User:Bengalski/PiusXII

Here's the whole list of EffK's points copied from his talk page.

The Reichskonkordat and the Empowerment of Nazism
Continuing forceful controversy surrounds Pope Pius XI's Cardinal Secretary of State Pacelli's personal over-seeing of the Holy See's Reichskonkordat with the German State in 1933 and many books ever since have concerned themselves with the historic issue of papal approbation made through it towards the Hitler regime.

The Brüning Era
One of Pacelli's main objectives as Secretary of State - historian Klaus Scholder called it his 'great goal' - was the conclusion of a Reichskonkordat with Germany. Between 1930 and 1933 Pacelli attempted to re-initiate the 1920's abortive negotiations with representatives of successive fragile Weimar Reublic German governments on this matter. The importance of the Reich or national concordat policy to Pacelli, to the point that it dominated his thinking on German matters, is exemplified in Heinrich Brüning's account of their meeting on 8th August 1931 (Bruning, the economist leader of the Catholic German Centre Party, who was Reich Chancellor between 29th March 1930 and 30th May 1932.) According to Brüning's memoirs Pacelli suggested that he disband the Centre Party's governing coalition with the Social Democrats and "form a government of the right simply for the sake of a Reich concordat, and in doing so make it a condition that a concordat be concluded immediately." In what was a stormy meeting, Bruning refused to do so, replying that Pacelli "mistook the political situation in Germany and, above all, the true character of the Nazis." Bruning angered the Cardinal by suggesting he not further interfere in the internal politics of Germany. In this same month it is alleged that an instruction from Pope Pius XI was sent to the Centre to do everything to support a Hitler Government {{ref|Mowrer]]

The German elections of July 1932 saw a further rise in Nazi representation: the Party became the largest in the Reichstag with 230 seats of 608 in the parliament. This prompted Pacelli again to advise the catholic Centre Party Germany to work with the Nazis in a coalition of the right, despite the fact that at this point the German bishops officially condemned Nazism and banned catholics from membership of the Nazi Party. Pacelli, however, saw things differently from the Hierarchy, telling a Bavarian envoy Ritter: "it is to be hoped and desired that, like the Centre Party and the Bavarian Peoples' Party, so too the other parties which stand on Christian principles and which now also include the National Socialist party, now the strongest party in the Reichstag, will use every means to hold off the cultural Bolshevizing of Germany, which is on the march behind the Communist Party."' {{ref|Ritter}}

The necessity for Hitler as pawn
According to Klaus Scholder, a Reichskonkordat was in fact impossible under the Weimar Republic: "as long as this democratic republic existed in Germany a Reich concordat was inconceivable." Catholic parties would never have sufficient strength to get a treaty past protestant and socialist opposition. It was thus the emergence of Hitler's dictatorship that allowed the Reichskonkordat to become a real possibility, following the model of the Lateran Treaties with fascist Italy where the Church had agreed to abstain from political activity in return for recognition in a concordat. pp160-1

'''Hitler's rise to power through Janauary 1933 came through receipt of financial guarantees from German Magnates and conspiracy towards a Hitler demand for the chancellorship in a coalition of the nationalist right, due the preceding inconclusive 6 November 1932 elections. According to Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen, the principlal organiser of this state of affairs ,a Christian basis for the German State was pre-requisite and the new German cabinet began to talk about a Reichskonkordat "immediately after 30 January 1933"(Hitler's presidential appointment)..

Ludwig Kaas and The Un-doing of the Reichstag
With the Nazis still short of a majority in the Reichstag, and desirous of absolute power, a remaining catholic Centre Party demand for constitutionality was answered by Hitler's dissolution of the parliament for more elections to be held on 5th March.

This period in Germany saw the roll-out of institutionalised brutality by forces of law, greatly accelerated by anti-communist arrests and anti-jewish propaganda. Pope Pius XI's well known anti-Bolshevik stance found echo in a widespread Nazi linkage of the semitic to the Boslhevik menace and on 23rd March Hitler assumed dictatorial powers with the passing of the Enabling Act. The Act required a two thirds majority as it amended the German constitution: this majority was obtained through the support of the Centre Party, though counter-argument both at the time and ever since claims that the Centre would not have been strong enough to resist. Historians including Klaus Scholder have maintained that a key reason for the Centre Party leadership agreeing to support the Enabling Act was a promise from Hitler to negotiate a Reich concordat with the Vatican. Scholder maintains that Centre Party Chairman Monsignor Ludwig Kaas, a priest and longstanding close associate of Pacelli since 1920, "probably acted as the key go-between in the whole matter." p.241, whilst other historical reports place Kaas together with von Papen, as the two most important architects for this crucial Hitler success. Historians ever since have remarked at the manner in which the Hitler speech at the voting for the Enabling Act, clearly referred to the prospect of warmer ties with the Holy See.

Hitler and Kaas
The day after the Enabling Act vote Kaas went to Rome in order to, in his own words, "investigate the possibilities for a comprehensive understanding between church and state." .The period is characterised by sinister forces {{ref|Nuremberg trials]] which acted in secrecy, from at least the 4 January agreement that Hitler rather than von Papen, would head the German Government during the transition to Dictatorship [{{ref|Wheeler-Bennett]], and this continued with Kaas' return from the Vatican by 2 April for a private meeting with Adolf Hitler. Even the subsequent negotiations for the concordat began with the secret arrival of von Papen as Foreign Secretary for Hitler's Government, in Rome on 9 April, accompanied by Kaas. Kaas it was who received first audience with Pacelli, and was subsequently deputed to himself over-see the drafting of the concordat.

Pope Pius XI approbation of Hitler
The controversy is compounded by memory of the pontiff, Pope Pius XI then on the 10 April receiving von Papen jointly with Hermann Goering as honoured Nazi Party representative with clear words of approbartion for hitler as a man of uncompromising strength against nihilist Russian communism. The pomp of the reception magnified these words and came only a week after the same Goering had publicly disdained any further necessity for any norms of legal principle in this uncompromising battle, and the current conrtoversy clearly rests between the hard to sustain but claimed Pacelli anti-Semitism strenghthening the entirely consistent Pius XI anti-Communism. Certainly Germany's catholic Hierarchy were in everyday contact with Rome, and both the anti-Christian as well as the anti-Semitic nature of Nazi brutality could not but have been continuously reported to Pacelli.

The Hierarchy and the abandonment of catholic resistance
The concordat was finally signed on 20th July. This shortly after Germany had signed similar agreements with the major Protestant churches in Germany. One of Hitler's keyconditions for agreeing the concordat had been the specifically voluntary dissolution of the Centre Party, for publicity reason, which occurred on 6th July.. This was pre-figured by Kaas himself, who remained thereafter in Rome sending clear approbation for the Fuhrer in a widely published vatican telegram for Hitler's 23 April birthday. However according to Fr. Robert Leiber, Confessor to this Cardinal, the secretary of state was upset that the party had dissolved itself earlier than necessary. (see Rychlak).This however does not balance the controversial view which, through succeeding historians shows a remarkable turnaround in the German Hierarchy's stance at the 28 March Bishop's Conference at Fulda coupled with the demise of the entirely entrenched catholic political organs. The importance of the voluntary dissolution of the catholic political bloc is linked to a large move amongst catholic voters, a third of the German electorate, into the successful, absolutist, and papally approved Nazi party.

(add double square brackets start and end) Image:konkordat.jpg|frame|Cardinal Pacelli, representing the Holy See, signs the "Reichskonkordat" on July 20, 1933 in Rome. From left to right: German Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen, representing Germany, Giuseppe Pizzardo, Pacelli, Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, German ambassador Rudolf Buttmann.

Deputy Arrest, Anti-Semitism and Pope Pius XI
The Reichskonkordat remains controversial.It gave important early international acceptance to Hitler's regime, though it was preceded by the Four-Power Pact Hitler had signed in June 1933.Germany's slide however into out-right political illegality preceded the Reichskonkordat and the fact remains that it was the un-constitutional Nazi arrest of the actual Communist Reichstag deputies which prefigured the final condonation by the Centre party on the 23 March. It is also fact that nation-wide anti-semitic brutalism in Germany was reported across the World before the von Papen and Goering April 10 audience with Pacelli and the condoning pontiff.

At the time, however, it was very common for the Holy See to sign concordats with many nations, which in reality had more to do with bolstering the new, 4-year-old Vatican State's own international recognition than with recognizing other regimes. Such concordats were important to the Holy See because without them the Church might be denied the right to organize youth groups, make ecclesiastical appointments, run schools, or even conduct religious services. The term "concordat" is itself misleading, as in English it appears to connote general approval and friendship, when in fact it is merely a treaty that addresses specific concerns (in this case German Catholicism), and is not a broad declaration of regimental or ideological approval.

Communism and Chairman Kaas as Papal tool
Together with this, the equally anti-democratic and subversively conspiratorial nature of German Communism, which was a stronger force than the catholic Centre Party, is factor in the out-come. Pacelli's position as principal advisor to a firmly anti-Communist papacy came at a time of drastic and complex economic conditions which both re-inforced German Communism and the fear of its success. The isolation of Pacelli's involvement (through his loyal friend Ludwig Kaas) from that of Pope Pius XI is thus hard for historians to estimate, as is the remaining and more widely researched questioning of Pacelli's Holocaust knowledge as wartime Pope Pius XII. This comes from the absence of publicly accessible documentation. That this friendship with Kaas persisted through the entire period is more widely remarked than the curiosities concerning the Kaas involvement. Apart from Kaas own words esteeming Hitler as a noble guide and of high ideals, the fact also remains that Ludwig Kaas performed six principle solo acts in 1933 whilst acting as Chairman of his constitutionally minded party: his 6 March approach to Papen and the Hitler coalition; his circa 22 March negotiation for a Hitler letter of Constitutional Guarantee; his giving of the Centre party bloc vote, made under duress but without the crucial and Centre persuading Guarantee; his immediate week sojourn in the Vatican following this vote for dictatorship; his 2 April private meeting alone with Adolf Hitler; and, lastly, his delegation to draft the Reichskonkordat itself on 9 April, and his inclusion in the concordat of a secret annexe which did not come to light until the Second World War.

Modern Study
The first published allegations against Kaas, Pacelli and Pope Pius XI were written by Avro Manhattan in 1949, and taken up by playwrite Rolfe Hochhuth by 1963. Edgar Ansel Mowrer published his accusation in 1967. Allegations continued to be published and defence against such controversy is published by numerous authors, such that one recent volume is called The Pius Wars, whilst another is called The Myth of Hitler's Pope, rebutting that Writer title. Many more scholarly writers include Guenter Lewy and Klaus Scholder.

Church Autonomy, Totalitarian Germany and Pacelli during the Holocaust
Critics of the Concordat show the manner in which it linked the Roman Catholic Church too closely with Nazism by un-necessarily weakening the power of its own members and clergy to respond to anti-Christian excess, or brutality. This and only this concordat sacrificed the very autonomy of the clergy to comment against the Hitler dominated Government of Germany. This was achieved through the requirement of all Clergy to swear allegiance to that "Totalitarian Government". The analysis made at the end of the Hitler instigated World War, by the victorious countries, was hasty and superficial but touched briefly upon this concordat, coming as it did after the start of the successful Nazi "Conspiracy" towards such Government. The analysis leant very much more towards representation of the concordat as somehow cheating the German catholics, than towards the since perrenial allegations, suggesting the concordat as pact against the forces of Communism. The continuous cynical brutality of Nazism immediately made of the concordat an insufficiency against such political excess and at the time these clear excesses were the priority focus.

The controversies surrounding Pius XI and Pacelli still focus on the clearer Nazi excesses concerning anit-Semitic Holocaust and in comparison the subtle maneuvers of Pacelli's friend Kaas concerning the Reichskonkordat, athough alleged since 1949, are harder to contemplate. Defense in the issue is rather less documented than is separate defense of Pacelli (as Pope Pius XII ) for his interventions in certain cases of threatened Jewry. The concordat's defenders argue that it was a necessary attempt to protect the Church from anti-Church policies by the new government. The 3 June encyclical Dilectissima Nobis, in which Pius XI protested against anti-Church policies in republican Spain, indicated that the Church found no difficulty in adapting herself to various civil institutions, be they monarchic or republican, aristocratic or democratic, "provided the Divine rights of God and of Christian consciences are safe".

Hitler saw the Reichskonkordat as a victory for his side. Hitler told his cabinet on 14 July:
 * "An opportunity has been given to Germany in the Reichskonkordat and

a sphere of influence has been created that will be especially significant in the urgent struggle against international Jewry."

In contrast, Pacelli, in a two page article in the Vatican influenced L'Osservatore Romano on 26 July and 27 July, dismissed Hitler's assertion that the concordat in any way represented or implied approval for national socialism, much less moral approval of it. He argued that its true purpose had been
 * "not only the official recognition (by the Reich) of the legislation

of the Church (its Code of Canon Law), but the adoption of many provisions of this legislation and the protection of all Church legislation."

The value of the Concordat to the Holy See has also to be seen as very considerable in that it did, and continues to bring Roman Catholicism back into an official position in the land that gave birth to the Reformation (of that same Holy See]]. A plethora of volumes are written concerning the significance of the concordat in the longer course of both Church and German History, whilst notable catholic Christian braveries, as well as collaborations, can be and are repeated in both Pacelli's favour and against.

Examples are Cardinal Faulhaber was one of Germany's leading catholic figures and at the time is reported to have said: "With the concordat we are hanged, without the concordat we are hanged, drawn and quartered."culture.org/docs/doc_view.cfm%3Frecnum%3D1438+%22With+the+concordat+we+are+hanged,+without+the+concordat+we+are+hanged,+drawn+and+quartered%22+-wikipedia&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1 However,this defensive quote can be balanced by previous Hierarchy resistance towards Nazism. On 18 March von Papen visits Cardinal Bertram, inquiring whether the Church would not revise its stand on Nazism. The Cardinal tells him, ""The act of revising has to be undertaken by the leader of the National Socialists himself." and it was  on 25 March 1933 that this Cardinal writes a list of proposed instructions to the clergy. He has now joined the group of Bishops who favor withdrawing  the various prohibitions imposed on the Nazi party.

By April 20, On Hitler's 44th birthday, Monsignor Kaas sends a telegram of congratulations from Rome that is widely published in the German press. Kaas assures Hitler of "unflinching cooperation." This accelerates the movement of Catholics into the Nazi Party. April 24 Baron von Ritter, the Bavarian ambassador at the Vatican reports to Berlin that Monsignor Kaas and the Papal Secretary of State are in constant touch with each other. "There can be no doubt that Cardinal Pacelli approves of a policy of sincere cooperation by the Catholics within the framework of the Christian Weltanschauung (world view) in order to benefit and lead the National Socialist Movement." By April 26 Hitler tells Bishop Berning and Monsignor Steinmann, representatives of the Catholic Church in Germany, that he is only going to do to the Jews what the Church of Rome has been trying to do without success for over 1,500 years. It is such as this last, coming as it did before the institution of the concordat with Germany, that has fuelled such continuing suspicions against Pacelli as successful advisor to Pius XI for the concordat.