User:Born2flie/Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter

__NOINDEX__ The Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program was a United States Army program to evaluate, develop and field a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) helicopter to replace the Army's aging OH-58D Kiowa Warrior.

History
On February 23, 2004, the U.S. Army announced their decision to cancel the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program. The program had cost US$6.9 billion dollars and 20 years of development without fielding a production aircraft. The cancellation was a result of a six-month Army study directed by Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker. The study recommended that by cancelling the program before the Comanche reached production, the Army could save US$14 billion dollars which could then be used to update and replace the aging airframes of the current fleet.

The OH-58D Kiowa Warrior was targeted by the study for replacement in the active service fleet, based on the age of the airframe, recent losses, and the lack of replacement airframes. The Army developed an armed reconnaissance helicopter concept that would use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology, with a goal of an operational unit of 30 helicopters and eight trainers ready by September 2008. On 9 December 2004, Army officials issued a request for proposals (RFP) for the ARH. Two companies submitted bids:


 * Boeing proposed the upgraded version of the MH-6 Little Bird, the MH-6M Mission Enhanced Little Bird (MELB). Because the aircraft was already in service with the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, it became the predictive favorite despite doubts that MD Helicopters Inc. (MDHI) could ramp up production to meet the contract's demands. To alleviate this concern, Boeing purchased the production rights for the design and served as the prime contractor.


 * Bell Helicopter Textron proposed an update of the OH-58D concept in a militarized version of the Bell 407, using a more powerful Honeywell HTS900 turbine engine and the Bell 427 tail assembly. This would allow the Army to use its existing OH-58 supply chain, a major consideration.

On 29 July 2005, Bell won a contract for 368 helicopters, with the first production vehicles to be delivered in mid 2007, and in the field by end of 2008. The first flight of the ARH-70 prototype was on 20 July 2006, at Bell's XworX facility in Arlington, Texas. On 21 February 2007, during its maiden flight, prototype #4 suffered a loss of engine power, due to fuel starvation, and made an autorotational landing at a nearby golf course. The aircraft was totaled when it rolled over during the landing, but the test pilots survived unhurt.

On 22 March 2007 the U.S. Army issued a Stop Work notice, giving Bell thirty days to come up with a plan to get the ARH program back on track. Previous estimates for the System Development Demonstration portion of the program had grown from $210 million to over $300 million. Textron, Bell's parent company, notified investors that they could lose $2-4 million on each aircraft under the contract. On 18 May 2007, the U.S. Army approved continuation of the ARH program.

On 25 July 2007, the House Appropriations Committee’s Defense panel released its 2008 Pentagon budget which zeroed out funding for ARH-70 production, but continued research and development.

In January 2008, US government officials began working on export policy to allow international sales of the ARH-70. They expect orders to total over 1000 including the US Army ordering 512.

On July 9, 2008 the Army filed a Nunn-McCurdy cost and schedule breach when new cost estimates showed a 40% cost increase above initial estimates. In August 2008, the Army requested that Bell cease hiring workers for the ARH-70 program pending the outcome of the Nunn-McCurdy review.

Cancellation
On 16 October 2008, the Army's Acquisition Executive Office for Aviation directed that the ARH contract be terminated completely for the convenience of the government. The cancellation was the result of the United States Department of Defense (DOD) not certifying the US$6.2 billion ARH-70 program to Congress. John Young, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, cited the reason as excessive costs of the program which had increased over 70 percent with an estimated per-unit cost of US$14.5 million, up from US$8.5 million.