User:Bob K31416/M-O

Linguistic frameworks
According to Rudolf Carnap, to discuss a kind of entity requires relevant terms which are part of a linguistic framework that includes rules for the use of the terms. In this framework, questions regarding the existence of these kinds of entities are called internal questions. Two examples of terms for kinds of entities are 'paper' and 'desk' in the linguistic framework of 'everyday language'. An internal question in this framework could be, “Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?” The answer can be found by the empirical method of looking at the desk. Another example is the linguistic framework of 'natural numbers' and an internal question could be, “Is there a prime number greater than 100?” The answer here can be found by a logical method. Linguistic frameworks are either factual or logical, depending on whether the answers to internal questions can be found using empirical or logical methods.

Existence questions that are not asked inside a linguistic framework are called by Carnap 'external questions'. These are questions asked by philosophers and tend to be general in nature, such as "Do numbers exist?" or "Do material objects exist?" These general questions could be asked as internal questions, but then the answer would be obvious in the relevant framework. For the two example questions, the answers found within the framework of everyday language would be trivially  "yes, numbers exist" and "yes, material objects exist". However, when a general existence question, like the two example questions, is asked and discussed by philosophers as an external question, there are lengthy  arguments that don't result in any generally agreed upon answer. According to Carnap, external questions should be reinterpreted as practical questions about whether or not to accept the relevant linguistic framework, or philosopher's could construct one. In any case, there is no better understanding of the reality of the related kinds of entities as viewed from outside the framework.


 * ==Para 1==

Carnap famously argues that there are two “kinds of question concerning the existence or reality of entities” (1950, 206): internal questions and external questions. To be able to speak about a kind of entity at all, or inquire about its existence, we must introduce terms for the relevant entity as part of a ‘linguistic framework’. Internal questions Carnap initially characterizes as “questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind [asked] within the framework”; they include questions (asked within the framework of everyday language) such as “Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?” (1950, 207), or (asked within the framework of natural numbers) “Is there a prime number greater than 100?” (1950, 208-9). The answers to internal existence questions, Carnap holds, “may be found either by purely logical methods or by empirical methods, depending upon whether the framework is a logical or a factual one” (1950, 206). In either case, internal existence questions may be answered straightforwardly using standard analytic methods (here: of mathematics) or empirical methods (here: of looking). There is no special mystery here, and no special role for philosophy. These are existence questions even Hume could love.

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 * there are two “kinds of question concerning the existence or reality of entities” (1950, 206): internal questions and external questions.
 * To be able to speak about a kind of entity at all, or inquire about its existence, we must introduce terms for the relevant entity as part of a ‘linguistic framework’.
 * Internal questions are “questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind [asked] within the framework”
 * they include questions (asked within the framework of everyday language) such as “Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?” (1950, 207)
 * or (asked within the framework of natural numbers) “Is there a prime number greater than 100?” (1950, 208-9)
 * The answers to internal existence questions “may be found either by purely logical methods or by empirical methods, depending upon whether the framework is a logical or a factual one” (1950, 206).
 * internal existence questions may be answered straightforwardly using standard analytic methods (here: of mathematics) or empirical methods (here: of looking).

Re rules: from para 7,
 * Internal questions, questions asked within, or using the framework, are questions that make use of the relevant terms (property terms, number terms, material object terms) according to the rules introduced.
 * To introduce a linguistic framework, according to Carnap, requires introducing “a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules” (1950, 206).

and from para 8,
 * Once those rules for introducing the new terms are in place we can use the relevant terms in accord with those rules and straightforwardly evaluate the truth of existential sentences containing those terms.
 * Making use of those rules, we are able to evaluate the truth of ‘There is a white piece of paper on my desk’ by engaging in the usual straightforward kind of empirical checks (we look, touch, etc.)

According to Rudolf Carnap, to discuss a kind of entity requires relevant terms which are part of a linguistic framework that includes rules for the use of the terms. In this framework, questions regarding the existence of these kinds of entities are called internal questions. Two examples of terms for kinds of entities are 'paper' and 'desk' in the linguistic framework of 'everyday language'. An internal question in this framework could be, “Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?” The answer can be found by the empirical method of looking at the desk. Another example is the linguistic framework of 'natural numbers' and an internal question could be, “Is there a prime number greater than 100?” The answer here can be found by a logical method. Linguistic frameworks are either factual or logical, depending on whether the answers to internal questions can be found using empirical or logical methods.


 * ==Para 2==

The metaphysician’s existence questions are generally expressed as highly general questions such as “Do numbers exist?”, “Do material objects exist?”, “Do properties exist”. But although Carnap uses specific questions as his examples of internal existence questions, that is not to say that general existence questions could not be asked—and answered—as internal questions. They certainly can be answered that way, as we can get trivial entailments from, e.g. ‘five is a number’ to ‘there are numbers’ (1950, 209). Carnap argues, however, that metaphysical questions, e.g. about the existence of numbers, can’t be intended as general internal questions, for:
 * nobody who meant the question ‘Are there numbers’ in the internal sense would either assert or even seriously consider a negative answer. This makes it plausible to assume that those philosophers who treat the question of the existence of numbers as a serious philosophical problem and offer lengthy arguments on either side, do not have in mind the internal question (1950, 209).

Thus, he concludes, the sense in which these general existence questions are raised and seriously debated by philosophers must be an external sense.


 * The metaphysician’s existence questions are generally expressed as highly general questions such as “Do numbers exist?”, “Do material objects exist?”, “Do properties exist”.
 * general existence questions could be asked—and answered—as internal questions, for example we can get trivial entailments from, e.g. ‘five is a number’ to ‘there are numbers’ (1950, 209).
 * metaphysical questions, e.g. about the existence of numbers, can’t be intended by philosophers as general internal questions since the answer would be obviously that they exist in the framework
 * Philosophers' general existence questions are not in the context of a framework, i.e. they are external to the framework


 * ==Para 3==

External questions are raised “neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by philosophers” (1950, 207). They include questions such as “are there numbers?”, or “is the thing-world real?”. Carnap argues that if we take external existence questions literally (as attempted theoretical or factual questions), they are ill-formed pseudo-questions. As a result, neither the nominalist’s nor the Platonist’s answer to the question ‘do numbers exist’, taken as an external question, should be embraced. Instead, the best we can do with them is to reinterpret them as implicitly practical questions regarding whether or not to accept the relevant linguistic framework: “we have to make the choice whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression in the framework in question” (1950, 207). Reconstrued as practical questions about the advisability of adopting a certain linguistic framework, there is here again no special philosophical or ontological insight into reality involved. Instead, the philosopher’s work lies in constructing linguistic frameworks (a kind of ‘conceptual engineering’) and making practical decisions about which to adopt for which purposes.


 * External questions are raised “neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by philosophers” (1950, 207).
 * Examples of external questions:
 * “are there numbers?”
 * “is the thing-world real?”
 * if we take external existence questions literally (as attempted theoretical or factual questions), they are ill-formed pseudo-questions.
 * the best we can do with external questions is to reinterpret them as implicitly practical questions regarding whether or not to accept the relevant linguistic framework — “we have to make the choice whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression in the framework in question” (1950, 207)
 * as practical questions about the advisability of adopting a certain linguistic framework, there is no special philosophical or ontological insight into reality involved
 * the philosopher’s work lies in constructing linguistic frameworks (a kind of ‘conceptual engineering’) and making practical decisions about which to adopt for which purposes.


 * ==Para 2–3==


 * %The metaphysician’s existence questions are generally expressed as highly general questions such as “Do numbers exist?”, “Do material objects exist?”, “Do properties exist”.
 * general existence questions could be asked—and answered—as internal questions, for example we can get trivial entailments from, e.g. ‘five is a number’ to ‘there are numbers’ (1950, 209).
 * metaphysical questions, e.g. about the existence of numbers, can’t be intended by philosophers as general internal questions since the answer would be obviously that they exist in the framework
 * %Philosophers' general existence questions are not in the context of a framework, i.e. they are external to the framework


 * %External questions are raised “neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by philosophers” (1950, 207).
 * Examples of external questions:
 * “are there numbers?”
 * “is the thing-world real?”
 * if we take external existence questions literally (as attempted theoretical or factual questions), they are ill-formed pseudo-questions.


 * the best we can do with external questions is to reinterpret them as implicitly practical questions regarding whether or not to accept the relevant linguistic framework — “we have to make the choice whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression in the framework in question” (1950, 207)
 * as practical questions about the advisability of adopting a certain linguistic framework, there is no special philosophical or ontological insight into reality involved
 * the philosopher’s work lies in constructing linguistic frameworks (a kind of ‘conceptual engineering’) and making practical decisions about which to adopt for which purposes.

Existence questions that are not asked inside a linguistic framework are called by Carnap 'external questions'. These are questions asked by philosophers and tend to be general in nature, such as "Do numbers exist?" or "Do material objects exist?" These general questions could be asked as internal questions, but then the answer would be obvious in the relevant framework. For the two example questions, the answers found within the framework of everyday language would be trivially  "yes, numbers exist" and "yes, material objects exist". However, when a general existence question, like the two example questions, is asked and discussed by philosophers as an external question, there are lengthy  arguments that don't result in any generally agreed upon answer. According to Carnap, external questions should be reinterpreted as practical questions about whether or not to accept the relevant linguistic framework, or philosopher's could construct one. In any case, there is no better understanding of the reality of the related kinds of entities as viewed from outside the framework.