User:BlueHoosier1/peerreview

= My edits are in parentheses and italics and can be found in the middle and end of paragraphs. = From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

< User:Petitepommerouge
Jump to navigationJump to search

Normal science, identified and elaborated on by Thomas Samuel Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, is the regular work of scientists theorizing, observing, and experimenting within a settled paradigm or explanatory framework. Regarding science as puzzle-solving, Kuhn explained normal science as slowly accumulating detail in accord with established broad theory, without questioning or challenging the underlying assumptions of that theory.

'''According to Kuhn, normal science encompasses three classes of scientific problems. The first class of scientific problems is the determination of significant fact, such as the position and magnitude of stars in different galaxies. When astronomers use special telescopes to verify Copernican predictions, they engage the second class: the matching of facts with theory. Improving the value of the gravitational constant is an example of articulating a theory, which is the third class of scientific problems' (BlueHoosier1 edit: I think this paragraph is really well done but would fit better under the section "Normal science at work." The astronomy example is very useful to explain the concept, but I think the use of an example makes the paragraph a more apt body paragraph rather than an introductory paragraph.)''

Contents

 * 1The route to normal science
 * 2Normal science at work
 * 3The breakdown of consensus
 * 4Criticism

The route to normal science[edit]
Kuhn stressed that historically, the route to normal science could be a difficult one. Prior to the formation of a shared paradigm or research consensus, would-be scientists were reduced to the accumulation of random facts and unverified observations, in the manner recorded by Pliny the Elder or Francis Bacon, while simultaneously beginning the foundations of their field from scratch through a plethora of competing theories.

Arguably at least the social sciences remain at such a pre-paradigmatic level today.

Normal science at work[edit]
Kuhn considered that the bulk of scientific work was that done by the 'normal' scientist, as they engaged with the threefold tasks of articulating the paradigm, precisely evaluating key paradigmatic facts, and testing those new points at which the theoretical paradigm is open to empirical appraisal.

'''Paradigms are central to Kuhn's conception of normal science. Scientists derive rules from paradigms, which also guide research by providing a framework for action that encompasses all the values, techniques, and theories shared by the members of a scientific community. Paradigms gain recognition from more successfully solving acute problems than their competitors. Normal science aims to improve the match between a paradigm's predictions and the facts of interest to a paradigm. It does not aim to discover new phenomena.' (BlueHoosier1 edit: This paragraph is great!)''

The breakdown of consensus[edit]
For the normal scientist anomalies represent challenges to be puzzled out and solved within the paradigm. Only if an anomaly or series of anomalies resists successful deciphering long enough and for enough members of the scientific community will the paradigm itself gradually come under challenge, and perhaps be subjected to a paradigm shift.

In this way however, according to Kuhn, normal science possesses a built-in mechanism that ensures the relaxation of the restrictions that previously bound research, whenever the paradigm from which they derive ceases to function effectively.

All scientific concepts are assumed to be accurate within the prevailing paradigm (BlueHoosier1 edit: This sentence overall doesn't make sense to me. Could you clarify what you mean by "scientific concepts?" Are these "theories within a paradigm" or something else?)'''. Kuhn only leaves room for the falsification of concepts during crises of normal science, at the time when scientific discovery takes place. Kuhn lays out the steps of scientific discovery (BlueHoosier edit: Scientific discovery or paradigm shift? Or scientific discovery at the time of paradigm shift?): first, one must become aware of an anomaly in nature that the prevailing paradigm cannot explain. Then, one must conduct an extended exploration of this anomaly. The crisis only ends when one discards the old paradigm and successfully maps the original anomaly onto a new paradigm, embracing a new set of expectations and theories that govern the work of normal science (BlueHoosier1 edit: I believe this is a dangling participle phrase). Kuhn calls such discoveries scientific revolutions. Successive paradigms replace each other and are necessarily incompatible with each other.'''

Criticism[edit]
Karl Popper has criticised Kuhn's view of normal science as excessively conservative and dogmatic—though whether Kuhn is prescriptive or merely descriptive here is open to doubt. Popper, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Toulmin and Watkins have also questioned whether the contrast between normal science versus revolutionary science is as stark as portrayed by Kuhn.

'''Kuhn's normal science is characterized by upheaval over cycles of normal science and scientific revolution, as opposed to cumulative improvement. In Kuhn's historicism, moving from one paradigm to the next completely changes the universe of scientific assumptions. Since Kuhn accepts multiple conceptions of the world under different paradigms, his position may result in the controversial position of moral relativism. (BlueHoosier1 edit: Who stated this criticism? Without citing the originator of the criticism, it appears as if it is your own. Also, could you better explain how this theory in the philosophy of science is related to moral theory?) Kuhn blurs the demarcation between science and non-science because unlike Popper's deductive method of falsification, scientific discoveries that do not fit the established paradigm do not immediately falsify the paradigm. They are treated as anomalies within the paradigm that warrant further research, until a scientific revolution refutes the entire paradigm.' (BlueHoosier1 edit: Could you more explicitly connect the last two sentences of your paragraph with the claim that Kuhn's theory of paradigm shifts results in moral relativism?)''

'''Lakatos provides an alternative framework of scientific inquiry. His model of the research programme preserves cumulative progress in science where Kuhn's model of successive irreconcilable paradigms in normal science does not. Lakatos' basic unit of analysis not a singular theory or paradigm (BlueHoosier1 edit: I think you're missing a verb.), but rather the entire research programme that contains the relevant series of testable theories. Each theory within a research programme has the same common assumptions and is supposed by a belt of more modest auxiliary hypotheses that serve to explain away potential threats to the theory's core assumptions. Lakatos evaluates problem shifts, changes to auxiliary hypotheses, by their ability to produce new facts, better predictions, or additional explanations. Lakatos' conception of a scientific revolution involves the replacement of degenerative research programmes by progressive research programmes. Rival programmes persist as minority views.' (BlueHoosier1: Other than the problem with the verb in sentence three, this paragraph is very well done!)''

(Also, don't forget to include the full citations below before moving your additions to the new article.)


 * 1) J. Childers/G. Hentzi eds., The Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literary and Cultural Criticism (1995) p. 110
 * 2) ^ Childers, p. 84
 * 3) ^ T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970) p. 35-42
 * 4) ^ Kuhn, p. 10-22
 * 5) ^ A. Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science (2005) p. 149
 * 6) ^ Kuhn, p. 25-8
 * 7) ^ Kuhn, p. 23
 * 8) ^ Kuhn, p. 42
 * 9) ^ Kuhn, p. 24
 * 10) ^ Kuhn, p. 52-78
 * 11) ^ Kuhn, p. 181
 * 12) ^ Kuhn, p. 24
 * 13) ^ Kuhn, p. 53
 * 14) ^ Kuhn, p. 92
 * 15) ^ Kuhn, p. 103
 * 16) ^ R. J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (2011) p. 69-70
 * 17) ^
 * 1) ^