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Andrei Gromyko's negotiation during the Cuban Missile Crisis
Rusk Negotiation

Andrei Gromyko, a Soviet Belarusian communist politician, and Dean Rusk, a former United States Secretary of State, discussed Cuban issues and both the USA’s and Soviet Union’s aggression during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Gromyko, in addition to speaking with John F. Kennedy, held important political discussions with Dean Rusk in regards to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Early into the conversation between the two, Gromyko mentioned that the whole issue revolving around Cuba has been caused as a result of USA’s “hostile policy”. He said, “Cuba belongs to the Cubans, not to Americans”, explaining that America cannot simply enforce their foreign policy on any land they please. Additionally, he didn't understand why USA believed that it was in a position to dictate a domestic policy for the Cubans, nor the social structure that they should live under. It was obvious that Cuba welcomed the Soviet Union with open arms, especially because both countries were under a communist regime and shared similar values.

Rusk, on the other hand, seemed to disagree with Gromyko’s statement and offered a rebuttal. He believed the complete opposite, that Cuba does indeed pose a threat with the involvement of the Soviet Union. He declared that Cuba has violated the peace on the continent. Furthermore, he understood the military capability that the soviet Union had at the time, and knew of the potential threat that could come with it. Understanding the capabilities and the power of the Soviet Union, Rusk said, “Cuba without the Soviet Union…is one thing; a Cuba where ‘Soviet operators’ run things is something different”, emphasizing the fact that the Soviets were up to something bigger than simply helping out the Cubans. He was referring to the fact that the Soviet Union was not only providing food resources like grain, but also military and defensive weapon training. Rusk went on to talk about how the situation worsened after July of 1962, when the Soviet weapons began to continuously arrive at the borders of Cuba.

Further into their conversation, Gromyko brought up a point about USA’s involvement in foreign countries, especially the positioning of their military bases in countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, Italy, England, and even more on the Asian and African continents. In an article, To the Brink: Turkish and Cuban Missiles during the Height of the Cold War, the author talked about the threat that Turkish missiles posed to the Soviet Union. The author mentioned, “…the installation process of the Jupiter missiles…motivated the Soviet Union to covertly install their own intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba”, explaining the main reason why the USSR wanted to expand their presence onto Cuba. Gromyko argued that the Soviet Union had every right to be present in Cuba, especially considering the fact that the USA had established their own missiles in Turkey (Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles). The Soviet Union was blamed for their presence in Cuba, yet America had established countless of foreign military bases worldwide.To Gromyko it seemed ironical, “It appears that the USA can have military bases in these countries, conclude with them military agreements, while the Soviet Union can not even provide assistance in support of the Cuban economy and for the strengthening of the defense capability of Cuba”, making the USA look hypocritical in his eyes. In Gromyko's eyes, it was only right for the Soviet Union to offer a rebuttal in return to USA's initial course of action.

Rusk’s response was that “…the significance of our bases is inflated”, stating that American atomic weapons and missiles are located in only three countries, England being one of them. He added that the 'Stalinist period' is what caused the USA, and other Western powers, to conduct a foreign policy that created bases overseas and deployed troops within them. With the escalation of the Korean War and the Berlin Blockade, America developed its military presence. Gromyko brought up World War II, specifically the defeat of Hitler's Germany, to prove a point that if the Soviet Union had expansionist intentions, then it could've occupied all of Western Europe. Yet the Soviet Union has not done so and hasn't started it either. He brought up this point in order to convince Rusk that Soviet Union's intentions with Cuba aren't for expansionist reasons. Gromyko rewinded back to his initial point, “the Americans have no grounds to reproach Cuba and the Cubans for steps of a purely defensive character…”, since so far, no aggressive action has been taken from neither the Cubans nor the Soviets towards the USA. He said that Cuba wants to strengthen their country and and gain its independence, which shouldn't present any danger, especially to a great power like the USA. Rusk compared USA's interest in Cuba to Soviet Unions interest in Hungary in the year of 1956, referring to the Hungarian Revolution. Gromyko deflected Rusk's analogy because of its groundlessness interpretation. Rusk, in return, didn't agree with the rejection of his analogy, but yet they still moved on.

Both Gromyko and Rusk continued their conversation, which lasted two hours, discussing several other topics including the Baruch Plan and the Chinese-Indian border conflict. After several negotiations, Gromyko mentioned: "By Rusk's behavior it was possible to observe how painfully the American leaders are suffering the fact that the Soviet Union decisively has stood on the side of Cuba...", showcasing Rusk's weak character, as stated in Gromyko's Telegram.When redirecting his conversation back to John F. Kennedy, he additionally noticed, “It is characteristic that Rusk, during our entire conversation with Kennedy, sat absolutely silently, and red ‘like a crab’”, implying his victory of the discussion. The general public was kept in the dark about the escalation of this crisis, and the government tried to keep it a secret. Over time, however, the tension between the Soviet Union and the USA became more obvious to the public in regards to the Cuban Missile Crisis. To many, the actual Cuban Missile Crisis was considered the closest that the two superpowers have ever come to a World War III.

Kennedy Negotiation

Rather than only speaking with Dean Rusk on the issues of Cuba, Andrei Gromyko had direct contact with the former president of the United States, John F. Kennedy. Without wasting much time, Gromyko asked Kennedy about the statements that the USA made about potentially invading Cuba, and posed a question, "what do the US need Cuba for? ". He didn't believe that Cuba posed a threat to anybody, especially to a superpower such as the USA. Comparing the resources and dimensions of both countries, it was obvious to differentiate a giant from a baby. Additionally, Cuba and their former prime minister, Fidel Castro, has openly came out and said that they don't intend to impose their system upon other countries, specifically those in Latin America. Gromyko openly stated that Cubans statements were supported by deeds and that he can't comprehend why the US government doesn't believe them. It was about the Cubans securing their homeland, and independence, therefore appealing to the Americans for a reason. He questioned Kennedy, asking why it's worth organizing a hostile policy against the Cubans, and those states that maintain a good relationship with them; "is it not a destruction of international law, of the UN principles and purposes? ". He was convincing that the Soviet Union cannot simply be a bystander and watch from a distance how these events unravel. Worst case scenario, if a war broke out, mobilization of additional 150 thousands reservists from the side of the USA wouldn't carry much significance, considering how modern warfare has evolved from the years of Napoleon and Hitler.

The assistance provided by the Soviet Union was exclusively to help out in the defensive department and development of peaceful economy, and that is something that Gromyko wanted to reaffirm. Defensive improvement cannot represent a threat to anyone because no offensive actions are taken. The Soviet Union would not be involved in such aid if the case was different. Kennedy admitted that the Cuba situation was pushed to the background by the USA, but that changed during summer time. The USA had no intention on launching an aggressive policy on Cuba until the Soviet Union acted first, and unreasonably. Kennedy stated that Mr.Khrushchev, without giving him a warning, began to suddenly increase supplies of armaments to the Cubans, though there was no reason in doing so since the USA posed no threat at the time. If Mr.Khrushchev would have at least notified him about his actions, then the situation could've turned out much differently. As the president of the United States, Kennedy had to calm down the public by maintaining control of the situation. Not addressing the issue was not an option, since the public outrage can cause even more conflict and drop Kennedy's rating as a president.

Continuing into the conversation, Kennedy admitted that the USA wanted Cuba to have a different government, but there were no intentions to aggress towards Cuba. The situation was the most dangerous one that has occurred after World War II. Kennedy wanted to trust the Soviet Union with the supply of armaments and mentioned that within the country there were many supporters who were for the invasion of Cuba. It was important to discuss what was to come next. Kennedy's goal was to prevent any conflict from breaking out because of the potential threat of a new war happening. He even stated that he declared against one of the Senators who supported the invasion. Kennedy put a remark that he already exchanged opinions with Mr.Khrushchev on the issue of the invasion of Cuba in 1961, referring to the Bay of Pigs Invasion, and admitted the mistake from the American side. Kennedy did, however, reassure that history won't repeat itself in the future. He stressed that the Americans had no intentions on invading Cuba. However, the armaments that were supplied by the Soviet Union have heavily complicated and worsened the situation. In addition, both sides agreed that it would be a great historic achievement if both countries came to terms over the questions and problems that separate them. It was understood that both Khrushchev and Kennedy had great responsibility on their shoulders and could not allow any actions to lead to a collision.