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Stalin's Complex Role as Leader
1. This report was published by the CIA in 1955. This report asserts that Stalin was a powerful leader, but doesn't actually call him a dictator. However, it's important to note that the information the CIA based this report on is not present in the report itself. The CIA could have made an error in this report and Soviet archives have since been opened since 1955, creating more available evidence to examine. The CIA said this about Stalin: "Even in Stalin's time there was collective leadership. The Western idea of a dictator within the Communist setup is exaggerated. Misunderstandings on that subject are caused by lack of comprehension of the real nature and organization of the Communist power structure. Stalin, although holding wide powers, was merely the captain of a team..."

2. This excerpt is taken from Georgy Zhukov's Memories, published in 1969. In this source, Marshal Zhukov offers a perspective that challenges the widely held belief that Stalin single-handedly made all military and strategic decisions. Zhukov recalls how Stalin did not make decisions in isolation, but rather made decisions collectively. While this account offers an alternative viewpoint, it is essential to examine multiple sources and perspectives to gain a comprehensive understanding of Stalin's decision-making during his leadership. Marshal Zhukov states: "After J. V. Stalin's death appeared the tale about how he used to take military and strategic decisions unilaterally. This was not the case at all. I have already said above that if you reported questions to the Supreme Commander with a knowledge of your business, he took them into account. And I know of cases when he turned against his own previous opinion and changed decisions he had taken previously."

3. Vospominaniia I Razmyshleniia was published by Georgy Zhukov in 1969 in Moscow. It highlights an environment where individuals felt relatively comfortable expressing their opinions. This suggests a certain degree of openness within the leadership structure. This greatly reflects a collective leadership, not a dictatorship. However, one thing that's important to note is the broader context with democratic centralism and how it can silence people's voices. It's also important to understand that this quote doesn't discredit other evidence that exists, it merely provides nuance. Marshal Zhukov said this: "His style of work, as a rule, was businesslike. Everyone could express his own opinion without being nervous. The Supreme Commander treated everyone the same way - strict and officially. He knew how to listen attentively when you reported to him with knowledge of your topic. He himself was laconic, and did not like verbosity in others."

4. This is another quote from Zhukov's memories. It offers insight into Stalin's leadership style. Marshal Zhukov shares his observations during the war, stating that Stalin was open to discussing difficult questions and engaging in debates. Rather than imposing his own thinking on others, Stalin fostered an environment where diverse viewpoints could be defended and discussed. Marshal Zhukov said: "By the way, as I was convinced during the war, J. V. Stalin was not at all the kind of person before whom it was impossible to raise sharp questions and with whom it would be impossible to argue and even firmly defend his point of view.

If anyone claims the opposite, I will say frankly that their statements are not true."''

5. Sergei Shtemenko was a general who had close contact with Stalin during the war years. He presents insights suggesting that the Soviet Union maintained a collective decision-making process rather than a dictatorship. Shtemenko writes: "I must say that Stalin did not decide and did not like to solve important issues of the war alone. He was well aware of the need for collective work in this complex area, recognized the authorities on a particular military problem, took into account their opinion and paid tribute to everyone. In December 1943, after the Tehran Conference, when it was necessary to outline action plans for the future, a report at a joint meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the State Defense Committee and the Stavka regarding the course of the struggle at the front and its prospects was made by A. M. Vasilevsky and A. I. Antonov, N. A. Voznesensky reported on the war economy, and I. V. Stalin took over the analysis of international problems "

6. This source, Tak Bylo, was published in Moscow 1999. According to the book, there are accounts suggesting that Stalin demonstrated attentiveness and an ability to change his mind when engaging in discussions with people. This perspective challenges some of the allegations against him, providing a different viewpoint on his character and decision-making process. Anastas Mikoyan writes: "He was also attentive to the proposals by the generals. Stalin listened carefully to what was said to him and to counsel, listened to disagreements with interest, extracting intelligently from them that bit of truth that helped him later to formulate his final, most appropriate decisions which were born in this way, as a result of collective discussion. More than this: it commonly happened that, convinced by our evidence, Stalin changed his own preliminary viewpoint on one or another question.”

7. This is a speech from Stalin at the plenum of the central committee on October 16, 1952. It sheds light on Stalin's leadership position and his expressed desire to be relieved of his duties. Stalin highlights the need for fresh perspectives and vigor within the Communist Party by emphasizing the importance of bringing in new individuals with energy, dedication, and political leadership qualities. The sincerity of Stalin's request is a matter open to interpretation, as conclusive evidence supporting or refuting its seriousness remains elusive. Stalin says: "They say, why do we need an enlarged Central Committee. But isn’t it self-evident that we need to get new blood and new strength into the CC CPSU? We arc getting older and shall sooner or later die, but we must think into whose hands we shall give this torch of our great undertaking, who will carry it onward and reach the goal of communism? For this we need younger people with more energy, dedicated comrades and political leaders. And what does it mean to bring up a dedicated, devoted political leader of the State?... I am asking that you relieve me of the two posts! [General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.]"

8. This book was published by historian Sebag Montefiore. It presents evidence suggesting that Stalin faced open criticism. It's important to note that dictators can sometimes tolerate criticism. However, when considering the notion of collective leadership alongside this evidence, the label of "dictator" may not fully capture the complexity of the situation. It is crucial to understand the context of democratic centralism during that period and its impact on the extent of permissible criticism. Montefiore wrote: "Molotov admired Koba but did not worship him. He often disagreed with him, and criticized, Stalin right up until the end… Voroshilov, Mikoyan and a Molotov frequently disagreed with Stalin…"

9. This book was published in 1995. It contains Stalin's letters to Molotov by various scholars and provides insights into Stalin's leadership style and decision making process. The evidence suggests that Stalin adopted a collective leadership approach, as he faced challenges in achieving his desired outcomes.. They write: “In a September 1930 letter to Molotov, Stalin stated “I propose Kaganovich from the Worker-Peasant Inspection as the candidate for head of civil aviation” [Footnote] On October 15, 1930, Goltsman was confirmed by the Politburo as head of the Civil Aviation Association”

10. This quote comes from the book Stalinist Terror by Arch Getty and Roberta Manning, published in 1993. It provides nuance to how the decision making process allowed for different viewpoints. They write: "In the fall of 1938, when the question arose of removing Yezhov from his position at NKVD, Stalin proposed the candidacy of G. M. Malenkov as the new Commissar of Internal Affairs. But a majority of the Politburo recommended L. P. Beria for the post."

11. This quote is from Pat Sloan about his time in the Soviet Union in the 30s. He describes his experiences in the country with Soviet democracy. It's important to note that this account represents just one perspective and focuses primarily on grassroots democracy rather than higher levels of Soviet government. In his description, Sloan highlights that his participation in an election was open to all working members of the community, regardless of nationality or citizenship. He writes: "I have, while working in the Soviet Union, participated in an election. I, too, had a right to vote, as I was a working member of the community, and nationality and citizenship are no bar to electoral rights. The procedure was extremely simple. A general meeting of all the workers in our organisation was called. by the trade union committee, candidates were discussed, and a vote was taken by show of hands. Anybody present had the right to propose a candidate, and the one who was elected was not personally a member of the Party. In considering the claims of the candidates their past activities were discussed, they themselves had to answer questions as to their qualifications, anybody could express an opinion, for or against them, and the basis of all the discussion was: What justification had the candidates to represent their comrades on the local Soviet?"

12. This quote is from Sidney Webb's book: The Truth About Soviet Russia in 1942. Webb discusses how the Soviet Union allows and even encourages criticism of various aspects of the USSR: "...free criticism, however hostile it may be, is permitted, even encouraged, in the USSR, of the directors of all forms of enterprise, by the workers employed, or by the consumers of the commodities or services concerned."

13. This book was published in 1998 by Robert Thurston. Thurston provides additional information regarding the criticism of Soviet officials: ''"Of course, criticism had been strongly encouraged during the purges, and local records contain plenty of it.152 The press strongly endorsed criticism from below at the end of 1938. Pravda denounced "haughty answers to critical questions by the Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Party district committee. . . .Such a statement by a party leader does not facilitate healthy Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism. On the contrary, it leads to stopping up, to tying up the initiative of the masses, to putting brakes on uncovering enemies."''

14. Stephen Wheatcroft published this in 2007. He suggests how Yefim Georgievich Evdokimov guided Stalin and even calling him the Evdokimov "architect of the Shakhty trial": "Evdokimov had a demonstrable influence on Stalin in guiding him to adopt certain policies at certain times."

15. J. Arch Getty wrote this book in 1985 analyzing the history of power in the Soviet Union. He suggests that Soviet Russia exhibited more characteristics of a traditional society rather than a highly organized totalitarian regime. "According to most Western views, power was transmitted from the top to the bottom, from the center to the localities... Theoretically, every committee was completely subordinate to the one above it, and individual members had no power or control at all. The political reality was much different. In fact, the chain of command collapsed more often than it functioned. The Communist Party, far from having penetrated every quarter of Russian life, was more an undiciplined and disorganized force with little influence outside the cities. Soviet Russia in the '30s resembled a backward, traditional society far more than it did the sophisticated order of totalitarianism."

16. Sidney and Beatrice Webb write in 1938 about Soviet government structure. The suggest that the Soviet Union had democratic institutions and explicitly write about Stalin's allegations of dictator: "...the Communist Party in the USSR is unlike the religious order in not being subject to any chief imposed upon it from without, and being democratically governed by its own membership, dispersed in. some 130,000 Primary Party organs, which elect a pyramid of tiers of committees, rising up to an All-Union Conference, with its central committee and sub-committees; Stalin, whom foreigners are apt to think of as a dictator, being merely the principal secretary to the organisation, a post from which he could at any moment be dismissed by the highest committee."

17. Sidney and Beatrice Webb also published a book in October of 1936 called "Soviet Communism: Dictatorship or Democracy?". They draw a comparison to other dictators such as Mussolini and Hitler, highlighting that Stalin does not possess the same level of authority [as Mussolini and Hitler did] over his fellow citizens or even the members of his own party: ''"Sometimes it is asserted that, whereas the form may be otherwise, the fact is that, whilst the Communist Party controls the whole administration, the Party itself, and thus indirectly the whole state, is governed by the will of a single person, Josef Stalin. First let it be noted that, unlike Mussolini, Hitler and other modern dictators, Stalin is not invested by law with any authority over his fellow-citizens and not even over the members of the Party to which he belongs. He has not even the extensive power which the Congress of the United States has temporarily conferred upon President Roosevelt, or that which the American Constitution entrusts for four years to every successive president... He is, in fact, only the General Secretary of the Party, receiving his salary from the Party funds and holding his office by appointment by the Party Central Committee, and, as such, also a member (one among nine) of its most important sub-committee, the Politbureau."''

18. This evidence was taken from Leonid Nikolaevich Efremov’s notes, a young man, on the October 1952 Central Committee Plenum. It adds to the idea that Stalin was genuine when he said that older people (including himself) should be replaced with younger people. This suggests that Stalin wanted new voices and leaders within the party:

''“Yes, we did hold the Congress of our party. It went very well, and many of you might think that amongst us there exists full harmony and unity. But we have not this harmony and unity of thought. Some people disagree with our decisions.''

''They say, why did we significantly enlarge the membership of the Central Committee? But isn't it self-evident that we need to get new forces into the CC? We old people will die out, but we must think to whom, into whose hands we shall pass the baton of our great undertaking. Who will carry it forward? For this, we need younger, dedicated people and political leaders. And what does it mean to bring up a dedicated, devoted political leader of the State? It takes ten, no, fifteen years to educate a state leader.''

''But just wishing for this is not enough. To educate ideologically firm state activists can only be done through practice, in the daily work of carrying out the general line of the party, of overcoming all sorts of opposition from hostile opportunist elements who are striving to slow down and interrupt the task of the building of socialism. And we must have political activists of Leninist experience, educated by our Party, in the struggle to defeat these hostile attempts and to achieve complete success in the realization of our great goals.''

''Is it not clear that we must lift up the role of our party and its party committees? Can we forget about improving the Party's work among the masses, as Lenin taught us? All this needs a flow of young, fresh forces into the CC, the general staff of our Party. This is what we have done, following Lenin's instructions. This is why we have expanded the membership of the CC. And the Party itself has grown a little.''

''The question is asked as to why we relieved some prominent Party and state figures from their important posts as ministers. What can be said on this account? We replaced comrades Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and others and replaced them with new workers. Why? On what basis? The work of a minister - this is hard, peasant labor. It demands great strength, concrete knowledge, and good health. This is why we have relieved some deserving comrades from the posts they occupied and appointed in their places new, more qualified workers who take initiative. They are young people, full of strength and energy. We must support them in their important work.”''

19. Yoram Gorlizki’s view: "Stalin's Cabinet: The Politburo and Decision Making in the Post-War Years" asserts that Stalin is a dictator. Despite this, he writes: “...rather than one Politburo there were in fact a variety of distinct 'politburos' in the late Stalin period. Despite this diversity, each 'politburo' was deployed by Stalin to lock his colleagues into a system of collective responsibility; each offered a flexible yet reliable system by which the dictator could bind his peers.” Gorlizki is arguing that despite Stalin’s power consolidation, there remained a degree of independence.

He continues “Despite Stalin's importance, even at the height of his dictatorship the Soviet system never freed itself entirely from a deep-seated Bolshevik tradition of party 'democracy'.” According to Gorlizki, there were not just one, but several distinct 'politburos' in the Soviet system. Despite Stalin's centralization of power, these 'politburos' represented a degree of independence and diversity in decision-making. This suggests that the tradition of collective decision making we have been discussing continued even into the “height of Stalin’s dictatorship” although Gorlizki does say that the ultimate goal was to maintain control and loyalty to Stalin's leadership.

He also writes: “... a 'third' politburo, one without Stalin, acquired sufficient momentum and coherence to negotiate the gulf represented by Stalin's death with minimum disruption.” By expressing the cohesiveness of this politburo after Stalin’s death, it implies that the ruling group, with their shared understanding and experience gained from working together, was prepared to continue decision-making in a relatively smooth manner. This further reinforces the notion that, despite the concentration of power under Stalin, the Soviet system retained, to some degree, collective decision-making capacity that could endure beyond an individual leader's rule.

Continuing: “The Politburo thus served as an important counterweight to an energetic Council of Ministers apparatus.” This suggests how there were differing factions within the Soviet government. It suggests that the Politburo’s role wasn’t to rubber-stamp the decisions made, but to be a counterbalancing force to ensure power was not concentrated in one institution.

Continuing: “On 13 April the Politburo adopted a resolution on the Orgburo and secretariat which assigned responsibilities among the new secretaries and attempted to define the relative powers of Orgburo and secretariat, something the leadership had never found it easy to do.” The fact that the leadership found it difficult to define the powers of the Orgburo and Secretariat suggests that there were competing interests and tensions among the individuals involved which adds to the complex power dynamics at the time. This further shows why we need to approach this with more caution to maintain a high quality and accurate article.

Continuing: “By the end of Stalin's reign the discrepancy between a Politburo which, in reality, had become jaded and undisciplined, and the considerable leadership functions which this body was expected to exercise, had become accentuated. It may have been for this reason that Stalin decided to modernise the Politburo. Thus at the XIX Congress the name, membership and operations of the Politburo were all fundamentally changed. This reorganisation of the  Politburo was more than a simple 'rationalisation', however. The reforms of October 1952 underlined the cabinet's role as an agency of bolshevik leadership. In fact, the creation of the new presidium resonated closely with the calls for 'party democracy' and the demands for increased accountability and collective decision making which were raised in the run-up to the party." This increased accountability and calls for party democracy reflects tendencies associated with collective democracy, not dictatorship. It signaled a recognition of the need to avoid excessive concentration of power in a single individual, like a dictator.

Continuing: “The XIX congress stimulated efforts to 'democratise' the party at all levels. Steps to promote 'internal democracy' within the party included more frequent meetings of the party rank and file, mandatory reports of the apparatus to full party committees and a host of protest votes against sitting party officials. Such moves to reactivate party 'democracy' were twinned with steps to regularise the party's decision-making processes at all levels. At the very highest tier, the Politburo and Orgburo were merged into the Presidium, with an enlarged full membership of 25 and 11 candidate members. In contrast to its narrowly constituted predecessor, the new larger Presidium appeared to be more representative of the different sectors of the Soviet party-state and thus more open to outside influences.” This continues to add to the idea that it was not Stalin did not have absolute power. There was more diversity and more representation within the government, and therefore more power.

Continuing: “The evolution of the cabinet in Stalin's last months reflected broader developments within the Soviet party-state. Prime among these was the holding of the XIX Congress, which had direct consequences for the Politburo. Apart from its new name, the regular sessions of the Presidium Buro accorded with the new post-congress emphasis on 'collective decision making'.” This suggests that the Soviet leadership, under Stalin's last months, shifted towards a more collective decision making process rather than relying solely on the directives of a single leader.

Continuing: “At the same time the oncoming succession also left its mark on the cabinet, which became less dependent on Stalin than it had been in earlier years and which, in line with Stalin's own wishes, accommodated a new generation of younger leaders, many of whom were from the provinces.” With the cabinet becoming less dependent on Stalin, it means they were more open to embracing a new generation of leaders. This shift signaled a more collaborative leadership style.

Even in the conclusion, Gorlizki says: “The system of rule, however, never descended into a pure dictatorship where Stalin pursued policies in his own name, bypassing the Politburo altogether. In fact, Stalin approached the Politburo with a measure of caution and reserve… Despite frequently being excluded and manipulated by the leader, members of the Politburo under Stalin were treated relatively leniently…” This suggests that despite holding immense power and authority, Stalin was not inclined to govern as an outright dictator, imposing his policies without any consideration for the Politburo. Instead, he demonstrated a certain level of caution and reserve when dealing with this key decision-making body. While there were instances where he excluded and manipulated its members, they were, on the whole, treated relatively leniently.

He also mentions: “Even at its height, Stalinism had never become an unalloyed personal dictatorship, for it always contained a strong trace of Bolshevik ideology. At times, such as the XIX Congress, this ideology became more robust and the practices of internal 'party democracy' were revived. This had direct consequences for the organisation of the party and its ruling committees. It was because of its claim to be more 'democratic' than any other institution that, at the time of the XIX Congress, party committees were elevated over institutions of the state. This, however, came at a price: the rise of party institutions was conditional on the resuscitation of 'collective decision making' within the party, a commitment that reached to the nerve-centre of the party's power. To the extent that three politburos had co-existed under Stalin-the expanded sessions of the de jure Politburo, the closed meetings of the inner circle, and the Politburo without Stalin-it was to be a combination of this drive for collective decision making and the fact of Stalin's death itself that would allow the last of these politburos-the Politburo without Stalin-finally to come into its own.” He ends this article by writing Stalinism never became a personal dictatorship, and highlighted the collective decision making within the party. Although Gorlizki continues to call Stalin a dictator despite also writing about the collective decision making that remained, I believe we should continue to take a more cautious approach in our article to prevent oversimplification.

To What Extent Did Peasants Oppose Soviet Collectivization?
There is evidence which suggests the extent that force and violence used in the 1930s was not frequent. Mark Tauger writes in Soviet Peasants and Collectivization, 1930-39: Resistance and Adaptation (pp 71-75) about an OGPU report from March 1931. This report lists 13,754 protests which had occurred in 1930. According to their data, there were around 2.5 million people who protested these changes, and Tauger estimates 3.3 million total protested. He then writes how the rural population at the time was 120 million, and the population of people over 15 was 70 million. This means that 5% of peasants protested the collectivization. Tauger then analyzes the evidence regarding the extent that violence was used against the protests that did occur. The majority of these protests were resolved peacefully with 10.0% of protests suppressed violently in February, 12.4% in March, and 2.8% in April. Tauger writes that the reason the majority of protests that occurred were resolved peacefully, was a result of explanation of local policies.

Change AAB suggestion:
The implementation of the Five-Year Plans, resulted in significant economic changes, including agricultural collectivisation, and rapid industrialisation. These policies created a command economy to drive economic growth and development.

Change AAA2 suggestion: Robert Conquest
These sources raise questions about the credibility of historian Robert Conquest from other historians.

The next evidence is about Robert Conquest and his reliability as a historian. I know there are other historians, but Conquest is one of the most prominent historians and is cited many times in our article. I believe we should try and find other evidence instead of using Conquest's work. Here's why:

1. Journalist David Leigh published this in 1978. This account details the collaboration between Robert Conquest and British intelligence in their efforts to counter Soviet propaganda. Afterward, it was suggested to Conquest to write a book. David Leigh wrote: "Christopher Mayhew, then a junior Labour FA Minister invented IRD, writing a confidential paper to Ernest Bevin, the foreign secretary of 1947. He proposed a covert "propaganda counter - offensive" against the Russians by means of a new FO department... Robert Conquest, the scholar and author, who has been frequently critical of the Soviet Union, was one of those who worked for IRD. He was in the FO until 1956...After he [Conquest] left, he says, IRD suggested to him that he could combine some of the data he had gathered from Soviet publications into a book. He sold Bodley Head a ready-made series of eight called 'Soviet studies.'"

2. Historian J. Arch Getty observed in 1985 that Conquest holds the view that rumor serves as a valuable means of disseminating political information. He writes: ''“ ...Conquest (Terror, 754) ... makes the astounding statement that “Truth can thus only percolate in the form of hearsay.” And, further, “On political matters basically the best, though not infallible, source is rumor ... “. He believes that the best way to check rumors is to compare them with other rumors--a dubious procedure given the fact that émigrés read each other’s works. Of course, historians do not accept hearsay and rumor as evidence in any other field of history.”''

3. Historian J. Arch Getty says that there have been discussions regarding the potential lack of independence in Robert Conquest's work, particularly his collaboration with British intelligence in crafting propaganda about the Soviet Union. It is important to note that this does not imply that the Soviets did not engage in their own propaganda efforts against the British. Getty writes: "Sometimes, the “scholarship” had been more than simply careless. Recent investigations of British intelligence activities (following in the wake of U.S. post-Watergate revelations), suggest that Robert Conquest, author of the highly influential Great Terror, accepted payment from British intelligence agencies for consciously falsifying information about the Soviet Union. Consequently, the works of such an individual can hardly be considered valid scholarly works by his peers in the Western academic community."

4. Historians Robert Davies and Stephen Wheatcroft published this in 2006. It discusses the evolution of Robert Conquest's views since his original publication. I included this source to illustrate the other side of the coin, how Conquest may be more reliable in his later years. They write: "Our view of Stalin and the famine is close to that of Robert Conquest, who would earlier have been considered the champion of the argument that Stalin had intentionally caused the famine and had acted in a genocidal manner. In 2003, Dr Conquest wrote to us explaining that he does not hold the view that ‘Stalin purposely inflicted the 1933 famine. No. What I argue is that with resulting famine imminent, he could have prevented it, but put “Soviet interest” other than feeding the starving first — thus consciously abetting it’."

5. The Village Voice published "In Search of a Soviet Holocaust" in 1988 which featured the opinions of two historians regarding Robert Conquest's then-newly released book, The Harvest of Sorrow. I included this source to illustrate how there is not a consensus yet among historians on the reliability of Conquest's writings.

Moshe Lewin says: "This is crap, rubbish... I am an anti-Stalinist, but I don’t see how this [genocide] campaign adds to our knowledge. It’s adding horrors, adding horrors, until it becomes a pathology."

Lynne Vio­la says: "I absolutely reject it... Why in god’s name would this paranoid gov­ernment consciously produce a famine when they were terrified of war [with Germany]?"