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= Practical Ethics = Practical Ethics is a 1979 introductory ethics book by the Australian ethical philosopher Peter Singer. It was very influential, and has over 6800 citations on Google Scholar as of April 2021. It has been translated into 15 languages.

Practical Ethics takes the principle of the equal consideration of interests from Singer’s previous book Animal Liberation (1975) and uses this principle to make a case for preference utilitarianism. He then examines a variety of contemporary ethical issues from a preference utilitarian standpoint. Singer has since written that he has become a hedonistic utilitarian. Practical Ethics covers race and sex discrimination, animal rights, abortion, euthanasia, poverty, climate change, poverty, terrorism, and the duty to act morally.

History
The book draws on Singer’s previous work, including Famine, Affluence and Morality; Reconsidering the Famine Relief Argument; and Democracy and Disobedience.

The first edition covered animal rights, abortion, euthanasia, wealth inequality, civil disobedience, and the duty to act morally.

The 1993 second edition adds a chapter on the environment, as well as a chapter on refugees based on an essay Singer co-wrote with his wife, Renata Singer. The second edition included revisions to the existing chapters. Terminology is updated in the second edition, “defective” and “retarded” are changed to “severely disabled”.

The 2011 third edition removed the chapter about refugees, added a chapter about climate change, and again updated terminology and current events.

Singer drew on chapter 7 of Practical Ethics for ''Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants''.

Summary
Preference Utilitarianism and the principle of equal consideration of interests The first chapter of Practical Ethics deals with the theoretical justifications for preference utilitarianism. Singer argues against divine command theory, ethical relativism, and subjectivism, on the grounds that they lead to highly unintuitive conclusions when examined closely. Next, he argues that one necessary criterion for an ethical system is that it be universal, which means that each person counts equally, and hence other people’s desires matter just as much as one’s own. From this conclusion, Singer argues that preference utilitarianism, which is the theory that what determines the moral character of an action is to what degree it satisfies the preferences of all people, is the minimal ethical theory that meets this criterion.

Singer uses the principle of equal consideration of interests derived in the first chapter and argues it proscribes racism and sexism, as well as a hypothetical system of intelligence-based discrimination, where those with IQs above a certain threshold enslave those below it. This is because characteristics such as race, sex, and intelligence do not affect the importance of the interests of the individuals involved, so unequal treatment is prohibited by the principle. However, it is still permissible to treat humans unequally in some cases if the differences between them are relevant. One example Singer gives is making being wheelchair bound a disqualification for becoming a firefighter. This is a kind of discrimination that is compatible with the principle of equal consideration of interests, as being unable to walk objectively affects one’s ability to be a firefighter. Singer writes that “all humans are equal” is not a statement of fact, but another way of stating that we should consider every person’s interests equally.

Speciesism
Singer argues that the principle of equal consideration of interests extends beyond humans to all sentient creatures. These other creatures have interests, so they should be considered. Singer uses the term ‘speciesism’ to refer to the belief that human interests should count for more than the interests of non-human animals. Non-human animals might have very different interests to humans, but they should be weighed equally when considering the moral thing to do.

Persons and non-persons
Singer differentiates a person, who has self-awareness and rationality, from one who is merely sentient, who can feel pleasure and pain, but is not a person. Singer argues that there are preference utilitarian grounds for thinking that killing a person is worse than killing a merely sentient being. Persons have a conception of themselves as existing over time, unlike the merely sentient. Therefore, persons have additional very strong preferences that are thwarted if they are killed. Whereas if sentient beings are killed painlessly and replaced, no desires have been thwarted. Because the same amount of pleasure exists in the new creature as the old, then from a utilitarian perspective, this is morally neutral.

Abortion
Singer argues that because sentient and personhood are the relevant criteria for moral worth, and early fetuses are neither, that they lack interests and thus early abortion is always permissable. Singer writes that fetuses after X months and newborns have sentience, but not personhood, therefore they should not be made to suffer, but cannot have a right to life yet, as they do not have a view of themselves existing over time. Therefore they can be killed when they will be replaced with happier people, or when their lives are not worth living.

Euthanasia
Singer argues that voluntary euthanasia and non-voluntary euthanasia are justified, but that involuntary euthanasia is only justified in very unusual circumstances.

Poverty
Singer argues that because we can prevent extreme poverty with minimal sacrifice to ourselves, we should do so.

Why act morally
Singer considers responses to the question “Why act morally?”. He rejects arguments that the question is nonsensical, that acting morally is necessary to be rational, that it is always in an individual’s self interest, and that morality is equivalent to conscientiousness. Singer argues that immorality is consistent with rationality, but that some/most human beings are biologically engineered to crave purpose and to help others, and so dedicating one’s life to doing the right thing is personally rewarding and part of living a meaningful life.

Reception
John Martin Fischer’s review was broadly positive, recommending Practical Ethics as reading for an introductory ethics course. He made minor criticisms of Singer’s explanation of utilitarianism’s details, writing that Singer says that some interests are more important than others, but it is not clear how this is decided. Fischer also noted that Singer’s conclusion that killing merely sentient beings humanely is morally acceptable provided they are replaced, was “highly unintuitive”.

H.L.A. Hart's review of the first edition in the New York Review of Books was mixed. While writing that "The utility of this utilitarian’s book to students of its subject can hardly be exaggerated", Hart also criticized Practical Ethics for insufficiently explaining preference utilitarianism. He argues that Singer maintains that people are not fungible, but this is not obvious from Singer’s preceding explanation of preference utilitarianism or his justification for it. Singer replied that Practical Ethics does explain the distinction between killing self-aware entities and not creating more self-aware entities, but conceding that his explanation was “insufficiently developed”. Singer wrote that Hart’s objection is a result of confusion about preference utilitarianism. Preference utilitarianism seeks to maximise the sum of satisfaction of preferences of already existing sentient entities, rather than to maximise the total possible satisfaction of desire. Creating new beings whose preferences are satisfied is morally neutral under preference utilitarianism, rather than a net positive, as is the case in classical utilitarianism.

Charles C. Camosy wrote that preference utilitarianism as Singer describes it is indifferent to the existence of humankind, and that Singer admits that this conflicts with his intuitions. Furthermore, preference utilitarianism cannot order preferences by degree of importance, so preference utilitarianism considers it morally neutral if in the future people prefer to play video games as opposed to appreciating nature, and again Singer admits this is counter to his intuitions. Not Dead Yet, a disability advocacy group has taken issue with the Singer’s views expressed in Practical Ethics on the quality and value of disabled lives, as well as the use in the first edition of the word “defective” to refer to disabled people. Singer has said that the term was standard usage at the time.

Singer claims an ethics course using the book as required reading was shut down after protests against the course on the grounds of Practical Ethics support of non-voluntary euthanasia of disabled infants.