User:Arushilahiri/China-India Relations

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Border clashes
Since the 1950s, during the term of India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India and China have repeatedly encountered border disputes at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), delineating the border between the two nations '''. The first Sino-India border war broke out in 1962 at the Aksai Chin region, escalating into a month-long military conflict . Initiating the conflict, China took advantage of global concern about the ongoing Cuban missile crisis to time their regional invasion in hopes of building a military road in India's Ladakh region .'''

During the current administration (led by Narendra Modi, 2014-present), border skirmishes restarted in May 2020 . Similar to explanations about China's timing of the prior border war, Modi's administration has claimed that the recent skirmishes were catalyzed by global insecurity and that China took advantage of the global focus on the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 .

Responses to border disputes
The strategic alliance between China and Pakistan and the vigorous arming of the Pakistani forces make India face the threat of a two-front war, making it all the more important for India to enter their own bilateral and multilateral security arrangements '''. One such example is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) . Established in 2004 to address the Indian Ocean tsunami, the QUAD consists of the US, Australia, India, and Japan and is tasked with addressing a broad agenda of security, economic, and diplomatic policy . More recently, after the deadly Chinese-initiated clash at Galwan Valley in June 2020 preceded by the 2017 Doklam standoff, the U.S.-based think tank, the Center for Foreign Relations, explained that there was a significant ramp-up in QUAD activity  . The group cites how, since 2020, the group has looked beyond regional cooperation and have focused on checking Chinese regional behavior with the four navies performing their first joint exercise in over a decade in November 2020; this was specifically initiated by India in response to the border skirmishes .'''

In the same vein of invigorating relationships with geopolitical allies, India has also strengthened their Look East Policy, transforming it into the Act East Policy under the Modi administration '''. The rebranded Act East Policy has an increased focus on infrastructure projects, such as the Agartala-Akhaura Rail Project and the Asian Trilateral Highway. Such geopolitical connectivity measures improved India's alliances with the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam to check Chinese dominance . These soft power measures also enhance Indian border security  .'''

Bilateral trade
China is India's 2nd largest trading partner.

In June 2012, China asserted that "Sino-Indian ties" could be the most "important bilateral partnership of the century", seemingly substantiated by current Prime Minister Narenda Modi's historic visit to China in May 2015 . At that pivotal visit, Wen Jiabao, the Premier of China, and Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister of India set a goal to increase Indo-Chinese bilateral trade to USD $100 billion by 2015. At the India-China Business Forum in Shanghai, Modi claimed that China and India would pool together their manufacturing capabilities, citing initiative examples, such as building “50 million houses by 2022”, "develop[ing] smart cities and mega industrial corridors”, and refining FDI policy and modernizing railway systems together .

Following that conference, bilateral trade between China and India touched USD $89.6 billion in 2017–18, with the trade deficit widening to US$62.9 billion in China's favor. In 2017, the volume of bilateral trade between India & China stood at US$84.5 billion. This figure excludes bilateral trade between India and Hong Kong which stands at another USD $34 billion. Chinese imports from India amounted to $16.4 billion or 0.8% of its overall imports, and 4.2% of India's overall exports in 2014. Major commodities exported from India to China were: cotton; gems, precious metals, coins; copper; ores, slag, ash; organic chemicals; salt, sulphur, stone, cement; machines, ''engines, pumps. Chinese exports to India amounted to $58.4 billion or 2.3% of its overall exports which made up approximately'' 12.6% of India's overall imports in 2014. Major commodities exported from China to India were: electronic equipment; machines, engines, pumps; organic chemicals; fertilizers; iron and steel; plastics; iron or steel products; gems, precious metals, coins; ships, boats; medical, technical equipment.

In 2020, in a departure from the previous pledges of collaboration, Modi instituted bans on Chinese products including both intangible apps (Tiktok) and tangible goods (toys and furniture) '''. Furthermore, the Modi administration created the Phased Manufacturing Program to encourage India-based cellphone assembly and manufacturing . Under guidance from this legislation and the accompanying task force to reduce import dependence, India raised import duties on electronic items produced in China as well as a laundry list of ancillary goods .'''

In 2018, a Standing Committee on Commerce chaired by Naresh Gujral submitted a report on the 'Impact of Chinese Goods on Indian Industry. The report pointed out insufficient implementation of existing anti-dumping laws, reliance on Chinese raw materials in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, reliance on Chinese imports in India's National Solar Mission, Goods and Services Tax on certain products resulting in increased imports from China, and Indian smart city administrations preferring Chinese bicycles over Indian ones. According to a survey published in ThePrint, 43% Indians did not buy ‘Made in China’ products since Galwan clash last year. Modi also took notice of Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM) campaigns, launching or reviving 220 out of 370 anti-dumping suits against Chinese items ranging from steels, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals .