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The Limits of Conventional Wisdom: A Response to Sandra Joireman

In the April 2007 issue of the African Studies Review, Vol., 50, No. 1, Sandra Joireman wrote a review of a book entitled “Myths and Realities in the Distribution of Socioeconomic Resources and Political Power in Ethiopia”. The publication of such a book, containing substantive data and dispelling myths about the distribution of resources and political power in Ethiopia, seems to have irritated a few “prisoners of paradigm” who have long viewed ethnic affiliation as the most important factor in the distribution of resources and political power in Ethiopia and other African countries. To be sure, members of the intellectual community have professional obligations to engage in scientific research and critique the works of others. And, in meeting their obligations through research, publication of major studies or book reviews, and the like, it is essential to remember that scholars must remain faithful to the norms and rules of research in the social sciences as is the case in the natural sciences. As a rule, discrediting a scholarly work or recognizing its contribution, however minimal it may be, to the understanding of a subject matter must be grounded not on speculation but on producing valid and reliable counter-evidence. Both as a norm and as a rule, criticisms are unjustified simply because the author brings to light fresh perspectives, explanations, and reveals contrary evidence to what has previously been accepted as a verity. Nor should the fear of harsh criticisms or the possibility of ostracism discourage one’s desire to express contending views or search for knowledge.

Objective criticism of a scholarly work must, at the very least, be accompanied not just by a mere speculation or hypothesis but, more importantly, by the operationalization of hypothesis and analysis of qualitative/quantitative data which, in Joireman’s case, would be to reassert that the ethnic group known as “Amhara” has economically exploited and politically repressed all other ethnic groups in Ethiopia. To reject an alternative hypothesis to the dominant paradigm as either true or false is not quite the same thing as rejecting a study for its erroneous misinterpretation of empirical data. In addition, to rely on conventional wisdom that perpetuates myths as realities based on unreliable evidence is to be “intellectually incarcerated,” even though such a path may be a safe passage to the position of self-gratification and perhaps even recognition as an “expert” in a particular field of study. Whatever motivates one to remain encapsulated within a conventional frame of reference, it should not be at the cost of fueling tensions where none existed before and dichotomizing plural societies into super-ordinate and subordinate groups.

To be fair, writing a book review is not an easy task; and it is even more difficult to come up with an alternative hypothesis and delve into a critical examination of data in a short piece. Yet, Joireman could still have captured the essence of the book had she not been desperately attempting to defend the position of her protégés and dwelling on the criticisms I have made against a few scholars who depicted almost every conflict and distribution of resources in Africa through the prism of ethnicity. The fact that she chose to engage in cherry-picking to challenge my criticism of a few self-proclaimed experts on African (or Ethiopian) studies and the politically tinted foreign aid agencies’ misguided allocation of funds for the implementation of education overhaul programs in Ethiopia is unfortunate, but not surprising.

Joireman noted that “Ethiopian studies is a stuffy attic desperately in need of fresh air” and that original data are hard to come by. It appears that the window of opportunity to bring-in fresh air can only be slightly opened in so far as it does not disturb the ways in which Joireman and her colleagues have arranged the “stuffy attic” for us. It is true that original data are hard to come by partly because they are often overlooked or pushed aside and partly because there are only a few scholars who devote their time and resources to on-site field research. Even when original data are presented in a few groundbreaking studies, they are usually welcomed if the hypothesis and supporting evidence comfortably fit into the theoretical and analytical lenses crafted by a few self-proclaimed experts on Ethiopian (African) studies. Lest one conveniently ignores what scholarly research is all about, to commit oneself to scholarship is to interpret and narrate the realities as they are experienced by the society in question.

Joireman is on target when she said that I have “set a high bar for gathering historical evidence” to disprove “the work of many other scholars of Ethiopian history.” But such a remark makes logical sense not because the data presented in the book do not strongly suggest that ethnicity had virtually nothing to do with the distribution of socioeconomic resources and political power in Ethiopia but primarily because a few scholars on Ethiopian studies rarely hesitate to level harsh criticism against a rival hypothesis so that everyone else remains committed to preserving the status-quo. For instance, in an attempt to undermine the contribution of “Myths and Realities in the Distribution of Socioeconomic Resources and Political Power in Ethiopia,” she claims that one example of the “unconvincing use of evidence to support the author’s argument” is that “the reader is not given the percentage of schoolage children enrolled in school in each province.” This would be surprising to objective and detailed oriented scholars because most of us hope that data presented in plain view are hard to miss, dodge, or misconstrue. That is to say, even though the author provides the data on the distribution of educational facilities and gross enrollment ratio by region, Joireman chose to dodge the data either fortuitously or deliberately. Whatever the reason, her assertion substantiates the author’s claim that a few scholars tolerate very little or no opposing views to the status-quo. As the evidence in the book demonstrates, students enrolled in private and missionary schools were more likely to receive quality education than students enrolled in public schools. Even though the evidence as a whole and the time series data on government revenue and expenditure, in particular, clearly indicate the absence of diversion of public funds to provide for greater access to quality health and education services as well as economic infrastructure, Joireman saw through a narrow analytical lens to suggest that the disproportionate enrollment of children of the alleged dominant group in public schools “seems to prove the fact that the government invested more in the north (the Amhara area).”

Joireman’s assertion regarding the diversion of public funds to the predominantly Amhara provinces and the absence of data on gross enrollment ratio by region may have been intended to distort facts and trivialize the study. Rather, it once again demonstrates her reluctance to entertain the view that perhaps the realities on the ground were not the same as what we have been led to believe. To be specific, the contingency table on page 127, the figure on page 128, and analyses of the data in various sections of the book (see page 233, for example), and the exploratory discussions concerning the question of land redistribution (presented in the appropriate chapters of the book) make her remarks simply wrong. Furthermore, as Joireman knows very well, students with access to education can still be mis-educated and dis-empowered if the curricula is a mere reflection of what foreign aid agencies prescribe to policymakers in Ethiopia and other African countries through their funding programs that overhaul education systems. By a fortunate but ironic twist, however, her remarks confirm the author’s observation that the concept of Amhara domination is a myth, and that myths are essentially analogous to probability statistics where the chances of their becoming almost a reality improves with repeated trials.

To the extent that “the road to success is paved with education,” as W. E. DeBois once said, the quality of education provided in the public schools under outright or elective dictatorial regimes did not allow for invention and innovation. As anyone who attended public schools in Ethiopia would know, the public schools were and continue to be one of the most essential instruments of the ruling class to subject the majority to political and economic servitude. Furthermore, as Paul Krugman noted, a reliable and efficient transportation system is critical to minimizing the degree to which agricultural products “melt away” in transition. Since Ethiopia’s economy depends on the production of agricultural goods for own-consumption and foreign currency earnings, an objectively and analytically inclined researcher would have explored the question of whether a 15km asphalt road in at least one of the predominantly Amhara provinces, with very little expansion and rehabilitation work carried out during the current and the two previous governments, is suggestive of something else other than what mainstream scholars have long insisted. Thus, the percentage of gross enrolment ratio cannot indicate, in and of itself, or significantly determine a particular group’s marginalization or economic empowerment. As the author clearly noted in the book, because of political necessity, Colonel Mengistu Haile-Mariam, Emperor Haile-Selassie, and their predecessors may have surrounded themselves with a few Amhara cadres and nobles. To be sure, there were loyalists to the throne as there were disciples of Marxist/Leninist rhetoric who submerged their ethnic sentiment in favor of the national interest, whatever the national interest entailed from the leadership’s viewpoint. Given the authoritative nature of the two governments, the few Amhara nobles and cadres who sang to the tunes of the monarchy and the brutal military regime had very little, if any, meaningful contribution to the overall policy of the regimes. Consequently, individual members of the ruling class did not sway the regimes’ social and economic policies. Contrary to the wishes of secessionist leaders and their proponents, it is impossible to compartmentalize Ethiopians into ethnic enclaves or super-ordinate/subordinate ethnic stratification.

To the dismay of the current ruling class, the impossibility of pigeonholing such a complex society was realized during the early days of what is essentially an oxymoron¾“ethnic federalism”¾when the Ethiopian Mapping Agency vainly attempted to draw up administrative boundaries along ethnic lines. It may be disappointing for exponents of the dominant paradigm on ethnography, but the facts and the realities on the ground do not support the long held perception about the distribution of resources and political power in favor of the alleged “ruling ethnic group” just as it is impossible to draw administrative boundaries along ethnic lines. Therefore, it is understandable that the author of the book seems to have expended no energy in advancing a parochial approach to the study of heterogeneous societies and perpetuate the notion that the culturally, linguistically, and ethnically diverse Ethiopians can be divided into ethnic Bantustans. The author of “Myths and Realities. . .” left such a romantic preoccupation to the current kleptocrats and their satellites. The facts reiterated here and the evidence presented in the book should be a wake up call to Sandra Joireman and her colleagues that African societies are more dynamic and complex than they would have us believe.

If mainstream scholars were objectively critical, they would be aware that the disproportionate concentration of socioeconomic resources in Addis Ababa and Eritrea were perhaps dictated by strategic concerns of the Haile-Selassie government rather than ethnic sentiment. Why? Because the overwhelming majority of the alleged economically and politically powerful ethnic group members do not live in either province. If we suppose for the purpose of argument that the Haile-Selassie government was predominantly composed of Amhara elites, then the military regime’s execution of over sixty members of parliament and cabinet of the Imperial government makes no logical or moral sense. The authoritative regimes under Emperor Haile-Selassie and Col. Mengistu knew no ethnic boundaries in the allocation of public resources or elimination of individuals with adversarial views. What figured prominently in the appointment of an individual to a high-ranking position during the reign of the two totalitarian regimes was political loyalty, not ethnicity! Unfortunately, while the “Amhara” have been as economically exploited and politically repressed as any other ethnic group in Ethiopia, they were “singing happy ballads,” as Donald Levine put it, in the face of socioeconomic plight.

Except for a few intellectuals who were committed to do justice in their study of the history, economics, politics, and culture of Ethiopia, most other scholars and leaders alike, including the Amhara nobles and agents of repression, buried their heads in the sand and, by their inaction, contributed to scholars of essentialist persuasion to monopolize the field of Ethiopian (and African) studies. With virtually no regard to the question of reliability of evidence and logical consistency of their argument, specialists who were able to monopolize the field of Ethiopian (African) studies were also able to dictate the framing of theories in which ethnic allegiance is viewed as the overarching factor in the distribution of resources and political power. As a result, it was possible for a few scholars to assume, sensationalize, and conclude that the “Amhara” is Africa’s crude, barbaric, and imperialist rule, despite the fact that there is logical inconsistency and lack of original and reliable data to support their sweeping generalizations and conclusions.

In short, the conventional approach to the study of Ethiopian society fails to examine, sufficiently and objectively, the question of distributive justice and the sources of conflict in Ethiopia. Nor have there been alternative explanations on the distribution of political power that convincingly demonstrate that political loyalty transcended primordial barriers in deciding who is to climb on the leadership ladder and where to allocate education and health facilities, agricultural research centers, and manufacturing industries. Therefore, Joireman’s criticism would have been best directed against scholars who have made sweeping generalization based on narrow theoretical lenses and unreliable and scant data on the distribution of resources and power in Ethiopia. In contrast, “Myths and Realities in the Distribution of Socioeconomic Resources and Political Power in Ethiopia” is analytically rigorous and conceptually and methodologically holistic. It brings to light substantive and substantial data which may have been pushed aside by researchers perhaps because the data were contradictory to the researchers’ theory or perhaps because they contained quantitative data which are not always the favorites of scholars in the disciplines of history or political science.

To put it simply, Joireman’s criticism is truly misplaced, out-of-context, and divisive. Her counter-argument is entirely based on gross speculation, distortion of the facts in the book and the realities as seen through the eyes of the majority of Ethiopians. She could have justifiably challenged the erroneous assumption in which one nationality group was depicted as Africa’s crude, imperialist, and barbaric ruler. Joireman could also have explored whether or not the military government of Mengistu Haile-Mariam, which was, as a matter of fact, composed of political loyalists transcending ethnic boundaries, allowed the alleged “super-ordinate” group to economically and politically marginalize all other ethnic groups. Such assertions have, of course, inspired a few inquisitive intellectuals to collect and examine evidence and to cast doubt that dichotomizing a complex society into “oppressive and exploitive ethnic group” vs. “oppressed and exploited ethnic groups” is simplistic.

While the review of the book by a scholar who may be interested in gaining a better understanding of Ethiopian culture, history, politics, or economics is welcomed, Joireman paid very little attention to the substantive issues raised in the book and engaged in a cherry-picking critique of the evidence presented in the study. The author of the book should find Joireman’s self-contradicting statements in the first sentences of the fourth and sixth paragraphs of her review a blessing in disguise. On the one hand, it substantiates the claim made in the book that socioeconomic resources and political power were not distributed along ethnic lines and, on the other hand, it illustrates her attempt to stretch the argument so thin that it ultimately becomes ludicrous.