert were concentrated in Timbuktu alongside militants of Ansar Dine, who form the Tuareg Front for the Salafi Group in Azawad. The movement is led by supporters of the former Malian consul to Saudi Arabia and a tribal and political leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly. An influential actor in the region, he was the field commander that led the rebellion against the government in Bamako. Through Algerian mediation he has, on occasion, reconciled with the government. Ansar Dine is considered a close ally of Algeria despite its Jihadist-Salafi orientation.

At the same time that Ansar Al-Din spread in Kidal and AQIM spread in Timbuktu, members of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) extended their influence to Gao. This distribution of territory is based on social and tribal ties. It is therefore natural to assume that Ansar Dine controls Kidal, the area of the Tuareg al-Fughas tribe tribe from which Iyad Ag Ghaly descended. Similarly, the Arab Amhar tribe heavily populates the city of Gao and is the tribe Sultan Ould Bady Al Mekni Abu Ali, the leader of MUJWA, is from. Among MUJWA, there are volunteer militants who came from various Arab countries like Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco as well as militants from Nigeria (Boko Haram members in particular) Chad, Niger and so on.

It is difficult to determine the number of Jihadist militants in Azawad as their number has increased since the outbreak of the crisis in early 2012. It is common for Al Qaeda recruits to assimilate with other groups out of ideological solidarity, making it difficult to define the groups' sizes. While some reports state the members of the jihadi movements before the crisis was no more than 3,000, this number has doubled and approached 6,000 when they were joined by members from Boko Haram, Chad, Sudan, Niger and Burkina Faso as well as the five Arab Maghreb countries. Many of these fighters may have obtained sophisticated weaponry from their participation in the Libyan war, and the ransoms they received after the release of western hostages and controlling the commercial networks both legally and illegally has provided them with a lot of money.

In addition to the three jihadist movements, there is a secular Tuareg movement, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which announced the independence of Azawad in April 2012 after victories against the Malian army. Although the group is mostly Tuareg, it contains a small number of Arab Azawad locals. Although the number of militants is estimated to be 2,000 troops, most of whom worked in Libya and crossed through Algeria after the fall of Gaddafi, they were the first to face the Malian army and expand their control over most of Azawad. However, their military influence on the ground has since been replaced by that of the Jihadist Salafi movements. The MNLA’s political wing is active, mainly in France and Belgium, and continues to have a presence in some media and diplomatic spheres. The MNLA’s separatist goals are unlikely to see the light of day as its influence was displaced by those of the jihadist movements and their differing approach. Ansar Dine, for example, wants to implement Islamic law in Azawad and spread it to other parts of Mali; its members, thus, do not want separation. The MNLA’s aim of separation is also subject to other obstacles such as Algeria, a powerful and prominent country in the region, and Niger, neither of which would allow the establishment of a Tuareg state on their borders as this would threaten their security especially since the population of southern Algeria and western Niger are mainly Tuareg.

Many reports agree that, if war broke out, the ECOWAS military might be able to regain control of the three cities in Azawad – Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao – but it would still be unable to control the vast Azawad deserts that could provide a safe haven for armed Jihadist movements. The terrain of the region is favourable for armed gangs, offering a variety of shelters (canyons, caves and overhanging rocks), and there will be alternate and inaccessible sites that ECOWAS forces will have a difficult time penetrating. The mountainous region in the northwest highlands of Adrar Ifoghas in northeastern Azawad, for example, is a perfect hideout and an excellent point for surveillance and early warning.

Azawad: The heart of strategic interests

The Azawad region has attracted a high degree of international attention because of its rich mineral resources and strategic geographic location. Oil, gas and uranium phosphate reserves have already been discovered, and all of this wealth increases the desire of foreign powers to secure their interests north Mali.

Investigations carried out by the French company, Total, in the Taoudeni basin in Mauritania, east of Azawad, proved the existence of important oil reserves. During the presidency of Toumani Touré, the government granted exploration contracts to six foreign companies. In addition, the United States hopes to control the region to effectively combat Colombian drug traffickers passing through the Azawad desert under the protection of armed Jihadist organisations. To the European Union, however, control of this aspect may allow better monitoring and surveillance of the flow of illegal immigration through the Mediterranean.

At the regional level, a clear disagreement arose between Algeria and Morocco with regards to this crisis. While Algeria supports the effort to negotiate, trying to persuade its Azawad allies (i.e. Ansar Dine) to engage with Bamako, the Moroccans stand firmly behind ECOWAS and support a military solution.

Some Algerian media sources accuse Morocco of being affiliated with MUJWA but this has not been confirmed by neutral sources. The operations of this group have targeted Algerian interests since October 2011 when members of MUJWA kidnapped three western hostages (two Spaniards and an Italian) from the desert refugee camps near the city of Tindouf in southern Algeria. Also, there was a recent operation that led to the kidnapping of the Algerian consul and six of his aides in Gao.

Conclusion

Clearly, the political crisis and security situation in north Mali are closely linked to the Libyan revolution and the resulting smuggling of arms to north Mali after Gaddafi's death, and it continues to take on disturbing proportions regionally and internationally.

The region of Azawad, which is a point of contact between the countries of the Maghreb and West Africa, is about to become an "Islamic emirate" controlled by a collection of Jihadist groups. In addition to the monopoly of military power, these groups have close relations with civil society groups through whom they have also woven close relations with Azawad locals through their provision of medicine, transportation and food. There has also been intermarriage between members of Jihadist groups and Azawad families. However, the local population’s feelings toward the Jihadists may change because of their tendency to demolish graves in regions they control, especially Timbuktu which is famous as the city of the 333 saints – an act that does not sit well with a large portion of the Sufi-oriented population. They have also prohibited games and have imposed the Afghan-style veil on local women, an affront to their local culture. Moreover, they have enforced arcane laws which they believe to be based on Islamic legal tenets such as flogging and chopping off thieves’ hands, without taking into account the strong and just judicial conditions under which such practices should be held. It is expected that a persistence of such practices will result in outrage that will end with a rupture between the Jihadist groups and the local population.

ECOWAS is seeking an urgent military solution to expel the Jihadi groups from Azawad and restore the government's control over the north. However, its intervention could result in further racial and ethnic tension, perhaps dragging the region into a civil war between negroes, Tuareg and Arabs. The Arabs might see ECOWAS soldiers as coming to support the Songhai and Fulani at their and the Tuareg's expense.

Igniting the conflict in Azawad will affect the entire Sahel region which has already seen a lot of conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo, Guinea, Casamance (southern Senegal) and the Darfur crisis in western Sudan. This could cause Azawad to become a source of instability in the region.

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Taken Question Office of the Spokesman Washington, DC January 17, 2008 QUESTION TAKEN AT JANUARY 17, 2008 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Somaliland

Question: Prior to this week, when was the last time that senior U.S. officials met with officials of Somaliland?

While the United States does not recognize Somaliland as an independent state, and we continue to believe that the question of Somaliland’s independence should be resolved by the African Union, we continue regularly to engage with Somaliland as a regional administration and to support programs that encourage democratization and economic development in the Somaliland region.

The Newsletter of the African Union Commission April 2012 Following the announcement by an armed group, the “National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)", regarding the so-called ‘independence’ of ‘Azawad’ from Mali, the Commission of the African Union (AU) on April 6, rejected the announcement, calling it null and of no value whatsoever. The Commission called on the international community as a whole to fully support this principled position of Africa. In the Statement, the Chairperson of the Commission recalled the fundamental principle of the tangibility of borders inherited by African countries at their accession to independence and reiterated the AU's unwavering commitment to national unity and territorial integrity of the Republic Of Mali. He stressed that the AU and its Member States will spare no efforts to contribute to the restoration of the authority of the Republic of Mali on its entire territory, and bring to an end the attacks being carried out by armed and terrorist groups in the northern part of the country. As a follow up to the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of April 3, 2012, the Commission, working closely with all stakeholders, is taking the necessary steps to apply individual sanctions to the leaders and members of armed groups involved in the attacks in northern Mali and in atrocities against the civilian population, as well as to compile a list of all terrorist and other armed groups operating in conjunction with them on the territory of the Republic of Mali, for their inclusion of the AU's list of terrorist groups.

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SOUTH KOREA

Statement by H.E. Mr. PARK In-kook Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly On Responsibility to Protect July 23,2009 New York  Mr. President, At the outset, let me join the other speakers by expressing my deep appreciation for convening this plenary meeting on the issue of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). At the September 2005 World Summit, global leaders humbly acknowledged the historic and collective failures of the international community to save human life, reflecting on Rwanda's genocide, the massacres in Srebrenica, ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and made a solemn promise that they would seek to prevent such atrocities in the future. These Heads of State asserted that it in a fundamental obligation of Governments to protect their people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, they affirmed the collective responsibility to protect people at risk of mass atrocities and crimes against humanity. With the concerted embrace of the historic notion of Responsibility to Protect, a lengthy debate over whether to act ended. Instead, discussions turned to how, exactly, this principle would be implemented. This remains the most pressing question before us at this juncture. However since the 2005 agreement, some concerns and assertions of the concept of R2P have been expressed, largely due to misconceptions or extended interpretations on the concept. In this regard, my delegation welcomes the Secretary-General's report and the GA debate on "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect" which provides a precious opportunity to ensure common understanding on R2P and to reach consensus on the overall direction of its implementation, turning promise into reality. The Republic of Korea fully supports the Secretary-General's clarification on R2P, as described in his report, along others; 1) The primary responsibility lies in the individual Government while the international community bears the secondary responsibility. After all, R2P is a call for States to address serious human rights issues and to protect its populations from atrocities. "Responsible sovereignty" should be upheld. 2) R2P is an ally of sovereignty, not an adversary. R2P helps states to meet their core protection responsibilities and facilitates success in the field. In this sense, the substance of R2P has nothing to do with so-called "humanitarian intervention." R to P is distinctly different from humanitarian intervention since it is based on collective actions, in accordance with UN Charter, but not unilateral one. 3) R2P has a narrow scope, applying only to the four specified crimes and violations, but not other calamities such as HIVIAIDS or natural disasters. As such, not all humanitarian tragedies or human rights violations call or should activate R2P. 4) While the scope may be narrow, the responses must be deep. The deployment of preventative and protective instruments wielded by Member States, the UN system, and regional and sub-regional organizations and their civil society partners should be definitive. 5) In extreme situations, which necessitate timely and decisive collective responses, what is most required is an early and flexible response tailored to each situation, yet ultimately focused on saving lives. My delegation endorses the above-emphasized points of the Secretary-General. Based on this understanding, the Secretary-General details the "Three Pillar" approach for turning the principle of R2P into an implementable and operational tool by suggesting a wide range of options under each respective pillar. Pillar One is self-evident. As the report states, protection of populations is a defining attribute of sovereignty. The policies and measures suggested in the report are all effective tools for authorities to implement R2P. Among others, we'd like to call upon the Member States to pay special attention to the following measures; - to ensure the effective mechanisms for handling domestic disputes - to respect human rights as an essential element of responsible sovereignty, - to become parties to and implement relevant international instruments on human rights, international humanitarian and refugee law, and the Rome Statute of the ICC - to engage in candid self reflection, searching dialogue, and periodic risk assessment - to consider introducing criteria relating to R2P into regional peer review mechanisms The Republic of Korea attaches great importance to Pillar Two, which is the commitment of the international community to assist states. As the Secretary-General's report pointed out, if the political leadership in a given state is determined to commit R2P crimes, assistance would be of little use. However, if the leadership is willing to implement its R2P but lacks the capacity to do so, international assistance can play a critical role. In this connection, we welcome the Secretary-General's emphasis on the need for assistance to states, rather than just waiting for them to fail. This explicitly shields humanitarian populations from grave risk and also bolsters collective international security more broadly. Among the recommendations and illustrative examples of activities to assist states, we take special note of the role of regional and sub regional mechanisms. In fact, the African Union pioneered R2P principle by stating in its 2000 Constitutive Act that it would not be indifferent in the face of failure by an AU Member protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Building the capacities of regional organizations to assist states and to deal with situations under stress within their respective regions would be a sound investment. While encouraging Member States to consider proposals to build capacity, such as standing or standby rapid response mechanisms, as well as to ask for assistance when under pressure, the delegation of the Republic of Korea stresses the need to mainstream the goals of R2P into the broad activities of the UN system. In the areas of human rights, humanitarian affairs, peacekeeping, peace building, governance, and development, there should be a common strategy to assist states' implementation of R2P. Mr. President, Now let me turn to Pillar Three, "timely and decisive measures." The most ideal situation would be for all states to be determined, as well as capable, to fully implement their obligations under R2P with efficient assistance from the international community wherever needed. However, when a state is manifestly failing, the international community has a collective responsibility to prevent atrocities and to save lives, responding to the imminent threats, as clearly stated by the World Summit Outcome Document. The Republic of Korea understands that the collective obligation is not to "intervene," but rather to take whatever timely and decisive actions the international community deems appropriate to respond to immediate threats to the lives of peoples, in accordance with the UN Charter. In this vein, it should be noted that many of the actions suggested as illustrative examples in the Secretary-General's Report, including mediation, are not coercive. In fact, the Report suggests a broad range of tools available, including pacific measures under Chapters 6, 7, and 8 of the Charter. With respect to coercive measures to be taken in extreme cases, we believe that R2P should be implemented in accordance of the relevant provisions of the UN Charter and there is no implication of any change to the respective role of the GA and Security Council. The primary role of the Security Council in authorizing coercive measures as a last resort reminds us of privilege, and duty, of the five permanent members, which must be matched with their special responsibility. In this context, we support the recommendation of the Secretary-General's report for the P5 to refrain employing the veto, or the threat of veto, in situations of manifest failure to meet R2P obligations. While noting the need to continue to consider principles, rules, and doctrine that should guide the application of coercive force relating to R2P, we would like to express our full agreement with the Secretary-General's contention that capacity, will, and imagination are most significant and that success lies in an "early and flexible response, tailored to the specific needs of each situation, focusing on saving lives." Mr. President, Looking forward, one urgent task that we should undertake is to buttress the UN's early warning capacity. There is no doubt that early warning and assessment through the UN is a necessary component for successful preventive and protective action. In fact, the "establishment of an early warning capability" is what leaders agreed upon in 2005. As suggested by the Secretary-General, bolstering the office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide would be fruitful primary step. In conclusion, the Republic of Korea would like to express its unwavering commitment to R2P. The sole purpose of R2P is to save populations from the most heinous crimes through an emphasis on the primary responsibility of states and the complimentary and collective responsibility of the international community. It is our sincere hope that the 63rd General Assembly will take concrete steps to put this norm into operation, redressing "never again collective failures" and "to save human life." The Secretary-General's recommendation for the GA, in particular, continuing the consideration role of the GA, conducting periodic review of the implementation of Member States, and submitting Secretary-General's report on implementation steps, will be a solid basis for the possible outcome of the current GA session. We must, collectively, take this critical leap forward to make the future more secure for vulnerable populations around the world while striving to avoid the costly error of stumbling backwards to past blunders. Thank you.

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MALI 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Mali is a constitutional democracy. On August 28, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita won the presidential election, deemed free and fair by international observers, and took office on September 4. This ended a 16-month transitional period following the March 2012 military coup that ousted the former democratically elected president, Amadou Toumani Toure. The election of a democratic government and the arrest of coup leader Amadou Sanogo restored some civilian control over the military. Authorities, however, failed at times to maintain effective control over the security forces, and individual units within the security forces committed human rights abuses. From January 12 to July 6, the government maintained a state of emergency. The Malian military, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and the French military conducted military operations against violent extremist organizations including Ansar al-Dine, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in the northern part of the country. Members of the military committed serious human rights abuses, including summary executions, as well as torture, abuse, and forced disappearance of civilians allegedly having ties to rebel fighters. Impunity was a problem, although the newly elected government took steps to prosecute coup leader Sanogo and some members of the military accused of perpetrating human rights abuses. By year’s end the Ministry of Defense had presented 10 cases to the civil courts for prosecution. Other human rights problems included arbitrary deprivation of life; harsh prison conditions; judicial inefficiency; limitations on press freedom; official corruption; rape of and domestic violence against women and girls; female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C); human trafficking; societal discrimination against black Tamasheqs, who were subjected to slavery-related practices; discrimination based on sexual orientation; and discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS. Workers’ rights were often disregarded, and exploitative labor, including child labor, was a problem.

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220345.pdf

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S. Korea pledges US$1 mln in humanitarian aid for Mali SEOUL, May 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will give US$1 million in humanitarian aid to help stabilize Mali, an official said Thursday, after the French military intervention drove Al Qaeda-linked Islamists from the western African nation.

First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kyou-hyun plans to announce the aid at an international aid conference on Mali, set for next Wednesday in Brussels, ministry spokesman Cho Tai-young told reporters.

According to the OEC, in 2012 Malian imports of South Korean goods were worth 21 million USD and is one of the largest African purchasers of South Korean goods. Mali is also one of the largest African providers of metals used in South Korea's high tech industries.

21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)21:03, 23 July 2014 (UTC)~ THE PILLARS OF SOUTH KOREA’S FOREIGN POLICY South Korea’s foreign policy is influenced by five internal and external constraints that have shaped the decision-making process of its Middle East policy: 1. The North Korean threat: North Korea has long been an important factor in South Korea’s foreign and security policy. The constant threat from Pyongyang has influenced Seoul’s security and foreign policies throughout the years, including its Middle East policy, and relations with its allies. 2. The alliance with the United States: The alliance with the United States, which defends South Korea from the North Korean threat, MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 9 has been an important pillar in South Korea’s defense and foreign policy throughout the years.6 This has influenced Seoul’s policy towards the Middle East, especially when Washington requested Korean troops in Iraq during the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, and more recently when it asked Korea to implement sanctions on Iran. 3. The economy: The development of the South Korean economy was an important factor that influenced relations between South Korea and the Middle East, as it led Korean companies to search for markets outside of Korea. The Middle East, mainly the Persian Gulf and North Africa, became a favored market for South Korean companies due to the increased number and volume of projects they won there. The second economic factor was the increasing need for energy to fuel the development of the South Korean economy, which caused Seoul to become dependent on the Persian Gulf for its oil and gas needs. 4. Self-perception and status: South Korea has attained political, economic, and military power throughout the years, which has changed its self-perception regarding its regional and global status. If Seoul had focused mainly on East Asia and the US until the 1970s, from the 1980s it began reaching out to other regions and international organizations as well. This change brought with it the understanding that South Korea had become an important player in the global arena. Since the 1990s, South Korea has debated the meaning and essence of its new global role as a “middle power.”7 The debate on the role that Korea should play in regional conflicts includes the Middle East. 5. China: Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea in 1992, the economic relations between the two states improved. China has become South Korea’s biggest trade partner,8 and trade with China is an important leverage on Korea’s economic policy in Asia. Beijing’s close relations with North Korea and its leverage on Pyongyang increase the importance of its influence on Seoul’s foreign and security policy in Asia. Currently China’s influence on Korea’s Middle East policy is relatively low in comparison to other factors, but will eventually increase due to rising competition on energy supply from the Middle East – with Japan in the mix as well – and an increase in China’s diplomatic and strategic role in the region.