User:Berntkar/info237

= Trade secret law =

Under Virginia law a "trade secret" is information, including but not limited to, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
 * 1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
 * 2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

Rivendell Forest Products v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 824 F. Supp. 961 (D. Colo. 1993)
Sales quote system. Cornwell leaves Rivendell and joins GP. Shows GP the Rivendell quote system and GP designs their own system to match Rivendell's. Verdict: Verdict in favour of Georgia Pacific

Reason: Concepts ad ideas are not protectable. Source code was not copied.

Rivendell Forest Products v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 28 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1994)
Verdict: District court verdict reversed and remanded in favour of Rivendell

Reason: Trade secrect can consist of elemenets that are in the public domain, but the integration of the element is protected from misappropriation.

Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 297 A.2d 433 (Del. Ch. 1971)
Data General sells the Nova computer with design drawings. The drawings are provided to customers under NDA. Digital Computer buys a Nova with the drawings and creates a clone. Verdict: Summery judgement for Digital denied.Preliminary injunction denied.

Reason:

Comprehensive Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730 (4th Cir. 1993)
Emplyees of CTI leave and form their own company to produce a competing product based on the same EDI technology/standard. Verdict: In favour of SA

Reason: S.A. did not misappropriate CTI's trade secrets because CTI failed to prove the existence of any trade secrets.

Asset Mktg Sys. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2008)
Verdict:


 * Gagnon granted AMS an irrevocable unlimited, nonexclusive license to retain, use, and modify the software.
 * Since AMS was legally entitled to use and modify the source code, the license included access to any trade secret embodied therein.
 * Since AMS was entitled access to these trade secrets, the non­competition agreements with Gagnon’s employees were invalid.

Microsoft Corp. v. Lee, No. 05-2-23561-6 SEA (Wash. Sup. Ct. Sep. 13, 2005)
Verdict:


 * The Court upheld the noncompete agreement and enjoined Lee and Google from the activities enumerated therein, but permitted Lee to establish and staff a Google development facility in China.
 * Lee's reputation, relationships, and outreach efforts were his own and could not be constrained by the noncompete agreement.

IBM v. Papermaster, No. 08-9078, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95516 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2008)
Papermaster worked for IBM and was an expert on micro processor technology. He had a 1 year non-compete with compensation with IBM. Joined Apple's iPod team.

IBM seeks a preliminary injunction, so it must show:
 * 1) irreperable harm if an injunction is not granted, and
 * 2) either:
 * likelihood of success on the merits or
 * sufficiently  serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation, and a balance of the hardships tipping decidedly in its favor

Verdict:


 * Threat of irreparable harm to IBM established.
 * The Noncompetition agreement was reasonable in duration and geographic scope and necessary to prevent the disclosure of IBM's trade secrets, thus it is probable that IBM will prevail on the merits of its claims.
 * In the alternative, the balance of hardships tips in IBM's favor.
 * Thus motion for preliminary injunction enjoining Papermaster from working for Apple granted.

= Copyright law = 17 USC § 102: (a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
 * 1) literary works;
 * 2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
 * 3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
 * 4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
 * 5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
 * 6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
 * 7) sound recordings; and
 * 8) architectural works.

§ 106. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
 * 1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
 * 2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
 * 3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
 * 4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
 * 5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
 * 6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.

Copyright Protection for Code
In any suit for copyright infringement, the plaintiff must establish its ownership of a valid copyright, and that the defendant copied the copyrighted work.

The plaintiff may prove defendant's copying either by direct evidence or, as is most often the case, by showing that:
 * 1) the defendant had access to the plaintiff's copyrighted work and
 * 2)  that defendant's work is substantially similar to the plaintiff's copyrightable material.

How should courts determine when the non­-literal elements of two computer programs are "substantially similar"? Answer: The Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison test developed by the count in the Altai case.

Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992)
Verdict: After filtering out non­protectable and de minimis elements, there was not substantial similarity between OSCAR 3.5 and ADAPTER, and thus no infringement.

Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995)
Is the Lotus 1­2­3 menu command hierarchy copyrightable subject matter?

Verdict: "We hold that the Lotus menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable "method of operation." (not protectable accoring to 102(b)

Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988)
Two versy similar karate games. Are they too similar?

Two­-step test:
 * 1) "extrinsic" test is used to determine whether two ideas are substantially similar.  This is an objective test.
 * 2) "intrinsic" test is used to compare forms of expression.  This is a subjective test which depends on the response of the ordinary reasonable person.

Verdict: Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the similar features resulted from either constraints inherent in the sport of karate or computer restraints, and these features necessarily followed from the idea of a martial arts karate combat game, or were inseparable from, indispensable to, or even standard treatment of the idea of the karate sport, and thus unprotectable.

Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994)
Verdict: GUI limited by hardware. Only small parts of the GUI could be considered to similar.

Ownership of Copies: First Sale and Section 117
§ 109: Limitations on exclusive rights: Effect of transfer of particular copy or phonorecord

§ 202. Ownership of copyright as distinct from ownership of material object

§ 117(a) Making of Additional Copy or Adaptation by Owner of Copy not an infringement provided:
 * 1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
 * 2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful.

§ 117(b) Lease, Sale, or Other Transfer of Additional Copy or Adaptation.

§ 117(c) Machine Maintenance or Repair

MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993)
Peak serviced and repaired MAI systems and in so doing, ran MAI's software to debug problems or confirm the repairs were successful. Running the program created a copy in RAM and since Peak was not the owner of the copy the district court fount it constitued copyright infringement.

Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
License versus sale of software.

Harmony was not a direct Microsoft licensee and acquired Microsoft products from third parties, often on a stand­alone basis, and resold such products, often on a stand­alone basis.

Verdict: License, not sale.

Defendants fail to prove that the first sale doctrine applies because they do not trace their purchase of Microsoft products to a "first sale" by Microsoft or any party authorized by Microsoft.

Microsoft Corp. v. DAK Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1995)
"[T]he economic realities of this agreement indicate that it was basically a sale, not a license to use."

Softman Products Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
Verdict: Sale, not license.

The circumstances surrounding the transactions between Adobe and its distributors indicate that Adobe sells its software, even if they call it a license.

MDY Indus. LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., No. 06-2555, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, 2008 WL 2757357 (D. Ariz. Jul. 14, 2008)
MDY developed and sold a program called Glider which would play Blizzard's World of Warcraft in auto mode.

End user is direct infringer (by exeeding rights in EULA). MDY is the enabler and liable for contributory copyright infringment.

Vicarious copyright infringement: "profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it".

The condition/covenant distinction: “limitations on the scope of the license rather than independent contractual covenants” ("Subject to ....")

Verdict: WoW purchasers are not owners of their copies of the software and hence not entitled to a § 117 defense. MDY is liable for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.

Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 2009 WL 3187613 (W.D. Wash. 2009)
Verdict: The transfer of AutoCAD packages from Autodesk to CTA was a sale. As such Vernor may invoke the first sale doctrine and relase is not infringment.

Why: the critical factor is whether the transferee kept the copy (did not have to return the copy).

Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., No. 09-35969 (9th Cir. Sep. 10, 2010)
Appeal court reversed the judgement.

“We hold today that a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a copy where the copyright owner:
 * 1) specifies that the user is granted a license;
 * 2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software; and
 * 3) imposes notable use restrictions.”

Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983)
The case: hardware board that would speed up games such as the Galaxy.

Verdict: Artic is found liable for contributory infringement.

§ 107 Fair Use
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include:
 * 1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
 * 2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
 * 3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
 * 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992)
Galoob manufactured the Game Genie that allowed a player to alter up to three features of Nintendo games.

Verdict: Even if one assumes that Galoob enabled the end users to make derivative works, such acts would be a fair use because end users are engaged in non commercial uses of Nintendo's works, which they have already paid for, and Nintendo did not demonstrate any market harm.

Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998)
300 user­created levels of Duke Nukem sold commercially as Nuke It.

Verdict: District Court held that "Nuke It" was not a derivative work and therefore did not infringe, but did issue a preliminary injunction with respect to the screen shots on the packaging.

9th circut found that Micro Star infringed FormGen's copyright by creating unauthorized derivative works that were not a fair use.

Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)
Arriba soft is a image search engine.

Verdict: fair use Why: Arribas user serves a different function with no harm Kelly's ability to sell his full-size images.

Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)
Third­party websites repost Perfect 10 images without permission. Google's image search crawls the third­party websites and provides thumbnails of the images it finds.

Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991)
Step-Saver sells systems to customers consisting of operating system from TSL, terminals from Wyse and main frame from IBM. Customers experienced problems with the systems and sued Step-Saver. Step-saver sued TSL and Wyse for breach of warranty.

TSL had a box-top license on the package. The box-top licese had different terms than purchase order and invoice. Is the box-top license enforceable/does it materially alter the agreement?

Verdict: the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of remedies provisions from the box­top license would, as a matter of law, substantially alter the distribution of risk between Step­Saver and TSL. ... the box­top license did not become a part of the parties' agreement.

ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
ProCD has different price for commercial and non-commerial user (in the EULA).

Matthew Zeidenberg bought a "non­commercial" copy and sold the data over the internet at a cheaper price.

Verdict: The district court held the EULA unenforceable because the terms did not appear on the outside of the packaging and thus purchasers could not agree to or be bound by terms that were secret at the time of purchase.

Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002)
Visitors could download the program SmartDownload, either from Netscape or elsewhere, without knowing of or agreeing to the license terms.

"Mutual manifestation of assent, whether by written or spoken word or by conduct, is the touchstone of contract."

"[A] consumer's clicking on a download button does not communicate assent to contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on the download button would signify assent to those terms"

Verdict: defendants did not provide reasonable notice of the license terms.

Reverse Engineering
Sony test: the sale of a product "does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses."

Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988)
CopyWrite is capable of "commercially significant non-infringing uses" because the RAMKEY feature permits the making of archival copies of copyprotected software, permitted under § 117(2).

Verdict: RAMKEY, despite containing 30 characters of source code from Vault's program, was not a substantially similar copy of Vault's program, served an opposing function, and was not a derivative work.

Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992)
Accolade made games for the Sega console without an agreement with Sega. It reversed engineered a Sega game and copied the boot code (20-25 byte) in order for its games to work on the Sega console. Was the reverse engineering fair use?

Verdict: Disassembly, which includes wholesale copying, to gain access to functional elements in a copyrighted computer program is a fair use of the copyrighted work.

Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990)
Lasercomb put a anti-competitive term in their license agreement with a 100 year duration.

Verdict: "We think the anticompetitive language in Lasercomb's licensing agreement is... egregious... and therefore  amounts to misuse of its copyright... Holding that Lasercomb should have been barred by the defense of copyright misuse from suing for infringement of its copyright in the Interact program, we reverse the injunction and the award of damages for copyright infringement."

Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
Erlich posts infringing material on Klemetruds BBS which is connected to the internet by a service provided by Netcom.

Verdict: Not liable for contributory copyright rinfringement due to operators lack of knowledge of the infringement. ALso not liable for vicarious infringement as it cannot be shown and direct financial benefit for Netcom.

Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004)
Loopnet had users post pictures of realestate properties. Some users posted Costar copyrighted pictures. Unlike in the Netcom case Loopnet has a gatekeeping function which would remove obvious infringing pictures and also respond to takedown notices.

Verdict: "...we hold that the automatic copying, storage, and transmission of copyrighted materials, when instigated by others, does not render an ISP strictly liable for copyright infringement."

Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008)
Cablevision is offering its customers a remote DVR, the ability record and playback media. The recording in done remote by Cablevision. Each customer get their own copy of the content.

"...these facts strongly suggest that the works in this case are embodied in the buffer for only a “transitory” period, thus failing the duration requirement."

"copies that are made automatically upon that customer’s command."

Verdict: "Cablevision’s proposed RS­DVR system would not directly infringe plaintiffs’ exclusive rights to reproduce and publicly perform their copyrighted works..."

Lexmark Int'l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004)
Verdict: No. The Toner Loading Program is not copyrightable and the authentication sequence does not control access to the Printer Engine Program.

Lesson learned. Before considering copyright infringement, one have to consider if the subject is copyrigthable.

Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
"We conclude that 17 U.S.C. § 1201 prohibits only forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners."

Verdict: Chamberlain failed to show the requisite lack of authorization because Chamberlain's customers are authorized to use the software embedded in the GDOs they purchase. Without a 1201(a)(1) violation or copyright infringement, Skylink cannot be liable for trafficking under 1201(a)(2).

Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C07-3783 JF, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66335 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2008)
"[I]n order for a copyright owner to proceed under the DMCA with “a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law,” the owner must evaluate whether the material makes fair use of the copyright."

"An allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a takedown notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine thus is sufficient to state a misrepresentation claim pursuant to Section 512(f) of the DMCA."

IO Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. C06-03926 HRL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65915 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2008)
Users of Veoh's site uploaded Io's works without permission and Io, forgoing the notice and takedown process, sued Veoh immediately for direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement.

Io never sent any notices.

Verdict: Veoh is entitled to DMCA safe harbour defense.

Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2103 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2010)
Ongoing.

= Trademark Law = Dilution: – the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of: (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception.

15 U.S.C. § 1114 – (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive... – shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.

Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998)
Verdict: Toeppen's registration of Panavision's trademarks as his domain names on the internet diluted those marks.

Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
Verdict: "Because defendant's use of plaintiff's mark is subject to the Lanham Act, because the Polaroid factors demonstrate that there is a likelihood of confusion arising from defendant's use of plaintiff's mark, and because defendant has not raised a defense that protects his use of the mark, plaintiff has met its burden of demonstrating that a preliminary injunction against defendant's use of plaintiff's mark is warranted."

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001)
PETA (People Eating Tasty Animals)

Verdict: Doughney falied to show his parodic intent.

Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001)
Zuccarini registered typos and variations of joecartoon.com and set up the sites with pay­per­click advertisements.

Verdict: Zuccarini violated ACPA and Shields is entitled to statutory damages and attorneys' fees.

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001)
Verdict: Doughney violated ACPA, but PETA is not entitled to damages because Doughney registered and used the domain prior to ACPA's enactment. Instead Doughney must merely surrender the domain.

Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Ent'mt Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999)
Verdict: The Lanham Act bars West Coast from including in its metatags any term confusingly similar with Brookfield's mark.

Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002)
Nominative use test:

"We adopted the following test for nominative use: – First, the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder."

Verdict: The PMOY '81 watermark was not a nominative use and thus remanded to the district court. All other uses were nominative, permissible uses.

===Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005) Kremer sets up BosleyMedical.com where he is complaining about Bosley Medical Inst.

Bosley Medical is a registered trademark.

Verdict: "[T]he noncommercial use of a trademark as the domain name of a website — the subject of which is consumer commentary about the products and services represented by the mark — does not constitute infringement under the Lanham Act."

1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005)
Verdict: WhenU does not make trademark use of 1­800's trademark.

Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004)
Initial Interest Confusion: customer confusion that creates initial interest in a competitor's product. Although dispelled before an actual sale occurs, initial interest confusion impermissibly capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark and is therefore actionable trademark infringement.

Verdict: Defendants' use is not nominative use and thus plaintiff's case may proceed to trial in which it may attempt to show a likelihood of confusion from defendants' acts.

Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005)
Lamparello operates a non­commercial "gripe" site at fallwell.com critical of Falwell and his views.

Verdict: not TM infringement

Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, (N.D. Cal., Apr. 18, 2007)
Does Google infringe ABWF's trademarks by selling the trademarks as keywords?
 * Does Google make trademark use of the marks?
 * Are ABWF's trademarks enforceable?
 * Is there initial interest confusion?
 * Is there dilution?

Verdict: Mark must be famous to succeed on dilution claim and ABWF failed to produce sufficient evidence of fame, thus summary judgment granted for Google as to this issue.

Contributory Infringement
There are two ways in which a defendant may become contributorially liable for the infringing conduct of another: infringe a trademark," and to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement."
 * first, if the service provider "intentionally induces another to
 * second, if the service provider "continues to supply its [service]

False Advertising: A claim of false advertising may be based on at least one of two theories: its face, or likely to mislead or confuse consumers.
 * that the challenged advertisement is literally false, i.e., false on
 * that the advertisement, while not literally false, is nevertheless

Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., (2d Cir. 2010)
eBay not liable for direct nor contrinutory TM infringement.

Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992)
Any confusion was the result of Sega's own decision to implement the TMSS as it did, and the TMSS initialization code is a functional feature of a Genesis­ compatible game and Accolade may not be barred from using it.

=Patent law = To receive a patent an invention must be:
 * Useful (§ 101);
 * Novel (§ 102);
 * Non­Obvious (§ 103); and
 * Clearly described in the patent application (§ 112).

Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 561 U.S. __ (2010)
machine­-or­-transformation test:
 * his claim is tied to a particular machine, or
 * by showing that his claim transforms an article.

Verdict: fail the machine-or-transformation test.

Netscape Commc'ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
Konrad patented a method to perform a search on a remote database. He demoed his technology and also offered it to Stanford.

Konrad's demonstrations constituted public use and his offer to sell the system satisfied the on­sale bar, thus the invention is not patentable.

Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
American Airlines operates the SABRE reservation system. SABRE system is prior-art.

Court finds that Lockwoods system is obvious given the known functionality in the SABRE system.

Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008)
The exhaustion doctrine applies to method patents, and because LG's agreement with Intel authorized the sale of components that substantially embodied LG's patents, the sales by Intel exhausted the patents.

Fujifilm Corp. v. Benun, 605 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
= "Hot News" Misappropriation=