User:Atborse/sandbox

The Nazi Party in the Netherlands pre-occupation
The Nationaal Socialistiche Beweging, or the Dutch Nazi Party (NSB), had existed for years before the Germans arrived in the Low Countries. Between World War I and World War II, Dutch society experienced a crisis in its sociopolitical system. The National Socialist movement offered a solution to the Netherland's instability and gained some influence without endangering the existing political order, a system that was already frail during a period of political democracy. However, this form of democracy was not completely in practice nor uncontested as a principle by the NSB.

Leading up to the German invasion, the Dutch Nazi Party spent much of the 1930s loudly denouncing the government's inability to protect the Dutch people from economic suffering, social chaos, and the expanding influence of Marxism-Bolshevism. The group separated itself as an internal force, gaining a small degree of importance during that mid-1930s, and eventually contributing to the German efforts to nazify the occupied Netherlands. The NSB began to admire the 'achievements' of the German Reich by 1936 and broadcasted their own warnings that 'International Jewry' had taken a hold of the Netherlands and would conquer Europe.

As the Germans gained power in the Netherlands, the NSB believed it could influence occupation policy and German behavior. The group anticipated Anton Musset, a prominent and founding member of the Party, to be Hitler's appointee during the occupational regime.

If the German invasion had never occurred, it is undisputed that the NSB would never have managed to take over political power of the Netherlands. The Germans did not allow for an independent Dutch way to National Socialism and only wanted to incorporate Dutch Nazis into the political structure as supporters and executors of German policy, not leaders of the country in its entirety.

Internal conflicts
There was a constant conflict between Seyss-Inquart, Hitler's personally appointed Reich Commissioner who relied directly on Hitler's support, and Rauter, who was the Generalkommissar for security matters and nominally subordinate to Seyss-Inquart, but as Higher SS and Police Leader he took direct orders from Heydrich and his chief, Himmler. In the period following the February Strike, Seyss-Inquart and Rauter engaged in a political struggle as each competed for control over Jewish affairs in the country. The control which Seyss-Inquart was supposed to have was almost non-existent in practice due to overlapping and contradictory competences and a series of unresolved conflicts between party and state organizations, as well as the individuals listed above.

Collaboration in the administration
As German authorities took hold of the Netherlands, they hoped to find substantial groups among the Dutch who were prepared to accept National Socialism and collaboration. Accommodation was the first phase of the occupation and was characterized by a readiness by the majority of the Dutch population to accept political consequences of their defeat. Dutch elites indicated a willingness to reach some understanding with the Germans, either playing an active role in some way in the persecution and deportation of the Jews or failing to put up any kind of resistance at all, this is particularly true of the Dutch administrative assistants and the authorities as a whole. The Dutch civil service, also, in general, adopted an accommodating attitude to the Germans.

In 1937, special Aanwijzingen (instructions) were formulated for the Dutch government employees and other public servants on cooperating with occupying forces. Public servants were to stay on the job and carry out their duties to the best of their ability, so those who remained at their post had to judge for themselves whether the contents of each order they were given were substantively and procedurally legitimate. Under these rules the traditional Dutch civil service were, therefore, expected to be loyal to the principles of administrative and public order above all other considerations.

Prime Minister Gerbrandy, exiled to London along with members of his cabinet and the royal family, announced in his speech, Commentaar op de Aanwijzingen (Comments on the Instructions), the guidelines of how public servants were expected to behave, stating that they were not to cooperate with the occupying force in any way, especially in the Nazi persecution of the Jews.

Although the Germans did appoint a number of NSB members and other Germanophiles to senior posts like secretaries-general and mayors, their numbers or ideological influence on the administration was not extensive. Dr. Friedrich Wimmer led the internal government and had the power to issue mandatory regulations to Dutch civil servants and under this rule local government was transformed into an instrument by which policy was used to nazify the Netherlands. The civilian administration in the Netherlands enabled the Germans to exert much tighter control over Dutch citizens than military occupied countries like the French government in Vichy.

The nature of the civilian, rather than a military, administration was a major contributing factor to the ease that Nazi-sponsored policies against the Jews were carried out. A general absence of any Wehmacht control over the running of the country allowed civilians and the agencies operated by Himmler's SS more freedom. In January 1941, civil servants, administrators, and elected representatives were ordered by the Germans to register the whole Dutch population by name and address, Jews were to be registered separately. These extensive and detailed population registers made it easy for the Germans to target Jews, and eventually allowing for the process of registration to be replaced by segregation, spoliation, and eventually deportation.

However, the bureaucracy in the Netherlands was not a model of efficiency, the SS/SD personnel were no more ruthless or efficient than elsewhere in Europe, but there were a greater number of German police, around 5,000, compared to that of France where it never went above 3,000. The dominance of the SS in the Netherlands has been cited as one of the fundamental differences between the Netherlands and other Western European occupied by the Germans.