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Mosaddegh Domestic Issues

How could the CIA come to Iran, pay some bribes, spread propaganda around and overthrow a true patriot, whose crime was working to get for his country what truly belonged to it, i.e. its oil resources?

Evidence for loss of Mosaddegh support among Iranians
Because this is such a controversial subject I've gone to the trouble to type out text from several sources to answer the question:

Quoting Amin Saikal: ''The British blockade of Iranian oil and that country's intervening actions for Mossadeq's downfall resulted in serious economic hardship and polarization of Iranians into pro- and anti-Mossadeq forces. The anti-Mossedeq forces were centered around the monarchy, which had the support of a large section of the armed forces. The situation worsened when, amid increasing unrest inside and outside the Majlis, Mossedeq attempted to take over the constitutional position of the Shah as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, rule by emergency powers legitimized by a referendum and bypass the responsibility of the Majlis. He thus isolated himself from some of the close colleagues, including Seyyed Abol Qazem Kashani, the speaker of the Majlis, and laid himself open to criticism of dictatorial rule, inviting a direct confrontation between his government and conservative forces." (Saikal, Amin, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, Princeton University Press, 1980, p.43-4)

Quoting Ervand Abrahamian: "The easy success of this coup can be explained by two factors, the widening gap between the traditional and middle classes within the National Front; and the incraseing alienation of the whole officer corps from the civilian administration." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.273-4)

''"... Mossadeq, confident that he had defeated the shah and thrown out the British, pressed ahead for fundamental social changes. When he gave the Ministries of Interior, Agriculture, and Transport to leaders of the secualr Iran party, the Ministry of Justice to Abu al'Ali Lufti, and anticlerical judge who had helped Reza Shah reorganize the judicial system, and the Ministry of Education to Dr. Mehdi Azar, a university professor from Azerbaijan sympathetic to the Tudeh party, Qonatabadi and other clerical leaders of the National Front expressed guarded fears for the future. When the minister of transport proposed to nationalize the bus companies of Tehran, Makki warned that such an act would open the way for the state to take over all small businesses, even groceries:

''"We would end up like the Soviet Union where the state owns everything and citizens nothing. Anyway, we all know that our bureaucrats are incompetent businessmen." ''When the minister of economics tried to reduce food prices by opening new bakeries, the bazaar guilds - encouraged by Kashani - protested that the government had no right to interfere with the free market. When the minister of communications recommended that the country's telephone companies be nationalized, Kashani solicited petitions from shareholders, and Haerzadeh proclaimed that 'Islam protects private property and prohibits expropriations.' When Fatemi complained that the prohibition against the sale of alcohol reduced government tax revenues and increased the consumption of pure alcohol, [Shams al-Din] Qonatabadi [a preacher and leader of the Society of Muslim warriors, which was a member of the National Front] exclaimed, ''"I cannot believe my ears. Here is an assistant minister who considers himself a Muslim and represents a Muslim country proposing to legalize what the shari'a has clearly made illegal." ''When Mossadeq's advisers proposed to enfranchise women on the grounds that the spirit of the constitution treated all citizens as equals, the 'ulama, supported by theology students and guild elders, protested that 'the religious laws undoubtedly limited the vote to men.' Kashani stressed that the government should prevent women from voting so that they would stay home and perform their true function - rearing children. ... One demonstrator was killed and ten were seriously wounded as theology students in Qum took to the streets to protest the proposal of extending the vote to women." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions'' by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.275-6)

''The conflict between the traditional and modern wings of the National Front reached a climax when Mossadeq asked Parliament from a 12-month extension of his emergency powers. Opposing the request, many of the clerical deputies left the National Front and formed their own Islamic Caucus (Franksium-i Islam). Kashani denounced the emergency powers as 'dictatorial'; informed foreign journalists that true democracy in Iran needs a faithful implementation of the shari'a; and told Behbehani, the royalist ayatollah, that Mossadeq's 'leftist advisers were endangering national security.' Qontatabadi claimed that the ministers of justice and education were replacing good Muslim employees with Kremlin-controlled atheists'; that he had always suspected the Iran party because of that party's alliance with the Tudeh in 1946; and that the 'government's dictatorial methods were transforming Iran into a vast prison.' Another clerical deputy suddenly discovered that Mossadeq's doctoral dissertation, written 35 years earlier in Switzerland, contained strong secular and anticlerical views. ..." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions'' by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.276-7)

Quoting Vali Nasr: Despite modernization and secularization in Iran in the 20th century, "One area where the ulama could still make their weight felt was the struggle against imperialism. Clerics supported both the nationalization of Iran's oil industry in 1951 and the popular movement that it created. ... While many in the Shia ulama supported Mossadeq's goals, at the end of the day the most senior clerics backed the restoration of the monarchy because they badly feared chaos and a communist takeover." (Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2005), p.124)

Quoting Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr on Iranian worries about communism: "The palpable fear of a communist takeover changed the political alignment that dominated Iranian politics. The religious establishment, worried about communism, switched sides, as did key segments of the middle classes and commercial interests, and some nationalist leaders. The political realignment promoted concerted action by the alliance between the monarchy and the Iranian military in close cooperation with the United States and Britain. The result was a military coup that toppled Mosaddeq's government, ended the democratic interregnum," (p.53 Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Democracy in Iran: history and the quest for liberty Oxford University Press, 2006,)

"Only five years after the Soviet attempt to separate Azerbaijan and Kurdistan from Iran, the monarchy and its allies believed that Iran's interests lay in close ties with the West to ward off the Soviet threat. Whereas Mosaddeq saw Britain as the foreign devil, they saw Britain and its imperialism as the lesser evil." (p.53)

Quoting Nikki Keddie: "The coup could not have succeeded without significant internal disaffection or indifference, but without outside aid it would not have occurred." (Keddie, Nikki R., Roots of Revolution, Yale University Press, 1981, p.140)

Quoting Sandra Mackay: "The loss of the political clerics effectively cut Mossadeq's connections with the lower middle classes and the Iranian masses which are crucial to any popular movement" in Iran. "It was Ayatollah Kashani who quietly inflicted Shiism's mortal wound on Muhammad Mossadegh." (Mackay, Sandra, The Iranians, Plume (1997), p.203,4)

Quoting Abbas Milani  "It was the clerical establishment's animosity towards Mossadegh that laid the groundwork for his ouster. A broad swath of clerics—Islamists like Ayatollah Abolgasem Kashani, a mentor of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—had initially supported Mossadegh. But, by late 1952, the clerics turned against him after he bucked their demands. The Ayatollah Kashani unsuccessfully pressed Mossadegh for the right to appoint key ministers. Another top cleric called on the prime minister to purge the civil service of Baha'is—a bane of Shia clergy. The clergy's allegiance to Mossadegh weakened further as he allowed the communist Tudeh Party to gain ever more power, despite his own personal abhorrence of communism. Once Mossadegh squandered the allegiance of the clergy, the inevitability of his fate became increasingly clear. (He had also alienated the middle class, increasingly weary of ideological warfare; and the army had pleaded for his ouster.)"

"None of this is to defend America's role in the coup. But it was hardly the only or even the decisive factor in his fall. ..." ("The Great Satan Myth, Everything you know about U.S. involvement in Iran is wrong" by Abbas Milani tnr.org, December 8, 2009)

Quoting Sepehr Zabih on Growth of Tudeh support and loss of Nationalist support:

"Perhaps the most critical miscalculation concerned the erosion of support for the [Mosaddegh] nationalist regime and the related problem of the Tudeh party's activity. As the regime became increasingly isolated from its traditional sources of support, a de facto alignment with the Tudeh supporters emerged. It mattered very little whether the government or the Tudeh party had initiated this de facto alignment. Since both were forced to fight a common enemy, i.e., the Shah and his various old and new allies, the emergence of that alignment appeared inevitable." (p.135)

"In July 1952 the forces of the nationalist parties overwhelmingly outweighed those of the Tudeh and its sympathizers. but in August 1953 this relationship was almost completely reversed by the gradual desertion of some of the more active supporters of Dr. Mossadegh, and the neutralization of others, as the crisis continued to erode their enthusiasm and resources. In the absence of this support and in view of the danger of a possible Tudeh takeover, active public resistance to the August army Royalist coup was limited in scope and fervor." (from Zabih, Sepehr The Mossadegh Era : Roots of the Iranian Revolution, Lake View Press, 1982, p.136)

"In 1953 a significant segment of the politically active populace of the country stood aloof to witness the collapse of a government which for such a long time had symbolized the new phase of Iranian nationalism. On this occasion, too, the critical reason for inaction seemed to be the public sense of an imminent threat to national independence on the part of the Tudeh party." (from Zabih, Sepehr The Mossadegh Era : Roots of the Iranian Revolution, Lake View Press, 1982, p.137)

''Richard Cottam, in one of the first studies of these events, writes about 'Behbahani dollars',' alluding to the payment made to the Royalist mob by the anti-Mossadegh clerics led by ayatollah Behbahani. This, however, he believes was not the only reason for the successful assemblage of the anti-Mossadegh crowd. Equally important was the prospect of a Tudeh takeover, which terrified other Iranians into joining that crowd without monetary reward." (p.124) Cottam, Richard W., Nationalism in Iran, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh of Pittsburgh Press, 1964, p.227 from Zabih, Sepehr The Mossadegh Era : Roots of the Iranian Revolution, Lake View Press, 1982

The fact of the matter is I didn't find any historian who said Mossadegh didn't lose support. --BoogaLouie (talk) 23:43, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

Did Iranians - not just foreigners - play a significant role in the coup?
Yes, according to the New York Times. "The history says [CIA] agency officers orchestrating the Iran coup worked directly with royalist Iranian military officers, handpicked the prime minister's replacement, sent a stream of envoys to bolster the shah's courage, directed a campaign of bombings by Iranians posing as members of the Communist Party, and planted articles and editorial cartoons in newspapers. 

"But on the night set for Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh's overthrow, almost nothing went according to the meticulously drawn plans, the secret history says. In fact, C.I.A. officials were poised to flee the country when several Iranian officers recruited by the agency, acting on their own, took command of a pro-shah demonstration in Tehran and seized the government." from How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79) Secrets of History The C.I.A. in Iran, By JAMES RISEN, NYT.com

Did Mossadeq have the support of the communists? Not until after Siyeh-i Tir uprising
To clear up this issue:

"As the the Tudeh gradually reemerged as a major force during 1951-1953, the party leadership was confronted with the inevitable question: whether of not to support the Mossadeq administration. Not surprisingly, the leaders where sharply divided." Older members of the Central Committee "favored an alliance" Newer members did not. "The debate was won by hard-liners."

''The Society of Democratic Youth sponsored teach-ins to "expose the conspiracy between the shah and his prime minister." (October 1951) ... The Tudeh press constantly portrayed Mossadeq as a feudal landlord, a devious old-time politician, and a stooge of the United States..... In 1951-2 the Tudeh supported the National Front only during the July uprising, when the danger from the shah appeared imminent." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions'' by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.323)

What was the association of Tudeh (communist party) and Mossadeq?
Mossadeq helping Tudeh ''"The election of Mossadeq helped the Tudeh even [more than the liberalization under Razmara] for the new prime minister accelerated the pace of liberalisation. Although he neither repealed the 1931 law nor formally lifted the 1949 ban, he believed that police controls violated civil liberties and the constitutional laws. He argued that the royalists smeared social reformers as communists in much the same way as the Qajars had labeled their opponents 'heretical Babis'. And he realized that he needed all the public support he could get in order to oust the British from the oil industry and expel the shah from politics." (p.318-9)

Tudeh helped the Nationalization fight and become stronger as a result. Comment of Hussein Fateh, ''"the anticommunist leader of the defunct Comrade's party":

"''One must admit that the Tudeh was a major force participating in the struggle to nationalize the oil company.'... although diverse elements participated in the July uprising, the impartial observer must confess that the Tudeh played an important part - perhaps even the most important part. .... If in the rallies before March 1952 one-third of the demonstrators had been Tudeh and two-thirds had been National Front, after March 1952, the proportions were reversed. [Panjah Saleh-e Naft-i Iran (p.320)" "Arsanjani, writing on behalf of Qavam, argued that the Tudeh was the chief force defeating the Shah. And Kashani, the day after the riots, sent a public letter to the pro-Tudeh organizations thanking them for their invaluable contribution toward national victory." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.320)

What was the deal with the August 1953 referendum?
The referendum occurred after speaker of the majlis Kashani has been removed by Mossadegh's supporters in Majlis. Half the deputies resigned as a result. Pro-Mosaddeq demonstrations demanded dissolution of the Majlis.

Kinzer says "Mossadegh announced that he would hold a referendum on the question and pledged to resign if voters did not vote to oust the existing Majlis. The referendum, hurriedly convened at the beginning of August, was a disastrous parody of democracy. There were separate ballot boxes for yes and no votes, and the announced result was over 99% in favor of throwing out the Majlis. The transparent unfairness of this referendum was more grist for the anti-Mossadegh mill. Mid-August found Roosevelt and his team of Iranian agents in place and ready to strike." (Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Stephen Kinzer, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.165)

Abrahamian reflects on how Mosaddeq had changed and become more radical by mid-1953: "Mossadeq, the constitutional lawyer who had meticulously quoted the fundamental laws against the shah, was now bypassing the same laws and resorting to the theory of the general will. The liberal aristocrat who had in the past appealed predominantly to the middle class was mobilizing the lower classes. The moderate reformer who had proposed to disenfranchise illiterates was seeking the acclaim of the national masses. To ensure victory at the polls, positive and negative ballot boxes were placed in different places. As expected, Mossadeq received an overwhelming vote of confidence, winning over 2,043,300 of the 2,044,600 ballot cast throughout the country. (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.274)

Gasiorowski calls the referendum "blatantly rigged" and "causing a great public outcry against Mosaddeq" in his 1991 book U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, Building a Client State in Iran, Mark J. Gasiorowski (Cornell University Press, 1991) p.75, but by the time of Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, (published 13 years later) he described it only in terms of a political mistake. "Mosaddeq's decision to conduct a controversial referendum to close Parliament gave the CIA's pre-coup propaganda campaign an easy target, probably helped persuade the shah to support the coup, and undoubtedly turned some Iranians against Mosaddeq." (Gasiorowski, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.266) One enthusiast for the referendum is Fakhreddin Azimi, writing in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. He has nothing to say complaints of unfairness or the lack of secret ballot,

''”Dissolving the Majles through a referendum, justifiably described as Mosaddeq's political masterpiece, was an ingenious countermeasure adopted by him to deprive his opponents of a quasi-legal vehicle for his ouster. The opposition capitalized on the referendum, denouncing it as another blatant violation of the Constitution. ... Kashani declared it religiously impermissible and called on the faithful not to take part in it." (Azimi in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran'', Ed, by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.95)

From Proquest Historical New York Times. New York Times article dated August 3 1953 gives more detail. ''"In Iran Plebiscite on Majlis Ouster" by Kennett Love, p.1 ''Teheran, Iran, Aug. 3 - Premier Mohammed Mossadegh won about 99.9 per cent of the votes cast today in the first phase [Tehran district] of a plebiscite to express the 'will of the people' as authority for dissolution of the Majlis. The proportion of the victory surprised few.

''The ballot was not a secret one. Separate polling places were provide for those voters favoring dissolution and those against, and the voter had to give his name, his address and the number and place of issuance of his identity card. ......  The opposition has charged the plebiscite was Premier Mossadegh's final step to a full dictatorship ....

Was it just different from the way Westerners do things?
An editor at the Mosaddeq article defended the voting on the talk page a couple years ago saying ... ''The context of the events is important. Until that time no such "Standard western type ballot" was performed in Iran (and maybe not until now!) ... That means it is not correct to judge with present western standards about a previous middle eastern referendum.''? (quoted from editor Alborz Fallah, above )

From Proquest Historical New York Times. ''"Mossadegh Voids Secret Balloting : Decrees 'Yes' and 'No' Booths for Iranian Plebiscite on Dissolution of Majlis" by Kennett Love, p.6 ''Teheran, Iran, July 28 - The institution of the secret ballot, inviolate since the Iranian Constitution adopted it in 1906, was swept aside by a Cabinet decree published today. .... ''<BR>According to the directives of the decree, each election district will have two marked polling booths, ... In addition each ballot must be clearly inscribed with the full name of the voter and the number and place of issue of his identity card. ''<BR>The legality of the plebiscite itself has been questioned. Premier Mohammad Mossadegh has said a favorable vote would be regarded as authority for the dissolution of the Majlis on the ground that the 'will of the people is above the law' despite the constitutional amendment specifically reserving to the Shah the power of dissolving Parliament. <BR>Although there is no provision in the constitution for a plebiscite such as the one proposed, the Constitution stipulates that the election of deputies must be 'direct and secret.'

From Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran
Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004

"The CIA's propaganda campaign and other destabilization activities probably played some role in turning the clergy and other elements against Mosaddeq, although Kashani, most other leading clergymen, and most Iranians in general had already chosen sides by this time. Similarly, U.S. influence may have helped discourage the Qashaq'i [tribe] from acting on Mosaddeq's behalf, although it is doubtful that they could have acted quickly enough to help him. Consequently, while these activities probably helped undermine Mosaddeq in the weeks prior to the coup, they seem mainly to have exacerbated trends that were already underway." (Gasiorowski, p.246)

Complaints and comments by foriegners on Mosaddeq's manner and behavior
From Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Stephen Kinzer, John Wiley and Sons, 2003

In July 1951 American diplomat Averell Harriman and oil expert Walter J. Levy fly to Iran to talk to Mossadegh. <BR>"Again and Again, Levy enumerated the obstacles that Mossadegh's government would face if it tried to run the Abadan refinery by itself. There were almost no Iranians trained for senior administrative and technical positions, and even if by some miracle a way could be found to keep the oil flowing. Iran had tankers to bring it to market. Loss of Anglo-Iranian's royalty payments, which in 1950 had reached nearly 10 million pounds, would destabilize Iran and possibly lead to Mossedgh's overthrow, and replacement by a Tudeh government controlled from Moscow ....

"None of these argument moved Mossadegh in the slightest. Whenever Levy paused after making what he thought was an especially trenchant point about how much Iran would suffer if it failed to reach an accord with the British, Mossadegh would roll his eyes and reply simply Tant pis pour nous (Too bad for us)." (p.104)

"To Harriman, it was a matter of practicalities, a set of technical challenges that could be resolved by rational analysis, discussion, and compromise. Mossadegh saw it from an entirely different perspective. He believed that Iran was at the sublime moment of liberation. Imbued with the Shiite ideal, he was determined to pursue justice even to the point of martyrdom. Details about refinery management or tanker capacity seemed to him laughably irrelevant at such a transcendent moment." (p.105)

Harriman reported that his July 1951 meeting with Mosaddeq "Foreign intervention, [Mosaddeq] insisted, was the root of all Iran's troubles, and 'it all started with that Greek Alexander, who had burned Persepolis twenty four centuries before. (p.104)

Criticism by author Stephen Kinzer of Mossadeq
"At several points he might have declared victory and made a deal. In the summer of 1952, for example, he was an unassailable national hero. He had been had been returned to power by a spontaneous mass uprising and had won a great victory over the British at the World Court. President Truman was on his side." (p.206)

"Another failure in Mossadegh's judgment was his inability or refusal to understand how the world looked to Western leaders. They were in a state of near-panic about the spread of communist power. Mossadegh believed that his conflict with Anglo-Iranian had nothing to do with the global confrontation between East and West. This was highly unrealistic." (p.207)
 * Self-awareness

"Mossadegh was also naive in his assessment of the communists who controlled Tudeh and were working assiduously to penetrate Iran's government, army, and civil society. ... The fact that communists had taken advantage of democratic systems in Eastern Europe to seize power and destroy democracy seemed not to affect him. His refusal to crack down on communist movements in Iran put him on Washington's death list. (p.207)
 * Communism

"Never during his 26 months in power did Mosaddeq attempt to forge the National Front into a cohesive political movement. It remained a loose coalition without central leadership or an organized political base. In the Majlis election of 1952 Mossadegh made no effort to assemble a state of candidates committed to its program. This made it highly vulnerable" to the CIA and efforts to break it apart. (p.207)
 * Disinterest in creating a united political movement/party:

From Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran
Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004

"[Mosaddeq's] clearly unconventional and visionary political modus operandi was not easily intelligible to his foreign and domestic detractors; hence the barrage of invective deployed by among other, the British ambassador, Shepherd, and occasionally his American counterpart, Henderson, denouncing Mosaddeq's alleged irrationality, lunacy, absurdity, and so on." (Azimi, p.100) [Azimi, of course, did not agree with this view of Mosaddeq]

"George Middleton, the British charge d'affaires, ... concluded that Mosaddeq's 'megalomania is now verging on mental instability. (Azimi, p.75) According to George Middleton " '[Mosaddeq's] strength lies in his powers of demagogy', Middleton wrote in his report to the Foreign Office, 'and he has so flattered the mob as the source of this power that he has, I fear, made it impossible for a successor to oust him by normal constitutional methods.' ... 'Mosaddeq appears to be beyond reasonable thought and to swayed entirely by emotion. (Louis, p.149-50)

UK Foreign secretary Anthony Eden had studied Persian at Oxford and ... "had been to Iran and had seen the oil fields. ...Behind the Caricature of Mosaddeq as a buffoon in pajamas negotiating from an Iron bedstead, Eden saw a shifty operator who was impervious to reason because of his antipathy to the British." (Louis, p.154)

American Ambassador Loy Henderson. "In early January 1952 he [Henderson] had described Iran as a sick country and Mosaddeq as 'one of its most sick leaders.' By late May he had concluded that there would be no oil solution as long as Mosaddeq remained in power." (Azimi, p.81)

"In a highly tendentious dispatch of March 10, 1953, ... Henderson reported 'Mosaddeq [is] so much [a] creature [of] his own emotion[s], prejudices and suspicion, that attempts to analyze motives [of] his various actions in [the] light [of] ordinary rules [of] logic or [on the] basis of reason might we lead one astray." (Azimi, p.82)

"After 30 Tir, [US] Ambassador Loy Henderson became progressively more pessimistic about Mosaddeq, even questioning his mental stability. Other advisers shared his pessimism and pressed for more drastic action." (Byrne, p.222)

Vernon A Walters report of Mosaddeq's view of the British: " 'You do not know how crafty they are. You do not know how evil they are. You do not know how they sully everything they touch.' [source: Vernon A Walters, Silent Missions (Garden City, NY; Doubleday, 1978) p.247] <BR>Melodramatic or not, Mosaddeq thus expressed a deeply felt sentiment, although he meant it collectively and not individually." (Louis, p.130)

"A few British "sympathized with his aspirations as an Iranian patriot and in any event believed it to be unethical to intervene in the affairs of other nations by covert means, at least in normal times. A good example is (Sir) Sam Falle, later high commissioner in Singapore and then Nigeria. In 1949-52 Falle was a young foreign service officer in Iran. 'In the Foreign Service I was known as 'Red Sam', because I believed in liberal causes, resurgent nationalism and the like .... Thus Dr. Mosaddeq was initially a man after may own heart. ... So the fact that even I eventually became convinced that he had to go says something.' It was the circumstances of the cold war that brought even well-wishers such as Falle around to the view that Mosaddeq must be toppled." (Louis, p.129) --BoogaLouie (talk) 00:33, 5 February 2010 (UTC)

i.e. How much power did the Shah have?
It's complicated:

From Iran and the CIA
Iran and the CIA, the Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited by Darioush Bayandor, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010

<P>When [Mosaddegh] presented his new cabinet to the Shah in mid-July, Mosaddeq had proposed himself as Minister of War, a move intended to supplant the Shah's control over the Army. The deep-seated discord on the interpretation of the constitution had burst onto the surface. <P>The constitution in effect accorded supreme command of the armed forces to the Shah, as indeed also the prerogative to appoint or dismiss minsters. For Mosaddeq, those titles and prerogatives were <I>nominal</I> as the Shah's functions ceremonial in nature. This interpretation rested on an article of the constitution according to which ministers, irrespective of the Shah's orders, were accountable to parliament. The constitution had indeed exonerated the Shah of any <I>accountability,</I> a provision that led to a degree of semantic confusion. Many confused the term 'accountability' with <I>responsibility</I> for which the same word, namely <I>mas'ouliat'</I> is used in the Persian language. The Shah's supporters argued that non-accountability arose from the monarch's exalted above-the-fray status and should not deprive him from exercising his constitutional prerogatives. This did not resonate well with liberals, who believed that authority goes with accountability. Nor was the jurisprudence on the Shah's authority strictly uniform. IN 1924, the Majles had passed legislation to give the title of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces to Reza Khan, then prime minister. ON the other hand, during the long interregnum between he thried and the fourth legislative periods of the Majles, coinciding mainly with the First World War, Ahmad Shah - or his regent on his behalf - had appointed and dismissed 11 prime ministers in 14 cabinet reshuffles thus establishing ample precedence for the Shah to exercise the contested authority at least during parliamentary interregna." (p.54-5)