User:Andrés Djordjalian/Review of "Falkland Islands"

In this page, I make some remarks of the Falkland_Islands article in its current version of August 23, 2013, hopefully to contribute to User:MarshalN20's refactoring of the article. I intend to gradually add sources to the statements given here. While doing so I may need to correct some, although I'm pretty confident that all of this is well sourced.

Discovery
The article does not mention hypotheses of discovery by sailors who were neither English or Dutch. In the early 16th century, the islands started appearing in Spanish maps, thus it seems that they were sighted by people employed by the Spanish empire. In 1540, Alonso de Camargo may have sighted and even shortly occupied the archipelago. Even Vesupucci and Magellan could have sighted the islands before. Besides, I don't think "likely" is the right word to use in Sebald's mention.

Strong's is not believed to be the first landing but the first recorded landing, because the absense of records of previous landings that were surely on the islands does not imply that none happened (e.g., possibly Camargo's).

In case it is argued that the theories of English discovery given in the article have a higher degree of confidence than the ones I mention above, see the following remarks in [Deas] and bear in mind that these possible "Latin" discoveries predate those:

See

 * 1) Gustafson 2007 (starting in min 4 aprox.) Lowell Gustafson is Dean of Villanova University, U.S., and he authored a book published by Oxford University on the subject of the sovereignty dispute, with a historical chapter.
 * 2) Dunmore, pp. 92-93. Emeritus Professor  John Dunmore is a leading authority in the history of 18th-century exploration of the Pacific. He was awarded the New Zealand Order of Merit for his contributions on the subject.
 * 3) Deas Malcolm Deas is currently an emeritus fellow at Oxford, where he worked as a historian specializing in Latin American history.

Foundation of Port Egmont
The article presents the foundation of the British settlement as if it were unrelated to the creation of the French and almost at the same time, whitewashing the picture given by authoritative literature.

Byron doubtfully founded the settlement in 1765 as stated in the article. During that visit to the harbour (at Saunders Island, a minor one neighbouring West Falkland/Gran Malvina) he just took formal possession "of this Harbour & of all these islands" [Dunmore, p. 121], what some scholars interpret as taking formal possession of the whole archipelago, and departed shortly afterwards. The settlement was started in 1766 by McBride. During Byron's visit, a crewman planted a small garden. British authorities later claimed that planting this garden constituted the beginning of the settlement (see Deas, and Dunmore p. 139) to date it as closely as possible to the French. Probably also to disguise the fact that they were building it as a reaction.

The foundation is dated in 1765 according to some sources that go through those events briefly (not necessarily bad sources) and in 1766 according to other brief sources like    etc. The latter is a Falklander official source and yet it dates the foundation in 1766 (point for the FIG!) More-detailed authoritative sources clarify these events (the underlining in the quotes below is mine).

Gustafson (introduced in "Discovery" section, but now I quote from his book published by Oxford U.) writes (pp. 9–10):

Byron reached the islands on 4 January 1765. He named a point in Byron Sound Port Egmont, after the first lord of the admiralty, and claimed the islands for Britain. Byron had left England before the French announced on 3 August 1764 their settlement on the Malouines. He did not explore the islands sufficiently to discover the already established French settlement. His surgeon did plant a vegetable garden. Showing that nothing can be too trivial in the history of the Falklands dispute, this garden has been mentioned as proving possession. [...] On 20 July 1765, the secretary of state for the Southern Department, Henry Conway, advised the lords of the admiralty to send a settlement expedition to the islands. A frigate, a sloop, a store ship, military equipment, and twenty-five marines were to go there. The secretary argued that the garden had been the beginning of the settlement. If anyone else should be found on the islands, they would be infringing on the sovereignty of the king and should be evicted. It was supposedly contrary to Conway's expectation to find any other settlement there, even though the French had publicly announced almost a year before that there was.

[...]

Britain's claim to the islands, Egmont later said, was based on first discovery of the islands and simultaneous settlement with France. Britain did not know of any French interest in the island until a paragraph in the foreign gazettes first mentioned in September 1764 that some frigates had returned to St. Malo from the Malouines. He mentioned no knowledge of a French settlement, though he suspected they were planning one. This was months after Byron's expedition was planned and six or seven weeks after he had sailed. Egmont did appreciate the advantage of first settlement and urged immediate action lest the French have too long a head start. If the French became well established before England settled the islands, then "it would probably be out of our power to expell, at least without direct and avow'd hostilities which may bring on an immediate rupture both with France and Spain, whereas . . . this will be less likely to ensue, if as things are now circumstanc'd we take our measures sooner or at least as soon as France."

Egmont's immediate purpose in urging the prompt sending of an expedition to the Falklands was to have England challenge the French right of occupation and to found a settlement soon enough after the French one's founding to be in effect simultaneous. Combined with first discovery, a challenge to the French settlement and a nearly simultaneous British settlement would retain title for Britain. Title continued to elude Egmont because discovery remained disputed, an extended interval had separated discovery and anyone's occupation, and France did found a settlement almost two years prior to Britain's. [...] It was with these purposes that Captain John McBride was instructed to sail for the Falklands, where he arrived on 8 January 1766. This was two years after the French had landed. With winter only some months away, the erection of a blockhouse armed with the ship's guns and a fort manned by twenty-five marines took precedence over exploration. [...] Concentrating at first on settlement at Port Egmont rather than on exploration, he did not suspect a French settlement until 20 September 1766.

[...] If he did not already know about it, McBride discovered the French settlement on 2 December 1766. [...] McBride told the French to leave British sovereign territory, and then he left for Port Egmont. The British believed their settlement and their objection to the French colony had challenged France's rights to the islands soon enough to deny them title based on first occupation.

The Spanish, who had already purchased but not formally taken control of the French colony, would argue that it was public knowledge that France had settled on the islands before anyone else. Spain's purchase of the islands gave it the legitimacy France's title had enjoyed because of first settlement.

Reisman (expert in international law from Yale U., in a paper published by the Yale Law Journal where he reviews Goebel's classic study, which was reprinted by Yale University Press) writes (p. 294)

[T]he British mounted an expedition to the Falklands to secure a base for future operations. Un-aware of the French settlement, the British circled the islands in 1765, took comprehensive surveys of the coast and sailed past Berkeley Sound, the location of the French colony. This expedition became an important basis for British claims to the islands; hence Goebel recounts in detail what was actually accomplished. At Port Egmont (now called Byron Sound), Captain Byron recorded, "Of this harbor and all the neighboring islands, I took possession for his Majesty, King George, the Third, of Great Britain, by the name of Falkland's Islands." The surgeon of the ship also "surrounded a piece of ground near the watering place with a fence of turf and planted it with many esculent vegetables as a garden, for the benefit of those who might hereafter come to this place." Goebel commented sarcastically, "This act of benevolence is mentioned here because it was later used as proof of possession!" Indeed, the following year, the Secretary of State, Conway, described the garden as a settlement when addressing the Lords of Admiralty. By this time, of course, the British knew of the French colony."

[...]

In 1766, a second British expedition established a settlement at Port Egmont. It took this expedition almost a year to find the French settlement.

Freedman (Official British Historian for the Falkland's Campaign) writes (p. 4):

On 23 January 1765, just before this Franco-Spanish agreement, which concerned East Falkland, Commodore John Byron, the poet’s grandfather, arrived aboard HMS Dolphin at West Falkland, which he claimed for King George III. [...] Having decided to take the Falklands seriously, the British sent a second expedition. This arrived a year later in January 1766 under the command of John McBride, commander of HMS Jason. At this point a British settlement of some 100 people was established in Port Egmont at Saunders Island on West Falkland.

Hope (Argentinean lawyer, from a paper published in the journal of a renowned U.S. law school where he studied) writes (p. 403):

In early 1765, almost one year after Bougainville had founded his colony on the main eastern island, Commodore John Byron, after making some surveys of the coast of the main western island, took formal possession in the name of George III on a spot in Saunders Island he called Port Egmont. Saunders Island lies to the northwest of the Gran Malvina (West Falkland). It is important to note that Byron's expedition did not leave a settlement. [Footnote: The chief remnant of the Byron expedition appears to have been a vegetable garden. According to Dr. Brown's "Anglo Spanish Relations in American in the Closing Years of the Colonial Era" (quoted in GoEBEL, supra note 20, at 232 n.36) the act of possession took place on January 23, 1765. There the flag was raised and the surgeon of the Tamar "surrounded a piece of ground near the watering place with a fence of turf and planted it with many esculent vegetables as a garden, for the benefit of those who might hereafter come to this place." Cj. HIDALGO NIETO, supra note 21, at 5.] A year later, in 1766, and two years after the founding of Port Louis by Bougainville, a first British settlement was secretly established in Port Egmont and for a period of around fourteen months this establishment on Saunders Island coexisted with Bougainville's colony, until the latter was formally transferred to Spain. Although the French settlers had suspected the possible existence of a British enclave in the area, the first encounter between both parties did not take place until December 4, 1766 when Captain MacBride sailed into Port Louis.

Dunmore writes (pp. 139-140):

Soon after [the transfer of Port Louis from France to Spain in September 1766], news arrived from French and Spanish sources of another British expedition to the Falklands. They already knew about Wallis's voyage, but this was a different matter altogether. It was a clear attempt by England to settle on the Falklands. Captain John McBride had been sent out in the Jason, had apparently landed on the archipelago and established a colony. Wallis, it was believed, was going to strengthen it. Furthermore, added Fieschi di Masserano, Madrid's ambassador in London, there were rumours of British 'plans to set up establishments in other parts of South America', in the South Seas and possibly in the Strait of Magellan.

All this incensed the Spanish. Fuentes, in Paris, was instructed to approach Choiseul and obtain his approval for a joint protest to London, which was to contain the words 'England will be held responsible for any consequences if she persists in these endeavours'. This sounded too close to an ultimatum for Choiseul - and for Louis XV, who had no wish to get embroiled in another war. The terms of the protest were toned down. The French were not even sure that it should be sent at all, as information recently received in Paris indicated that Wallis was not going to the Falklands, and that McBride's so-called colony was little more than a move to warn off the French.

The instructions McBride had received from the Admiralty did not even mention a French settlement, let alone require him to set up a colony. They suggested simply that he should carry out a general reconnaissance and show the British flag: "If any subjects of a foreign Power were found to be settled at any point in the Islands, they were to be visited and informed that the Islands belonged to Great Britain, and that, since His Majesty had given order for the settlement thereof, the subjects of no other Power were entitled to reside there without the King's permission. Any such persons were to be offered transport on His Majesty's ships to some port in the Dominions of the Power to which they belonged."

McBride had sailed from England on 26 September 1765. He intended to check on the settlement Byron was reported to have made, and which the French and the Spanish had taken to be the implantation of an actual colony. It was in fact no more than the 'Pritty little Garden' laid out by the Tamar's surgeon. McBride had reached the islands on 8 January 1766, cleared a patch of land at Port Egmont, 'weeded Byron's vegetables', but he had not yet found the French colony. He did little more than erect a small fort, but in September, having climbed a hill, he came across a bottle containing a message in French, presumably the one left by the Aigle's survey party. Thus alerted, McBride at last discovered the Saint-Louis settlement and promptly sent the French a note asking by what authority they had erected a settlement in the Falklands.

Nerville was able to gain time by replying that he could not read English and so could not understand the Englishman's message. McBride largely ignored this - it was not his role to argue with the settlers, but to warn them off. He sent a small party ashore, taking a formal warning to Nerville to remove his colony. This done, the Jason sailed back to England. McBride had not presented any immediate threat to the French, and the British left no lasting trace of their passage, but the Jason expedition clearly indicated that Britain was not about to allow the islands to fall into Bourbon hand - and McBride had made it quite clear that they would return before long.

See also this catalog entry (pp. 264-265) for Papers relative to the Falklands Islands, where primary sources are summarized as quoted:

This volume contains:

Copy of a letter from Commodore Byron to the Earl of Egmont. Dolphin, Port Famine (Falkland Is.). 24 Feb, 1765. In which he tells the First Lord of the Admiralty of his meeting with the Giants of Patagonia; of his unsuccessful search for Pepys Island; his visit to Falkland Is., where he named a fine harbour after the E. of Egmont and of how he intended to take a new route for India as our Ships are too much disabled for the California Voyage.

Letter from E. of Egmont to D. of Grafton. July 20, 1765. Speaking of the great value of the Falkland Is. "which is undoubtedly the Key to the whole Pacific Ocean," and which "must command the Ports of Trade of Chili Peru Panama . . and all the Spanish Territory upon that Sea," etc.

Letter from Mr. Secretary Conway to the Lords of the Admiralty. July 20, 1765. Concerning the Admiralty's decision to form a settlement at Port Egmont.

Secret Instructions to Capt. John McBride, Commander of H.M.S. Jason, from E. of Egmont, C. Saunders and A. Keppel, for the establishing of the proposed settlement. McBride on his arrival there, renamed some of the Islands the Jason Islands, and two others Saunders and Keppel Islands.

Letter from Capt. McBride to E. of Egmont, dated Jason, Port Egmont, April 6, 1766. Received June 19. Describing his arrival at the Falkland Islands his voyage out and some particulars regarding the Islands.

Orders to McBride, 13 Sept, 1766, from the Admiralty, saying that it is intended to relieve him, and ordering him to go to Berkley Sound, as there were rumours of an establishment there by another European Power.

I think we can confidently extract the following conclusions:


 * 1) Byron stayed shortly at the islands early in 1765. He was probably unaware of the French settlement. He claimed possession but had no orders or intention to create a settlement.
 * 2) Throughout 1765, there was growing suspicion at London of the creation of a French settlement.
 * 3) Around mid year, McBride's mission was planned as a reaction to those suspicions (according to Gustafson at least). I call them "suspicions" but Reisman says that at that point "they knew" and Gustafson that the French, almost a year before, had "publicly announced" the existence of their settlement.
 * 4) It is not clear if McBride was to simply warn off the hypothetical French settlers (see Dunmore) or if he was also ordered to create a settlement (see Gustafson and the catalog entry).
 * 5) It was crucial for Britain to make the settlements appear as simultaneous as possible, so London argued that a small garden that Byron reported to have planted (for the benefit of passing sailors, presumably) was actually the beginning of theirs.
 * 6) McBride built the first buildings of Port Egmont in 1766 and he later discovered Port Louis.

I don't see academia buying the "garden" theory, but I wouldn't say that there's a categorical denial. At least, there is a discrepancy.

Then the article states that Port Egmont and Port Louis were founded unaware of one another. Firstly, this makes them appear simultaneous, as the Earl of Egmont wanted. But of course Port Louis was founded unaware of the other settlement—Port Egmont didn't exist! Secondly, the phrase hides the fact that, even though Britain didn't know the details of the French settlement, Port Egmont was started as a reaction to its creation, or at least as a reaction to signs of its existence.

The article also states that the Spanish discovered Port Egmont only after settling, which downplays that they were informed of McBride's expedition shortly after signing the transferal of Port Louis, which was months before implementing it. I also doubt that the French at Port Louis were not informed of Port Egmont at the time of the transferal (after being visited by McBride) and told the Spanish, but I would need to check on sources about that.

Restitution of Port Egmont
It may mislead to call the instrument that returned Port Egmont to Britain a "peace treaty". No part had declared a state of war and the paper was signed only by the Spanish crown, though there was a British note of acceptance. Calling it a "peace treaty" seems to serve the purpose of suggesting (stronger) legal effects from the restitution but, apart from the relevance of an absence of war, there was an explicit reservation of Spanish rights in that paper.

Searching for '"port egmont" restitution' with Google Books yields many results. Searching for '"port egmont" restitution "peace treaty"' returns three. In two of those, the use of "peace treaty" refers to other documents. The third is Goebel, where there is no snippet or preview provided and I don't have that book with me, but I very much doubt that Goebel uses "peace treaty" for that particular document. I think that we can confidently conclude that the instrument is not normally called a "peace treaty" in literature, if ever called that way.

Spain (alone) in the Islands (1774-1811)
The article downplays Spanish dominion from 1774 on. Concurring with modern studies, U.S. Secretary of State and future president James Madison wrote in 1808:

But the article's main text summarizes this period with no more than a factually-correct but odd "the Falklands were again abandoned when the British evacuated them in 1774 and the Spanish followed suit in 1811". Actually, it makes a crucial difference that Spain remained for decades.

Then it says that "The status of the archipelago went unchecked until 1820", apparently disregarding any de-jure possibility related to the independence of the viceroyalty.

Furthermore, Footnote D cites Cibran referring to a plaque left by the British on their departure and then to an alleged "unsuccessful development of the [Spanish] settlement". A settlement that lasted decades was unsuccessful? They even left cattle behind. The abandonment in 1811 has plausible explanations related to the beginning of the independence war in the neighbouring mainland, from where the islands were controlled. That reference to Napoleon looks odd to me too. Regarding the British plaque, its existence is well documented thus WP state it in its voice, but its importance is doubtful if we consider that it had no legal effect according to scholars (see Hope, Greenhow, and even Freedman [Official British Historian for the Falklands Campaign] attributes no more than a "dubious" validity to it).

Argentina in the Islands (1820-1833)
I also find the article to be downplaying Argentine acts of sovereignty. To begin with, in 1820, Jewett not only informed the other ships about the Argentine claim, as the article states, but he also performed a ceremony of possession, which was a requirement for legal title at the time. The article seems to assume that he also attempted a settlement, which was hardly the case, although he did remain for some months, apparently following orders from Buenos Aires to exert a military presence there, until he was replaced in 1821 by Guillermo Mason, who remained some weeks more. That is why Argentine historiography often mentions Jewett and Mason as the first Buenos Airean governors there.

The article disregards this, featuring instead that Jewett couldn't establish an authority. But did he try to give orders to the ships passing by? He had enough trouble keeping his crew afoot after a troubled voyage and his priority was not to oppose what the ships were doing but to formally demonstrate, via a Buenos Airean presence amidst a Spanish absence, that the islands were emancipated territory alongside the mainland ex-viceroyalty.

Footnote E says that, according to Laver, the UK disregards Jewett's actions for some reasons given there, but the citation is not accurate. What Laver offers is a summary of the arguments presented by the British authorities in 1834, where they mentioned events that, to their understanding, enforced their position, which is not quite the same thing as disregarding what Jewett had done, much less doing it presently. Besides, there are responses to those arguments, from scholars and Argentine authorities. Yet in the article only the old British observations are published, unchallenged.

In 1823, Buenos Aires granted land to Pacheco and Vernet, followed by their attempt to settle in 1824. They had previously requested the entitlement of their employee Areguatí as governor and it was apparently granted. In that petition they argued that, via the creation of a militia lead by Areguatí, they would protect the islands as a property of Buenos Aires. Areguatí and his men lived at the islands between half and one year.

The article leaves all of this unmentioned, stating instead that, after Jewett's landing in 1820, "the Falklands remained ungoverned until Luis Vernet re-established the old Spanish settlement under its former French name (Port Louis) in 1826."

Connections between that other enterprise and Buenos Aires are minimized. All that is mentioned is in Footnotes F and G. They state that Vernet's venture had "permission and encouragement from Buenos Aires". Probably an understatement, given that he had been awarded grants of land besides permission to hunt the cattle left at the time of the vice-royalty. Such grants of land were acts of sovereignty, regardless of that authority following from title or being one that was assumed unlawfully. Even the British government acknowledged this in its 1829 note of protest :

The reference to the further grants that Vernet got in 1828 is unnecessarily put in Cawkell's voice. Vernet's expressions in favor of Argentine sovereignty, such as in the aforementioned 1823 petition or in this memo he wrote in 1832, are completely disregarded. His entitlement as governor in 1829 (or rather Civil and Military Commander, which is basically the same) is said in no more than a footnote. From the main text, it appears that Vernet had nothing to do with Buenos Aires, because what is not neglected is given merely in footnotes, taking about as much space as is dedicated there to some dubious mentions by Cawkell of a consular stamping and a request for protection, which I have argued against in here. My points were basically:


 * 1) Though we have looked, we haven't found any other sources that mention those stampings. I would conclude that they were either non-existent or unimportant consular legalizations.
 * 2) If the stampings were real and as important as to deserve a place in these articles, there would be other mentions in literature. As I see it, this common-sense inference is reflected in WP policy when it requires that "Any exceptional claim requires multiple high-quality sources. Red flags that should prompt extra caution include: surprising or apparently important claims not covered by multiple mainstream sources".
 * 3) Cawkell is a biased source. I base this assertion on an analysis of her passage, contrasting it with other sources, and on a statement by the British Official Historian for the Falkland Campaign who called her book "a history of the islands reflecting the view of the Falklanders".
 * 4) Cawkell writes that Vernet "expressed the wish" of British protection. Primary sources show that this expression was merely a tacit one based on the British consul's judgement. And that the conditional "in the event of the British returning" was Cawkell's addendum. A presumed wish of this kind and the author's unique speculation are hardly this important.
 * 5) The inclusion of Cawkell's singular passage is aggravated by the fact that it allows chauvinistic misinterpretations, particularly because the prominence that WP is attributing to it (it is present in 9 articles, including this main one) suggests that it has special significance. In some of those instances, the mentions even explicitly include one of those misinterpretations.

According to several first-person accounts, the USS Lexington pretty much destroyed the settlement but some settlers and property remained. Why state that Vernet's enterprise ended there? Why give prominence to what Capt. Duncan said? There is a footnote where Duncan's log is compared to Vernet's claims in courts, without mention of the accounts that give more-reliable signs of the degree of destruction.

Calling the population sent by Buenos Aires in 1832 "a garrison" downplays its nature. Firstly, it included women and children. Secondly, in the context of colonial Americas, these kinds of militarized frontier populations were frequently used to protect territories from claims of abandonment and to support frontier populations and roads (see the concept of a "presidio" in the Spanish Empire).

1833–
The article states that there was no resistance at the takeover, but Pinedo (acting as political authority) protested, refused to remove his flag, and left only at the threat of greater force. According to scholars, this was an act of force. The immediate diplomatic protests from Buenos Aires to London are mentioned only in a footnote. From the main text, it appears that the Buenos Aireans were sort of alright with the British taking control... By the way, Pinedo had suffocated the mutiny when the British forces arrived.

The following diplomatic activity is not mentioned. On the contrary, it seems to be downplayed by saying simply that Rosas didn't break relations (should he?). Like if nothing happened in that field from 1834 to the mid 20th century. Actually, there were regular protests from Argentina, and Hope mentions proposals of arbitration that were refused by Britain.

By the way, isn't there a bias in calling 1833 a "reassertion of rule" while 1982 is called an "invasion"? Or to refer to the disputed South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands as "other British territories" alongside the islands?

Arana-Southern Treaty
The Arana-Southern Treaty is mentioned in Footnote I with a quotation that is out of context, because the "existing differences" referred in the introduction are those related to the Anglo-French blockade, as is indicated in the body of the treaty. Furthermore, it may mislead that "perfect friendship" was used differently in those times, meaning honest and broad but not necessarily spotless.

In his address to Congress between the signature and ratification of the treaty, Rosas states that the claim to the islands is alive and taken care of. He welcomes that Palmerston had acknowledged the pretensions of the Confederacy some months before, in a communication that could be interpreted to mean a diplomatic request not to insist so regularly, because Palmerston clarifies that the failure to receive a protest wouldn't be interpreted as a concession of title. This may partly explain why Argentina suspended its formal protests, which were resumed about a quarter century later, after hefty wars for Argentina and 12 years of rule of a Liberal Party that was not too keen to disturb relations with Britain. Pepper and Pascoe make a gross out-of-context quotation of this communication, which can be read in more-complete form from Hope. Rosas's speech is also available online, in Spanish.

I don't think it is fair to mention the treaty without these and other elements. Its importance is very doubtful. Not surprisingly, it is rarely (if ever) mentioned in studies about the dispute. I can only remember a Mexican historian who dedicates just half a line, saying that the treaty awarded title to Britain without explaining on which grounds. And another source (was it Caillet-Bois?) that simply criticizes Rosas for not including it. There is a point there, but it is not a big deal. A treaty that does not acknowledge the dispute does not help the Argentine case, but just as it doesn't help the British having recognized the republic without any such mention, something that the WP articles don't touch afaik even though it can be argued to be graver (because it added up to a prolonged silence, whereas Rosas had protested a few months before and had received a sort of "permission not to protest all the time").

Stronger interpretations have been made in unreliable webpages that do not resist a legal analysis. It has been said that title was awarded to Britain by uti possidetis, neglecting that, for that legal effect, the parts should have sometime declared that they were in a state of war, which they didn't, or that the treaty explicitly circumscribes its reach to another conflict, establishing the restoration of a relationship that included this unresolved sovereignty issue. There are also legal principles in treaty law to consider. One states that outside elements can be used to clarify points in the text (though not to contradict them). In this case they could be Rosas's speech and Palmerston's communication. Another one states that, in case of reasonable doubt, a treaty must be interpreted in the way that is less onerous to the part making the apparent concession.

If the theory of the treaty conceding the islands was worthy of mention, it should appear in major studies. Solely mentioning the treaty in WP without giving any interpretation does not solve this lack of reliable analyses if elements that suggest a pro-British reading are given without presentation of those that discourage it. However, the treaty has been mentioned by British diplomats, though again not detailing how they believe it to be relevant, and it is frequently brought up in casual conversation and unreliable commentary on the web. Perhaps the most informative solution is not to disregard it altogether...