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Overview
Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America is a 1990 book written by Dr. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and published by Clarion House. The author’s purpose is to build the case that the USA’s current problems with drug trafficking and drug use are not merely the result of supply and demand but are rather the result of political warfare conducted against the US by Communist governments.

Preface and Chapter 1: The Chinese Initiative
In the book’s preface and first chapter, the author introduces the concept that the drug epidemic plaguing the United States of America today is not simply the natural result of personal choices, supply and demand, and profit-seeking drug lords as one might assume. Citing Chinese reports and testimony, as well as books written about China and Mao Tse-tung during the period of the 1920s and 1930s, the author presents the case that Chinese Communists deliberately decided to increase opium production, as a state-sponsored activity, to wage “chemical warfare by indigenous methods” against Imperialist powers. The strategy described by the author is one of using drugs against an enemy to “soften a target area” and then, once the enemy area had come under Chinese control, to cut off drug supply and retain the drugs for use only against enemy territories. The author claims that during the period of 1949-1952, China’s opium production levels increased to the point of exceeding 2000 tons annually. According to the author, this corresponded to a new height of drug use in the US. The targets specifically included US servicemen. The author includes the following quote from Professor J. H. Turnbull of the United Kingdom, who analyzed the subject, when identifying Communist goals in launching drug-based warfare: “To finance subversive activities abroad; to corrupt and weaken the people of the Free World; and to destroy the morale of U.S. servicemen fighting in Southeast Asia.”

Chapter 2: The Soviet Decision
The author introduces one of his most important sources, Czechoslovak defector Jan Sejna, who is identified in the preface as the “highest positioned Soviet bloc official ever to seek political asylum in the West, and the only such official who actually was a member of the decision-making hierarchy.” (Sejna wrote his own book, an autobiography about his defection, entitled We Will Bury You, but the topic of drugs is never explicitly addressed, nor does any drug-related entry appear in the work’s index. ) The author lists Sejna’s many Party credentials and states that Sejna “was present during the inception, planning, and implementation of Soviet narcotics trafficking operations.” According to the author, referring to Sejna throughout, Soviet-sponsored drug operations were inspired by the clinical studies conducted by Soviet scientists during the Korean War on prisoners and corpses, when a correlation was observed between cardiovascular damage and drug use. According to the author, the concept was developed to use drugs as a long-term, strategic weapon over the course of generations, not just as a tactical or financial tool. This was to be combined with Soviet campaigns of training terrorists and infiltrating organized crime. The author summarizes the interrelation of these concepts as follows:

“Narcotics, terrorism, and organized crime were coordinated and used together in a complementary fashion. Narcotics were used to destroy the society. Terrorism was used to destabilize the country and prepare the revolutionary situation. Organized crime was used to control the elite. All three were long-range strategic operations and all three were incorporated into Soviet Bloc planning by 1956.”

Based on Sejna’s knowledge, the author discusses the training camps that were established to launch these strategic operations, and using the data provided by Sejna, extrapolates that if operations had continued at a steady rate from Sejna’s day onward, around 25,000 drug dealers would have graduated from such training camps by the time of the book’s publication in 1990.

Chapter 3: Building the Latin American Drug Network
The author relates Sejna’s knowledge of the establishment of the Soviet drug operation in Sejna’s own Czechoslovakia. The author states that Czechoslovakia was tasked with launching operations on two fronts: Asia and Latin America. The author focuses this chapter primarily on the Cuban operation in Latin America. Due to Castro’s distrust of the USSR, the Soviets essentially used Czechoslovakia, to whom the new Castro regime had reached out for military assistance, as their instrument to handle Cuba in order to mask the fact that the Soviets were actually the sponsor of the whole thing. According to the author, “Cuba agreed to become a revolutionary center in the West and to allow Czechoslovakia to establish an intelligence station in Cuba.” The training of Cubans and the production of the drug network therefore got underway, allegedly under Czechoslovak control, but actually under the oversight of the Soviet Union. Throughout the chapter, the author emphasizes that the Soviet Union retained strategic control over the entire narcotics operation but remained tactically detached as far as the daily running of affairs, even when the operation branched out to other Latin American countries. Eventually, Cubans established drug networks in such countries as Chile and Argentina, after having been trained by the Czechoslovaks, who had been working under USSR orders all along. The author states that Sejna eventually had knowledge of operations in the US, Canada, Mexico, Panama, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, Peru, Guadeloupe, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica.

Another point which the author emphasizes in this chapter is the fact that these operations came to also represent Soviet manipulation of American law enforcement agencies. Whenever the need for discipline or removal or uncooperative/dangerous drug network assets arose, the Soviets could simply arrange for those individuals to be sacrificed to the Drug Enforcement Administration or other agencies, a practice which would not only solve the disciplinary problem but also deceive Americans by bolstering these agencies’ public image.

Chapter 4: Khrushchev Instructs the Satellites
The author states, per Sejna’s testimony, that at a meeting in 1962, Khrushchev officially announced to the leaders of East European Soviet satellites the plan to undermine the West via the narcotics operation. Khrushchev apparently noted the success that the Chinese had been having and decided that the Soviets should launch their own operation full-force, since they were so well-networked as to be able to make even more effective use of such warfare than the Chinese. The author states that as part of the disinformation, deception, and propaganda that tended to accompany Soviet operations, the Soviets deliberately drew attention to the Chinese narcotics operations in order to draw attention away from their own increase in drug trafficking. The author notes that certain objections were raised by Soviet satellite leaders to the Soviet narcotics operation, including the question of morality. The author quotes Khrushchev as responding “that anything that speeds the destruction of capitalism is moral.” Khrushchev’s name for the narcotics operation against the West would be Druzhba Narodov (“friendship of nations”), and its operational details would be kept in extreme secrecy.

Chapter 5: Organizing for “Druzhba Narodov”
The author notes that “just because an operation expands does not mean that control over information becomes loose.” He discusses the elaborate network and interagency collaboration utilized by the Soviets to execute the narcotics operation while still maintaining the secrecy of the overall plan. He notes that unlike in the West, “intelligence operations” of the Soviet Union and their satellites utilized the entire array of government agencies, not just those devoted to intelligence. The author discusses the spectrum of entities employed by the USSR and its satellites to actually carry out the details of the Druzhba Narodov operation, from scientists doing the initial drug-related research to the elaborate trade agreements and customs arrangements which ensured that cross-border shipments would not be disturbed. The author discusses the parallels of Russia’s structure of agencies with the agency structures of its satellites, especially Czechoslovakia. In the chapter’s conclusion, to emphasize his point about operational security still being maintained regardless of the extent of government involvement, the author states that in Czechoslovakia, at least twenty government agencies were involved in the operation yet fewer than 30 people had been provided the big picture.

Chapter 6: Political War with Drugs in Vietnam
The author states that both the USSR and Communist China ramped up their drug production efforts to target US servicemen as the Vietnam War broke out. As part of the “Great Leap Forward,” the Chinese dramatically increased their narcotics production and trafficking efforts as they observed the increasing US military presence in Asia, because they were aware of the tremendous successes their previous narcotics operations had had in both the Indochina and Korean Wars. The author notes that this corresponded with the Soviets’ launch of their own operation, as they too were aware of the successes which China had experienced. The author states that in 1958 or 1959, the Soviets even suggested to Chinese Defense Minister Marshal P’eng Te-huai that their narcotics operations should cooperate with each other and divide up the market, but that Mao Tse-tung instead had his Defense Minister killed for even communicating with the Soviets about the narcotics operation in the first place. The author discusses how drugs (opium and then heroin as well) from both sources flooded US military installations. The street prices made it obvious that the operation was not profit-driven: quoting US General Lewis Walt, the author claims that heroin vials which would have cost $250 on the street in New York City were sold outside military bases for $1 - $2. The author also states that in the years of 1970 and 1971, drug usage supplanted combat as the leading cause of death in the Air Force.

Chapter 7: Soviet Intensification During the Late 1960s
The author discusses the Soviet intensification of their narcotics operation Druzhba Narodov during the Vietnam War. Use of drugs to compromise the rising class of the Western “technical elite” became a strategy to supplement the already favored tactic of stealing technology from the West. The author reiterates the Soviets’ utilization of organized crime in accomplishing such goals. The author also discusses Soviet penetration of financial institutions and experimental development of new drugs. Returning to the subject of incredibly low street prices for such drugs as heroin, the author makes the following point: “The casual explanation is increased supply and competition. The more informed observer might question this explanation and consider other possibilities; for example, political war and actions designed to defeat the so-called war on drugs.” The surge of popularity of crack cocaine in the late 1980s is also discussed.

Chapter 8: Cuba and the Rise of Narco-Terrorism
The author notes that increased publicity was brought to drug trafficking in the US with the arrest of several prominent Cubans, including Cuban Communist government officials, in the 1980s. He also notes that as more details came to light, the overall operation bore striking similarity to the Soviets’ strategic narcotics operation that was described by Sejna. A key concept introduced by the author is narcoterrorism, described as “close linkages between drug trafficking and terrorist-revolutionary activities.” The author repeats yet again the concept that although money is still a consideration in this strategic narcotics campaign, the political warfare dimension is always the most important facet. The author also emphasizes again, per Sejna’s testimony, that the KGB made highly effective use of narcotics, terrorism, and organized crime in concert with each other.

Chapter 9: Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil
In this chapter, the author begins to elaborate upon the concept that the failure of the USA as a whole to officially recognize the deliberate, induced nature of America’s drug epidemic may be due to reasons more sinister than lack of knowledge or comprehension. The author notes that throughout the 1950s, efforts of such individuals as Harry Anslinger (US Commissioner of Narcotics) had actually led to widespread, official US government recognition of the fact that Communist China was the source of many narcotics entering the US. He states that this all changed radically in the 1960s, when “Harry Anslinger retired and...pro-China interests moved into the State Department.” He notes that China officially disappeared from the “Golden Triangle” (a CIA map of Asia which identified the major narcotics production/organization regions) after the White House edited it. He also states that Henry Kissinger chaired the Ad Hoc Committee of Narcotics and, citing Edward Jay Epstein, claims that “Kissinger evidenced little interest in the heroin problem and rarely attended committee meetings.” The author also states that “Kissinger stopped the [narcotics-related reconnaissance] overflights of Burma specifically to avoid threatening détente with China.” The author discusses other examples of seemingly deliberate efforts to disassociate China with such concepts as drug trafficking and notes that “China is rarely listed as a producing country in any of the reports issued by the State Department, the Drug Enforcement Administration, or U.S. Customs.” The crux of the author’s position in this chapter, regarding China, is as follows: “While statements such as these [referring to official reports which omitted or denied Chinese association with narcotics] can be explained as the results of naivete or incompetence, it seems quite clear that there was also present a continuing effort to cover-up Chinese communist drug trafficking.”

The second part of the chapter presents a similar image of the situation with the USSR. Not only was there no official US recognition of Soviet sponsorship of the problem, but the US went so far as to work out agreements with such countries as Bulgaria regarding training of customs officials and sharing of intelligence in order to help these eastern European nations combat drug trafficking. After spending the rest of the chapter raising numerous other concerns regarding the absence of any official US recognition of a strategic, Communist-sponsored narcotics plot, the author concludes the chapter by citing the State Department’s 1988 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, in which the State Department argued that their strategy was “working,” and asks the question, “For whom?”

Chapter 10: Questions of Intelligence
The majority of this chapter is dedicated to a detailed discussion of the US intelligence community’s handling of Czechoslovak General Jan Sejna when he defected in 1968. The author raises numerous concerns regarding the oddities of certain things that were done and that were not done in the debriefing of this defector and even after the debriefing. The author argues that the Washington Post was correct in identifying Sejna as “one of the highest-ranking communists ever to defect,” but the author asserts that other than that, the vast majority of publicity surrounding Sejna was entirely negative, false, and had the effect of seriously damaging his reputation and credibility. The author also argues that when the totality of Sejna’s political/military responsibilities are considered, it becomes apparent that Sejna was not given nearly high enough priority as a potentially valuable source of strategic information. The author argues that although it was perfectly reasonable to begin the debriefing with questions of potentially immediate tactical significance, the focus should have eventually shifted to the immense insight which Sejna could have offered on Soviet long-term strategic plans. This shift never occurred. The author also notes that Sejna was never sent to meet with such key CIA officials as Richard Helms or James Angleton. The author presents numerous examples throughout the chapter of occurrences which seemed deliberately designed to keep Sejna quiet (such as his not being given a US government job ) and even threatened his ability to maintain a livelihood in his new country (such as interference with the publication of his memoirs, as well as the CIA’s establishing him as a restaurant manager – a profession with which he had no experience ). Throughout the entire chapter, the author repeatedly questions who was ultimately making such decisions regarding this defector and why they were being made.

A section at the end of the chapter addresses the question of whether or not a Communist government as a whole should be viewed as responsible for an operation (such the strategic narcotics operation that is the subject of the book) once it becomes apparent that individual officials were involved. The author’s answer is yes, and he reiterates the organizational structure and level of control which Communists governments exert(ed) over their officials and operations. Essentially, the author’s assertion is that operations such as the ones described in this book cannot occur without the general knowledge and backing of the government.

Chapter 11: Fixing the Responsibility
The author intensifies his case-building in asserting that America’s current drug-usage epidemic is largely the result of a deliberate, targeted, strategic Soviet narcotics operation. The author notes that the general consensus regarding the source of the problem has been supply and demand, profit, immorality, youthful experimentation, etc. He concedes that these factors have certainly been present but insists that they are not at the root of the problem. In this chapter, the author inserts a table in which he has compiled thirteen statements from sources which unequivocally point to Chinese and Soviet political warfare against the US in the form of narcotics trafficking. The entirety of the table is included here:


 * “Opium should be regarded as a powerful weapon. It has been employed by imperialists against us, and now we should use it against them. Such warfare can be called chemical warfare by indigenous methods.” – Mao Tse-Tung, 1935.


 * “We will disarm the capitalists with the things they like to taste.” – Chou En-Lai, 1958.


 * “Anything that speeds the destruction of capitalism is moral.” – Nikita Khrushchev, 1962.


 * “Deception and drugs are our first two strategic echelons in the war with capitalism.” – Nikita Khrushchev, 1963.


 * “The United States is the main target because they are our worst enemy; it is simple to move drugs into the United States; and, there is an unlimited supply of money there. – Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary, Communist Party of Bulgaria, 1964.


 * “We are growing the very best poppies for the U.S. servicemen.” – Chou En-Lai, 1965.


 * “Drugs will be a decisive weapon in disrupting the fabric of Western democracies.” – Raul Castro, late 1960s.


 * “The goal is to hurt the United States full with drugs.” – Fernando Ravelo-Renedo, Cuban Ambassador to Colombia, 1978.


 * “I was ordered to load up the United States with drugs.” – Mario Estevez Gonzalez, Cuban intelligence agent, 1981.


 * “Drugs were used as political weapons. The target was the youth of the United States.” – Antonio Farach, high-level Nicaraguan official, 1984.


 * “Drugs are the best way to destroy the United States.” – General Barreiro, Chief of Cuban Intelligence, 1987.


 * “The trafficking is a way of waging war on the United States. It also provides a profit.” – Humberto Ortega, Nicaraguan Minister of Defense, 1987.


 * “Drugs are considered to be the best way to destroy the United States . . . by undermining the will of American youth, the enemy is destroyed without firing one bullet.” – Major Juan Rodriguez, Cuban intelligence officer, 1988.

Chapter 12: What the Future Holds, and Epilogue
The author’s view of the future at the time of the book’s publication in 1990 was that such American strategies as the “war on drugs,” “zero-tolerance” policies, opium crop destruction, and financial aid to the governments of foreign nations will all be destined for failure until the U.S. government officially recognizes the drug problem as political warfare directed against the United States. The author also addresses his perceptions of the failure of the U.S. to effectively use the tracking of money laundering as a tool to combat the drug networks as well as the failure of the government to set aggressive enough goals for combating the problem. He also argues that the problem of low goal setting has been compounded by the lack of continuity between one Presidential administration’s goals and the next.

In the epilogue, the author concludes that the natural question for the reader to ask would be, “Is there a way out [of the drug problem]?” The answer, according to the author, is to ask the question, “How bad will the drug problem have to get before the American public decides they have had enough?” In writing this book to ask these questions, the author asserts that his goal is to obtain “the active involvement of more Americans” in the struggle to recognize the true nature of the problem in order to “shed some badly needed light on an area too many people wish to keep in darkness.”

About the Author
Dr. Douglass received his doctorate degree from Cornell University and had already acquired 25 years of intelligence/defense community experience by the time of this book’s publication. He has also taught at the Naval Postgraduate School, Cornell, and Johns Hopkins School of International Relations.