User:Bryantbob/sandbox

OTHER BRYANTBOB PAGES ON WIKIPEDIA
 * User:Bryantbob
 * User talk:Bryantbob
 * User:Bryantbob/common.js (Setup 10/24/20 to catch abbreviated citations [e.g., "Overy 1995"] when no such source is cited in detail. See User talk:Bryantbob page entry for 10/22/20.)

WORKS IN PROGRESS:

=Projects to complete=


 * At "lists of aircrat carriers...", correct tables relating to damage, etc. and/or remove content that is included in main article; add "summary table" to sources.
 * Complete text for aircraft operations for guadalcanal and there after.
 * Add carrier lost-time damage text and tables to main aircraft carrier article and to article with lists of operational carriers.
 * Find missing references and add citations.
 * Add appropriate links to articles involving aircraft carrier battles.
 * Make corrections to other Wikipedia articles where errors were identified.
 * Add text to article re USS Card.
 * Review and edit article re lists of aircraft carrier operations.
 * Complete tables for article re design and capability of aircraft carriers.
 * New article (?) re turning points in the Pacific War.
 * New article (?) re carrier aircraft squadrons and crews.
 * New content for article re judicial "originalism".
 * Clean up sandbox, eliminating obsolete text.
 * Create table for Guadalcanal showing resupply dates, net aircraft, and men on the island for Allies and Japan. (See "Guadalcanal" tab at ARCFTCRS.

=Unfinished Work re Aircraft carrier operations during World War II=

Nimitz
[from Symonds audio, need page references] [to cite autobooks, see https://style.mla.org/citing-an-audiobook/] [see also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citing_sources#Audio_and_video_sources] 

[Audio and video sources Specify the time at which the event or other point of interest occurs. Be as precise as possible about the version of the source that you are citing; for example, movies are often released in different editions or "cuts". Due to variations between formats and playback equipment, precision may not be accurate in some cases. However, many government agencies do not publish minutes and transcripts but do post video of official meetings online; generally the subcontractors who handle audio-visual are quite precise. ]

[In-source locations

minutes: Time the event occurs in the source; followed by "minutes in". OR: time: Time the event occurs in the source; preceded by default text "Event occurs at". time-caption: Changes the default text displayed before time.]

In the first five months [?] of the war, [through the Doolittle Raid] Admiral King dominated, exercising direct command over operations in Nimitz' area of responsibility, calling the shots. In addition, subordinate Block made decisions, including some countermanding Nimitz' orders, without advising Nimitz.

Nimitz' access to and reliance upon code-breaking at Hypo put him in a position to challenge King on decisions.

Nimitz called the shots re Coral Sea and Midway. Need examples.

Citations Needed
Battle of Cape Esperance: "Admiral Kondo had a 3:2 advantage in strike aircraft over Admiral Kinkaid. In addition, Kondo's air groups contained the remainder of the 3,500 [REF?] highly prized, highly trained, and now highly experienced pilots with which Japan began the war."

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: The Allies had gained control of the air and sea around Guadalcanal, day and night.[5] [MORE REFS NEEDED]

Round 3: "Vangergrift now had 23,000 men." [this is for ~Sept 18; Toland seys 23,000 also on 13 Oct after getting 3K more from Americal Div. Check Frank; may be ok assuming casualties]

Round 3: "In addition, Kondo's air groups contained the remainder of the 3,500 [REF?] highly prized, highly trained, and now highly experienced pilots with which Japan began the war." [Maybe from WWIIdb article re Masaichi Kondō?]

RLB NOTE: THIS COMMENT APPEARED FOR Pacific War. "This article may be too long to read and navigate comfortably. The readable prose size is 110 kilobytes." FROM Article size: "Articles of more than 200 kB (~30 pages) exist for topics that require depth and detail, but typically articles of such size get split into two or more sub-articles" Total bryantbob sandbox size (using https://xtools.wmflabs.org/articleinfo) as of 8/31/19 is 472kB. Plan to split out lengthy tables and, if necessary, split Atlantic from Pacific.

Aircraft carrier operations to be explored further

 * Operation EF (1941) involving HMS Victorious and Furious attacks on merchant vessels in the northern Norwegian port of Kirkenes and the north Finnish port of Liinakhamari in Petsamo.

Turning points
Unlike World War I, during which it was unclear, for most of the conflict, which side would "win", World War II was characterized by Axis powers dominating the early years with the Allies dominating the later years. By late 1942, there was little doubt over the ultimate outcome.

In addition to the better known turning points such as Coral Sea, Midway, El Alamein, Stalingrad, and Guadalcanal, there were other first-time events that prevented further Axis expansion and helped enable the Allies to take the strategic initiative.


 * Aug 1939 Soviet Japanese War (Russians stop IJA in Manchuria and tied down IJA divisions for rest of war)
 * Oct 1939 Changsha (after Chinese victories in Changsha and Guangxi, and with Japan's lines of communications stretched deep into the Chinese interior, the war reached a stalemate... (tied down IJA divisions for war) Changsha was the first major city to successfully repel Japanese advances. Retaining the city allowed the Nationalist Chinese forces to prevent the Japanese from consolidating their territories in Southern China.)
 * Nov 1941 Battle of Gondar (UK victory over Italians in Africa, the East African campaign was the first Allied victory of World War II)
 * Dec 1941 Moscow (beginning of Russian counter-offensive)
 * May 1942 Coral Sea
 * June 1942 Midway
 * Sept 1942 Milne Bay (defeated Japanese land forces, forced them to withdraw completely and abandon their strategic objective for first time)
 * Sept 1942 Kokoda Track, New Guinea (Australians; most force in North Africa? Dissed by McCarthur))
 * Nov 1942 El Alamein (stopped German advance in North Africa)
 * Nov 1942 Stalingrad (initiation of Russian counter offensive, Operation Uranus)
 * Nov 1942 Guadalcanal
 * May 1943 Battle of the Atlantic

Air warfare of World War II

Questions and Citations needed; sources to check out TEMP
Information To Add/Correct


 * After two years of near stalemate, 100,000 Japanese attacked Changsha in search of a decisive victory. After suffering a 40% casualty rate, the Japanese withdrew in the first week of Oct 1939, resulting in the first major defeat in the war for the Japanese Army. ( https://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=179)


 * [footnote D, main article re Langley] "Includes USS Langley, the first US aircraft carrier, that was reclassified as a seaplane tender before World War II began. She was used during the early months of the war to conduct anti-submarine patrols and ferry aircraft, just as an escort carrier would do. Because she still had a flight deck and could still transport, launch, and retrieve aircraft, Langley is included here as an escort carrier rather than a seaplane tender."

Question is, could Langley retrieve aircraft at sea without cranes, etc.?

Check tables:

[VALUES FOR AMERICAN AND BRITISH FLEET & LIGHT CARRIERS CHECKED 2/10/20 AND RECONCILED WITH SPREADSHEET VALUES SAME DAY BUT ONLY FOR DEC '41 AND MAY-DEC '42. NEED TO CHECK VALUES FOR OTHER DATES AGAINST THE SPREADSHEET.
 * "Number of aircraft carriers operational each month"

Questions:

When during the Solomon/Admiralty Islands campaign did Halsey's commander change from Nimitz to MacCarther?

Why was there so much time between commissioning and coming to the Pacific for the Essex through Belleau Wood???

Citations needed:


 * "Significant strategic offensive decisions by Axis leaders proved unsound, creating opportunities that the Allies. [EXAMPLES IN FOOTNOTE OR REF] " (at AC contribution to war)


 * "torpedoes with magnetic pistol detonators that sometimes exploded prematurely or not at all. [NEED REF HERE] (at "Early German Successes")


 * "Germany had broken Britain's naval code, giving them great intelligence about convoy movements that lasted until August 1940.[62][63] [? Again in May 1943, a British change of ciphers "at last defeated the highly skilled German cryptographers."[64]]" (at "Early German Successes")


 * "cruiser Admiral Hipper. Carrier aircraft was mostly crated and the carriers initially unready for offensive action. The raider withdrew rather than engage with the escorting destroyers. By the time carrier aircraft was ready to attack, the raider could not be located. [REFERENCE? TRY ROSKILL.] " (at "Early German Successes")


 * After Germany attacked Russia in June, Furious accompanied convoys there [?], making an unsucessfull raid on Petsamo, Finland [?] as HMS Victorious raided Kirkenes, Norway. [?] " (at "Early German Successes")


 * Citation for when 4 CAMs were retired from service (at "CVE development)


 * " Commencement Bay-class. They were fast and carried 34 operational aircraft. Nineteen of these carriers were commissioned beginning in November 1944 but only a few saw combat during the war.[90]" DID ANY SEE COMBAT?  (at "CVE development)


 * "during June through August in all waters of the Atlantic and Pacific theaters excluding the Mediterranean, U-boats sank about 58 Allied merchant ships but lost 74 U-boats in return.[134] [CHECK THIS U-BOAT LOSS FIGURE.] " (at The Turning Point)

"They also had 46 escort carriers of which 32 were operational. [FROM SPREADSHEET] "
 * Allied invasion of Northern France st Normandy/Operation Overlord (June 1944)

Task Force 88 (United States Navy) for DRAGOON see ship list.
 * Allied invasion of Southern France/Operation DRAGOON (August 1944)


 * Guadalcanal round 3: " [use FRank? Frank, pp. 315–320;]  Replacement aircraft and fuel was quickly supplied from Espiritu Santo.  [BY WHEN HOW?  FLOWN FROM THERE OR DELIVERED BY CARRIER?]


 * "Carriers available for amphibious invasions"; need reference for number of British Pacific Fleet carriers.

Sources to checkout:


 * http://www.uscarriers.net/ US carrier histories

Finished Tables
LIST OF ARTICLES IN SERIES- KEEP FOR NOW

See also other articles in this series:
 * Atlantic Theater aircraft carrier operations during World War II
 * Pacific Theater aircraft carrier operations during World War II
 * Carrier aircraft used during World War II
 * Design and capability of aircraft carriers during World War II
 * Lists of aircraft carriers operational during World War II
 * Lists of aircraft carrier operations during World War II

TABLES IN "LISTS OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS..." THAT NEED IMPROVED SOURCING INFORMATION

They currently include principal sources as: "Ship histories for aircraft carriers that were operational during the war are available at:"
 * 1) Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
 * 2) Imperial Japanese Navy Page
 * 3) Naval War In The Pacific 1941–1945
 * 4) Royal and Dominion Navy Warships
 * 5) World War II Database

(Tables in main article that list only "Lists of Aircraft Carriers..." as sources:]
 * Aircraft carriers (CVs, CVLs, CVEs, MACs) operated during World War II (source to ww2db article "Aircraft Carrier Contributions To Allied Victory In World War II")
 * Attrition of fleet and light aircraft carriers, 31 August 1939 – 31 October 1942 (source to ww2db article "Aircraft Carrier Contributions To Allied Victory In World War II")
 * Commissioning of aircraft carriers, March 1918 – August 1945

(May want to reorganize section on "Aircraft carriers sunk?)
 * Aircraft carriers sunk-Fleet and Light Carriers.
 * Aircraft carriers sunk-Escort Carriers
 * Aircraft Carriers Sunk.-Aircraft Carriers Sunk.
 * Aircraft Carriers Sunk.-Aircraft Carriers Sunk- Japanese CVEs
 * Aircraft Carriers Sunk.-forty-one aircraft carriers sunk
 * Aircraft Carriers Sunk.-how each combatant's carriers were sunk.

(May want to update WW2db tables first)
 * Carrier non-operational time due to combat-related damage
 * causes of carriers becoming non-operational due to combat-related damage and sinkings.
 * Carrier non-operational time due to overhauls and refittings

{need to refine this for WW2db to include CVEs first)
 * Carriers operational at the end of each month

OLD SOURCE INFORMATION. KEEP FOR NOW.

Principal Sources:
 * 1) World War II Database
 * 2) The Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
 * 3) Royal and Dominion Navy Warships
 * 4) Imperial Japanese Navy Page
 * 5) Naval War In The Pacific, 1941-1945

See also information at Lists of aircraft carriers operational during World War II. Principal Sources:
 * 1) The Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
 * 2) Royal and Dominion Navy Warships
 * 3) Imperial Japanese Navy Page
 * 4) Naval War In The Pacific, 1941–1945

WW2DB MAIN ARTICLE- Source: World War II Database

Source: World War II Database

Detailed information is available at Lists of aircraft carriers operational during World War II.

1. Source info for Percentage of time operational:

Source: World War II Database

Detailed information for each carrier is available for US

, UK,

and Japanese carriers

.

2. Source info for Status- Carriers operational at the end of each month:


 * Source: World War II Database. Detailed information for monthly operational status of each carrier is available for US, UK, and Japanese carriers.

3. Source info for Carrier functions:


 * Source: World War II Database. Detailed information for each carrier is available for US, UK, and Japanese carriers.

REFERENCE TEMPLATES

Other Tables
Ascendancy of aircraft carriers Functions performed by aircraft carriers Aircraft carrier contribution To Allied Victory Number of aircraft carriers operational each month of the war Etc.
 * Number by Country of Each Aircraft Carrier Type Operated And Sunk During World War II
 * Percentage of Each Combatant's Aircraft Carriers Performing Each Function
 * Production of Each Combatant's Aircraft Carriers from September 1939 to August 1945
 * Aircraft Carriers (CVs, CVLs, CVEs, MACs) Operated During World War II
 * Commissioning by Country of Aircraft Carriers from March 1918 to August 1945
 * Causes of damage for each combatant"s aircraft carriers during the war
 * Number of Aircraft Carriers Sunk During World War II
 * Percent of time Aircraft Carriers Were Operational
 * Number Of Aircraft Carriers In Service At The End Of Each Month

Additional sources and links to explore
Battle of the Atlantic TEMP links- work into text as wiki links or citations or delete


 * Operation Trutz I
 * Hunter-Killer Groups
 * ASW part III


 * [List of German U-boat World War II raiding careers U-boat histories incl how sunk]
 * u-boat.net count of subs sunk
 * list of subs sunk by year and cause
 * 1,162 built, 632 sunk at sea, 246 by surface ships and 245 by land-based(/) aircraft
 * summary of german submarine offensive in the atlantic
 * subs sunk by patrol aircraft wwii
 * German U-Boat Casualties in World War Two]
 * Convoy battles of World War II
 * Losses during the Battle of the Atlantic
 * Mid-Ocean Escort Force

Carrier air squadrons and crews
[TAKEN LIVE AND REMOVED. KEEP FOR NOW] Naval air crews served from both land bases and warships. Individuals and squadrons were deployed as needed and were frequently moved from ship to ship and base to base. Many pilots flew more than one model of aircraft. As examples, Masaichi Kondō served in the Imperial Japanese Navy from 1935 to 1944, flying with four different carrier-based and two different land-based air groups (kokutai) in China and in the South Pacific. When hostilities broke out, he was flying the newly introduced biplane fighter Nakajima A4N. Later he piloted Mitsubishi A5M "Claude" and A6M "Zeke" aka "Zero" monoplane fighters. Eugene Lindsey, a 1927 graduate of the US Naval Academy, served on the USS Saratoga, Lexington, and Enterprise, all before World War II broke out. He died with most of his USS Enterprise-based VT-6 squadron of Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers leading it to attack IJN carrier Kaga during the Battle of Midway. Stan Laurie served with the British Royal Navy from 1939 to 1945 in five different air squadrons flying from nine different ships and airfields. He saw action in the Mediterranean, Red, and Arabian Seas as well as in the Atlantic, Arctic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. Stan flew Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers and Supermarine Walrus reconnaissance aircraft. Both were biplanes that served throughout the war.

Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, British and American aviation experts grossly underestimated the quality of Japanese pilots, regarding them as laughably inept. A British newspaper opined that the Japanese lacked a sense of balance necessary to be good fliers because they were carried on their mother's backs as children. These delusions came to an abrupt end as Japanese airmen in carrier-launched and land-based bombers flying over unexpectedly long distances effectively wiped out Allied air power throughout most of the Pacific theater during the opening weeks of the war.

"I remember a British national newspaper ran a story in which the opinion was expressed that the Japanese would never be good fliers because they had no sense of balance through being carried on the backs of their mothers as children." (Quote at about 41 minutes into the 56 minute episode #6)

"Like the Americans at Pearl Harbor, the British at Malaya had been wrongly led to believe that the Japanese Air Force was poor. But now British air cover waned and eventually disappeared. (Quote at about 45 minutes into the 56 minute episode #6)

Principal sources for this article and five related articles


=Pacific Theater Carrier Operations= [MUCH BUT NOT ALL OF THIS SECTION WAS TRANSFERRED TO A NEW ARTICLE 9/29/20 DELETED FROM SANDBOX 12/19/20]

Commanders- Nimitz
MORE ON HIS CONRIBUTION:

Symonds credits him with thaking the big gamble at Midway.

Submarines Underway refuelings

For Coral Sea, "stop the enemy" (Morison p. 142) For Midway, employ "strong attrition tactics" and "calculated risk" (Toland, "Rising Sun" p. 327)

Commanders- Halsey & Spruance
Halsey got into details while Spruance deligated, per Toll Morison also noted that Halsey bypassed Mitscher at Leyte, making the latter "little more than a passenger in his own task force." (XII p.175) "little better than a passenger" (XII p. 196)

NOTES, ETC.
[TEMP for the main article section re construction of carriers]

[Essex laid down in April 1941]

Construction of carriers took time, even under the pressure of extreme necessity. The USS Hornet was commissioned in October 1941 as part of President Roosevelt's prescient effort to begin building a two-ocean navy. Hornet was commissioned in time to serve in the Pacific Theater during the formative period of 1942 when the strategic initiative shifted from Japan to the Allies. The next US fleet carrier, the USS Essex, had been laid down in April 1941 and 20 months later commissioned December 1942, a year after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Japanese carrier construction took even longer.

Even after war broke out and it became apparent that aircraft carriers were likely to be the new capital ships around which fleets would be organized, it was not until that a new fleet carrier, the Essex, was commissioned. She was laid down in April 1941, but not commissioned until

Table showing buildup of Allied & Axis troops and allied aircraft; table showing loss of planes during Guadalcanal campaign.[?]

Maybe a section titledA"ttrition of Experienced Japanese Aircrews (1942)." The strong cadre of skilled, experienced Japanese aircrews...

Table showing aircrew losses since the battle of the Coral Sea?

[more from Roskill, chapter XIII but start with Toland and Morison, etc.]

The Guadalcanal Campaign (Aug 1942 - Feb 1943)
[see online article for campaign through "Round 3"]

[more info for Battle of Santa Cruz Islands]
Hornet and the newly repaired Enterprise,

[on 10/26, near the battle's end, three radar-equipped PBYs armed with bombs and torpedoes attack Zuikaku and Junyo per CombinedFleet-Zuikaku] INCLUDE INFO FROM COMBINED FLEET FOR ALL IJN CARRIERS.]

MORE FOR OVERVIEW


By comparison, the Allies landed 19,000 Marines during the initial invasion of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Gavutu and

Reinforcing, Supplying, and Ground Fighting- Round 4, Adm. Tanaka (Oct-Nov 1942)
DRAFT #1

Efforts to reinforce and resupply. Neither the IJN nor IJA were yet willing to give up on retaking Guadalcanal. The race between Japan and the Allies to reinforce and supply their forces continued, and both sides sent substantial naval forces to disrupt the other's efforts in early November. American transports disembarked 6,000 troops but, with Admiral Kondo's battleships approaching, departed early with two thirds of the artillery, howitzers, ammunition, and rations still in their holds. Similarly, Admiral Raizō Tanaka was delayed in his destroyer squadron's mission of delivering troops and supplies by aircraft attacks. During November 14, as large fleets maneuvered for the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Tanaka's transport group was attacked on six different occasions by a total of over 100 B-17s, torpedo bombers, dive bombers, and fighters. He persisted but, of 12,000 troops and 10,000 tons of supplies, he delivered only 4,000 shocked troops and about five tons of supplies. The Allies had gained control of the air and sea around Guadalcanal, day and night. [MORE REFS NEEDED]

DRAFT #2

Efforts to reinforce and resupply. Believing that the fighting in the Solomons had become the decisive battle with the Allies, neither the IJN nor IJA were yet willing to give up on retaking Guadalcanal. The IJA made additional plans to reinforce and resupply its forces on the island and to eliminate the threat to resupply vessels from Allied planes based at Henderson Field by bombarding it using naval gunships and by bombing and straffing runs. Allied warships were expected to challenge such bombardment and present yet another possibility for the sought-after decisive naval battle. [REF]

By this time, the Japanese had made a total of seven attempts, with widely varying success, to land troops and supplies on Guadalcanal. They were to made another eight attempts.

The wily and aggressive Admiral Raizō Tanaka commanded the 2nd Destroyer Squadron (Desron 2) that was the core of Japan's Reinforcement Group. He was experienced with supporting invasions, having done so for the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, and the failed attempt at Midway. Tanaka was involved in almost all of the supply efforts for Guadalcanal and was typically with the transporting ships.

The resultant caused Allied transports to leave   or to completely abandon delivery of troops and supplies

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

lead to additional naval actions. Admiral Tenaka's 11-ship destroyer squadron accompanied 11 transports carrying 13,000 men

Allied control of the air, made possible principally by delivery of aircraft to Henderson Field by carriers,

R. Tanaka destroyer-escorted convoys, etc., during Guadalcanal Campaign (page numbers for Frank)


 * 1:
 * Delivered Ichiki Detachment 18-19 Aug (146-47, 157)


 * 2:
 * Battle of Eastern Solomons [TANAKA MENTIONED ABOVE BOMBARDING BUT NOT LANDING TROOPS]
 * 3:


 * [TANAKA ARGUMENT WITH KAWAGUCHI MENTIONED ABOVE]


 * 4:
 * Transported more Ichiki for Kawaguchi for Round #2 30 Aug (202)
 * "Relinquished command of the Reinforcement Unit" 31 Aug (205)


 * 5:
 * Escorted Kurita battleships Kongo and Haruna for bombardment of Henderson field 10 Oct (316) "one of the most concentrated shellings in history"


 * 6:
 * Tanaka escorted bombardment unit with heavy cruisers Myoko and Maya 15-16 Oct (325) "with Admiral Tanaka's every-ready destroyer squadron"


 * 7:
 * Battle of The Santa Cruz Islands 26 Oct (378, )


 * 1) ? Battle of Tassafaronga (517-18) "Tanaka ordered the supply landing plans abandoned and all ships to Attack "None of the supplies carried by the Reinforcement Unit reached the 1th Arm on Guadalcanal."

DRAFT #3

Efforts to reinforce and resupply. Neither the IJN nor IJA were yet willing to give up on retaking Guadalcanal. The race between Japan and the Allies to reinforce and supply their forces continued.

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (12-15 Nov, 1942)

"The first battleship night action of the war"

Battle of Rennell Island] (29-30 Jan 1943

Battle of Tassafaronga a Japanese victory on 30 Nov, but Japanese unable to freely supply Guadalcanal.

Japanese Withdrawal from Guadalcanal (29 January 1942 - 8 February 1943)
Operation KE - Evacuation of Guadalcanal: Departed Truk for Ontong Java Island area north of Guadalcanal with carriers ZUIHO, JUNYO to cover withdrawl of ground forces. Returned to Truk. On 29 January, ZUIKAKU, ZUIHO, detached 36 fighter Advance Group to Rabaul to cover evacuation. Returned to Truk. 

NOTES: y'blood pp 18

Last gasp for IJN before they evacuated Guadalcanal between February 2 and February 7 1943.

23 January 1943: Arrive at Truk. 29 January 1943: Assigned to Forward Force Air Force, for Operation "KE", the evacuation of Guadalcanal. 31 January 1943 to 9 February 1943: Depart Truk for operations in support "KE" operations. 9 February 1943: Return to Truk. Assigned to Striking Force Main Unit. Remain at Truk through April. 

Battle of Rennell Island (29-30 January, 1943)

Carrier Enterprise Alone (27 Oct 1942 - ? Jan 1943)
[when did first Essex class carriers arrive in Pacific war zone?]

Advances in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands (March 1943 - March 1944)
[aircraft from Japanese carriers transferred to land bases for defense of Solomons, etc. 11 February 1943: A segment of air group is flow into Buin. 15 February: A section of air group is detached to Kavieng. 1 April 1943: ZUIKAKU and ZUIHO ordered by cinC Yamamoto to perform "Operation I-GO" the reinforcement of Rabaul, by delivering aircraft to reinforce the 11th Air Fleet at Rabaul. 2 April: Fighter and dive-bomber squadrons are detached to Rabaul and Buin, while the torpedo-bomber squadron is detached to Kavieng and Rabaul. 


 * https://www.wearethemighty.com/mighty-tactical/british-aircraft-carrier-us-navy/ This British aircraft carrier served in the US Navy during WWII

With the Guadalcanal reasonably secure, the Allies, mostly Australians, New Zealanders, and Americans, continued with a simultaneous push up the Solomon Islands and the coast of New Guinea. This Operation "Cartwheel" was intended to neutralize the Japanese strong position at Rabaul and was under the overall command of General Douglas MacArthur. Although Halsey officially reported to Nimitz, he operated under MacArthur's direction when in the Southwest Pacific Area. Both were aggressive commanders. Notwithstanding the overall Allied policy of "Germany-first," the Allies were on a determined offensive campaign in the Pacific.

Air superiority continued to be essential. A Japanese effort in early March to reinforce troops at Lae in Northern New Guinea without air support failed with enormous losses at the Battle of the Bismark Sea. In early April, Yamamoto initiated Operation I-Go intended to slow up Allied advances using the 350 aircraft available to him. The operation was opposed by fighters from Henderson Field and succeeded in sinking only three warships, a couple of transports, and downing 25 aircraft. Although Yamamoto's attacks had been made from land bases, many carrier aircraft and specially trained, increasingly scarse carrier pilots were used. Fifty-five aircraft were lost, extending the steady attrition of planes and pilots of the Guadalcanal Campaign. Yamamoto now recognized that such raids would not stop the Allied drive. He accepted the IJA's strategy of vigorously defending outposts to make Allied successes so costly that they would be more inclined to negotiate a peace. As Yamamoto flew to Bougainville to inspire the troops at this outpost, he was killed as his plane was ambushed by fighter aircraft from Henderson Field, who were guided by Allied code breakers that had learned exactly where and when Yamamoto would arrive. Admiral Mineichi Koga became commander of IJN Combined Fleet.

In late January 1943, Saratoga [now part of TF-14] delivered aircraft to Henderson Field on Guadalcanal and raided the airstrip at Vila near Kolombangara in the central Solomon Islands. In May, she was joined by the British fleet carrier HMS Victorious in the US Third Fleet to support the Solomons operation. The two carriers trained together with the expectation of participating in the invasion of New Georgia. With both Japanese and the Allies' navies weakened by recent battles, no major carrier confrontations were initiated before Victoriousreturned to the Home Fleet in August.

In July, the drive up the Solomons began with the Operation "Toenails", the invasion of New Georgia at Munda Point. It was followed by a series of additional invasions, each following a similar pattern. First the Allies would land at a place where they faced minimal initial opposition, followed quickly by Japanese air strikes. This in turn was followed up with an assault by IJN surface forces with their highly effective Long Lance torpedoes which, at the time, were the most effective ship-killing weapons of the war. the IJN would then be met with a US surface force using radar-controlled guns, which provided a decided advantage over the night optics equipment in use by the IJN.

Taking Munda Point was costly. The 5,000 Japanese defenders inflicted heavy casualties on the 33,000 Allied invaders. This was consistent with the Japanese "New Operation Policy" calling for defending strong points to the death to wear the Allies down. With many such strong points ahead, Halsey, Nimitz, and MacArthur adopted the approach (probably initially proposed by Halsey's deputy commander, Addmiral Wilkinson) of "leap-frogging" past them, cutting them off, and letting them wither on the vine. Historian Craig Symonds regards this as among the most important strategic decisions of the Pacific War. As a result, Kolombangara, large parts of Bougainville, and even Rabaul were bypassed, saving many lives. Leap-frogging past Lae on New Guinea resulted in Japanese evacuation, resulting in an unopposed Allied landing. MacArthur bypassed Wewak during the Hollandia operation. Historians still debate whether Peleliu and even Iwo Jima should have been similarly bypassed. In any event, the series of leap-frogging and outflanking operations in the Solomons and New Guinea established a pattern widely followed for the rest of the Pacific island war.

Bourgainville was too big to bypass in its entirety, and Allied landings were planned for Empress Augusta Bay. Anticipating a strong air response from Rabaul, the Allies made sixty preemptive airstrikes throughout October using several hundred aircraft of General Kenney's Fifth Air Force, AirSols, and Halsey's carriers USS Saratoga and the new USS Princeton. The Allies landed November 1. The initial Japanese effort by naval surface forces to disrupt these landings was rebuffed. IJN then sent a strong cruiser force to Rabaul from Truk with the intention of making a second attempt. Halsey shifted his main carrier striking force, now augmented by three more carriers, [FOOTNOTE: WHICH CARRIERS] to focus on the buildup at Rabaul with devastating results. He sent all 97 of his aircraft against the naval buildup at Rabaul followed up days later witha almost daily raids. The poor performance of Japanese land-based aircraft against the American carriers, coupled with the growing number of carriers in the Allied fleets, indicated to Allied commanders that these valuable warships could be risked more during future operations.

Another sustained bombing campaign against Rabaul began in January, 1944 and, by 20 February, the Japanese withdrew their surviving combat vessels from the harbor and what was left of their combat aircraft from the air fields. For the remainder of the war, the 100,000 Japanese servicemen of Rabaul withered on the vine, hiding in tunnels and suffering from hunger and malaria.

[where was kinkaid in all this? Admiral Halsey had the US Third Fleet(?) and Kinkaid the US Seventh Fleet?]

[WHEN DID ALLIES GAIN CONTROL OVER AIR AND SEA AT NIGHTTIME?] Per Morison (Struggle for Guadalcanal)Beginning about 23 Aug??, "the Japanese controlled the seas around the Solomon Islands during nighttime. However, any Japanese ship within range (200 miles or 320 km) of the aircraft at Henderson Field during daylight hours was in great danger from air attack. This tactical situation existed for the next several months of the campaign."

Rabaul was 600 miles from Guadalcanal. Out of range for many Japanese planes? (toland p. 353) (or 650 mi per Whitehouse?)

Had been putting forces in piecemeal. (Toland, Rising Sun p 386) by the time the Japanese realized their mistake, they had lost control of the air (and therefore the sea by day). Their gunships could still control the sea by night, but had to be away by daylight.

Japan's home islands (Aug 1945)
At the same time that Halsey was achieving his objectives in the Solomon Islands and MacArthur was moving up the New Guinea coast, Admiral Spruance began the Allied drive across the Central Pacific. It was spearheaded by his Fast Carrier Task Force then with [?] fleet and light carriers and the entire strength of the Central Pacific Command. Like Japan's [[1st Air Fleet| Kidō Butai  of 1941, this powerful fleet could move and strike at will almost anywhere in the Pacific.

Decades of prewar planning by both the Americans and the Japanese had assumed an immediate American dash at the onset of war across the Central Pacific culminating in a decisive battleship confrontation in the vicinity of the Philippines, an American colony since the Spanish–American War. The virtual destruction of America's fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the highly successful Japanese establishment of powerful bases between Hawaii and Japan made this scenario unrealistic for the Americans. Instead, in late 1943, Spruance began the relatively lengthy process of neutralizing Japanese positions through invasion or isolation by leap-frogging. He and Halsey alternated command of the most powerful naval force ever assembled, with one engaging the enemy while the other made plans for the next engagement. Together, they ultimately did bring about the decisive battle to the Philippines.

The battles up to and including those for Guadalcanal had been costly for both Japan and the Allies, but by late 1943, American carrier construction had more than made good on Allied losses. The Japanese Navy, however, lost both its numerical advantage for carriers and for experienced aircrews from which it never recovered. It could not even fully provide trained aircrews for the carriers it still had. IJN had hoped to maintain a defensive perimeter from the Aleutians and the Gilberts in the east to the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean in the west. Doing so would protect both homeland Japan and its conquered territory, including the oil-rich islands in the former Dutch East Indies. This objective was no longer realistic and was challenged by a thrust through the central Pacific simultaneously with the thrust through New Guinea and the Solomons.

Tarawa on the Gilbert Islands (November 1943).

Advancing across the vast ocean areas of the Pacific presented new challenges to the Allies. Previous invasions had been made within range of friendly airfields and within reasonable range of sustainable support during the operation. Advancing over 700 miles from Hawaii [??] to the Gilberts and beyond would necessarily involve bringing invasion air cover with them on aircraft carriers. Also, instead of being able to secure a foothold and be reinforced during the campaign, all troops, equipment, and supplies for the campaign had to be embarked with the initial invasion fleet. This newly designated "Fifth Fleet" would be the largest assemblage of naval airpower in history and include 20 fleet and light aircraft carriers.[17 PER WIKI; RLB FIGURE?] The initial target was an airfield on Betio, an island of the Tarawa atoll in the Gilbert Islands. It was the first of the stepping stones on the way to the Philippines and within striking distance of the next step, the Marshall Islands which, in turn, was within striking distance of the heavily defended Mariana Island.

The Japanese defenders were well dug in and not greatly degraded by the preliminary, unprecedented heavy bombardment and bombing. Virtually every warship in the fleet fired rounds for most of an hour. This was followed by carrier aircraft dropping hundreds of tons of bombs, after which the bombardment resumed. Landing craft carried troops as close to the shore as possible before being stopped by coral reefs. Allied casualties from enemy gunfire were high before they even reached the beach. Over the next three days, all but 17 of the 4,800 Japanese defenders fought to the death. Americans also suffered very heavy casualties, consistent with Japanese plans to resist such that the Allies would seek a negotiated peace rather that continue to accept such losses. Casualties at Tarawa, like those the previous year at Buna–Gona in New Guinea, were unexpectedly high and gave support to plans for bypassing Japanese strong points in the future. Makin Island was also taken. The USS Liscome Bay was sunk by a torpedo from I-175. Nonetheless, the Japanese defensive barrier had now been pierced, invading or bypassing Attu in the north, Tarawa in the center, and Rabaul in the south. [MORE DETAILS FROM OTHER SOURCES]

Kwajalein and E on the Marshall Islands (date?)

Mariana Islands

In Feb? 1944 The Fast Carrier Task Force did what the Kido Butai did in early 1942. Raid on Truk in Feb 1944 (Carolines) during which carrier aircraft wiped out Truk aircraft; Then on to raid [?} the Marianas with an invasion plan to leapfrog Truk and go to the Marianas.

Of the three forces moving toward the Philippines (MacCarther on New Guinea, Kincade's Seventh Fleet moving up the Solomons, and Spruance's Fifth Fleet driving across the Central Pacific), only Spruance had aircraft carriers. After MacCarther took Manus in the Admiralty Islands and began developing it as an advanced naval base, Spruance brought his carriers to New Guinea to support MacCarther's planned three pronged, combined operation attack on Humboldt Bay which was to leap-frog past Rabaul. On the way, in March, Spruance's carrier-launched aircraft raided the Paulaus Islands, mining harbors. Japanese Admiral Koga's Main Fleet had pulled back from Truk to the Palaus and then further back to Singapore, far from the Allied action.

American Forward Naval Bases (1943 - 1945)

To engage the Japanese Navy, the American Navy had to operate thousands of miles from their principal bases in Hawaii and on the West Coast. If warships had to travel to these distant facilities for support, the percentage of time each could spend on combat operations would be dramatically reduced. Rather than take the ships to major ports, the navy took major ports to the ships by establishing large support bases closer to combat action.

As the drive across the Pacific progressed, major logistics centers were setup behind the forward-moving front lines of warships. In early 1943, Service Squadrons were established to operate these centers. The forward support base positions in early 1944 were at the recently captured Majuro, Kwajalein, and Eniwetok in the Marshall Islands. Following continued American victories, forward-most facilities were established at Kossol Roads in the Palau Islands, then at Ulithi in the Carolines, then at Layte in the Philippines, then at Saipan in the Marianas, and finally on Okinawa. Hundreds of ships could anchor at one time at these facilities. Warships could be resupplied with food, fuel, ammunition, etc. and be repaired at floating dry-docks.

Ulithi could hold 700 vessels. Piers were built there and thousands of skilled workmen were shipped in. The dry dock could handle a 45,000 ton battleship. Specialty ships distilled fresh water, baked bread, and made ice cream. When Task Force 58 [WHERE WAS BRITISH TF-57?] sortied from Ulithi in March 1945 for the invasion of Okinawa, it included 29 aircraft carriers, 15 battleships, 23 cruisers, 106 destroyers, and hundreds of support transports.

notes:

Long Island CVE For the remainder of the war [after delivering aircraft to Guadalcanal], she trained pilots and transported aircraft from the West Coast to various Pacific locations. At war's end, Long Island brought soldiers and sailors home as part of Operation Magic Carpet.

By September, USS Copahee had begun delivering troops, aircraft, and supplies to the South Pacific. In the months and years ahead, she ferried replacement aircraft, pilots, and supplies to bases and aircraft carriers at Pearl Harbor, Australia, the Marshall Islands, Admiralty Islands, and Guam and Saipan in the Mariana Islands. Finally, she too participated in Operation Magic Carpet.

By the end of 1943, the Japanese had adjusted their defensive perimeter to include only the Marianas and Carolines, which were essential for defense of their defense of the Philippines. This line did not survive Spruence's raid beginning Feb 1944.

TF 1, 11, TF 16, TF 17, TF 18 Allied TF 16 Task Force 16 Allied TF 38 (1943) (Aug-1943) later raided South China Sea

Note: "Turning point of war (Nov 1942)?" El Alamain, Stalingrad, Torch, Guadalcanal

Misc links:
 * https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN-Chron.html

Kawanishi H8K "Emily" flying boats and Nakajima A6M2-N "Rufe" floatplane

Allied Domination And Victory (1944-1945)
The US Navy maintained an effective and efficient forward presence as they moved westward toward Japan by establishing large forward naval bases. In January of 1944, the US took possession of Majuro in the Marshall islands and made this large anchorage into a forward base. It became the largest and most active port in the world until. to, which was larger than Majuro and Pearl Harbor, capable of handling 700 ships. On the way there, US Naval Service Squadrons progressively established forward bases with repair and resupply capabilities at Majuro, Kwajalein, Enewetak, Manus Island, Kossol Roads in the Palau Islands] and finally [[Ulithi atoll in the Caroline Islands.  From there were launched naval operations against the Philippines and Okinawa.  Admiral Nimitz referred to the Service Squadrons making these forward based possible as his "secret weapons." At the beginning of 1945, the USN Pacific Fleet had 17 carrier division containing a total of 28 fleet and light carriers and 49 escort carriers. The transport squadron contained another 21 escort carriers.

Saipan (Mariana Islands) June 1944

Mariana and Palau Islands campaign Battle of the Philippine Sea https://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/silentservicemarianas.aspx

Included discussion of CVEs and battleships staying behind at Saipan: https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Philippine_Sea

Peleliu (Palau Islands) September 1944

Invasion of Southern Philippine Islands October 1944

Nimitz orders for Halsey for Leyte were similar to Yamamoto's orders to Nagumo for Midway in that they included provisions conflicting objectives and unclear priorities.

Halsey chased the decoy fleet with his 16 carriers and 78 combat vessels in all. He created a contingency for a battleship task force (TF-34) to guard the San Bernardino Strait but did not ultimately do so.

Halsey saw first kamikazi strike on 29 Oct 1944 during mop-up operations at Leyte as one hit the USS Intrepid. Next day, three more carriers were struck. Initial use of kamikazis. Over the war, there occurred over 2,550 kamikazes that killed over 12,000 Americans and sink or damage 74 American Warships.

Invasion of Northern Philippine Islands (Dec 1944 - Aug 1945) Battle of Mindoro Battle of Luzon

Planning to counteract kamikazi threat. DEs as pickets. Downsize carrier groups fom four to three. New refueling-at-sea organization.

"Big Blue Blanket" strategy. 24 hour screen over every Japanese airfield on Luzon Escorting and screening the carriers were 9 battleships, 16 cruisers, and about 60 destroyers. TF-38 7 CVs and 8 CVLs with total of about 540 fightrs, 150 dive bombers, and 140 torpedo bombers for a total of 830 carrier-launched aircraft. "Greatest naval force in the history of warfare." Dec 16 Halsey's carrier aircraft were hitting Japanese targets on the Philippines, about 100 airfields. "shooting gallery"; destroyed 270 aircraft, most on ground, and sank 18 ship, crippled 37 more. Halsey requested permission from Nimitz to locate and destroy what was left of the Japanese Combined Fleet; Nimitz denied permission.

Typhoon Cobra. Fighter planes swept off decks into the sea. Planes breaking lose from mooring on hanger decks and bouncing off each other and bunkheads, exploding, starting fires. All planes on hanger deck on fire on USS Monterey. One fell down elevator shaft threatening ammunition magazine. Lost 18 of 34 aircraft with the remaining 16 seriously damaged. Fires also on USS Cowpens and USS Altamaha, the later losing 32 of her planes being swep overboard. Waves washing across decks of Monterey that were 57' above the waterline. USS San Jacinto rolled to 45 degree angle. Also had fires. Lt. Jerry Ford (later President Ford) blown overboard but pulled himself back aboard the Monterey hand over hand using a firehose. USS Cape Esperance had a steering malfunction and lost all her planes except one. USS Langley reported rolling consistently to 70 degree angle like a pendulum. Winds sometimes blowing steadily at 125 knots, blowing men and planes overboard. Waves estimated at up to 100'. Visibility as low as 30' resulted in some near collisions [p200] The inclinometer on one destroyer (Dewey) reached 84 degrees. Destroyers lost stacks and masts and power.

Halsey remained focused on his commitment to support MacArthur's landings on Mindoro with continued airstrikes on Luzon [p141] and was slower than many ship captains to recognize or acknowledge that his fleet was fighting a typhoon. Orders to make refueling attempts were maintained even in the face of impossible conditions. Ships remained on orders to maintain fleet formation rather than permitted to take individual actions that could improve chances for ship survival. In the end, three destroyers capsized, 12 other ships rendered inoperable, and 146 carrier aircraft were lost by being battered, burned, or blown overboard. Many men spent up two days in the water clinging to nets, fighting fatigue, hypothermia, delirium and shark attacks while awaiting rescue.[p219] Ninety-three were saved; [p264] 793 died, nearly as many as died in the battles of Midway and Coral Sea combined. Halsey's fleet retired to Ulithi for repairs and preparation for continuation of "Big Blanket"air support for MacArthur as the latter invaded Luzon in January, 1945. [p.274]

[FOOTNOTE FOR LOST DESTROYERS] The destroyer USS Hull reportedly experienced a near mutiny before capsizing and may have been the inspiration for Herman Wouk's fictional account in The Caine Mutiny.

The Court of Inquiry attributed Halsey's unfortunate decisions to "an error in judgement." Admiral Nimitz attributed them to a "commendable desire" to support MacArthur. Admiral King perferred to attribute them to a "firm determination."

Iwo Jima (Iwo Islands) February 1945

Okinawa (Ryukyu Islands, Japan) April 1945

March 1945, 218 bombers and fighters from four British carriers off Sakishima Gunto made raids to prevent six Japanese airfield there from being used as staging points for reinforcements from Formosa to Okinawa. In April, Indefatigable was hit by a Kamikaze, but her armored deck prevented serious damage. Raids were then made on Formosa to end Japanese attacks on Okinowa invasion shipping. Then more raids on Sakishima. After replenishment at Layte in May, the fleet returned to Sakishima. Kamikazes hit Formidable, Indomitable, and Victorious. The fleet retired to Manus. Newly arrived Implacable was part of a June raid on Truk.

Allied TF 58

They led the fleet through the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa,

In June 1945 off Okinawa, Halsey sailed into another typhoon ("Viper") that resulted in 6 deaths, 36 ships damaged, and 76 aircraft destroyed.

End For The Japanese Carriers (Jan - Aug 1945)

IJN Ryuho returned to Japan from Formosa on 18 Jan 1945, ending the last Japanese carrier sortie of the war outside home waters.

USN Task Force 38/58 (including 11 fleet and 5 light carriers) began launching attacks against Japan's home islands in mid-February, 1945. Attack on Kure (March 1945), Allied naval bombardments of Japan during World War II, Attack on Yokosuka, Attacks on Kure and the Inland Sea (July 1945),

USN submarines disrupted Japanese supply activities. IJN escort carrierTaiyō was attacked five times by submarines while transporting and/or escorting convoys. She was hit and damaged and on three of these occasions and ultimately sunk during a fourth.

Surrender of Japan (2-Sep-1945)

=Aircraft, aircrews, and weapons for aircraft carriers during World War II=

Naval historians such as Evan Mawdsley, Richard Overy, and Craig Symonds concluded that World War II's decisive victories on land could not have been won without decisive victories at sea. Naval battles to keep shipping lanes open for combatant's movement of troops, guns, ammunition, tanks, warships, aircraft, raw materials, and food largely determined the outcome of land battles. Without the Allied victory in keeping shipping lanes open during the Battle of the Atlantic, Britain could not have fed her people or withstood Axis offensives in Europe and North Africa. Without Britain's survival and without Allied shipments of food and industrial equipment to the Soviet Union, her military and economic power would likely not have rebounded in time for Russian soldiers to prevail at Stalingrad and Kursk. Without victories at sea in the Pacific Theater, the Allies could not have mounted amphibious assaults on or maintained land forces on Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Saipan, The Philippines, Iwo Jima, or Okinawa. Allied operations in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters were interconnected because they frequently competed for scarce naval resources for everything from aircraft carriers to transports and landing craft. Effective transport of troops and military supplies between the two war theaters required naval protection for shipping routes around the Cape of Good Hope, through the Suez canal, and through the Panama Canal. In both theaters, maritime dominance enabled combatants to use the sea for their own purposes and deprive its use by adversaries. As naval historian Admiral Herbert Richmond stated, "Sea power did not win the war itself: it enabled the war to be won".

Aircraft carriers played a major role in winning decisive naval battles, supporting key amphibious landings, and keeping critical merchant shipping lanes open for transporting military personnel and their equipment to land battle zones. This article is part of a series that covers World War II from the vantage point of aircraft carrier operations. This article is focused upon carrier aircraft, the experiences of airmen that flew them, and the weapons systems they used.

[THE FOLLOWING TEXT WAS TAKEN LIVE 12/15/20]

This article is part of a series that covers World War II from the vantage point of aircraft carrier operations. This article is focused upon carrier aircraft, the experiences of airmen that flew them, and the weapons systems they used.

Carrier aircrew experiences
No two airmens' experiences were the same. This section contains examples to illustrate the wide variety of equipment flown, geographic locations occupied, and combat activity engaged in by naval aircrews during World War II. The airmen included below were eyewitnesses to many aircraft carrier actions, and their experiences provide a more personal view of carrier operations during World War II. Following the airmen rather than carriers also provides a look at operations during periods when carrier aircraft were land-based.

Stanley Laurie, RN (1939-1945)
Laurie sank the Italian Royal Navy destroyer Daniele Manin

===Donald Sheppard, RN (1939-1945)

http://www.vintagewings.ca/VintageNews/Stories/tabid/116/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/475/Navy-Blue-Fighter-Pilot-Episode-Three-Until-the-Bitter-End.aspx Don Sheppard Episode 3
 * http://www.vintagewings.ca/VintageNews/Stories/tabid/116/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/471/Navy-Blue-Fighter-Pilot-Episode-Two.aspx Don Sheppard
 * http://www.vintagewings.ca/VintageNews/Stories/tabid/116/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/471/Navy-Blue-Fighter-Pilot-Episode-Two.aspx Don Sheppard (Episode 2 of 3)
 * http://www.vintagewings.ca/VintageNews/Stories/tabid/116/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/468/language/en-CA/Navy-Blue-Fighter-Pilot-Episode-One.aspx Don Sheppard Episode 1

Other info and some sources
(this section not to be part of article)

Japan:

E7K and E8N seaplanes were effective as auxiliary fighters and bombers during the invasion of Canton, "which set the precedent for them to be used in the same role during the wider Pacific conflict." (Matt)

air group commander (Hikōtaichō)Hikōtaichō division leaders (buntaichō) Buntaichō Kuomintang forces (Nationalist Party of China or Chinese Nationalist Party (CNP)

[DUPLICATE TIMELINE TO KEEP] [1936-7 ON RYUJO AT SHANGHAI Central coast]
 * Nov 1936 Kondo on Ryujo (Hata p 294)
 * 23 Aug 1937 Kondo fight over Paoshan near Shanghai (Hata p 294)
 * 1937 Ryujo returned to Sasebo Naval Arsenal for resupply, then sailed to soughern China. (Hata, p.144)

[1937-38 CANTON- South China] [ON KAGA AT CANTON] 13 April 1938 "At 0830, 18 D1A2 bombers escorted by three A4N1 and 3 A5M2 fighters take-off from KAGA to bomb Tien He airbase. They are intercepted over their target by 18 Gloster "Gladiator" bi-plane fighters of the Chinese 28th and 29th Pursuit Squadrons. During the 40 minute aerial combat, one IJN A5M2, two A4N1s and two Aichi D1A2s are lost as are four CAF "Gladiators." (Hackett & Tully) [WHERE DID 15TH KU OPERATE??] [JAPAN] [12TH AIR GROUP- Central China] [SOUTH CHINA WITH 12TH KU?] [ON ZUIHO AT SANTA CRUZ] [ON JUNYO OVER GUADALCANAL AND EASTERN NEW GUINEA]
 * Autumn 1937 "Japanese had successfully eliminated most Chinese air opposition in Southern China during the autumn of 1937, shipments of new aircraft from foreign partners continued to arrive in the area. American, British, German and Italian models were either arriving by ship at Hong Kong or Canton harbours, by train from Indochina, or flying over the Himalayas from Burma into the southern city of Kunming." Japan decided to blockage ports. (Matt)
 * 20-30 Sept 1937 Ryujo raided Canton (Hata, p.144)
 * 21 Sept 1937 Kondo attack on Canton (Hata p 294)
 * 21 Sept 1937 "South China coast. CarDiv 1's HOSHO and RYUJO begin operations against Chinese forces near Canton despite bad weather. The Chinese 29th PS scrambles seven Curtiss "Hawk III " bi-plane fighters to intercept an attack on the Teinho and Peiyun airfields by 12 Type 94 dive-bombers, three torpedo bombers and 15 Type 90 fighters. A 30-minute dogfight ensues in which two "Hawk IIIs" are shot down. The Japanese also shoot down two Chinese observation planes. Five of HOSHO's fighters run out of fuel and are forced ditch short of the carrier. IJN destroyers and other vessels rescue the pilots. This is the largest single loss of IJN fighters during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1941. That afternoon, RYUJO launches six carrier bombers, three atttack planes and nine fighters to attack Canton. They are engaged by CAF "Hawk III" fighters. RYUJO's pilots claim five "Hawk IIIs" shot down." (Hackett & Tully)
 * 3 Oct 1937 Ryujo returned to Shanghi area (Hata p. 144)
 * 5 Oct 1937 Ryujo air group went ashore to Kunda airfield to provide support for the ground forces (Hata p.144)
 * late 1937, Kaga "completed her cruise in southern waters" (Matt)
 * c24 Oct 1937, Kaga departs Chinese waters. (Hackett & Tully)
 * Late 1937, 20 E7K and E8N floatplanes in use to suppress activity around Canton
 * 24 Feb 1938, floatplanes encountered The E8Ns had encountered the newly obtained Gloster Gladiators (Matt)
 * 1938 Transferred to Kaga (Hata p 294)
 * 13 Apr 1938 "Concerned about the continued Chinese resistance, the Japanese tasked the carriers Kaga, Soryu and Ryujo with destroying the resurgent Chinese Air Force." Attacked with 6 fighters escorts (half were A4N biplanes, the rest A5Ms) and 18 D1A bombers. Opposed by Gloster Gladiators.  Regardless of inflated claims by both sides, each side lost about 4 aircraft. (Matt)
 * 13 Apr 1938 Attack on Canton involving Kondo (Hata)
 * 29 October 1938 Canton falls. "These operations completed the blockage of Chinese ports and effectively left the Burma Road and the The Hump air route over the Himalayas as the only way to get supplies into China." (Matt)
 * 25 June - 15 Dec 1938 15th Naval Airgroup #1 existed. List of air groups of the Imperial Japanese Navy
 * June 1938 Kondo posted to 15th Ku (Hata p 294)
 * November 1938 Kondo returns to Japan (Hata p 294)
 * July 1938? 12th Ku reduced in size since Rikkos were raiding inland China, including bombing Chungking, which was out of range for A5Ms. [A6Ms did not arrive until summer 1940.] (Hata p. 178)
 * Oct 1939 Kondo assigned to 12th Ku (Hata p 294) [Any action?]
 * 11 June - 27 Oct 1938 Battle of Wuhan
 * 1938 "After the capture of Hankou [Hankow, near Wuhan], the unit [12th air group] transferred to an airbase near Hankou. Nevertheless, due to the lack of range to escort the medium bombers into the inland China, they did not see much action" (Wiki 12th air group)
 * Zhou Zhikai, flying an I-15bis fighter, shared a victory with his squadron commander Captain Jiang Weihua for the downing of a G4M bomber of Japanese 15th Kokutai over Liuzhou, Guangxi, China. ww2dbase [Zhou Zhikai | Liuzhou, Guangxi | CPC] (WWIIdb timeline)
 * 30 Dec 1939 Attack on Liuchow (Hata p 294)
 * 10 Jan 1940 raid on Kweilin (Guilin) (Hata p 294)
 * July 1942 assigned to Zuiho (Hata p 294)
 * 26 Oct 1942 involved in Battle of Santa Cruz with Lt. Hidaka leading 9 Zeros to escort first attack wave; met US torpedo-bombers from Enterprise heading for Japanese fleet. Kondo followed Lt Hidaka as he left the bombers he was esorting and attacked the opposing formation, ultimately claiming that the Zero pilots shot down 6 fighters and 8 torpedo-bombers.  Losing their bearings, other in Hidaka's group failed to return to their ships.  (Hata p 294)
 * November 1942 transferred to Junyo from which he was involved in fighting over Guadalcanal, support of convoys to Wewak, the evacuation of Guadalcanal, and the "I-Go" operation. (Hata p 294)
 * 18-20 Dec 1942 From Junyo, patrolled above Army convoy to Wewak (Hata p 141)
 * 17-25 Jan 1943 Junyo air group detached to Wewak, continuing patrols, intercepting B-24s. (Hata p. 141)
 * Late Jan-Feb 1943 involved in evacuation of Guadalcanal (Hata, p. 141)
 * Junyo sailed home to Sacki (Hata p 141)
 * March Junyo sortied
 * 2 April 1943 Junyo Air group again detached, this time to Rabaul for operations over Solomons (Hata, p. 141)
 * 1943 Junyo air group took part in Operation I-go.
 * 17 April 1943 Junyo air group withdrew to Truk (Hata, p.141)
 * May 1943 returned to Japan to take part in relief of Attu, but instead... (Hata p 294)
 * 1943 Junyo on brief visit home. (Hata, p. 141)
 * 15 June 1943 Junyo sailed to Roa in the Mrshalls
 * 30 June 1943 US lands on Rendove Island; all aircraft from 2n Air Flotilla carriers (including Junyo) detached to Buin.
 * 2 July to end of Autust 1943 daily air battles (Hata, p. 141)
 * 2 July 1943 Junyo ordered to go to Buin for the air battle around Rendova. (Hata p 294)
 * 15 August 1943 provided direct escort to dive-bombers heading for Vella Lavella. Shot down one aircraft but severely wounded in leg.  Made it to Buin, where he was hospitalized.  (Hata p 294)
 * Evacuated home, spent 15 months in hospital. (Hata p 294)
 * Posted to 203 KU but did not take part in any further combat before the war ended. (Hata p 294)

[KEEP THIS DUPLICATE FOR NOW. ALL FROM HATA]
 * Nov 1936 on Ryujo
 * 23 Aug 1937 fight over Paoshan near Shanghai
 * 21 Sept 1937 attack on Canton
 * 1938 Transferred to Kaga
 * 13 Apr 1938 Attack on Canton
 * June 1938 Posted to 15th Ku
 * November return to Japan
 * Oct 1939 assigned to 12th Ku
 * 30 Dec 1939 Attack on Liuchow
 * 10 Jan 1940 raid on Kweilin (Guilin)
 * July 1942 assigned to Zuiho
 * 26 Oct 1942 involved in Battle of Santa Cruz with Lt. Hidaka leading 9 Zeros to escort first attack wave; met US torpedo-bombers from Enterprise heading for Japanese fleet. Kondo followed Lt Hidaka as he left the bombers he was esorting and attacked the opposing formation, ultimately claiming that the Zero pilots shot down 6 fighters and 8 torpedo-bombers.  Losing their bearings, other in Hidaka's group failed to return to their ships.
 * November 1942 transferred to Junyo from which he was involved in fighting over Guadalcanal, support of convoys to Wewak, the evacuation of Guadalcanal, and the "I-Go" operation.
 * May 1943 returned to Japan to take part in relief of Attu, but instead...
 * 2 July 1943 Junyo ordered to go to Buin for the air battle around Rendove.
 * 15 August 1943 kprovided direct escort to dive-bombers heading for Vella Lavella. Shot down one aircraft but severely wounded in leg.  Made it to Buin, where he was hospitalized.
 * Evacuated home, spent 15 months in hospital.
 * Posted to 203 KU but did not take part in any further combat before the war ended.

In total, ROCAF had about 645 combat aircraft, 300 of which were fighters. Japan had a total of about 1,530 IJN and IJA aircraft, about 400 of which were in in China.

United Kingdom:

Candidates for Aircrew Experiences:
 * Naval Aviation Development in World War II–U.S. Navy Versus Royal Navy Experience (second crewman- "navigator/observer")
 * 
 * Stanley Orr Atlantic, Mediterranean, Tirpitz attempts
 * Book: Royal Navy Aces of World War 2 (Aircraft of the Aces)

United States:

David McCampbell survived Wasp sinking; ace at Phil Sea and Leyte; medal of honor, only pacific fleet pilot to earn it;
 * http://acepilots.com/usn_mccampbell.html lengthy article re McCampbell
 * https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/w/wasp-viii.html danfs ship history for Wasp
 * http://acepilots.com/usn_mccampbell.html McCampbell history

[Airman on Wasp (atlantic and pacific)?; airman off Enterprise land-based temporarily on Guadalcanal?; airman from Big Blue Fleet/Task Force 38/58 during sweep across Pacific? (David McCampbell?)]

Jeffery S. Underwood, The wings of democracy


 * Naval Aircraft Squadrons


 * Naval Wings and Squadrons

Principal Sources (?):
 * 1) IJN Battle Orders

Category:United States Navy pilots of World War II

Carrier aircraft weapons
Bombs

Torpedoes

Mark XII Torpedo used by Swordfish at Taranto. 16' long, 1,548 lbs, aircraft had to approach low (<150') and slow (70kn).

=Lists for aircraft carriers operational between 1918 and 1945=

Citations/questions to be answered:
 * "at the Battle of Iwo Jima, American Task Force 58 included 18 (or 17??) carriers over 1,000 aircraft. (CITATION?)"
 * "example of the range of operations a fleet carrier were assigned... [to be continued.  Enterprise?  Ark Royal?  Akagi?]"
 * "[THE FOLLOWING TABLE [1918-1945] WAS CHECKED FOR ACCURACY 2/7/20 EXCEPT FOR THE LOCATION OF CARRIERS FOR DATES BEFORE 1939]"

NOTE: Ship histories, etc., included in other Wikipedia articles (e.g., for USS Enterprise, HMS Ark Royal, IJN Akagi) use many of the same sources as for this article but presents the information about location, combat activity, and operational status in paragraphs of text rather than, as done here, as tables of lists. The latter facilitates side-by-side comparison of what carriers were doing at any point in time.

Introduction TEMP
[THIS SECTION WAS TAKEN LIVE ABOUT 11/1/20 AND MAY BE DELETED.]

This article contains a complete list of aircraft carriers that operated some time during the period from September 1918 and August 1945. For each carrier, the list includes date of commissioning, loss, and its location and operational status at the end of each month. Additional lists show the functions performed by each carrier, damages sustained during combat, circumstances around sinkings, and the portion of time each was available for combat. Tables summarize information from the lists. Information was obtained from online ship histories, principally from the following sources:
 * 1) Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
 * 2) Royal and Dominion Navy Warships
 * 3) Imperial Japanese Navy Page
 * 4) Naval War In The Pacific 1941-1945

Types of Carriers
[THIS SECTION WAS TAKEN LIVE ABOUT 11/1/20 AND MAY BE DELETED. DELETED FROM SANDBOX 12/19/20]

Functions assigned aircraft carriers
The combatants differed in the functions they emphasized for carrier use, in part as a result of the challenges presented by their principal theater of operations. The table below indicates the percentage of carriers each combatant used for each function. For example, the US Navy operated a total of 33 fleet and light carriers during the war. Seventy-three percent of these carriers participated in naval battles at one time or another. Eighty-five percent were involved in support of invasions, etc.

Escort carriers performed almost all the functions of the fleet and light carriers.

The combat role of IJN Zuikaku provides an example of the range of operations assigned to a fleet carrier during the war. Commissioned just four months before Japan launched the war with the Western Allies, Zuikaku became part of the Kido Butai and launched 71 of the 414 aircraft that attacked Pearl Harbor. Zuikaku and three other fleet carriers of Kido Butai then raided the Australian base at Rabaul. In March she sortied with Kido Butai on a raid into the Indian Ocean that attacked Allied shore installations and sank Allied ships, including aircraft carrier HMS Hermes. After first returning to Truk, she joined IJN Shōkaku for the planned invasion of Port Moresby in New Guinea that resulted in the Battle of the Coral Sea. While undamaged, she lost so many aircraft and aircrew that she was not able to participate in the decisive Battle of Midway the following month. During the naval engagements off Guadalcanal, she fought at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942 and in October at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. She was severely damaged there and, also significant, she along with Shōkaku and Zuihō lost a total of 43 of the 110 aircraft they had launched. With the Japanese navy on the defensive, unable to take strategic offensive initiatives, Zuikaku assisted with transporting aircraft and provided air cover during the Japanese withdrawal from Guadalcanal. She also pursued, without result, American carriers in response to their raids on Japanese positions. Her aircraft fought unsuccessfully at the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Finally, she was assigned to the "decoy fleet" for the Battle of Leyte Gulf and was sunk during the one-sided engagement off Cape Engaño.

As an example of the range of operations escort carriers were assigned, aircraft from USS Suwannee supported the Allied invasion of North Africa during Operation Torch by sinking a submarine and bombing Casablanca Harbor prior to Allied troop landings. During the struggle at Guadalcanal, she provided air cover for troopships and supply ships. Her planes bombed targets in support of US Marine landings during Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands and Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. She shuttled replacement aircraft to fleet carriers during the landings at Hollandia in New Guinea. On combat air patrol during the American Marine invasion of the Marianas, Suwannee's planes sank a submarine. She supported Allied landings to retake Morotai in the Dutch East Indies and attacked targets in the Philippines as part of the American landings at Leyte Gulf, withstanding kamikaze attacks. Other escort carriers supporting the Leyte Gulf landings withstood severe attacks from a vastly superior enemy force during the Battle off Samar. Their resistance significantly helped protect the landings.

Combat damage
[DETAILED LIST OF DAMAGE AND SINKINGS WILL BE INCLUDED IN A SEPARATE ARTICLE WITH SUMMARY INFORMATION INCLUDED IN THIS ARTICLE AND LESS DETAILED SUMMARY IN THE MAIN ARTICLE, "AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATIONS DURING WORLD WAR II"]

Damage to carriers due to weapons systems, collisions, weather, and other causes also reduced the number of carriers available for operations at any given time. Not every incident resulted in significant loss of combat effectiveness or retirement from combat. The table below shows sources of damage for each combatant"s aircraft carriers during the war.

[DATA AS OF 2/11/20 BASED UPON THOROUGH REVIEW OF FOUR BASIC ONLINE SOURCES. NEED TO BE UPDATED AFTER ADDITIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES, EG. Y'BLOOD]

Operational carriers 1918-1945
Taking construction, shakedown trials, delivery, refitting, combat damage, and sinkings into account, the tables below shows the number of aircraft carriers that were operational for each combatant in each theater at the end of the month from commissioning of the first aircraft carrier in September 1918 until the end of World War II. The Pacific theater includes the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic theater includes the Mediterranean Sea. Carriers are counted as "operational" if they are available for combat-related operations in a war zone. The counts are taken from the detailed tables in this article and include carriers being used exclusively for training and carriers that were idle only because they lacked aircraft, pilots, and/or fuel. The counts exclude carriers that were on sea trials following commissioning or extensive repairs. They also exclude carriers that were not operational because of combat damage or because they were undergoing other repairs or refitting to improve performance. Finally, they exclude carriers immobilized by being grounded or that are in use only to provide accommodations for military personnel.

[DATA FOR THE FOLLOWING HAS NOT YET BEEN UPDATED OR RECONCILED WITH OTHER TABLES OR WITH THE SPREADSHEET.]

Operational carriers, all types, 1939-1945

Percent of time in service ("operational")
Sea trials, delivery time, refitting

After commissioning, carriers underwent sea trials to test the ship's systems and to train personnel. Upon satisfactory results, the carriers were then delivered to their intended war zones. This could involve weeks or months. In the case of HMS Victorious (CV), she was chasing the German raider Bismark in the North Atlantic just weeks after commissioning and completion of final acceptance trials. For USS Essex (CV), however, sea trials and deploying her to the war zone in the Pacific took five months, and she did not see her first action until a raid on Rabaul eight months after commissioning.

The elapsed time between commissioning and combat action could also be short or long for escort carriers. USS Santee (CVE), a converted oil tanker rushed into service, still had workmen aboard during her shakedown cruise. Within seven weeks of commissioning, her aircraft were bombing airfields, spotting for warship's guns, patrolling for enemy cruisers and submarines, and refueling other ships in support of the invasion of North Africa. On the other hand, HMS [[HMS Empress (D42)|Empress| (CVE), experienced one of the longest periods between commissioning and combat action. She was built in a West Coast US shipyard and then transferred to a Royal Canadian Shipyard, also on Canada's West Coast, where she was commissioned in August 1943.  She remained there until February 1944 during modifications to meet Britain's requirements for deployment to defend convoys.  She then sailed to the Atlantic and participated in exercises with other escort carriers in the Caribbean.  Aircraft were embarked for transport to Britain, where Empress arrived in April.  There, through November, she underwent repairs for defects and modifications considered necessary based upon experience with other operational CVEs.  Further preparations took place in December. In January 1945, still without aircrew aboard, she sailed for the Indian Ocean, where she took on an air squadron and participated in additional exercises in February.  Thus about 18 months elapsed between commissioning and becoming operational in a war zone.

Escort carriers constructed in American shipyards and transferred to Britain spent more time being delivered because of the distance from America's west coast and Britain. In addition, modifications made in some cases because of concerns over onboard safety increased the elapsed time between CVE's commissioning and becoming operational. Britain made major changes to many American-made escort carriers due to concerns over fuel handling facilities after the unexplained explosion and consequent loss during refueling operations on HMS Dasher in March 1943. In addition, some elapsed time was due to modifications to make some carriers suitable for specific combat functions. As lessons were learned during combat, carriers were refitted to change armament or otherwise reconfigure systems. Such modifications removed carriers from combat availability during these modifications. In short, long periods could occur between a carrier's being commissioned and its becoming operational for combat.

Percentge of Time Carriers Were Operational

Taking into account all the factors that kept aircraft carriers out of combat after commissioning, carriers generally were typically operational 80% to 90% of the time. They were typically out of service 5% to 15% for combat-related damage repair and 5% to 10% for delivery and refitting to otherwise improve performance.

Detailed lists of carrier operating times
This is a complete list of aircraft carriers with flight decks that could launch and retrieve aircraft at sea and which operated some time during the period from September 1939 and August 1945. The list also includes to total time each carrier was in service and the percentages for time it was operational, undergoing repair

[CREATE TABLE USING SPREADSHEET]

Principal Sources

 * 1) Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
 * 2) Royal and Dominion Navy Warships
 * 3) Imperial Japanese Navy Page
 * 4) Naval War In The Pacific 1941-1945

=List of Carrier Operations (SPEARATE ARTICLE)=

Named operations involving carriers

 * List of World War II military operations
 * List of naval and land-based operations in the Pacific Theater during World War II ALL JAPANESE OPERATIONS ENTERED FROM THIS SOURCE
 * List of Japanese operations during World War II LIKELY JAPANESE OPERATIONS ENTERED FROM THIS SOURCE
 * List of naval and land-based operations in Mediterranean Sea area during World War II
 * Malta convoys
 * Club Run ALL RN & US OPERATIONS ENTERED FROM THIS SOURCE
 * Ruler-class escort carrier has list of carriers and links to some not found by Goggle searchs
 * Indian Ocean in World War II

OTHER SOURCES TO CHECK OUT:
 * Musciano, Walter A (1994). Warbirds of the Sea: A History of Aircraft Carriers & Carrier-based Aircraft. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing. ISBN 978-0-88740-583-9.
 * J. D. Brown, 1968, Carrier Operations in World War II: The Royal Navy, London, Ian Allan, p. 93.
 * http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/index_oob.php#World_War_II
 * http://www.armouredcarriers.com/
 * BRITISH INVASION FLEETS by J de Winsert.
 * OPERATION PACIFIC by E. Gray
 * THE FORGOTTEN FLEET by J Winton
 * WAR WITH JAPAN (HMSO)
 * SEEK and STRIKE by W Hackmann (U-boat search operations)
 * http://www.ww2pacific.com/ww2.html
 * http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/index.html
 * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escort_Group#9th_Escort_Group
 * http://www.royalnavyresearcharchive.org.uk/ESCORT/HUNTER.htm
 * http://www.francispike.org/show_maps.php?

ALTERNATE SITES FOR POSTING:
 * http://pacific.valka.cz/ships/index_frame.htm
 * http://www.hazegray.org/
 * https://ww2db.com/ship_spec.php?ship_id=A315
 * https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/w/white-plains-i.html

CHATROOM FOR WAR INFO (FROM AAR):
 * https://networks.h-net.org/h-war

ANOTHER SAMPLE OF WIKITABLES TO CHECK OUT:
 * Pvris

[Wiki articles list operation names alphabetically rather than chronologically. This table will be a chrono list for operations involving aircraft carrier combining USN, RN, and IJN operations for Atlantic and Pacific theaters. Dates are for carrier involvement (from Valka), not necessarily for the entire operation?? Not an exhaustive list: included all major operations and some representative small ones (eg. minelaying)]

Not included in table?


 * HAILSTONE
 * DESECRATE I
 * RECKLESS
 * PERSECUTION
 * FORAGER
 * KING II
 * GRATITUDE
 * DETACHMENT
 * JAMBOREE
 * ICEBERG I  Okinawa
 * ICEBERG II ?
 * [home island raids]

RN Clearing Out the Aegean Area of the Mediterranean sea (Sept - Nov 1944) Operations OUTING I & II, MANNA, and CONTEMPT

RN Operations Clearing the Indian Ocean (Mar - Sept 1945) Operations DRACULA, DUKEDOM, COLLIE, ZIPPER, JURIST


 * https://www.taskforce58.org/operations/operations-detachment-and-jamboree/

[to be deleted: 43/08/? 	       TF 38  Halsey    Invasion of Bougainville 44/01/06? 	TF 38 > TF 58 Spruance  Invasion of Gilberts & Marshalls; Marianas 44/08/26 	TF 58 > TF 38 Halsey    Invasion of Palau, Philippines 45/01/26 	TF 38 > TF 58 Spruance  Invasion of Iwo Jima, Okinawa 45/05/28 	TF 58 -> TF 38 Halsey   Okinawa, Home Islands 45/05/28 	TF 57 > TF 37

Task Force 38/Third Fleet (From Aug 1943) Sherman then McCain/Halsey 1943/08 - 10 "SHOESTRING II." - Cape Torokina Landing Kieta area, Bougainville Bombardement Shortland Bombardment 1944/01/08 Green Island Landing - Covering Force 1944/04 - 05 "STALEMATE II" "KING II."- Leyte Landing, x Leyte Mindoro Landing "MIKE I." - Luzon Landing "ICEBERG" - from 1945/05/28 Home Islands Raids 1945/07 - 45/08

Task Force 58/Fifth Fleet (From 6 Jan 1944) Mitscher/Spruance "FLINTLOCK"/"CATCHPOLE" "HAILSTONE" - Truk raid Marianas Raid 44/02/21 "DESECRATE I." - Palau Raid 1944/03 "RECKLESS" & "PERSECUTION" Marcus-Wake Raid "FORAGER" "DETACHMENT" & "JAMBOREE" "ICEBERG" - before 45/04/07 PM "ICEBERG" - after 45/04/07 PM

["The Fast Carrier Task Force.. Task Force 38 (in the 3rd Fleet) under Halsey and Task Force 58 (in the 5th Fleet) under Spruance, was the main striking force of the US Navy’s Pacific Fleet in the second half of the Pacific campaign of World War II. TF38 came into existence in August 1943 on the basis of the fleet carrier Saratoga and under the command of Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman. TF58 was created under the command of Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher on 6 January 1944."]

43/08/?        TF 38 created  Halsey 44/01/06 	TF 58 created Spruance 44/? 	       TF 57 (BPF) created]

Carriers at specific battles, invasions, and raids
Aircraft carriers were involved in many attacks and support activities in addition to the better known major carrier battles. The more complete list below includes battles, invasions, and raids including the specific carriers involved. "Naval battle" refers to a navel engagement entirely on water, "invasion" refers to an operation involving amphibious landing of troops to occupy land areas, and "raids" refers to attacks without the intention to occupy the land areas involved. Also included in the list are some transport, convoy escort, and antisubmarine warfare operations.

Summary timeline for aircraft carriers
Sources for timeline:



1941



1942



1943



1944



1945


 * USN sinks IJN Yamato
 * USN sinks IJN Yamato
 * USN sinks IJN Yamato
 * USN sinks IJN Yamato
 * USN sinks IJN Yamato
 * USN sinks IJN Yamato

TEMP NOTES FOR BATTLES ETC NOT YET INTEGRATED:
 * TF-8 (Feb-1942); Yorktown, Enterprise; US raids on Marshall Islands, US raids on Wake and Marcus Islands
 * TF-17; dates; Yorktown, Enterprise, Hornet; US raids on Marshalls and Gilberts, Invasion of Lae-Salamaua, Battle of Coral Sea, Battle of Midway.
 * TF-61; dates; Enterprise; support American Landings on Guadalcanal
 * TF-34; ?; {part of 102 warships for Operation Torch:} Ranger, Sangamon CVE, Suwannee CVE, Chenango CVE, Santee CVE { part of 300 warships for Battle of Layte Gulf:} 8 fleet, 8 light, 18 escort carriers
 * TF-50; Enterprise;
 * TF-50; Enterprise;

Principal Sources:
 * 1) World War II Database
 * 2) Imperial Japanese Navy Page
 * 3) World War II Ship Histories
 * 4) The Imperial Japanese Navy
 * 5) Service Histories of Royal Navy Warships in World War II

Summary of aircraft carrier operations in the Indian Ocean (1939-1945)
[THIS SECTION NEEDS CHECKING FOR ACCURACY AND COMPLETENESS]

1939


 * Sept 1939 to Feb 1940: HMS Eagle patrolling Indian Ocean with Force I [?] for raiders and submarines.
 * Dec 1939 to April 1940: HMS Hermes in Indian Ocean on trade protection duties.

1940

1941


 * 2 Feb 1941: HMS Formidable aircraft raided Mogadishu for Operation Breach.
 * Jan to April 1941: HMS Hermes aircraft supported the Allied offensive against Italian Somaliland.
 * 13 Feb 1941: HMS Formidable aircraft sank Italian merchantman SS Monacalieri during Operation Composition, a raid on Massawa.
 * 21 Feb 1941: HMS Formidable aircraft raided Massawa.
 * 1 Mar 1941: HMS Formidable aircraft raided Massawa.
 * May 1941: HMS Hermes provided air cover for Allied operations during the Anglo-Iraqi War after the pro-Nazi  coup d'état.

1942


 * Jan to Apr l942: HMS Hermes raided Italian assets in East Africa.
 * 27 Jan 1942: HMS Indomitable aircraft defended Java.
 * Feb to Apr 1942: Hermes in Indian Ocean; trade protection, then against Japanese Indian Ocean Raid
 * Apr 1941: HMS Hermes provided air cover for Allied operations with Force T [?] after Iran coop.
 * 9 Apr 1942: Japanese carrier planes sank HMS Hermes off Trincomalee, Cylon.
 * May - Nov 1942: Operation Ironclad (Madagascar) [CARRIERS?]
 * 10 Sept 1942: Operation Stream Line Jane (Madagascar) [CARRIERS?]

1943

1944


 * 19 April 1944: HMS Illustrious and USS Saratoga aircraft raided Northern Sumatra during Operation Cockpit.
 * 17 May 1944: HMS Illustrious and USS Saratoga aircraft raided Surabaya during Operation Transom.
 * 19 June 1944: HMS Illustrious aircraft raided Port Blair during Operation Pedal.
 * 25 July 1944: HMS Illustrious and HMS Victorious aircraft raided Northern Sumatry during Operation Crimson.
 * 24 August 1944: HMS Indomitable and HMS Victorious aircraft raided Pedang during Operation Banquet.
 * 18 November 1944: HMS Indomitable and Illustrious raided Northern Sumatra during Operation Outflank.
 * 17 October 1944: HMS Indomitable and Victorious aircraft raided kPort Blair during Operation Millet.
 * 17 December 1944: HMS Indomitable and HMS Illustrious aircraft raided Northern Sumatra during Operation Robson.

1945


 * 4 January 1945: HMS Victorious, HMS Indomitable, and HMS Indefatigable raided Sumatran oil refineries during Operation Lentil.
 * 21 Jan 1945: HMS Ameer (CVE) aircraft spotted for battleship guns on HMS Queen Elizabeth during Operation Matador.
 * 24 January 1945: HMS Illustrious, HMS Victorious, HMS Indomitable and HMS Indefatigable aircraft raided Sumatran oil refineries during Operation Meridian.

Fleet aircraft carriers Ship 	Nationality 	Date joined 	Date left 	Fate/ next assignment Eagle 	 UK 	<September 1939 March 1941 	May 1940 May 1941 	Mediterranean Fleet South Atlantic and Africa Station Formidable 	 UK 	March 1942 	August 1942 	Operation Torch Hermes 	 UK 	<March 1942 	9 April 1942 	Sunk by Japanese air attack off Ceylon (Sri Lanka) Illustrious 	 UK 	May 1942 January 1944 	January 1943 November 1944 	Joined Mediterranean Fleet Joined British Pacific Fleet Indefatigable 	 UK 	November 1944 	November 1944 	Joined British Pacific Fleet Indomitable 	 UK 	January 1942 July 1944 	July 1942 November 1944 	Joined Mediterranean Fleet Joined British Pacific Fleet Saratoga 	 US 	April 1944 	May 1944 	USA for refit Unicorn 	 UK 	January 1944 	December 1944 	Joined British Pacific Fleet. Usually used as an aircraft maintenance ship Victorious 	 UK 	July 1944 	November 1944 	Joined British Pacific Fleet Escort aircraft carriers Ship 	Nationality 	Date joined 	Date left 	Fate/ next assignment Activity 	 UK 	April 1945 	September 1945 	to UK into reserve Ameer 	 UK 	June 1944 	October 1945 	Returned to USN Atheling 	 UK 	May 1944 	December 1944 	Joined USN for operations SW Pacific Attacker 	 UK 	April 1945 	September 1945 	Returned to USN Battler 	 UK 	November 1943 	December 1944 	Joined Home Fleet Begum 	 UK 	April 1944 June 1945 	January 1945 October 1945 	Refit on Clyde Returned to USN Emperor 	 UK 	March 1945 	November 1945 	Returned t o USN Empress 	 UK 	February 1945 	November 1945 	Returned to UK for pay-off, then to USN[1] Hunter 	 UK 	March 1945 	October 1945 	Returned to USN Khedive 	 UK 	February 1945 	September 1945 	Returned to UK for pay-off, then to USN[2] Pursuer 	 UK 	August 1945 	November 1945 	Returned to UK for pay-off, then to USN[3] Searcher 	 UK 	August 1945 	August 1945 	Returned to UK for pay-off, then to USN[4] Shah 	 UK 	April 1944 	September 1945 	Returned to UK for pay-off, then to USN[5] Stalker 	 UK 	March 1945 	October 1945 	Returned to UK for pay-off, then to USN[6] Trouncer 	 UK 	October 1945 	October 1945 	Returned to UK for pay-off, then to USN[7] Trumpeter 	 UK 	July 1945 	January 1946 	Returned to UK for pay-off, then to USN[8] Heavy cruisers
 * List of Eastern Fleet ships

=Operational Damage to Carriers (SEPARATE ARTICLE)=

[COMPLETE TABLE OF DAMAGE INCIDENTS- ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC WITH SUMMARY TABLE FOR USE IN OTHER ARTICLES]

=Design and capability (SEPARATE ARTICLE)=

[Several additions, deletions, and comments were made to this section on 1/20/22 by GraemeLegget. Key issues are whether detailed information is useful and whether it should be included in the article until the data is more complete. Editor also regarded text as unencyclopediac and more essay-like.

"This article is written like a personal reflection, personal essay, or argumentative essay that states a Wikipedia editor's personal feelings or presents an original argument about a topic. Please help improve it by rewriting it in an encyclopedic style. (January 2022) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)"

"curprev 2022-01-20T16:22:45‎ GraemeLeggett talk contribs‎ 15,903 bytes +56‎ →‎"Experimental" Designs: more important that donor hull undothank Tag: Visual edit curprev 2022-01-20T16:16:30‎ GraemeLeggett talk contribs‎ 15,847 bytes −42‎ →‎Japanese aircraft carriers: finish removing last of contextless OR undothank Tag: Visual edit curprev 2022-01-20T16:16:01‎ GraemeLeggett talk contribs‎ 15,889 bytes −1,509‎ →‎Japanese aircraft carriers: cleanup table formatting undothank Tag: Visual edit curprev 2022-01-20T16:12:33‎ GraemeLeggett talk contribs‎ 17,398 bytes −55‎ move references and remove commentary on state of article undothank Tag: Visual edit curprev 2022-01-20T16:11:10‎ GraemeLeggett talk contribs‎ 17,453 bytes −16,884‎ →‎All carriers: not a useful table, too much detail intended and too little filled in undothank curprev 2022-01-20T16:10:09‎ GraemeLeggett talk contribs‎ 34,337 bytes +32‎ reads like an essay undothank Tag: Visual edit"]

Aircraft carrier design involved trade-offs between offensive striking power and defensive survivability. The more carrier tonnage allocated to guns and armor for protection, the less was available for carrying and launching aircraft, the warship's principal weapon. Combatant nations of World War II placed varying emphasis on these factors depending upon conditions in their principal operating theater, their preferred operating tactics, and their industrial capability. Experts continue to debate whether increasing carrier survivatility through increased anti-aircraft armament and armored flight decks was optimal during World War II since doing so necessitated reductions in the number of carrier aircraft available to inflict damage upon the enemy. For example, would designing the USS  Yorktown so that it was more likely to survive the punishment it took at the Battle of Midway have been desirable if its carrying a smaller air group resulted in fewer Japanese carriers being sunk?

SUMMARY TABLE WITH REPRESENTATIVE DESIGN INFO, FOR CLASSES?

American Designs. Americans perceived their principal operating theater would be the Pacific, where immense distances between refueling bases placed a premium on carrier speed and range. Threats were likely to come from other warships, either as enemy aircraft or ship's artillery, rather than from land-based planes or guns. Enemy carrier-launched strikes would involve fewer aircraft and each would carry less of a payload, comprised of 250lb and 500lb bombs, compared to land-based aircraft. Also, war-games indicated the ability to strike first and decisively was important for success. Strong first strikes against enemy carriers were expected to reduce or eliminate their ability to counter attack, reducing the need for strong defensive measures. As a result of these considerations, Americans placed greater emphasis on aircraft striking power than upon survivability when attacked. Accordingly, carriers were designed to carry more aircraft and aircraft components at the expense of more anti-aircraft guns and flight deck armor. To further increase the number of aircraft carried, large numbers of them were kept on the flight deck in addition to those kept below in hangers. In the Pacific, storms that could toss or wash deck-park aircraft overboard were uncommon and could often be navigated around. Finally, within a year of the beginning of the Pacific War, America's industrial capacity enabled them to rapidly make good their carrier losses, enabling them to take greater risks with their carriers to achieve greater success.

British Designs. The British also operated in the Pacific but, for most of the war, their principal areas of carrier operation were the coastal Atlantic, Mediterranean, and North Sea. In these areas, there were no enemy carriers. The threat was from land-based, potentially multi-engine, heavy bombers in potentially overwhelming numbers that could deliver heavy payloads comprised of 1,000lb bombs or more and be protected by equally large numbers of fighter aircraft. Unlike with relatively few and small enemy attacking aircraft in the Pacific, it was almost assured that some attacking aircraft would penetrate a fighter and anti-aircraft screen. Further, attacks from land bases could be sustained after airfield repairs, unlike in the Pacific where the launch platform could be sunk or sufficiently damaged to require an immediate return to dry-dock facilities. Accordingly emphasis was placed on surviving an attack such that a counter attack could be launched. Survivability was enhanced with more anti-aircraft guns and flight deck armor at the expense of larger aircraft groups. Additional anti-aircraft armament also made carriers more self-sufficient for defense and less reliant upon other warships for screening. Also, heavy weather was more common and less avoidable in the Atlantic theater than in the Pacific. and deck-parking to increase aircraft group size was less common.

Japanese Designs, The Japanese navy emphasized offensive capability consistent with their strategic vision of orchestrating and winning a single, decisive battle.

https://www.quora.com/Why-in-the-Pacific-war-were-Japanese-aircraft-carriers-sunk-so-easily-compared-to-Americans "flimsy, barely seaworthy vessels which maximized their offensive capability (both in the number of aircraft, the payload of the aircraft and range of aircraft) on expense of defence. They had poor anti-aircraft gunnery, poor fire control and very little or no armour." ...Taiho was top-heavy, impossible to ventilate safely and her lift shafts extended beneath the waterline."

Aircraft carrier design prior to the outbreak of World War II was constrained by limitations of international agreements among the major navel powers intended to avoid an arms race over capital ships. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 limited carrier displacement for the five signers to 27,000 tons ( long tons of 2,240 lbs/ton), except that each could convert two existing battleship hulls to carriers having displacements up to 33,000 tons. Armament for carriers was limited to a maximum of ten guns with a maximum caliber of 8 inches. Aircraft carriers were defined as having displacements of at least 10,000 tons and used exclusively for launching and landing aircraft. The overall tonnage limit for carriers was 135,000 tons for Britain and America, 81,000 for Japan, and 60,000 tons for Italy and France.

"Experimental" Designs Only four aircraft carriers were in service or under construction at the time the Washington Naval Treaty was agreed to. These four were considered "experimental" and not included as part of the treaty's overall tonnage limitations. They were relatively small in size and carried a relatively small number of aircraft. These were HMS Argus (a converted liner), USS  Langley (a converted collier), IJN Hōshō (laid down as a carrier), and HMS  Hermes (laid down as a carrier). [was Hermes the 4th??? or Furious as stated in Wikipedia article for Washington Treaty??]

New Designs

Hermes, Ranger, Hosho, Ryujo were new designs

Converted Merchant Ships

Converted Battleships

Lexington, Saratoga, Furious, Courageous, Glorious, Akagi and Kaga were converted battlecruisers.

Armoured Aircraft Carrier Design Evolution
 * http://www.armouredcarriers.com/landing

Values are typically "as designed" or "as built", not as later modified.

Confirm type of tonage used for displacement values and whether values are loaded or unloaded.

Add number of hanger decks? (Ark Royal was designed to carry a large number of aircraft and had two hangar deck levels.)

Add number of flight decks on each ship?? (IJN design had multiple decks but this may have been before PH.)

Date commissioned as an aircraft carrier

Displacement in tons (2,000 lbs "standard" and "full load" (aka "deep load") [a "long ton" is 2,240 and is specified in the Washington Naval Treaty. a "metric ton" is 2,205 lbs.]

Length and beam in feet overall (not at waterline unless otherwise noted. Yorktown and Enterprise had beam of 83 w/l and 109 o/a.  Wasp was 81 w/l.  For Panama Canal passage?)

Speed in knots

Range in nautical miles

Heavy anti-aircraft guns were 3" to 8", typically 4" to 5") (3" for IJN Hōshō; 8" for Akagi, Lexington class)

Light anti-aircraft guns are a mix of, e.g., 40mm and 20mm guns; includes earlier 1.1" and 0.50 cal (Yorktown1" that became "obsolete" during the war.

Belt armor in inches

Deck armor in inches Most had a single catapult. Yorktown and Enterprise had 2 on the flight deck and one on the hanger deck. Ark Royal had two. Wasp had 2 on the flight deck and 2 on the hanger deck and three elevators.)

Aircraft is shown as total available to launch plus additional number in storage (e.g., 6+8 indicate six operational and eight in storage). If a range is shown, it indicates either that the specific mix of fighters/dive bombers/torpedo bombers aboard would result in different number of operational aircraft or that a shift occured as the war progressed to carry more aircraft.

SELECTED ESCORT CARRIERS

Long Island aircraft: 16 hanger + 46 flight deck Audacity: no hanger; aircraft stored on flight deck

=TEMP: WORKING AREA FOR AIRCRAFT CARRIER ARTICLE (NOT TO BE INCLUDED)=

Aircraft carrier development prior to World War II
[to be completed??]

American Fleets, Carrier Divisions, Task Forces with Carriers
United States Fleet (1922 - 1945)

Atlantic Fleet (1906 - )
At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack (7 Dec 1941), the Atlantic Fleet had two carriers in one division:

USN Carrier Division Three USN Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet
 * Ranger (CV-4)
 * Wasp (CV-7)
 * Yorktown (CV-5)
 * Hornet (CV-8)
 * Long Island (CVE-1)

At the beginning of 1942, the USN Atlantic Fleet had, in Carrier Division 3, the fleet carriers Ranger, Hornet, and Wasp and the escort carrier Long Island. [THIS PARA IS DUPLICATED AT ATLANTIC "Organizations, Commanders, and Strategies"]

[Pacific Fleet]

 * TF-8 (Feb-1942); Yorktown, Enterprise; US raids on Marshall Islands, US raids on Wake and Marcus Islands
 * TF-17; dates; Yorktown, Enterprise, Hornet; US raids on Marshalls and Gilberts, Invasion of Lae-Salamaua, Battle of Coral Sea, Battle of Midway.
 * TF-61; dates; Enterprise; support American Landings on Guadalcanal
 * TF-34; ?; {part of 102 warships for Operation Torch:} Ranger, Sangamon CVE, Suwannee CVE, Chenango CVE, Santee CVE { part of 300 warships for Battle of Layte Gulf:} 8 fleet, 8 light, 18 escort carriers
 * TF-50; Enterprise;
 * TF-50; Enterprise;

1941
USN Task Force 8- Wake Island Reforcement (Nov - Dec 1941)
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)

USN Task Force 12- Midway Air Reinforcement (Dec 1941)
 * USS Lexington (CV-2)

USN Task Force 1- Covering Task Force, Pacific Fleet (Dec 1941)
 * USS Saratoga (CV-3)

USN Task Force 2- Recon/Raiding Force, Pacific Fleet (Dec 1941)
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)

USN Task Force 3- Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet (Dec 1941)
 * USS Lexington (CV-2)

1942
USN Task Force 17 (Dec 1941 - June 1942)
 * USS Saratoga (CV-3)
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10)

USN Task Force 11 (Dec 1941 - May 1942)
 * USS Lexington (CV-2)

USN Task Force 18 (1 Apr - Sept 1942)
 * USS Hornet (CV-8) Merged into TF-16 13 Apr 1942
 * USS Wasp (CV-7) Transit Panamal Canal 10 June 1942; sunk 15 Sept 1942.

USN Task Force 16 (Feb - Nov 1942):
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)
 * USS Hornet (CV-8) [to TF-17 when??]

USN Task Force 1 (May-June 1942)
 * USS Long Island (CVE-1)

USN Invasion of Guadalcanal (7 Aug 1942) US Operation WATCHTOWER (aka "Operation Shoestring") USN Task Force 61 (Fletcher) USN Task Group 61.1 (Noyes) USN Task Unit 61.1.1 aka Task Force 11: USN Task Unit 61.1.2 aka Task Force 16: USN Task Unit 61.1.3 aka Task force 18:
 * USS Saratoga (CV-3)
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)
 * USS Wasp (CV-7)

USN Task Force 17 (Aug - Oct 1942)
 * USS Hornet (CV-8)

USN Task Force 11 (June 1942 - Feb? 1943)
 * USS Saratoga (CV-3)

USN Reinforcement of Guadalcanal's Henderson Field (7-11 Oct 1942) USN Task Force 63: USN Task Unit 63.8: USN Task Group 63.8.1:
 * USS Copahee (CVE-12)

USN Task Force 32 (Dec 1942)
 * USS Sangamon (CVE-26)
 * USS Suwannee (CVE-27)

1943
USN Task Force 13 (Dec 1942 - Jan 1943)
 * USS Chenango (CVE-28)

USN Task Force 18 (Jan - Feb 1943)
 * USS Chenango (CVE-28)
 * USS Suwannee (CVE-27)

USN Task Force 18 (Feb 1943)
 * USS Chenango (CVE-28)
 * USS Suwannee (CVE-27)

USN Task Force 14 (Mar 1943):
 * USS Saratoga (CV-3)

Task Force 15 (Mar 1943):
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)

Task Force 51 (Apr - June 1943) Attu Landings Operation "Landcrab" Task Group 51.1 - Support Group
 * USS Nassau (CVE-16) Air Squadrons VC-21,VMO-155

USN Task Force 36 (20 June - 7 Oct ? 1943) [or to Aug 1943 for Saratoga?] USN Task Group 36.3:
 * USN Saratoga (CV-3)
 * HMS Victorious (R-38)

USN Task Force 50 (Aug 1943) Raid on Rabaul USN Task Group 50.3
 * USN Essex (CV-9)
 * USN Bunker Hill (CV-17)
 * USN Independence (CV-22)

USN Task Force 38 (Aug - Sept 1943)
 * USN Saratoga (CV-3)

USN Task Force 37 (Aug - Sept 1943)
 * Breton (CVE-23)

USN Task Force 15 (Sept 1943):
 * USS Essex (CV-9)
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10)
 * USS Independence (CVL-22)

USN Task Force 11 (Sept 1943):
 * USS Princeton (CVL-23)
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24)

USN Task Force 15 (Sept 1943)
 * USS Essex (CV-9)

USN Task Force 50 (18-19 Sept 1943) Raid on Tarawa and Makin Island
 * USS Lexington (CV-16)
 * USS Princeton (CVL-23)
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24)

USN Task Force 14 (Oct 1943):
 * USS Essex (CV-9)
 * USS Lexington (2) (CV-16)
 * USS Yorktown (2) (CV-10)
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25)
 * USS Independence (CVL-22)
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24)

USN Task Force 38 (Oct - Nov 1943):
 * USS Saratoga (CV-3)
 * USS Princeton (CVL-23)

USN Task Force 53 (Nov 1943) Preparations for Invasion of Gilbert Islands: Task Group 53.3:
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)
 * USS Essex (CV-9)
 * USS Independence (CVL-22)

USN Task Force 37 (Dec 1943 - Jan 1944): Task Group 37.2:
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17)
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26)

USN Task Force 50 (Nov - Dec 1943) Invasion of Gilbert Islands; USN Operation GALVANIC USN Task Group 50.1 - Carrier Interceptor Force - Mili Landing USN Task Group 50.2 - Northern Carrier Group - Makin Landing USN Task Group 50.3 -Souther Carrier Group - Tarawa Landing [USN Task Group 50.3 - 43/12 (?? from 43/11/25 ??) [DOUBLE COUNTED?] USN Task Group 50.4 - Relief Carrier Group - Nauru Landing USN Task Group 50.4 - from 43/11/25 [DOUBLE COUNTED?] USN Task Group 50.8 - Bombardement Group USN Task Group 52.13 CarDiv24- Northern Attack Force (created 23 Nov): [DUPLICATION HERE] USN Task Force 52: USN Task Group 52.3 - Air Support Group: USN CVE CarDiv24: USN Task Force 53: USN Task Group 53.6 - Carrier (Support) Group: USN Task Unit 53.6.1 CarDiv22:
 * USS Saratoga (CV-3) Air Squadrons VF-12, VB-12, VT-12
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6) Air Squadrons VF-2, VB-6, VT-6
 * USS Essex (CV-9) Air Squadrons VF-9, VB-9, VT-9; Until 8 Dec
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10) Air Squadrons VF-5, VB-5, VT-5
 * USS Lexington (CV-16) Air Squadrons VF-16, VB-16, VT-16
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17) Air Squadrons VF-17, VB-17, VT-17
 * USS Independence (CVL-22) Air Squadrons VF-6, VF-22, VC-22
 * USS Princeton (CVL-23) Air Squadrons VF-23, VT-23
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24) Air Squadrons VF-6, VF-24, VC-22
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25) Air Squadrons VF-6, VF-25, VC-25
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26) Air Squadrons VF-30,VC-30; Until 8 Dec
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10)
 * USS Lexington (CV-16)
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25)
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24)
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26) Until 8 Dec
 * USS Essex (CV-9)
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17) Until 8 Dec
 * USS Independence (CVL-22) Until 23 Nov
 * USS Essex (CV-9)
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24)]
 * USS Saratoga (CV-3) Until 30 Nov
 * USS Princeton (CVL-23)
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17) After 8 Dec?
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26) After 8 Dec?
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17) After 8 Dec?
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26) After ?
 * USS Nassau (CVE-16) attached from TG 53.6
 * USS Barnes (CVE-20)
 * USS Liscome Bay (CVE-56) Air Squadron VC-39
 * USS Coral Sea (CVE-57) Air Squadron VC-33
 * USS Corregidor (CVE-58) Air Squadron VC-41 From 28 Nov
 * USS Liscome Bay (CVE-56) Air Squadron VC-39
 * USS Coral Sea (CVE-57) Air Squadron VC-33
 * USS Corregidor (CVE-58) Air Squadron VC-41
 * USS Sangamon (CVE-26) CVEG-37 Air Squadrons VF-37, VC-37
 * USS Suwannee (CVE-27) CVEG-60 Air Squadrons VF-60, VC-60
 * USS Chenango (CVE-28) CVEG-35 Air Squadrons VF-35, VC-35
 * USS Barnes (CVE-20) Launched Air Squadron VF-1 to Tarawa 25 Nov
 * USS Nassau (CVE-16) Launched Air Squadron VF-1 to Tarawa 25 Nov; From 18-28 Nov 11/18; Future Tarawa garrison, not part of CarDiv22

1944
USN Task Force 58 created (6 Jan 1944)

USN Task Force 58 (Jan - Feb 1944) Invasion of Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands; Operation FLINTLOCK CTF RAdm Marc A. Mitscher USN Task Group 58.1 - Roi-Namur Landing USN Task Unit 58.1.5 - Carrier Unit: USN Task Group 58.2 - Maloelap Landing: USN Task Group 58.3 - Eniwetok Landing: [ENIWETOK? NOT KWAJALEIN??] USN Task Group 58.4 - Wotje Landing:
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6) CVG-10 Air Squadrons VF-10, VB-10, VT-10
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10) CVG-5 Air Squadrons VF-5, VB-5, VT-5
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24) CVG-24 Air Squadrons VF-24, VT-24
 * USS Essex (CV-9) CVG-9 Air Squadrons VF-9, VB-9, VT-9
 * USS Intrepid (CV-11) CVG-6 Air Squadrons VF-6, VB-6, VT-6, VF(N)-78
 * USS Cabot (CVL-28) CVG-31 Air Squadrons VF-31, VT-31
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17) CVG-17 Air Squadrons VF-18, VB-17, VT-17
 * USS Monterey (CV-26) CVG-30 Air Squadrons VF-30, VT-30
 * USS Cowpens (CV-25) CVG-25 Air Squadrons VF-25, VT-25
 * USS Saratoga (CV-3) CVG-12 Air Squadrons VF-12, VB-12, VT-12
 * USS Princeton (CV-23) CVG-23 Air Squadrons VF-23, VT-23
 * USS Langley (CV-27) CVG-32 Air Squadrons VF-32, VT-32

USN Task Force 51 (Jan - Feb 1944) Invasion of Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands; Operation FLINTLOCK CVE 	11 USN Task Group USN Task Group 51.2 - Majuro Attack Group USN Task Group 52.9 - Southern Carrier Group: USN Task Unit 52.9.1 - CarDiv24: USN Task Force 53 - Northern Attack Force (Roi-Namur): USN Task Group 53.6 - Northern Carrier Group: USN CarDiv22:
 * USS Nassau (CVE-16) Air Squadron VC-66
 * USS Natoma Bay(CVE-62) Air Squadron VC-63
 * USS Manila Bay (CVE-16 Air Squadron VC-7
 * USS Coral Sea' (CVE-57) Air Squadron VC-33
 * USS Corregidor (CVE-58) Air Squadron VC-41
 * USS Sangamon (CVE-26) CVEG-37 Air Squadrons VF-37, VC-37
 * USS Suwannee (CVE-27) CVEG-60 Air Squadrons VF-60, VC-60
 * USS Chenango (CVE-28) CVEG-35 Air Squadrons VF-35, VC-35

USN Task Force 51 (Jan - Feb 1944) Invasion of Enewetak Atoll in the Marshall Islands; Operation CATCHPOLE USN Task Group 51.17 - Fire Support Group 3 CVE

USN Task Force 12 (Jan-Feb 1944)
 * USS Lexington (CV-16)

USN "HAILSTONE" - Truk raid (17-18 Feb 1944) USN Task Force 58: USN Task Group 58.1: USN Task Group 58.2: USN Task Group 58.3:
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6) CVG-10 Air Squadrons VF-10, VB-10, VT-10
 * USS Yorktown (CV-5) CVG-5 Air Squadrons VF-5, VB-5, VT-5
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24) CVG-24 Air Squadrons VF-24, VT-24
 * USS Essex (CV-9) CVG-9 Air Squadrons VF-9, VB-9, VT-9
 * USS Intrepid (CV-11) CVG-6 Air Squadrons VF-6, VB-6, VT-6, VF(N)-78
 * USS Cabot (CVL-28) CVG-31 Air Squadrons VF-31, VT-31
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17) CVG-17 Air Squadrons VF-18, VB-17, VT-17
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26 CVG-30 Air Squadrons VF-30, VT-30
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25) CVG-25 Air Squadrons VF-25, VT-25

USN Task Force 50 (18 Feb 1944) Night Strike on Truk USN Task Group 50.9:
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25)

USN Task Force 50 (18 Mar 1944) Raid on Mili Atoll USN Task Group 50.10:
 * USS Lexington (CV-16)

USN Task Force 50 (15 Mar - 7 Apr 1944) TG 50.15 - Fast Carrier Supply Group Resupply TF-58 at Majuro and Tulagi: CarDiv22:
 * USS Sangamon (CVE-26) Air Squadrons VF-37,VT-37)
 * USS Suwannee (CVE-27) Air Squadrons VF-60, VT-60)
 * USS Chenango (CVE-28) Air Squadrons VF-35, VT-35)
 * USS Santee (CVE-29) Air Squadrons VF-26, VT-26)

28 Mar 1944 "DESECRATE I." - Palau Raid 1944/03 USN Task Force 58: USN Task Group 58.1 USN Task Group 58.2 Cabot (CV-28) CVG-31 USN Task Group 58.3 USN Task Group 50.10: USN Task Group 58.5 USN Task Group 58.9
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25) CVG-25
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17) CVG-8
 * USS Hornet (CV-12) CVG-2
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26) CVG-30
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10)
 * USS Lexington (CV-16)
 * USS Princeton (CVL-23) CVG-23
 * USS Langley (CVL-27) CVG-32
 * USS Saratoga (CV-3)
 * USS Lexington (CV-16)
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25)

USN Task Force 36 (Mar 1944) Invasion of Emirau USN Task Group 36.1 USN Task Group 36.3 From 2 Apr
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)
 * USS Manila Bay (CVE-61) Air Squadron VC-7
 * USS Natoma Bay (CVE-62) Air Squadron VC-63;
 * USS Corregidor (CVE-58)
 * USS Coral Sea (CVE-57) Air Squadron VC-33

Task Force 11- Hunter Killer CVE Groups Protecting Pearl Harbor to Marshall Islands Routes (Mar - May 1944) USN Task Group 11.1: USN Task Group 11.2:
 * USS Altamaha (CVE-18)
 * USS Kalinin Bay (CVE-68)
 * USS Fanshaw Bay (CVE-70)

USN Task Force 12 (Mar - June 1944) USN Task Group 12.4:
 * USS Barnes (CVE-20)
 * USS Nehenta Bay (CVE-74)

"RECKLESS" & "PERSECUTION" (13 Apr - 14 May 1944) 58.1 strike Wakde & Sawar Invasion Battle of Wakde 18-21 May 1944 US Operation STRAIGHT LINE 58.2 strike Wakde, Hollandia Battle of Hollandia Operation RECKLESS 58.3 strike Hollandia, support Tanahmerah Bay Landing 44/04/29 	strike Truk 44/04/30 	strike Palaus

USN Task Force 58: USN Task Group 58.1: USN Task Group 58.2: USN Task Group 58.3:
 * USS Hornet (CV-12)
 * USS Belleau Wood (CV-24)
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25)
 * USS Bataan (CVL-29)
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17)
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10)
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26)
 * USS Cabot (CV-28)
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)
 * USS Lexington (CV-16)
 * USS Princeton (CVL-23)
 * USS Langley (CVL-27)

USN Task Force 34 (Apr - May 1944) USN Task Group 34.9 USN Task Group 34.9.3
 * USS Petrof Bay (CVE-80) Transferred aircraft to TF-48 29 Apr

USN Task Force 19 (Apr - June 1944)
 * USS Wasp (CV-18)
 * USS Midway (CVE-63)
 * USS Franklin (CV-13)

USN Marcus-Wake Raid USN Task Force 58: USN Task Group 58.6 (15-31 May 1944):
 * USS Wasp (CV-18) CVG-14
 * USS Essex (CV-9) CVG-15
 * USS San Jacinto (CVL-30)

USN Task Force 30- Hunter Killer Group (May - June 1944) USN Task Group 30.4:
 * USS Hoggart Bay (CVE-75)

USN Invasion of Saipan in the Marina Islands (15 June - 9 July 1944) Part of USN Operation FORAGER USN Task Force 58: USN Task Group 58.1 CarDiv5: [BEFORE BATTLE OF PHILIPPINE SEA 19-20 JUNE] USN Task Group 58.1 CarDiv5 From 30 June: [AFTER BATTLE OF PHILIPPINE SEA 19-20 JUNE] USN Task Group 58.2: USN Task Group 58.3: USN Task Group 58.4
 * USS Hornet (CV-12)CVG-2)
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10) CVG-1; Until 31 July
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24) CVG-24; Until 2 Aug
 * USS Bataan (CVL-29) CVG-50
 * USS Franklin (CV-13) From 29 July
 * USS Hornet (CV-12) CVG-2
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10) CVG-1 Until 29 July
 * USS Bataan (CVL-29) CVG-50 Until 12 July
 * USS Cabot (CVL-28) CVG-31 From 13 July
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17) CVG-8
 * USS Wasp (CV-18) CVG-14; From 30 June
 * USS Franklin (CV-13) 30 June - 29 July
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26) CVG-28; Until 07/23),
 * USS Cabot (CVL-28) CVG-31; Until 13 July
 * USS Lexington (CV-16) CVG-16
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6) CVG-10
 * USS San Jacinto (CVL-30) CVG-51
 * USS Princeton (CVL-23) CVG-27; Until ? July
 * USS Essex (CV-9) CVG-15
 * USS Langley (CVL-27) CVG-32
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25) CVG-25: Until 10 July
 * USS Princeton (CVL-23) CVG-27: 14 July - 2 Aug
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24) From 2 Aug

USN Transport to Marshall and Mariana Islands (May - Aug 1944) USN Operation FORAGER Mariana and Palau Islands campaign Task Force 51: USN Task Group 51.18: USN Task Unit 51.18.10: USN Task Unit 51.18.11 USN Task Group 52.11- Carrier Support Group 2 USN Task Unit 52.11.1 CarDiv26: USN Task Unit 52.11.2 CarDiv24: USN Task Group 52.14 - Carrier Support Group 1: USN Task Unit 52.14.1 CarDiv25: USN Task Unit 52.14.2: USN Task Force 53 - Southern Attack Force, Operation SEVEDORE (Guam) USN Task Group 53.7 - Carrier Support Group USN CarDiv22: USN Task Unit 53.7.1 From 21 June: USN CarDiv24: USN Task Force 57 (Formed 18 June 1944): USN Task Group 57.4: USN Task Unit 57.4.11 [AND/OR 57.19.7; SEE BELOW] USN Task Group 57.5: USN Task Unit 57.5.5: USN Task Group 57.19: USN Task Unit 57.19.7:
 * USS White Plains (CVE-66)
 * USS Copahee (CVE-12)
 * USS Kitkun Bay (CVE-71) Air Squadron VC-5
 * USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73) Air Squadron VC-10
 * USS Sangamon (CVE-26)
 * USS Suwannee (CVE-27)
 * USS Coral Sea (CVE-57) Air Squadron VC-33; From 20 June
 * USS Corregidor (CVE-58) Air Squadron VC-41
 * USS Midway (CVE-63) Air Squadron VC-65
 * USS Fanshaw Bay (CVE-70) Air Squadron VC-68; Until 18 June
 * USS White Plains (CVE-66) Air Squadron VC-4
 * USS Kalinin Bay (CVE-68) Air Squadron VC-3; From July
 * USS Nehenta Bay (CVE-74)
 * USS Sangamon (CVE-26) Air Squadrons VF-37,VT-37)
 * USS Suwannee (CVE-27) Air Squadrons VF-60, VT-60)
 * USS Chenango (CVE-28) Air Squadrons VF-35, VT-35)
 * USS Coral Sea (CVE-57) Air Squadron VC-33
 * USS Corregidor (CVE-58) Air Squadron VC-41
 * USS Kalinin Bay (CVE-68) Air Squadron VC-3
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26)
 * USS Kalinin Bay (CVE-68)
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26)

USN Task Force 50- Invasion of the Mariana Islands (11 June - July) USN Operation "FORAGER" USN Task Group 50.?: USN Task Group 50.17 - Fueling & Aircraft Replacement Group:
 * USS Manila Bay (CVE-61)
 * USS Natoma Bay (CVE-62)
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26)
 * USS Copahee (CVE-12)
 * USS Breton (CVE-23)

USN Task Force 12 (July - Aug 1944) USN Task Group 12.4- Hunter Killer Group "Forager": USN Task Group 12.7
 * USS Hoggatt Bay (CVE-75)
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10)

USN Task Force 30 (Aug - Nov 1944) Task Group 30.7- Hunter Killer Group: Task Group 30.8 -Fleet Oiler and Transport Carrier Group:
 * USS Hoggatt Bay (CVE-75)
 * USS Barnes (CVE-20)
 * USS Nassau (CVE-16)
 * USS Nehenta Bay (CVE-74)
 * USS Rudyerd Bay (CVE-81)
 * USS Sargent Bay (CVE-83)
 * USS Sitkoh Bay (CVE-86)
 * USS Steamer Bay (CVE-87)

USN Task Force 12 (Sept 1944) USN Task Group 12.5:
 * USS Monteray (CVL-26)

USN Task Force 19 (Sept 1944 - Aug 1945): Note: CarDiv29: Makin Island, Lunga Point, Bismarck Sea, Salamaua (Oct 1944)
 * USS Ticonderoga (CV-14)
 * USS Makin Island (CVE-93)
 * USS Lunga Point (CVE-94)
 * USS Bismarck Sea (CVE-95)
 * USS Salamaua (CVE-96)
 * USS Kasaan Bay (CVE-69)
 * USS Tripoli (CVE-64)
 * USS Saratoga (CV-3)
 * USS Vella Gulf (CVE-111)

USN Task Force 32- Peleliu and Angaur Landings (15 Sept 1944 - 27 Nov 1944): Mariana and Palau Islands campaign USN Task Group 32.4: USN Task Group 32.7 - Western Escort Carrier Group: Task Unit 32.7.1 CarDiv27: USN Task Unit 32.7.2 CarDiv28: USN Task Unit 32.7.3 CarDiv26:
 * USS Kadashan Bay (CVE-76) Until 24 Aug
 * USS Marcus Island (CVE-77) 12 Aug - 24 Aug
 * USS Petrof Bay (CVE-80) 12 Aug - 24 Aug
 * USS Kadashan Bay (CVE-76) Air Squadron VC-20
 * USS Marcus Island (CVE-77) Air Squadron VC-21
 * USS Savo Island (CVE-78) Air Squadron VC-27
 * USS Ommaney Bay (CVE-79) Air Squadron VC-75
 * USS Kalinin Bay (CVE-68) Air Squadron VC-3
 * USS Petrof Bay (CVE-80) Air Squadron VC-76
 * USS Saginaw Bay (CVE-82) Air Squadron VC-78
 * USS White Plains (CVE-66) Air Squadron VC-4)
 * USS Kitkun Bay (CVE-71) Air Squadron VC-5)
 * USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73) Air Squadron VC-10)

USN Task Force 12 (Sept 1944 - Apr 1945) USN Task Group 12.2 (Jan - Feb 1945): USN Task Group 12.3 (Mar - Apr 1945): USN Task Group 12.4: USN Task Group 12.5:
 * USS Saratoga (CV-3)
 * USS Randolph (CV-15)
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17)
 * USS Bennington (CV-20)
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24)
 * USS Corregidor (CVE-58)
 * USS Tulagi (CVE-72)
 * USS Santee (CVE- 29)

USN Task Force 38 (Sept - Oct 1944) [Halsey/Mitscher?] [CTF VAdm Mitscher, from 10/30 VAdm McCain] [Layte] Note: 7 Oct 1944? 9 CV, 8 CVL, 6 BB, 4 CA, 10 CL, 58 DD USN Task Group 38.1: USN Task Group 38.2: USN Task Group 38.3: USN Task Group 38.4:
 * USS Wasp (CV-18) From 5 Nov [IF NOV, NOT SEPT/OCT]
 * USS Hornet (CV-12) From 25 Sept
 * USS Hancock (CV-19) 22-26 Oct, otherwise in TG 38.2
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10) From 7 Nov) [IF NOV, NOT SEPT/OCT]
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25)
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26) From 17 Sept
 * USS Intrepid (CV-11)
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17 Until 23 Oct
 * USS Hancock (CV-19) 22 Oct detached to TG 38.1; Hancock transferred from 38.1 back to 38.2; From 17 Nov [IF NOV, NOT SEPT/OCT]
 * USS Cabot (CVL-28)
 * USS Independence (CVL-22)
 * USS Lexington (CV-16)
 * USS Essex (CV-9)
 * USS Ticonderoga (CV-14) From 30 Oct [CarDiv6] [NOT FOR SEPT OCT?]
 * USS Langley (CVL-27)
 * USS Princeton (CVL-23)
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)
 * USS Franklin (CV-13) Until 20 Oct
 * USS San Jacinto (CVL-30)
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24)

USN Task Force 30- Layte Landing (Oct - Nov 1944) USN Task Group 30.3: USN Task Group 30.7- Hunter Killer Group: USN Task Group 30.8- At Sea Logistics Group:
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25) [in 38.1 in early Oct??]
 * USS Cabot (CVL-28) [in 38.2 in early Oct??]
 * USS Anzio (CVE-57) Squadron VC-82
 * USS Nassau (CVE-16)
 * USS Altamaha (CVE-18)
 * USS Barnes (CVE-20)
 * USS Nehenta Bay (CVE-74) damaged during storm (17 Jan 1945)
 * USS Rudyerd Bay (CVE-81)
 * USS Sargent Bay (CVE-83)
 * USS Shipley Bay (CVE-85)
 * USS Sitkoh Bay CVE-86)
 * USS Steamer Bay (CVE-87)
 * USS Cape Esperance (CVE-88)
 * USS Kwajalein (CVE-98)

[TASK FORCE DID NOT CHANGE MUCH FROM SEPT/OCT; MAYBE DO NOT NEED TO RE STATE IT HERE. SIMILARLY, IT MAY NOT BE NEEDED TO RESTATE TF COMPOSITION FOR MINDORO LANDINGS (LOVE III) IN DEC 1944;] USN Task Force 38 (Nov 1944) [Halsey/[McCain] [McCain from 10/30 [Philippines] USN Task Group 38.1: USN Task Group 38.2: USN Task Group 38.3: USN Task Group 38.4:
 * USS Wasp (CV-18) From 5 Nov
 * USS Hornet (CV-12) From 25 Sept
 * USS Hancock (CV-19)
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10) From 7 Nov)
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25)
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26) From 17 Sept
 * USS Intrepid (CV-11)
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17) Until 23 Oct [TO 38.4 AND NOT IN 38.2 IN NOV?]
 * USS Hancock (CV-19) From 17 Nov [WHERE FOR 26 OCT - 17 NOV?]
 * USS Cabot (CVL-28)
 * USS Independence (CVL-22)
 * USS Lexington (CV-16)
 * USS Essex (CV-9)
 * USS Ticonderoga (CV-14) From 30 Oct [CarDiv6]
 * USS Langley (CVL-27)
 * USS Princeton (CVL-23)
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17)
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10) From 7 Nov) [FROM 38.1 AFTER FRANKLIN DAMAGED???]
 * USS San Jacinto (CVL-30)
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24)

USN Task Force 30- Mindoro Landing (Nov - Dec 1944) USN Task Group 30.7- Antisubmarine Warfare Group: USN Task Group 30.8- At Sea Logistical Group:
 * USS Anzio (CVE-57) Squadron VC-82
 * USS Altamaha (CVE-18) Damaged in Typhoon "Cobra" (18 Dec 1944)
 * USS Nehenta Bay (CVE-74) Damaged in Typhoon "Cobra" (18 Dec 1944)
 * USS Rudyerd Bay (CVE-81)
 * USS Shipley Bay (CVE-85) replacement planes
 * USS Cape Esperance (CVE-88) Damaged in Typhoon "Cobra" (18 Dec 1944)
 * USS Kwajalein (CVE-98)

USN Task Force 30- Luzon Landing (Dec 1944 - Jan 1945) USN Task Group 30.7- Hunter Killer Group: USN Task Group 30.8- 3rd Fleet Logistical Group:
 * USS Anzio (CVE-57)
 * USS Altamaha (CVE-18)
 * USS Nehenta Bay (CVE-74)
 * USS Shipley Bay
 * USS Kwajalein (CVE-98)

USN Task Force 38 (Dec 1944) [Mindoro Landings- Opn Love III] [Halsey/[McCain] USN Task Group 38.1: USN Task Group 38.2: USN Task Group 38.3:
 * USS Essex (CV-9)
 * USS Wasp (CV-18)
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10)
 * USS Ticonderoga (CV-14)
 * USS Langley (CVL-27)
 * USS San Jacinto (CVL-30)
 * USS Lexington (CV-16)
 * USS Hornet (CV-12)
 * USS Hancock (CV-19)
 * USS Independence (CVL-22)
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26)
 * USS Essex (CV-9) [ALSO IN TG 38.1??]
 * USS Ticonderoga (CV-14) [ALSO IN TG 38.1??]
 * USS Langley (CVL-27) [ALSO IN TG 38.1??]

[NO LONGER IN A TG OF TF-38??? what are they doing???]
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25)
 * USS Intrepid (CV-11)
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17)
 * USS Hancock (CV-19)
 * USS Cabot (CVL-28)
 * USS Princeton (CVL-23)
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)
 * USS Bunker Hill (CV-17)
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10)
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24)

1945
USN Task Force 5 - Night Carrier Task Force (Jan 1945)
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6)
 * USS  Essex (CV-9)
 * USS  Independence (CVL-22)

USN Task Force 50- Invasion of Iwo Jima (19 Feb - 26 Mar 1945) USN Operation "Detachment" USN Task Group 58?

USN Task Group 50.7 - Antisubmarine Group: USN Task Unit 50.7.1: USN Task Unit 50.7.3: USN Task Group 50.8 - At Sea Logistic Support Group Replenishment ships: Covering ships: USN Task Force 51 (Jan - Mar 1945) Task Group 51.17: USN Task Force 52 - Amphibious Support Force: USN Task Group 52.2 - Support Carrier Group: USN Task Unit 52.2.1 ComCarDiv26: USN Task Unit 52.2.2 CarDiv29: USN Task Unit 52.2.3 CarDiv25: USN Task Unit 52.2.3 from 45/03/08 USN Task Unit 52.2.4 Attached 21 Feb 1945
 * USS Anzio (CVE-57) Air Squadron VC-82
 * USS Tulagi (CVE-72) Air Squadron VC-92
 * USS Sitkoh Bay (CVE-86)
 * USS Windham Bay (CVE-92)
 * USS Admiralty Islands (CVE-99) 16 Feb - 2 Mar
 * USS Bougainville (CVE-100)
 * USS Attu (CVE-102)
 * USS Shamrock Bay (CVE-84)
 * USS Makassar Strait (CVE-91)
 * USS Rudyerd Bay (CVE-81)
 * USS Natoma Bay (CVE-62) Air Squadron VC-81
 * USS Wake Island (CVE-65) Air Squadron VOC-1
 * USS Petrof Bay (CVE-80) Air Squadron VC-76
 * USS Sargent Bay (CVE-83) Air Squadron VC-83
 * USS Steamer Bay (CVE-87) Air Squadron VC-90
 * USS Makin Island (CVE-93) Air Squadron VC-84
 * USS Lunga Point (CVE-94) Air Squadron VC-85
 * USS Bismarck Sea (CVE-95) Air Squadron VC-86
 * USS Saginaw Bay (CVE-82) Air Squadron VC-88
 * USS Rudyerd Bay (CVE-81) Air Squadron VC-77
 * USS Wake Island (CVE-65) Air Squadron VOC-1
 * USS Tulagi (CVE-72) Air Squadron VC-92
 * USS Saginaw Bay (CVE-82) Air Squadron VC-88 [DUPLICATE]
 * USS Saratoga (CV-3) Until 22 Feb
 * USS Enterprise (CV-6) From 22 Feb

USN Invasion of Okinawa (1 Apr - 22 June 1945) USN Operation "Iceberg" USN Task Force 38 (28 May 1945): USN Task Group 38.1: USN Task Group 38.2: ? USN Task Group 38.3: USN Task Group 38.4: USN Task Force 30- Okinawa Covering Force (28 May - 17 June 1945) USN Task Group 30.7- Antisubmarine Warfare Group: USN Task Group 30.8- Logistic Support Group (ServRon6): USN Task Group 50.7 - Antisubmarine Warfare Group USN Task Group 50.8 - At Sea Logistic Support Group (ServRon6): USN Task Unit 50.8.4 - CVE Plane Transport Unit USN Task Unit 50.8.13: Task Unit 50.8.23: USN Task Force 52- Amphibious Support Force: USN Task Group 52.1 - Support Carrier Group
 * USS Bon Homme Richard (CV-31) From 6 June
 * USS Independence (CVL-22)
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26)
 * USS Hornet (CV-12)
 * USS Bennington (CV-20)
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24)
 * USS San Jacinto (CVL-30)
 * USS Essex (CV-9)
 * USS Shangri-La (CV-38)
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10)
 * USS Ticonderoga (CV-14)
 * USS Anzio (CVE-57)
 * USS Tulagi (CVE-72)
 * USS Block Island (CVE-21) until 16 June
 * USS Windham Bay (CVE-92)
 * USS Salamaua (CVE-96) 4-6 June
 * USS Admiralty Islands (CVE-99) until 15 June
 * USS Bougainville (CVE-100)
 * USS Anzio (CVE-57) 22 Mar - 30 Apr 1945 & from 21 May 1945
 * USS Tulagi (CVE-72)
 * USS Savo Island (CVE-78) 7-16 Apr
 * USS Rudyerd Bay (CVE-81) 17-27 Apr; Attached from 52.1 7 Apr
 * USS Windham Bay (CVE-92)
 * USS Admiralty Islands (CVE-99)
 * USS Bougainville (CVE- 100)
 * USS Attu (CVE-102)
 * USS Shamrock Bay (CVE-84) Detached to 52.1.1 7 Apr; Air Squadron VC-94
 * USS Makassar Strait (CVE-91) Detached 7 Apr to 52.1.2; Air Squadron VC-97
 * USS Shipley Bay (CVE-85) 7-16 May

RESTART HERE TF-52 ICEBERG

Task Unit 52.1.1 Task Unit 52.1.2 ComCarDiv24: Task Unit 52.1.3 ComCarDiv22: USN SpecEscCarGrp - Special Escort Carrier Group  [TF?] Transported 192 F4Us and 30 F6Fs of MAG-31 & MAG-33:
 * USS Makin Island (CVE-93) Air Squadron VC-84
 * USS Fanshaw Bay (CVE-70) Air Squadron VOC-2
 * USS Lunga Point (CVE-94) Air Squadron VC-85
 * USS Natoma Bay (CVE-62) Air Squadron VC-9; Detached 17 Apr - 8 May
 * USS Savo Island (CVE-78) Air Squadron VC-91; Detached to 50.8 on 7 Apr
 * USS Steamer Bay (CVE-87) Air Squadron VC-90; Damaged in collision 25 May
 * USS Anzio (CVE-57) Air Squadron VC-13); Antisubmarine Warfare
 * USS Shamrock Bay (CVE-84) Air Squadron VC-94; 04/07; Attached 7 Apr from TG-50.8
 * USS Hoggatt Bay (CVE-75) Joined 8 May
 * USS Marcus Island (CVE-77) Air Squadron VC-87) Until 29 Apr
 * USS Saginaw Bay (CVE-82) Air Squadron VC-88)
 * USS Sargent Bay (CVE-83) Air Squadron VC-83; Detached to TG-50.8 7-18 Apr
 * USS Petrof Bay (CVE-80) Air Squadron VC-93
 * USS Rudyerd Bay (CVE-81) Air Squadron VC-96; Detached to TG-50.8 17-27 Apr
 * USS Wake Island (CVE-65) Air Squadron VOC-1 Until 3 Apr
 * USS Tulagi (CVE-72) Air Squadron VC-92; Antisubmarine Warfare; Sinks I-44 29 Apr
 * USS Makassar Strait (CVE-91) Attached 7 Apr - 7 May
 * USS Suwannee (CVE-27) CVEG-40: Air Squadrons VF-40, VT-40
 * USS Sangamon (CVE-26) CVEG-33: Air Squadrons VF-33, VT-33; Collision with DE
 * USS Chenango (CVE-28) CVEG-25: Air Squadrons VF-25, VT-25
 * USS Santee (CVE-29) CVEG-24: Air Squadrons VF-24, VT-24
 * USS Block Island (CVE-21) (MCVG-1: VMF-511, VMTB-233) from 5 May
 * USS Gilbert Islands (CVE-107) (MCVG-2: VMF-512, VMTB-143) from 21 May
 * USS Sitkoh Bay (CVE-86) Transported Marine Aircraft Group 31 (MAG-31)
 * USS Breton (CVE-23) Transported Marine Aircraft Group 31 (MAG-31)
 * USS Hollandia (CVE-97) Transported Marine Aviation Training Support Group 33 (MAG-33)
 * USS White Plains (CVE-66) Transported Marine Aviation Training Support Group 33 (MAG-33)

USN Task Force 32- Okinawa (May - July 1945) USN Task Group 32.1 - Support Carrier Group USN Task Unit 32.1.1: USN Task Unit 32.1.3:
 * USS Sargent Bay (CVE-83) From 2 June
 * USS Shipley Bay (CVE-85) 6-22 June
 * USS Salamaua (CVE-96) Until 4 June
 * USS Shamrock Bay (CVE-84) From 31 May
 * USS Makin Island (CVE-93) Unil 1 June
 * USS Lunga Point (CVE-94)
 * USS Natoma Bay (CVE-62)
 * USS Gilbert Islands (CVE-107) Unil 16 June
 * USS Hoggatt Bay (CVE-75)
 * USS Steamer Bay (CVE-87) Air Squadron VC-93; 15-22 June
 * USS Block Island (CVE-106)

USN Task Force 12 (June 1945) USN Task Group 12.4:
 * USS Hancock (CV-19)
 * USS Lexington (CV-16)
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25)

USN Task Force 38- Home Island Raids (July - Aug 1945) USN Task Group 38.1: USN Task Group 38.2: USN Task Group 38.3: USN Task Group 38.4: USN Task Group 38.5 - 45/08/13 - British Pacific Fleet [SEE MORE INFO RE SPECIFIC RAIDS AT valka.] USN Task Force 37- The British Pacific Fleet (July - Aug 1945): USN Task Force 30- Home Island Raids (July - Aug 1945) USN Task Group 30.7- Antisubmarine Warfare Group: USN Task Group 30.8- Third Fleet Logistical Group:
 * USS Wasp (CV-18) From 26 July
 * USS Independence (CVL-22)
 * USS Lexington (CV-16)
 * USS Hancock (CV-19)
 * USS Bennington (CV-20)
 * USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24)
 * USS San Jacinto (CVL-30)
 * USS Essex (CV-9)
 * USS Ticonderoga (CV-14)
 * USS Randolph (CV-15)
 * USS Monterey (CVL-26)
 * USS Cabot (CVL-28)
 * USS Bataan (CVL-29)
 * USS  Essex (CV-9) From 20 Aug
 * USS Shangri-La (CV-38)
 * USS Yorktown (CV-10)
 * USS Bon Homme Richard (CV-31)
 * USS Cowpens (CVL-25)
 * HMS Indefatigable (R10) [DOUBLE COUNTED? SEE TF-37, BELOW]
 * HMS Formidable (67) Air Squadrons 1841, 1842, 1848, and 848.
 * HMS Victorious (38) Air Squadrons 1834, 1836, and 849.
 * HMS Indefatigable (R10) Air Squadrons 887, 894, 1772, and 820.
 * HMS Implacable (86) Air Squadrons 801, 880, 1771, and 828.
 * USS Anzio (CVE-57) Squadron VC-13; sunk I-13 on 16 July
 * USS Chenango (CVE-28) 26 July - ?
 * USS Anzio (CVE-57) 6 July - 19 Aug
 * USS Kitkun Bay (CVE-71) Until 15 Aug
 * USS Nehenta Bay (CVE-74)
 * USS Sitkoh Bay (CVE-86) 25 Aug - 5 Sept
 * USS Steamer Bay (CVE-87) 3 July - 21 July
 * USS Thetis Bay (CVE-90)
 * USS Hollandia (CVE-97)
 * USS Admiralty Islands (CVE-99) 29 June - 21 July)
 * USS Roi (CVE-103)
 * USS Munda (CVE-104) From 20 July
 * USS Gilbert Islands (CVE-107)

USN Task Force 12, Task Group 12.3 (Aug 1945):
 * USS Cabot (CVL-28)
 * USS 'Antietam (CV-36)

USN Task Force 44-Northern Honshu & Hokkaido Surrender Force (Aug - Sept 1945):
 * USS 'Manila Bay (CVE-61)
 * USS 'Fanshaw Bay (CVE-70)
 * USS 'Kitkun Bay (CVE-71)
 * USS 'Nehenta Bay (CVE-74)
 * USS 'Hoggatt Bay (CVE-75)
 * USS 'Savo Island (CVE-78) From 15 Aug

Atlantic Fleets
List of task forces of the Royal Navy for RN Task Forces A to Z
 * https://www.naval-history.net/xGW-RNOrganisation1939-45.htm#2

PROCESSED AND/OR ENTERED IN BATTLES, ETC LIST:
 * UK Mediterranean Fleet (1665 to 1967); ?; Battle of Taranto, Battle of Cape Matapan
 * Force de Raid (Sep-1939); Béarn
 * UK Force L (Oct-1939); Béarn
 * UK Force C (Jul-1940); Eagle; Battle of Calaria
 * UK Force D (Nov-1940); any?; Battle of Spartivento
 * UK Force F (Nov-1940); Ark Royal
 * UK Force H (Nov-1940 to ?-1943?); Argus, Ark Royal, Eagle, Illustrious; British naval formation in western Mediterranean formed after French naval power was eliminated by French armistice with Nazi Germany. Supported operations Catapult, Judgement, Collar, Excess, Grog, Substance, Halberd, Ironclad, Harpoon, Pedestal (part of Torch), Husky, and Avalanche. Also participated in battles of Calabria and Cape Spartivento
 * UK Force I (Oct?-1940); Eagle; Searched for German cruiser Admiral Graf Spee in the Indian Ocean
 * Allied Force W (may-1942); HMS Eagle, USS Wasp; delivered critically needed aircraft to Malta

NOT ENTERED IN BATTLES LIST, ETC:
 * Allied Force X (Oct-1942) British and French ships searching for German shipping in the Atlantic off French West Africa.

RN Home Fleet (3 Sept 1939 - Operated in UK home waters; UK’s main battle force in the European Theater. Principal responsibility was to prevent German warships from breaking out from the North Sea into the Atlantic. Sent most of its heavy units to the Far East after sinking the German battleship ‘’Tirpitz’’ •	HMS ‘’Ark Royal’’ (3 Sept 1939 - •	HMS ‘’Furious’’ (3 Sept 1939 - •	HMS ‘’ Pegasus’’ (3 Sept 1939 -

RN Mediterranean Fleet (3 Sept 1939 - HQ at Alexandria, Egypt •	HMS ‘’Glorious’’ (3 Sept 1939 – •	1.	RN Force A (1940 – Mar 1942) Battle of Calabria (9 July 1940) Force A originally at Malta later to Trincomalee •	HMS ‘’Eagle’’ [or was Eagle in Force B?] 2.	Force B Battle of Calabria (9 July 1940) Force B originally at Malta later to Trincomalee (Mar 1942) 3.	RN Force B Battle of Cape Spartivento (27 Nov 1940) •	HMS ‘’Ark Royal’’ (CV- 1.	RN Force B First Battle of Sirte (17 Dec 1941) •	No carriers 2.	RN Force H (1940- 3 Sept 1943)  Based in Gibraltar; Formed after the Fall of France to replace French naval power in the western Mediterranean;  River Plate, Operation Catapult, Operation Rheinubung, Operation Harpoon, Operation Husky, Operation Torch convoys to Malta.  With the surrender of Italy (3 Sept 1943),  there was no longer a need for heavy naval units in the Mediterranean, and carriers were sent to the Home Fleet and Eastern Fleet. •	HMS ‘’Ark Royal’’ (CV-) (23 June 1940 – 14 Nov 1941) •	HMS ‘’ Eagle’’ (CV-) (Feb – Aug 1942) •	HMS ‘’Illustrious’’ (CV-) 3.	RN Force X     Operation Harpoon (12-15 June 1942) •	HMS ‘’Eagle”  (CV-) •	HMS ‘’Argus (CV-I49) 4.	French Force X (29 Apr 1940) originally to deter Italy; after France fell,  part of Fleet went to Alexandria and another part joined the Vichy French. Attack on Mers-el-Kebir (3 July 1940) Part of RN Operation Catapult to cripple the Vichy French Fleet. When Germany invaded Vichy/the “Free Zone”, the whole of Force X joined the Allies [NEED CLARIFICATION HERE] •	HMS ‘’Ark Royal’’ (CV-) •

RN Western Approaches Command (1939 – 1945) After Fall of France in June 1940, the main North Atlantic Convoys were routed ”around the north of Ireland through the north-western approaches.” 7 Feb 1940, centered at Liverpool

•	Carriers? •

RN South Atlantic Command General responsibility for whole of South Atlantic Based in Freetown, Sierra Leone •	HMS ‘’Albatross’’ (seaplane carrier) •

RN Southern North Sea Command?

RN English Channel Command

Pacific Fleets
RN Far East Fleet

RN East Indies Squadron ( -8 Dec 1941)

RN Eastern Fleet (8 Dec 1941- 22 Nov 1944) [1941-1945] Battle Fleet (9 Jan 1943 – 4 May 1945) Force A (Mar 1942 – June 1942) Force B (Mar 1942 – June 1942) 21st Aircraft Carrier Squadron (Mar 1945 – Dec 1945) 1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron (Oct 1945 – Oct 1947)

RN East Indies Fleet (22 Nov 1944 –  [1944-1952] Based at Trincomalee
 * [no carriers? All transferred to BPF?]

RN British Pacific Fleet (22 Nov 1944 –Dec 1945) Main base at Sydney, Australia Forward base at Manus Island 6 fleet carriers, 15 smaller carriers

•	‘’Formidable’’ (CV-) •	‘’ Illustrious’’ (CV) •	‘’Implacable’’ (CV) •	‘’Indefatigable’’ (CV) •	‘’Indomitable’’ (CV) •	‘’Victorious’’ (CV) •	‘’Colossus’’ (CVL) •	‘’Glory’’ (CVL) •	‘’Venerable’’ (CVL) •	‘’Vengeance’’ (CVL) •	‘’Striker’’ (CVE) •	‘’Arbiter’’ (CVE) •	‘’Chaser” (CVE) •	‘’Fencer’’ (CVE) •	‘’Ruler’’ (CVE) •	‘’Reaper’’ (CVE) •	‘’Singer’’ (CVE) •	‘’Speaker’’ (CVE) •	‘’Vindex’’ (CVE) •	‘’Pioneer’’ (Maintenance Carrier) •	‘’Unicorn’’ (Maintenance Carrier)

USN Task Force 57 BPF (23 Mar 1945 - )

RN British Pacific Fleet Strikes on Sakishima Islands, Ishigaki Island, and Formosa (Apr - May 1945) Operation ICEBERG Task Force 57 (Apr - May 1945): USN Task Group 57.2 CarRon1 [45/05/28 TF 57 > TF 37]
 * HMS Indomitable (CV-92); Hit by kamikaze 4 May
 * HMS Victorious (CV-38); Hit by kamikaze 9 May
 * HMS Indefatigable (CV-R10) Hit by kamikaze 1 Apr
 * HMS Illustrious (CV-87) From 15 Apr
 * HMS Formidable  (CV-67) From 15 Apr; Hit by kamikaze 4 May and 9 May

USN Task Force 37 BPF (24-28 July 1945) Raids on the Japanese Home Islands

RN British Pacific Fleet (July - Aug 1945): Note: Also referred to as USN Task Force 37.
 * HMS Formidable (67) Air Squadrons 1841, 1842, 1848, and 848.
 * HMS Victorious (38) Air Squadrons 1834, 1836, and 849.
 * HMS Indefatigable (R10) Air Squadrons 887, 894, 1772, and 820.
 * HMS Implacable (86) Air Squadrons 801, 880, 1771, and 828.

1922
There were no IJN carriers at the time the Washington Naval Treaty was signed (6 Feb 1922), but Japan's first carrier was commissioned a few months later:
 * Hōshō CVL commissioned 27 Dec 1922

1928
There were two carriers in one division at the time of the Jinan incident, an armed conflict between the Imperial Japanese Army and China's Nationalist Army (3-11 May 1928): IJN First Carrier Division (1 Apr 1928)
 * Akagi CV
 * Hōshō CVL

1931
There were two carriers in one division with a third carrier in reserve status at the time the Shanghai incident and during the initial Japanese invasion of Manchuria (Sept 1931 - Feb 1932): IJN First Carrier Division (1 Dec 1931) IJN Reserve (Dec 1931 - Apr 1933)
 * Kaga CV
 * Hōshō CVL
 * Akagi CV

1937
There were four carriers in two divisions at the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War (7 Jul 1937): IJN First Carrier Division (15 Nov 1934) IJN Second Carrier Division (15 Nov 1934)
 * Ryūjō CVL F (15 Nov 1934 & mid-1936)
 * Hōshō CVL
 * Akagi CV
 * Kaga CV

1938
There were four carriers in two divisions and one in reserve at the end of 1938: [( Sept 37 - July 39?)]

IJN First Carrier Division (1 Dec 1937) IJN Second Carrier Division (15 Dec 1938) IJN Reserve
 * Akagi CV
 * Kaga CV
 * Ryūjō CVL
 * Sōryū CV
 * Hōshō CVL (Dec 1937)

1940
There were six carriers in two divisions at the time of the Japanese invasion of French Indochina (22-26 Sept 1940):

IJN First Carrier Division (15 Nov 1939) IJN Second Carrier Division (15 Nov 1939) IJN training ship IJN reserve
 * Akagi  CV
 * Kaga CV ???
 * Sōryū CV
 * Hiryū CV
 * Ryūjō CVL
 * Hōshō CVL (Dec 1937)

1941
There were six carriers in three divisions with a seventh not yet assigned to a division at the time the 1st Air Fleet, aka Kidō Butai or "Mobile Force" was created on 10 Apr 1941.

IJN First Carrier Division (10 Apr 1941): IJN Second Carrier Division (15 Nov 1940) IJN Third Carrier Division (15 Nov 1940) IJN not yet assigned to a division
 * Akagi CV
 * Kaga CV
 * Sōryū CV
 * Hiryū CV
 * Hōshō CVL
 * Ryūjō CVL
 * Zuihō, CVL

There were nine fleet and light carriers in five divisions at the time the IJN attacked Pearl Harbor (7 Dec 1941). All six fleet carriers (CarDiv1, CarDiv2, and CarDiv5) participated in the attack and comprised the Kidō Butai ( aka "Mobile Force"):

IJN First Carrier Division (10 Apr 1941): IJN Second Carrier Division (15 Nov 1940): IJN Third Carrier Division (11 Aug 1941): IJN Fourth Carrier Division (1 Apr 1941): IJN Fifth Carrier Division (25 Sept 1941):
 * Akagi CV
 * Kaga CV
 * Hiryu CV
 * Soryu CV
 * Hōshō CVL
 * Zuihō CVL
 * Ryūjō CVL
 * Taiyo CVE (10 Sept 1941)
 * Shōkaku CV
 * Zuikaku, CV

1942
There were ten carriers in five divisions at the time of the Battle of the Coral Sea (4-8 May 1942)

IJN First Carrier Division (10 Apr 1941): IJN Second Carrier Division (15 Nov 1940): IJN Third Carrier Division (11 Aug 1941): IJN Fourth Carrier Division (3 May 1942): IJN Fifth Carrier Division (25 Sept 1941):
 * Akagi CV
 * Kaga CV
 * Hiryu CV
 * Soryu CV
 * Hōshō CVL
 * Zuihō CVL
 * Ryūjō CVL
 * Shōhō CVL
 * Shōkaku CV
 * Zuikaku, CV

There were ten carriers in five divisions at the time of the Battle of Midway (4-7 June 1942). Shōhō had been sunk at the Battle of the Coral Sea but newly commissioned Jun'yō kept the total number of fleet and light carriers at ten.

IJN First Carrier Division (10 Apr 1941): IJN Second Carrier Division (15 Nov 1940): IJN Third Carrier Division (11 Aug 1941): IJN Fourth Carrier Division (3 May 1942): IJN Fifth Carrier Division (25 Sept 1941):
 * Akagi CV
 * Kaga CV
 * Hiryu CV
 * Soryu CV
 * Hōshō CVL
 * Zuihō CVL
 * Jun'yō CV [??? commissioned 5 may 1942]
 * Ryūjō CVL
 * Shōkaku CV
 * Zuikaku, CV

There were six carriers in two divisions at the time of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons (24-25 Aug 1942). After the losses at Midway, the IJN reorganized carriers into just two divisions, each comprised of two fleet carriers and one light carrier. Aircraft from the fleet carriers were intended to strike enemy targets while aircraft from the light carrier were intended primarily to provide cover for the fleet carriers. Hōshō became a training ship.

IJN First Carrier Division (14 Jul 1942): IJN Second Carrier Division (14 Jul 1942): IJN Third Carrier Division (1 Apr 1942) IJN Fourth Carrier Division (14 Jul 1942): IJN training ship:
 * Shokaku CV
 * Ziukaku' CV
 * Ryūjō CVL
 * Jun'yō CV
 * Hiyō  CV
 * Zuihō CVL [ASSIGNED CARDIV1 14 JUL 1942; TO CARDIV ON 12 AUG 1942, AND TO CARDIV1 AGAIN ON 12 SEPT 1942 PER COMBINEDFLEET.COM]
 * (division disbanded)
 * (division disbanded)
 * Hōshō CVL

NOTE: Per 1st Air Fleet article, the Second and Fifth Divisions were disbanded on 14 July 1942. Error?

1944
There were carriers at 1 feb 1944

IJN Third Carrier Division (1 Feb 1944)
 * Zuihō CVL
 * Chiyoda CVL
 * Chitose CVL

There were ten??? fleet and light carriers in two divisions at the time of the Battle of the Philippine Sea (19-20 Jun 1944). There were also two hybrid carriers that did not have flight decks in a third division.

IJN First Carrier Division (1 Apr 1944): IJN Second Carrier Division (1 Apr 1943) IJN Fourth Carrier Division (1 May 1944):
 * Shokaku CV
 * Ziukaku' CV
 * Taiho CV
 * Jun'yō CV
 * Hiyō CV
 * Ryūhō CVL
 * Ise AC
 * Hyūga AC

There were 8??? fleet and light carriers in three divisions at the time of the Battle of the Layte Gulf (23-26 Oct 1944). There were also two hybrid carriers.

IJN First Carrier Division (15 Aug 1944): IJN Third Carrier Division (15 Aug 1944) IJN Fourth Carrier Division (10 Aug 1944):
 * Unryū CV
 * Amagi CV
 * Zuikaku CV
 * Zuihō CVL
 * Chiyoda CVL
 * Chitose CVL
 * Jun'yō CV
 * Ryūhō CVL
 * Ise AC
 * Hyūga AC

There were 5??? fleet and light carriers in one division at the end of 1944. There were also two hybrid carriers in a second division.

IJN First Carrier Division (15 Dec 1944): IJN Fourth Carrier Division (24 Oct 1944):
 * Jun'yō CV (15 Nov 1944)
 * Unryū CV (15 Nov 1944)
 * Amagi CV
 * Katsuragi CV
 * Ryūhō CVL
 * Ise AC
 * Hyūga AC

Dates that carrier divisions were permanently disbanded:

IJN First Carrier Division (10 or 20 Apr 1945)

IJN Second Carrier Division (10 Jul 1944)

IJN Third Carrier Division (15 Nov 1944)

IJN Fourth Carrier Division (1 Mar 1945)

IJN Fifth Carrier Division (14 Jul 1942)

Principal Sources:
 * 1) Imperial Japanese Navy Page
 * 2) World War II Database
 * 3) US Task Forces List
 * 4) IJN Battle Orders

Individual carrier Summaries
Websites For Detailed, Individual Carrier Histories


 * 1) All Country's Carrier Histories (WWII Database)
 * 2) All Country's Carrier Histories (Military Factory)
 * 3) American Carrier Histories
 * 4) British and Dominion Carrier Histories
 * 5) British Escort Carrier Histories- Lend Lease 1941-1944
 * 6) Japanese Carrier Histories
 * 7) Japanese Seaplane Ships


 * British warship histories (again)

Fleet and Light Carries

The following list summarizes actions for each fleet and light carrier that participated in World War II. They are listed in the order of the date (shown in parentheses) that each was commissioned as a carrier. (More extensive summaries are available at each carrier's individual Wikipedia article.)


 * 1) HMS Argus (16-Sep-1918); training carrier; US-3 convoy protection for troop transports; ferried aircraft to Iceland, Malta as part of Operation Hurry with HMS Ark Royal and, as part of Force H and Operation White, to the Gold Coast, and Gibraltar; protecting convoy WS-5A with HMS Furious drove off German cruiser Admiral Hipper; ferried aircraft to Murmansk and again to Gibraltar; with HMS Ark Royal ferried aircraft as part of Operation Perpetual during which Ark Royal was torpedoed and sunk; provided air cover for HMS Eagle as she delivered aircraft to Malta during Operation Harpoon; supported the Allied invasion of Algeria as part of the Eastern Naval Task Force; with CVE Avenger when torpedoed by U-155; reclassified as a CVE and subsequently used only for training; reclassified as an accommodation ship.
 * 2) Hōshō CVL (27-Dec-1922); Invasion of Shanghai, Second Sino-Japanese War?,
 * 3) HMS Hermes CVL (1-Jul-1923);  Home Fleet engaged in anti-submarine patrols; Senagal with French Navy as Force X hunting German commerce raiders and blockade runners; escorted convoy from Dakar to Britain; after fall of French Republic, blockaded Dakar and attacked Vichy French warship there; patrolled South Atlantic and Indian Ocean for Axis shipping; along with Formidable, bombed Italian installations in support of East African Campaign; blockaded Somali port of Kismayo; based in Ceylon, searched for Axis shipping;  covered troop disembarkation at Basra during the Anglo-Iraqi War; patrolled the Indian Ocean around ceylon then joined the Far East Fleet in Ceylon; assigned to Force B;  sunk during Japan's Indian Ocean Raid.
 * 4) HMS Eagle (20-Feb-1924); Indian Ocean searches for German commerce raiders; escorted convoys to Malta and Greece and attacked Italian bases, warships, and other ships; Battle of Calabria; searched for Axis shipping, including the German cruiser Admiral Graf Spee as part of Force I, the the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic, sinking a blockade runner; joined convoy WS 16 to Gibralter; assigned to Force H; delivered aircraft to Malta;attacked Tripoli harbor; Operation Bowery, Operation Style, Operation Harpoon, Operation Salient, Operation Pinpoint; sunk during Operation Pedestal.
 * 5) HMS Furious (Sep-1925);
 * 6) Akagi (25-Mar-1927);
 * 7) Béarn (May-1927); {For French Republic against Axis Powers:}  anti-raider petrol in West Indies; transported French bullion reserves to Canada; {For Vichy France against Allied Powers:} effectively interned at Martinique; {For Free France against Axis Powers:} lengthy refit until March 1945 followed by aircraft transport service.
 * 8) USS Saratoga (16-Nov-1927);
 * 9) USS Lexington (14-Dec-1927); {As TF 12:} was ferring aircraft to Midway Island when Pearl Harbor was attacked; {As TF 11:}} attacked Japanese bases in Marshall Islands as a diversion for the force attempting to relieve Wake Island; repelled attack by aircraft launched at Rebaul; raided Lae-Salamaua; opposed Japanese attempt to invade Port Moresby by sea and was sunk during the Battle of the Coral Sea.
 * 10) HMS Courageous(Feb-1928);
 * 11) Kaga (30-Nov-1929)
 * 12) HMS Glorius (Mar-1930);
 * 13) Ryūjō CVL (9-May-1933);
 * 14) USS Ranger (4-Jun-1934);
 * 15) Sōryū (29-Sep-1937);
 * 16) USS Yorktown (30-Sep-1937);
 * 17) USS Enterprise (12-May-1938);  resupply Wake; protecting Hawaii, sank sub I-70; Samoa convoy protection; raids on Marshalls; raids on Wake and Marcus Islands; Doolittle Raid on Tokyo; sortie to Coral Sea but too late for battle; feint toward Nauru and Banaba islands disrupting Japanese Operation RY; Battle of Midway; Guadalcanal Campaign; Battle of Eastern Solomons; Battle of Santa Cruz; Battle of Rennell Islands; Battle of Makin Islands; ... etc
 * 18) HMS Ark Royal (16-Dec-1938);
 * 19) Hiryū (5-Jul-1939);
 * 20) USS Wasp (25-Apr-1940);
 * 21) HMS Illustrious (25-May-1940);
 * 22) HMS Formadible (24-Nov-1940);
 * 23) Zuihō CVL (27-Dec-1940);
 * 24) HMS Victorious (14-May-1941);
 * 25) Shōkaku (8-Aug-1941);
 * 26) Zuikaku (25-Sep-1941);
 * 27) HMS Indomitable (10-Oct-1941);
 * 28) USS Hornet (20-Oct-1941);
 * 29) Shōhō CVL (26-Jan-1942);
 * 30) Jun'yō CV (5-May-1942);
 * 31) Hiyō CV (31-Jul-1942);
 * 32) Ryūhō CVL (28-Nov-1942);
 * 33) USS Essex (31-Dec-1942);
 * 34) USS Independence CVL (14-Jan-1943);
 * 35) USS Lexington (17-Feb-1943);
 * 36) USS Princeton CVL (25-Feb-1943);
 * 37) HMS Unicorn CVL (12-Mar-1943);
 * 38) USS Belleau Wood CVL (31-Mar-1943);
 * 39) USS Yorktown (2nd) (15-Apr-1943);
 * 40) USS Bunker Hill (25-May-1943);
 * 41) USS Cowpens CVL (28-May-1943);
 * 42) USS Montery CVL (17-Jun-1943);
 * 43) USS Cabot CVL (24-Jul-1943);
 * 44) USS Intrepid (16-Aug-1943);
 * 45) USS Langley (2nd) CVL (31-Aug-1943);
 * 46) Chiyoda CVL (31-Oct-1943);
 * 47) USS San Jacinto CVL (15-Nov-1943);
 * 48) USS Bataan CVL (17-Nov-1943);
 * 49) USS Wasp (2nd) (24-Nov-1943);
 * 50) USS Hornet(2nd) (29-Nov-1943);
 * 51) HMS Indefatigable (8-Dec-1943;
 * 52) Chitose CVL (1-Jan-1944);
 * 53) USS Franklin (31-Jan-1944);
 * 54) Unryū (6-Mar-1944);
 * 55) Taihō (7-Mar-1944);
 * 56) USS Hancock (15-Apr-1944)
 * 57) USS Ticonderoga (8-May-1944);
 * 58) USS Bennington (6-Aug-1944);
 * 59) Amagi (10-Aug-1944);
 * 60) HMS Implacable (28-Aug-1944);
 * 61) USS Shangri-La (15-Sep-1944);
 * 62) USS Randolph (9-Oct-1944);
 * 63) Katsuragi (15-Oct-1944)
 * 64) Shinano (19-Nov-1944);
 * 65) USS Bon Homme Richard (26-Nov-1944);
 * 66) HMS Colossus CVL (16-Dec-1944);
 * 67) HMS Venerable CVL (17-Jan-1945);
 * 68) USS Antietam (28-Jan-1945);
 * 69) HMS Vengeance CVL (Mar-1945);
 * 70) HMS Glory CVL (2-Apr-1945);
 * 71) HMS Warrior CVL (2-Apr-1945);
 * 72) USS Boxer (16-Apr-1945);
 * 73) USS Lake Champlain (3-Jun-1945);
 * 74) HMS Ocean CVL (8-Aug-1945);

The following list summarizes actions for each American escort carrier that participated in World War II. They are listed in the order of the date (shown in parentheses) that each was commissioned as a carrier. The US seaplane tender (SPT) USS Langley is included in the list since her flight deck was capable of launching and retrieving aircraft and since she essentially served in the capacity of an escort carrier during the early phases of the Pacific War.


 * 1) USS Langley SPT (7-Apr-1913); Seaplane tender of Cavite in the Philippines; As part of the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command naval force, assisted with [[Anti-submarine warfare|anti-submarine patrols from Darwin.  ferried thirty-two aircraft to Tjilatjap, Java; attacked and sunk while on anti-submarine duty south of Tjilatjap by IJN land-based bombers from Bali.
 * 2) Long Island CVE (2-Jun-1941)
 * 3) Charger CVE (3-Mar-1942)
 * 4) Copahee CVE (15-Jun-1942)
 * 5) Nassau CVE-16 (20-Aug-1942)
 * 6) Santee CVE-29 (24-Aug-1942)
 * 7) Sangamon CVE-26 (25-Aug-1942)
 * 8) Altamaha CVE-18 (15-Sep-1942)
 * 9) Chenango CVE-28 (19-Sep-1942)
 * 10) Suwannee CVE-27 (24-Sep-1942)
 * 11) Bogue CVE-9 (26-Sep-1942)
 * 12) Card CVE-11 (8-Nov-1942)
 * 13) Core CVE-13 (10-Dec-1942)
 * 14) Barnes CVE-20 (20-Feb-1943)
 * 15) Block Island CVE-21 (8-Mar-1943)
 * 16) Prince William CVE-31 (9-Apr-1943); Ferried plans and personnel from West Coast to New Caledonia, Canton Island, Samoa, Espiritu Santo and Townsville, Australia; used for flight training in the Chesapeake Bay; ferried to Casablanca, bringing back worn aircraft engines; training duties in Narragansett Bay area and Key West; ferrying planes and personnel between West Coast and Hawaii.
 * 17) Breton CVE-23 (12-Apr-1943)
 * 18) Croatan CVE-25 (28-Apr-1943)
 * 19) Casablanca CVE-55 (8-Jul-1943)
 * 20) Liscome Bay CVE-56 (7-Aug-1943)
 * 21) Coral Sea/Anzio CVE-57 (27-Aug-1943)
 * 22) Corregidor CVE-58 (31-Aug-1943)
 * 23) Mission Bay CVE-59 (13-Sep-1943)
 * 24) Guadalcanal CVE-60 (25-Sep-1943)
 * 25) Manila Bay CVE-61 (5-Oct-1943)
 * 26) Natoma Bay CVE-62 (14-Oct-1943)
 * 27) St. Lo/Midway CVE-63 (23-Oct-1943)
 * 28) Tripoli CVE-64 (31-Oct-1943); Center ship for task Group 21.15 that, along with five destroyer escorts of Escort Division 7 (CortDiv 7), patrolled west of Cape Verde Island to disrupt German U-boat refueling operations; anti-submarine patrols off Brazil and again around the Cape Verdes, again disrupting German refueling operations; escorted a convoy heading to Nova Scotia; pilot training in the Chesapeake Bay; based at Recife, conducted anti-submarine operations off Brazil with TG 47.7 using radar-equipped aircraft; ferried aircraft to the Marshall Islands; pilot training; repatriated personnel as part of Operation Magic Carpet.
 * 29) Wake Island CVE-65 (7-Nov-1943)
 * 30) White Plains CVE-66 (5-Nov-1943)
 * 31) Kalinin Bay CVE-68 (27-Nov-1943)
 * 32) Solomons CVE-67 (21-Nov-1943)
 * 33) Kasaan Bay CVE-69 (4-Dec-1943)
 * 34) Fanshaw Bay CVE-70 (9-Dec-1943) |
 * 35) Kitkun Bay CVE-71 (15-Dec-1943)
 * 36) USS Tulagi CVE-72 (21-Dec-1943)
 * 37) Gambier Bay CVE-73 (28-Dec-1943)
 * 38) Nehenta Bay CVE-74 (3-Jan-1944)
 * 39) Hoggatt Bay CVE-75 (11-Jan-1944)
 * 40) Kadashan Bay CVE-76 (18-Jan-1944)
 * 41) Marcus Island CVE-77 (26-Jan-1944)
 * 42) Savo Island CVE-78 (3-Feb-1944)
 * 43) Ommaney Bay CVE-79 (11-Feb-1944)
 * 44) Petrof Bay CVE-80 (18-Feb-1944)
 * 45) Rudyerd Bay CVE-81 (25-Feb-1944)
 * 46) Saginaw Bay CVE-82 (2-Mar-1944)
 * 47) Sargent Bay CVE-83 (9-Mar-1944)
 * 48) Shamrock Bay CVE-84 (15-Mar-1944)
 * 49) Shipley Bay CVE-85 (21-Mar-1944)
 * 50) Sitkoh Bay CVE-86 (28-Mar-1944)
 * 51) Steamer Bay CVE-87 (4-Apr-1944)
 * 52) Cape Esperance CVE-88 (9-Apr-1944)
 * 53) Takanis Bay CVE-89 (15-Apr-1944)
 * 54) Thetis Bay CVE-90 (12-Apr-1944)
 * 55) Makassar Strait CVE-91 (27-Apr-1944)
 * 56) Windham Bay) CVE-92 (3-May-1944)
 * 57) Makin Island CVE-93 (9-May-1944)
 * 58) Lunga Point CVE-94 (14-May-1944)
 * 59) Bismarck Sea CVE-95 (20-May-1944)
 * 60) Salamaua CVE-96 (26-May-1944)
 * 61) Hollandia CVE-97 (1-Jun-1944)
 * 62) Kwajalein CVE-98 (7-Jun-1944)
 * 63) Admiralty Islands CVE-99 (13-Jun-1944)
 * 64) Bougainville CVE-100 (18-Jun-1944)
 * 65) Matanikau CVE-101 (24-Jun-1944)
 * 66) Attu CVE-102 (30-Jun-1944)
 * 67) Roi CVE-103 (6-Jul-1944)
 * 68) Munda CVE-104 (8-Jul-1944)
 * 69) Commencement Bay CVE-105 (27-Nov-1944)
 * 70) Block Island CVE-106 (30-Dec-1944)
 * 71) Gilbert Islands CVE-107 (5-Feb-1945)
 * 72) Kula Gulf CVE-108 (12-May-1945)
 * 73) Cape Gloucester CVE-109 (5-Mar-1945)
 * 74) Salerno Bay CVE-110 (19-May-1945)
 * 75) Vella Gulf CVE-111 (19-Apr-1945)
 * 76) Siboney CVE-112 (14-May-1945)
 * 77) Puget Sound CVE-113 (18-Jun-1945)
 * 78) Bairoko CVE-115 (16-Jul-1945)

LIST OF AMERICAN CVEs FROM ABOVE THAT PRINCIPALLY PROVIDED TRANSPORT, CONVOY PROTECTION, AND/OR TRAINING SERVICES:
 * 1) USS Prince William

LIST OF US CVEs FROM ABOVE THAT DID MORE THAN PROVIDE TRANSPORT, CONVOY PROTECTION, AND/OR TRAINING SERVICES:
 * 1) USS Langley
 * 2) USS Tripoli

The following list summarizes actions for each British escort carrier that participated in World War II. They are listed in the order of the date (shown in parentheses) that each was commissioned as a carrier.


 * 1) Audacity CVE (20-Jun-1943); During her short career, she carried only fighters (Grumman F4F Wildcats aka Martlets) as opposed to anti-submarine patrol aircraft since her main task was to support Gibraltar convoys against which the main threat was perceived to be long-range German reconnaissance/anti-shipping/maritime patrol bombers (Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor);  Escorted only four convoys: OG-74, HG74, OG-76, and HG-76; HG-76 was attacked by twelve U-boats and several Condors; sunk by U-751 off Spain on 21-Dec-1943.
 * 2) Archer CVE (17-Nov-1941); Transferred to UK under Lend-Lease.  Multiple mechanical problems compounded by a collision at sea; part of Convoy AS 2 for Puerto Rico; fruitless anti-submarine patrols; delivered aircraft to HMS Illustrious at Sierra Leone; searched for survivors from a ship sunk By German U752; more repairs required; Convoy UGS-2 New York to Casablanca carrying aircraft and troops for Operation Torch; Convoy MKF3 from Gibraltar to the UK; lengthy refit and then rectification work; escorted convoys ONS-6, ON-182, and HX-239; sank U-752; escorted convoy KMS-18B; anti-submarine patrol in the Bay of Biscay; used as an accommodation ship; converted to a transport ship and renamed Empire Lagan.
 * 3) Avenger CVE  (2-Mar-1942); Escorted Convoys AT-17 doing anti-submarine patrols; Escorted the large Convoy PQ 18 to Archangel, Russia, that was attacked by large fleets of bombers, torpedo-bombers, U-boats and mines, sinking thirteen ships;  German attack aircraft included Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condors (long-range reconnaissance and anti-shipping/maritime patrol bomber), Blohm & Voss BV 138s (long-range maritime patrol and reconnaissance flying boat), Junkers Ju 88s (bomber/dive bomber/night fighte,r, torpedo bomber, reconnaissance aircraft, and heavy fighter),  Heinkel He 115s (torpedo bomber, reconnaissance, mine-laying sea plane), and Messerschmitt Bf 110s (heavy fighter-bomber);  German aircraft and submarines were opposed by Avenger's Sea Hurricanes and  fighters and Fairey Swordfish anti-submarine aircraft; escorted home-bound Convoy QP 14 that lost a one escorting destroy and one merchant ship; provided air cover for convoy taking British troops to North Africa as part of Operation Torch; along with the Argus, Biter, and  Argus provided cover for the landings; sunk by a single torpedo from U-155 west of Gibraltar on 15-Nov-1942.
 * 4) Biter/Dixmude CVE (6-May-1942); Provided air cover off Oran for Center Task Force of Operation Torch along with ; opposed by Vichy French aircraft; protection for Convoy ONS-4, whose escorts sank two U-boats, with Fairey Swordfish on anti-submarine patrols; as Support Group SG5, joined Convoy HX 237 during the "crisis month" dubbed "Black May" 1943 for the German U-boats, with only three of thirty-eight convoy ships lost but with three U-boats sunk and several others damages; conducted continuous anti-submarine patrols for Convoy SC 129 attacked by a "wolf pack" that was beaten off with only two of twenty-five ships sunk; Escorted Convoy HX 237; (what did she do between November 1943 and April 1945, when she was returned to the US Navy for lending to France?).
 * 5) Dasher CVE (2-Jul-1942);  Participated in Operation Torch; ferried aircraft in the Mediterranean; major modifications from 20-Nov-1943 to mid-January 1943; convoy escort for Convoy JW53 to Russia; sunk by internal explosion 27-Mar-1943
 * 6) Activity CVE (20-Sep-1942); Initially operated as a deck landing training carrier; escorted North Atlantic convoys OS-66, KMS-40, ON-222, NS-28, SL-147, MKS-38, HX-277, KMS-43, and MKF-29; escorted Arctic convoy JW-58 during which her aircraft sank U-288 and U-355 and damaged three others; escorted convoy RA-58; escorted Atlantic convoys OS-78, KMS-52, SL-158, MKS-49, OS-78, KMS-52, AL-159, MKS-50, SL-162, MK-53, KMF-33, MKF-33, OS-86, KMS-60, SL-167, AND MKS-58; ferried aircraft, personnel and supplies to Ceylon; provided transport services with convoys MKF-36 and KM-39; all together, she operated both in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, escorting for at least twenty-seven convoys, sinking or damaging five submarines, and providing transport with at least three other convoys.

Provided anti-submarine cover for convoy CU01; with CVEs Battler, Hunter, and Salker, sailed to Gibraltar, encountering a severe storm; provided fighter cover for Operation Avalanche (Sep-1943) landings, the invasion of Italy, as part of Task Force 88 that included CVEs Attacker, Battler, Hunter, Stalker, and maintenance carrier Unicorn, the last in an unusual operational role, and with Force H including Illustrious and Formidable; etc.
 * 1) Attacker CVE-7 (30-Sep-1942); Initially a convoy escort in the Atlantic; converted to an "assault carrier" and saw service in the Mediterranean and Pacific; Operation Jurist, the surrender of Penang in Malaya;


 * 1) Battler CVE-1 (15-Nov-1942)
 * 2) Stalker CVE-15 (21-Dec-1942)
 * 3) Hunter CVE-8 (20-Jan-1943)
 * 4) Tracker CVE (31-Jan-1943)
 * 5) Fencer CVE-14 (20-Feb-1943)
 * 6) Searcher CVE-22 (7-Apr-1943)
 * 7) Chaser CVE-10 (9-Apr-1943)
 * 8) Ravager CVE (25-Apr-1943)
 * 9) Striker CVE-19 (28-Apr-1943)
 * 10) Emperor CVE-34 (31-May-1943)
 * 11) Pursuer CVE-17 (14-Jun-1943)
 * 12) Atheling CVE-33 (3-Jul-1943)
 * 13) Ameer CVE-35 (20-Jul-1943)
 * 14) Begum CVE-36 (22-Jul-1943)
 * 15) Pretoria Castle CVE (29-Jul-1943); Operated as a trials and training carrier throughout the war; no active combat service,
 * 16) Trumpeter CVE-37 (4-Aug-1943)
 * 17) Slinger CVE-32 (11-Aug-1943)
 * 18) Empress CVE-38 (12-Aug-1943)
 * 19) Khedive CVE-39 (25-Aug-1943)
 * 20) Nabob CVE-41 (7-Sep-1943)
 * 21) Shah CVE-43 (27-Sep-1943)
 * 22) Patroller CVE-44 (23-Oct-1943)
 * 23) Premier CVE-42 (3-Nov-1943)
 * 24) HMS Ranee CVE-46 (8-Nov-1943)
 * 25) Thane CVE-48 (19 Nov-1943)
 * 26) Speaker CVE-40 (20-Nov-1943)
 * 27) Vindex CVE-6 (3-Dec-1943)
 * 28) Queen CVE-49 (7-Dec-1943)
 * 29) Nairana CVE (12-Dec-1943)
 * 30) Ruler CVE-50 (20-Dec-1943)
 * 31) Arbiter CVE-51 (31-Dec-1943)
 * 32) Rajah CVE-45 (17-Jan-1944)
 * 33) Smiter CVE-52 (20-Jan-1944)
 * 34) Trouncer CVE-47 (31-Jan-1944)
 * 35) Puncher CVE-53 (5-Feb-1944)
 * 36) Reaper CVE-54 (18-Feb-1944)
 * 37) Campania CVE (7-Mar-1944)

LIST OF BRITISH CVEs FROM ABOVE THAT PRINCIPALLY PROVIDED TRANSPORT, CONVOY PROTECTION, AND/OR TRAINING SERVICES:

LIST OF BRITISH CVEs FROM ABOVE THAT DID MORE THAN PROVIDE TRANSPORT, CONVOY PROTECTION, AND/OR TRAINING SERVICES:

The British Merchant Aircraft Carriers (MACs) typically transported oil and grain from North America to Britain and provided air cover for other ships in their convoys. From early in 1944, almost all HX convoys and ON convoys included at lease one MAC, and several MACs transported full deck-loads of aircraft to Britain rather than provide convoy protection. Aircraft from MACs made a dozen attacks on U-boats but none were sunk. Like the catapult aircraft merchant ship, introduction of the MACs was initially envisioned as a stop-gap measure until sufficient escort carriers became available. However, by the time of MAC introduction in 1943, escort carriers were already being commissioned in large numbers. None the less, all but four of the MACs continued in service through the war.

The following list summarizes actions for each Japanese escort carrier that participated in World War II. They are listed in the order of the date (shown in parentheses) that each was commissioned as a carrier.


 * 1) Taiyō CVE (15-Sep-1941); Ferried aircraft to Formosa and Palau; trained naval aviators; following Midway, assigned along with Un'yō to Combined Fleet; delivered aircraft to the Marshall Islands; traveled to Palau, Davao City, Kavieng; torpedoed by USS Trout; ferried aircraft from Japan to Truk and Kavient; torpedoed by USS Tunnybut torpedoes did not explode;  unsuccessfully attacked by USS Pike; damaged by torpedoes from USS Cabrilla; as part of First Surface Escort Unit, escorted Convoy HI-61 from Japan to Singapore via Manila and then escorted Convoy HI-62 back to Japan.  Ferried aircraft to Manila as part of Convoy HI-69; escorted Convoy HI-71 to Singapore via Mako and Manila; torpedoed by USS Rasher off the Philippines, sinking August 1944. Taiyo was attacked on five separate occasions by US submarines between Sep-1942 and Aug-1944.
 * 2) Un'yō CVE (31-May-1942: Delievered aircraft to Truk, Saipan, Rabaul, Philippines, Palau, and Dutch East Indies; transported troops from Java to Truk; ferried aircraft to Truk, sometimes accompanied by Taiyō and Chūyō; attacked by USS submarines  USS Halibut and USS Steelhead and hit by one torpedo; on subsequent mission was torpoed by USS Sailfish; ferried aircraft ans supplies from Japan to Truk; hit by three torpedoes, two of which detonated, from USS Haddock; attacked by USS Halibut;  attacked by USS Gudgeon and USS Saury; part of Convoy HI073 carrying aircraft to Singapore; part of Convoy HI-74 from Singapore; hit by two torpedoes from USS Barb, sinking her in September 1944. Un'yō was attacked on five separate occasions by a total of eight different US submarines  between Jul-1943 and Sep-1944.
 * 3) Chūyō CVE (25-Nov-1942)); thirteen trips between Japan and Truk; attacked y USS Tunny in April 1943 but spared because of the defective detonators of the Mark 14 torpedoes; sustained damage from torpedoes from USS Cabrilla; torpedoed repeatedly by USS Sailfish off Japanese coast, sinking December 1943. Chūyō was attacked by three different submarines during her career
 * 4) Shin'yō CVE (15-Nov-1943); Escorted Convoy HI-75 from Japan to Singapore and then Convoy HI-76 from Singapore to Moji;  November 1944 provided air cover for Jun'yō; Escorted Convoy-81 taking aircraft and troops to the Philippines; torpedoed by USS Spadefish and sunk November 1944.
 * 5) Kaiyō CVE (23-Nov-1943); aircraft and troop transport; Convoy HI-33; ferried aircraft to Truk; attacked by USS Permit but torpedos missed; escorted Convoy Hi-57 to Singapore via Taiwan and Indochina and HI-58; her aircraft spotted USS Rabalo, which was attacked by other convoy escorts but escaped; Convoy HI-65 along with Shinyo to Singapore, on which an escort was attacked by a submarine;  Convoy HI-66 Singapore to Japan; Convoy HI_69 that ferried aircraft to the Philippines;transported aircraft to Taiwan; Convoy HI-83 to Singapore; Convoy HI-84; attacked but missed by USS Dace; assigned to pilot training in the Inland Sea; bombed by American carrier aircraft from Task Force 58; served as target ship for kamikaze pilots; hit a mine; attacked presumably by the British Pacific Fleet; struck another mine; towed to Beppu Bay and intentionally grounded to prevent her from sinking; repeated air attacks by Allied planes; abandoned and ultimately scrapped in place.

LIST OF JAPANESE CVEs FROM ABOVE THAT PRINCIPALLY PROVIDED TRANSPORT, CONVOY PROTECTION, AND/OR TRAINING SERVICES:
 * 1) IJN Taiyō
 * 2) IJN Un'yō
 * 3) IJN Chūyō
 * 4) IJN Shin'yō
 * 5) IJN Kaiyō

CARRIER CLASSES AND MEANINGS OF NAMES FOR JAPANESE CARRIERS:

Taiyō-class escort carrier: Carriers of this class were relatively slow (21 knots) and unable to keep up with main fleet warships.
 * Chūyō; "Hawk which soars"
 * Taiyo; "Big Eagle" or "Goshawk"
 * Un'yō; "Cloud Hawk"

Single carrier class:
 * Shin'yō; "Divine Hawk"

Single carrier class:
 * Kaiyō; "Sea Hawk"

Services performed by aircraft carriers
Carriers provided a wide range of services including:
 * Support for invasions
 * Defense against invasion
 * Raids on enemy installations
 * Defense against raids
 * Destruction of enemy warships
 * Defense against enemy warships
 * Convoy protection
 * Combat air patrols (CAP)
 * Anti-submarine patrols
 * Anti-raider patrols
 * Blockade enforcement
 * Aircraft/troop/supplies transport/resupply

Timeline of engagements involving carriers
Naval engagements and operations at which aircraft carriers were present are listed below. Each entry includes the name of the engagement/operation, when it began, the carriers involved, and results of the engagement.



1939









1940

















1941
 * 1) Operation Excess (6 to 13-Jan-1941); Illustrious; British supply convoys to Malta, Egypt, and Greece were opposed by the German Luftwaffe.   The transports arrived safely, but the Illustrious sustained damage requiring repairs in the US.
 * 2) Bombardment of Genoa and La Spezia/Operation Grog (9-Feb-1941); Ark Royal; Aircraft from Ark Royal attacked Genoa, La Spezia, and Livorno.  ??
 * 3) Operation Begum (Feb-1941); Hermes, Formidable; naval blockade to prevent supplies from reaching Italian forces in Somaliland.
 * 4) Battle of Cape Matapan (27 to 29-Mar-1941); Formidable; UK force, with help from code breaking at Bletchley Park, damaged several Italian warships, inflicting upon the Regina Marina its greatest naval defeat.
 * 5) Anglo-Iraqi War (2 to 31-May-1941); Hermes; Successful re-occupation of Iraq by Britain.
 * 6) Sinking the Bismarck (26 to 27-May-1941); Ark Royal; A torpedo from carrier-launched aircraft damaged the German raider's steering gear, preventing her escape.  She was subsequently sunk by gunfire from British battleships.
 * 7) Battle of Crete (20-May to 1-Jun-1941); Formidable; Successful German airborne invasion of Crete, which the Royal Navy resisted at great cost.  This action was studied by the Americans when planning their airborne operations.  First significant allied use of intelligence from the Enigma machine.
 * 8) Operation Substance (23 to 26-July-1942); Ark Royal; British convoy GM 1 from Gibraltar to Malta was attacked by Italian bombers and MAS boats but defended by aircraft from Ark Royal.  Transports made it to Malta.  An Italian manned torpedo attack was prevented using intelligence from Ultra.
 * 9) Operation Halberd (27-Sep-1941); Ark Royal; Italian land-based aircraft attacked British Force H protecting large convoy GM 2 from Gibraltar to Malta.
 * 10) Operation Perpetual (11 to 12-Nov-1941); Argus, Ark Royal (sunk); British captured ports east of Algiers as part of Operation Torch.  Carriers transported aircraft to area.
 * 11) Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor (7-Dec-1941); Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, Zuikaku;  Japanese surprise attack damaged or sank eight US battleships and brought the US into the World War.
 * 12) US Convoy to Samoa (Jan-1942); Enterprise

1941:







1942
 * 1) US Raids on Marshall Islands (1-Feb-1942); Yorktown, Enterprise;  The raid on these IJN installations had little long-term impact.
 * 2) US Raids on Marshall Islands, Wake, and Marcus Islands ;  Enterprise
 * 3) US resistance to Japanese invasion of New Guinea at Salamaua and Lae (8–13 March 1942); Lexington, Yorktown; Japanese forces successfully established a base and airfield.
 * 4) Indian Ocean raid (31-Mar to 10 Apr-1942) HMS Hermes sunk.
 * 5) Doolittle Raid on Tokyo (18-Apr-1942); Hornet, Enterprise; B-25s launched from Hornet dropped bomb on Tokyo.  Little damage was inflicted, but resulting IJN embarrassment may have led to fateful decision to invade Midway Island in order to extend Japan's defensive perimeter in the Pacific.
 * 6) Battle of the Coral Sea (4-8 May-1942); Shōkaku, Zuikaku, Lexington, Yorktown;
 * 7) Operation Bowery (3 to 9-May-1942); HMSEagle, USS Wasp; successfully delivered critically needed aircraft to Malta.
 * 8) Operations Ironclad and Stream Line Jane (5-May to 6-Nov-1942); Illustrious, Indomitable; British amphibious assault followed by a ground campaign to capture Madagascar from the Vichy French and prevent use of its ports by the Imperial Japanese Navy.
 * 9) Battle of Pantelleria/Operations Julius,Vigorous, and Harpoon (Jun-1941); Argus, Eagle;  Convoys to supply Malta from Egypt and Gibraltar were supported by British carrier-launched aircraft but successfully opposed by Italian Navy warships and  Italian and German land-based aircraft.
 * 10) US Feint Toward Naumea;  date; Enterprise, Hornet; caused delay (and ultimately the cancellation) of Japanese Operation RY for invasion of the Nauru and Banaba islands.
 * 11) Battle of Midway (4-Jun to 7-Jun 1942);  Akagi (sunk), Kaga (sunk), Soryu (sunk), Hiryu (sunk), Yorktown (sunk), Enterprise, Hornet;  Japanese planned invasion of Midway Island thwarted with excessive loss of carriers, planes, and pilots.
 * 12) Eastern Solomons
 * 13) Santa Cruiz
 * 14) Guadalcanal Campaign (8-Aug-1942 to 15-Nov-1942)
 * 15) Battle of mid-August/Santa Marija Convoy/Operation Pedestal (Aug-1942); Furious?, Victorious, Eagle (sunk), Indomitable ; Axis attack with bombers, E-Boats, MAS boats and submarines to prevent major convoy from reaching Malta resulted in the loss of a significant number of Allied ships.  However, the successful passage of the tanker Ohio provided fuel for Maltese-based aircraft and submarines that kept Malta effective in harassing Axis ships attempting to supply German forces in Libya and Egypt.


 * 1) Operation Torch (8 to 16 Nov-1942);  Ranger, Avenger CVE (sunk); Successful invasion of North Africa by the Allies.
 * 2) Naval Battle of Casablanca (8 to 11-Nov-1942); Ranger, Sangamon CVE, Suwannee CVE, Chenango CVE, Santee CVE; Successful action against Vichy French as part of Operation Torch.


 * MO
 * MI
 * AF

1943

1944
 * 1) Philippines Sea
 * 2) Leyte Gulf

1945

See also:
 * List of naval and land-based operations in Mediterranean Sea area during World War II
 * List of World War II military operations

List of campaigns involving carriers

 * North African Campaign (10-Jun-1940 to 13-May-1943);
 * Battle of the Mediterranean (10-Jun-1940 to 2-May-1945)
 * New Guinea campaign (Jan-1942 to Aug-1945);
 * Battle of Madagascar (5-May to 6-Nov-1942)
 * Guadalcanal Campaign (7-Aug to 9-Feb-1942);

List of convoys whose escorts included carriers

 * WS-5A (Dec-1940); Argus, Furious; Carriers joined convoy as they ferried aircraft for Egypt via West (or East???) Africa. Convoy was attacked by German heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper on its first sortie for German Operation Nordseetour without much damage done to the convoy although the HMS Berwik sustained serious damage.  Carrier aircraft and munitions were loaded for delivery rather than for defense of the convoy.  As a result, no effective offense against the Admiral Hipper was launched.

Malta convoys GM 1 was the first of a series from Gibraltar to Malta; Ark Royal GM 2 ; Ark Royal Convoy MW4, part of Operation Vigorous; Argus, Ark Royal protecting from a distance

See also:
 * Convoy battles of World War II
 * List of Allied convoys during World War II by region


 * AP and WS Convoys|http://www.naval-history.net/xAH-WSConvoys03-1940.htm
 * Index of Warships Escorting or Taking Passage in WS Convoys|http://www.naval-history.net/xAH-WSConvoys07-Warships.htm
 * WS Convoy Background|http://www.naval-history.net/xAH-WSConvoys02.htm
 * Malta convoys

Military intelligence affecting carrier operations
German crypotographers broke British naval cipher early in the war. (Roskill p. 51)

There are some reports that JN-25 was broken by the British prior to Pearl Harbor.

JN-25 code broken by the Americans before Midway.

blackout caused by a change to the C 38m machine in early March 1942

The Italian Navy and German Luftwaffe Subsequent Ultra intercepts by the Allies indicated that Operations Harpoon and Vigorous had been compromised beforehand to Italian military intelligence that had broken the code which used by the British in Egypt to make military reports the Americans.

Carrier weapons and detection systems
When the European war began, the only effective air-deliverable weapon against submarines was the torpedo. The anti-submarine bomb required a direct hit to do any damage. In the spring of 1940, a Royal Navy model depth charge was modified to become the MK.VI used by Britain's Coastal Command aircraft. Another year passed before a satisfactory "depth bomb" came into general serveic.

The limited success of the British attacks on an Italian fleet south of Sardinia in 1940 was principally ascribed to faulty torpedoes.

Three or four bombs dropped on pocket battleship Scheer did not explode. (Roskill p. 49).


 * Fighting the U-boats- Weapons and Technologies]

Dive Bombers

Medium Bombers: B-25s (Carrier-launched for the Doolittle Raid)

Japanese Carrier-Launched Aircraft

Axis Land-Based Aircraft Attacking Carriers

Focke-wulf Condor

"Navy determined that F4U Corsairs were not safe to operate from carriers. So VF-17 was removed from Bunker Hill and replaced by the F6F Hellcats of VF-18. VF-17. " https://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/general/articles/usscharger.aspx

Air observer

Table for how U-boats were sunk
Carrier-launched aircraft is credited with sinking or assisting with sinking about one-third of German submarines during the Battle of the Atlantic. (REF?? Morison??) SEE ALSO ROSKILL

TABLE AT BEGINNING OF BATTLE FOR THE ATLANTIC FOR HOW SUBS WERE SUNK? US escort carriers credited with sinking over 50 (51?) U-boats Allied submarines sank 24 U-boats, 13 by British subs.


 * U-boats sunk by Allied subs; 24 total
 * U-boat losses 1939-1945
 * U-boat losses by causes
 * Subs sunk by aircraft
 * The Battle against the U-boat in the American Theater- three parts

Timelines for World War II WORKING DRAFTS
[Not for inclusion with article]

Major events
This timeline includes major events for World War II.











Guadalcanal campaign
Landings:

Supplying, Reinforcing, Fighting- Round 1 (August 1942):

Battle of the Eastern Solomons (24 August 1942):

Supplying, Reinforcing, Fighting- Round 2 (August - September 1942):

Supplying, Reinforcing, Fighting- Round 3 (September - October 1942):

Battle of Santa Cruz Islands:

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal:

Timeline For Carrier Actions During World War II
This timeline includes aircraft carrier actions and events affecting or affected by those actions. Unless otherwise noted, all named warships are fleet carriers or light carriers.



1941:











Wikipedia Tables That Are Part of This Article

 * [to be prepared]

Other Wikipedia articles

 * List of aircraft carriers of World War II
 * List of aircraft carriers
 * Timeline of aircraft carriers of the Royal Navy
 * List of seaplane carriers by country

Principal Sources




[KEEP THESE AS "PRINCIPAL SOURCES"? CHECK THE WEBSITES.]











FROM THE INTRO TO LISTS OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS:

Information was obtained from online ship histories, principally from the following sources:


 * 1) Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
 * 2) Imperial Japanese Navy Page
 * 3) Naval War In The Pacific 1941–1945
 * 4) Royal and Dominion Navy Warships
 * 5) World War II Database

RESTATE THE ABOVE FOR PRINCIPAL SOURCES



PRINCIPAL SOURCES TEMPLATES:


 * Feigin, Judy, "The Office of Special Investigations: Striving for Accountability in the Aftermath of the Holocaust", U.S. Department of Justice, 2006.




 * 1) Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships



REFERENCE TEMPLATES:











Miscellaneous Notes
Miscellaneous Sources, some used

Selected sources used for Wikipeida articles for aircraft carrier histories:
 * 1) This article incorporates text from the public domain Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. The entry can be found here: https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/e/enterprise-cv-6-vii.html
 * 2) Mason, Geoffrey B. (2003). "HMS Ark Royal – Fleet Aircraft Carrier". Service Histories of Royal Navy Warships in World War 2. Naval-History.Net. Archived from the original on 7 April 2010. Retrieved 4 June 2010.
 * 3) Tully, Anthony P. (2000). "IJN Hiryu: Tabular Record of Movement". Kido Butai. Combinedfleet.com. Retrieved 16 June 2013.

More info regarding East Indies Fleet operations available from:
 * British Pacific Fleet
 * war diaries- Eastern fleet Jan-Oct 1945
 * Eastern Fleet Jan-Aug 1945
 * The Forgotton Fleet by J. Winston
 * Operation Pacific by Edwin Gray
 * War With Japan by HMSO

Sources for American Carrier List:
 * 1) World War II Database
 * 2) Wikipedia List of aircraft carriers of World War II
 * 3) Wikipedia List of aircraft carriers of the United States Navy
 * 4) Wikipedia List of United States Navy escort aircraft carriers


 * 1) World War II Database
 * 2) Imperial Japanese Navy Page
 * 3) Royal and Dominion Navy Warships
 * 4) World War II Aircraft Carriers (1939-1945)
 * 5) Wikipedia List of aircraft carriers of World War II
 * 6) Wikipedia List of aircraft carriers of the United States Navy
 * 7) Wikipedia List of United States Navy escort aircraft carriers

Sources for British Carrier List:
 * 1) Escort Carriers To Britain- Lend Lease 1941-1944
 * 2) Royal and Dominion Navy Warships
 * 3) Squadrons of the Sea
 * 4) World War II Database
 * 5) Wikipedia List of escort carriers of the Royal Navy
 * 6) Wikipedia List of United States Navy escort aircraft carriers

Empire ship

Sources for Japanese Carrier List:
 * 1) Imperial Japanese Navy Page
 * 2) World War II Database
 * 3) Japanese Seaplane Ships

VIDEO: 'Armoured' and 'Unarmoured' Carriers

1. Guide To Warships WWI & WWII; 'Armoured' and 'Unarmoured' Carriers: Survivaility vs. Strike Power- YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_dHdGHP8hCg Jan 2, 2019 Drachinifel (Alexander Pocklington)

—Notes from video:— British flight deck armor only over hanger area, forming an armored box. "Ends of the flight deck were strengthened, but not fully armored." "Major naval historians/well respected naval historians" [naval engineers?] do not agree on best approach re armored decks: David K. Brown, Norman Friedman, Robert O Dulin, Jr., William H. Garzke/Garske/Garskey.

Relatively contemporary classes: Ark Royal, Yorktown, Illustrious, Implacable, Essex. Wasp was designed light to use up Washington Treaty tonnage.

American carriers designed mainly for Pacific operations. For Britain, Ark Royal designed with Pacific (Japan) in mind but later British classes were designed anticipating a European power as the enemy.

Some British carriers had two hanger decks: Ark Royal, Indomitable, Implacable. These decks were only 14' high compared to 17' for American ships.

"Durability" "Tactical" (can be brought back to operational status quickly), "Survivable" (can be brought to port for repair), "Strategic" (can be restored to use without major losses in capability).

2. History of Navy Carriers Part 1 of 5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6JqnkEHlPzI

Category:Naval historians

Draft Text re Stan Laurie

Naval Air Squadrons and Air Crews

Naval Air Squadrons.

Squadrons not permanently tied to a given carrier. Example of a squadron.


 * Royal Navy Air Squadrons
 * 838 squadron history

Naval Air Crews. Just as ship assignments changed for each squadron as circumstances required, so did the squadron assignments and tasks change for each airman. Assignments included both carrier-based and land-based tours. As an example, one young British midshipman served in five different squadrons at nine different ships and bases.

Stan Laurie began his carrier experience in the summer of 1940 aboard the HMS Illustrious. He flew Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers on anti-submarine and reconnaissance sorties from this newest of Britain's fleet carriers as it ran the Mediterranean gauntlet. Facing threats from submarines and dodging bombs from Italian land-based aircraft, the Illustrious escorted a convoy from Gibraltar to Malta and Alexandria in Egypt. Upon arrival at Alexandria, Laurie was assigned to a different unit, the 824 Naval Air Squadron operating off of the HMS Eagle. From this old carrier, Laurie made sweeps of the eastern Mediterranean in Swordfish aircraft, attacking enemy installations and shipping. Bombing raids were made on Rhodes, Tripoli, and Sicily. When damage to the Eagle from enemy aircraft bombs required her to be dry-docked, some crews of the 824 transferred to the Illustrious for the famous raid on Taranto in November 1940. Laurie, however, was assigned to a dirt airstrip in the Western Desert where his crew bombed Italian ground forces and spotted for battleship bombardment in support of the assault on Bardia in January 1941, the first military operation of the Western Desert Campaign. In April, he and his crew were ordered to a land base at Port Sudan from which they bombed Italian destroyers based at Massawa in Italian Somaliland that had threatened British troop convoys to Egypt routed around the Cape of Good Hope and through the Red Sea. Laurie and his squadron sank or dispersed them before they could be scuttled, as the Italians planned, to block the Suez Canal. Rejoining the Eagle when it was ordered to the Indian Ocean, Laurie's squadron searched for German merchant raiders, U-boats, and their supply ships, sinking some. When the battleship HMS Duke of York was commissioned in November 1941, Laurie was assigned as crew for its catapult-launched Supermarine Walrus float planes. This new battleship took Winston Churchill to Virginia and then escorted Arctic convoys to Russia. Laurie was briefly transferred to 819 Squadron for mine-dropping operations from Fairy Swordfish. Returning to catapult aircraft on the Duke of York, he spotted for the bombardment of Algiers during the Allied invasion of North Africa. On the way to join Naval Air Squadron 851 in America aboard the RMS [RMS Queen Mary|Queen Mary]],  Laurie again ran into Winston Churchill. Laurie flew TBF Avenger torpedo bombers from Boston to San Francisco, embarked upon the newly commissioned escort carrier HMS Shah, which ferried aircraft along with the 851 Squadron to Ceylon, arriving in March 1944. There Laurie did anti-Submarine patrols from the Maldives, Seychelles, Mombasa, and up the Arabian Sea as part of a hunter-killer group guided to targets by Enigma decrypts. Patrolling near the Seychelles in August 1944, his plane located and damaged German submarine U-198, which group escorts were credited with sinking immediately afterward.

Laurie ultimately returned safely to Britain. His first cousin, US bomber pilot Robert Laurie of Hingham MA was not as fortunate. He died in his Fifth Air Force B-24 heavy bomber over New Guinea in March 1944 during the Huon Peninsula campaign.


 * Naval Aviation Development in World War II–U.S. Navy Versus Royal Navy Experience (second crewman- "naigator/observer")

Raw Material Movements

Germany imported iron ore from Norway. England Imported oil and bauxite from South America and rubber from Ceylon. Japan imported rice from Korea, ? from Manchuria, rubber from British Malaya, and oil from the Dutch East Indies. Troops came to Europe and the Pacific theater from six continents.

Notes:


 * Military production during World War II
 * Arctic convoys of World War II
 * https://ww2-weapons.com/military-expenditures-strategic-raw-materials-oil-production/

OLD DRAFT Midway
Midway (4-7 June 942)

All eight of Japan's other fleet and light carriers along with nearly all of Japan's surface fleet did participate the simultaneous campaigns to occupy Midway Island (Operation MI) and the Aleutian Islands (Operation AL). Both operations were intended to extend Japan's defensive perimeter and thereby prevent raids on the Japanese mainland like the Doolittle Raid of the previous April. For Admiral Yamamoto, the operation was also another bid for the "decisive battle" he sought, believing the Americans would send their carrier fleet in response after an assault on Midway. He, like Admiral Nagumo, did not know where the American fleet was but believed it would not be near Midway as the Japanese attack began.

Military intelligence played a significant role in the battle for Midway. The Americans had broken Japan's naval code and knew where the enemy aircraft carriers were and their intentions. Americans brought all three of their then available carriers and 233 carrier-launched planes to the battle. In addition, they had over 100 aircraft of various types from Midway's airfield, an "unsinkable carrier." The Japanese believed the Yorktown had been sunk or at least damaged and not operational as a result of the Coral Sea battle the month before. They did not know where the rest of the American carriers were and had been misled by earlier American fleet movements into believing they were probably in the South Pacific. A cordon of submarines had been positioned between Midway and Hawaii to report on any enemy ship movements. Another submarine had been operation at French Frigate Shoals to refuel a float plane that also was to report on ship movements around Pearl Harbor. No carrier sightings had been reported to Nagumo from either of these operations. Even if the carriers were at Pearl Harbor, he reasoned, it would take them 48 hours to respond to his attack and reach Midway.

Splitting their forces as they frequently did, the Japanese engaged only their four fleet carriers,  Kaga, Akagi, Soryu and Hiryu, with a total of 243 aircraft at Midway. An additional 133 aircraft did not participate in the battle because two other carriers (Hosho and Zuiho) were kept too far in the rear to assist and two more (Ryujo and Junyo) were sent north for the simultaneous attack on Dutch Harbor and Kiska in the Aleutian Islands. Thus more than a third of the Japanese aircraft that could have been engaged at Midway were not.

The duel objectives of the operation created problems for the Japanese carriers. The plan was for the carrier-launched aircraft to eliminate the ability of Midway to resist the landing of occupation forces. This was the carriers' first priority unless enemy aircraft carriers were found to be in the vicinity. In that unlikely eventuality, the first priority would shift to destroying the enemy carriers and only after that to paving the way for the landing forces. Consequently, Japanese first-strike carrier aircraft were armed to carry high explosive and fragmentation bombs appropriate for destroying land targets. Second-strike aircraft were armed, as a precaution against the presence enemy warships, with torpedoes and armor-piercing bombs appropriate for sinking ships. After the first strike bombers and fighters were launched against Midway, the second strike torpedo planes, bombers, and fighters armed to attack warships were brought up from the hanger decks to the flight decks ready to be launched if necessary. Seven reconnaissance planes were sent out in a fan pattern to search for American carriers. Launching one of the planes from the cruiser Tone was delayed 30 minutes because of problems with its catapult.

The Japanese first strike against Midway was launched at 0430 and consisted of 36 fighters and 72 attack planes. The attack did considerable damage to buildings, oil tanks, and the seaplane hanger. Twenty-five American Midway-based fighter pilots, outnumbered and with inferior aircraft compared to the Japanese Zero fighter, rose to oppose the incoming bombers. Fifteen American planes were shot down. However, their efforts combined with intense and accurate anti-aircraft fire shot down 38 attackers and left another 29 inoperable. Nagumo had lost the use of 67 of his 108 planes in the first strike, leaving his four carriers with only 167 left. [NEED ANOTHER SOURCE FOR THIS. YOUTUBE FIDEO SAID TOTAL SHOT DOWN AND DAMAGED WAS ONLY 25 JAPANESE PANES] As a Japanese pilot was leaving the area at the end of the first strike, he caught sight of and reported a plane taking-off from Midway's airfield.

At 0705, about the same time the first strike on Midway ended, 41 Midway pilots began attacking the Japanese carriers with torpedo planes, dive bombers, and high-level bombers. Many of these planes were shot down by Zeros like the fighters over Midway. The sacrifices of all these American pilots had an unintended but highly significant consequence. Admiral Nagumo decided that Midway had not been sufficiently neutralized and that it constituted an immediate threat to his carriers. He ordered that second strike against Midway be made. At 0715, believing he was under no immediate threat from enemy carriers, Nagumo ordered aircraft on Akagi and Kaga that were armed with torpedoes to be lowered from the flight deck to the hanger deck and be armed with high explosive and fragmentation bombs instead. Unbeknownst to Nagumo, American aircraft from Enterprise and Hornet began launching against him fifteen minutes before he made this fateful decision.

The night of June 3, the three American carriers were about 300 miles east northeast of Midway at location auspiciously designated "Point Luck." The Yorktown had been repaired by a Herculean effort of 1,400 workers at Pearl Harbor in only two days rather than the 90 days originally thought necessary. This added 75 aircraft to the American's striking power.

At 0702 Admiral Spruance, commanding TF-16 with Enterprise and Hornet and having learned the location of the Japanese carriers, aggressively ordered an offensive strike force of 116 planes keeping back only 36 fighters back for defense. These planes were in the air by 0806 and expecting to find the enemy near the extreme end of their 200 mile range. Rather than risk losing the advantage of striking the enemy first, Spruance ordered his dive bombers off without waiting for the planes from Yorktown. Admiral Fletcher, commanding TF-17 with the Yorktown, ordered 35 planes sent out, keeping another 35 for defense.

At 0728, as Type 97 torpedo planes on Akagi and Kaga were rearmed being with bombs, Nagumo received word that pilot of the Tone float had sighted "ten ships, apparently enemy" heading southeast away from Midway at a distance of about 200 miles. No carriers were mentioned in the report. Surface ships without carriers that far away did not pose an immediate threat, and rearming the Type 97 planes continued. It occurred to someone that enemy ships heading southeast were headed into the wind, suggesting that the ships might be enemy carriers launching aircraft. In fact, they were. Nugamo gave the order to discontinue removing torpedoes on the Type 97 bombers. Another report from the Tone plane was received at 0809 reporting 5 cruisers and 5 destroyers" Not until 0820 was a report received that "enemy appears to be accompanied by a carrier."

Nagumo shifted the priority away from a second strike on Midway to launching planes for attacking American carriers. Torpedo-armed planes were on the decks of Hiryu and Soryu and could be launched immediately. Attack planes on Akagi and Kaga were also on deck, albeit armed with types of bombs that were less effective against warships. However, the fighters that would escort those planes against the American carriers were now overhead in the combat air patrol and would have to be refueled first. Nagumo had just witnessed the massacre of American torpedo planes that attacked him without fighter protection. Adding to his dilemma, first-strike planes low on fuel were now beginning to return from Midway. If they were not permitted to land, many planes would run out of fuel and be splashed with losses of planes and some pilots. On the other hand, not attacking the American carriers immediately was also highly risky. Also risky was not having a refueled and rearmed combat air patrol overhead to protect his carriers if, as he now had reason to believe, American carrier-launched planes were headed his way. The decisions Nagumo had made during the last hour left him without good options.

He decided to land his planes and refuel and rearm them against warships rather than land installations, thereby delaying an attack on the American carriers. Planes spotted on all four carriers were again lowered to their hangers to clear the flight decks for landings. By 0918, the first-strike planes had all landed. Work to refuel and rearm was rushed. Bombs on Akagi and Kaga removed to make way again for torpedoes were not properly stowed. Fuel lines were open.

In a planned coordinated attack, American dive bombers were expected to distract enemy fighters so that the relatively slow, vulnerable torpedo planes could make their approaches in greater safety. American fighters would also be there to protect the attack planes from enemy fighters. For this battle, however, the torpedo planes from the three American carriers became separated from the dive bombers and fighters. By chance, the torpedo planes arrived before the dive bombers and were mostly unescorted by fighters. Each group immediately and unhesitatingly attacked Japanese carriers successively over the hour beginning just after Nagumo landed all the surviving planes from his first strike on Midway. The torpedo plane attacks prevented Nagumo from launching the aircraft he armed to destroy the American carriers and from launching the fighters to augment his combat air patrol overhead. Japanese Zeros in the air descended and slaughtered the American torpedo squadrons as they made their lumbering torpedo approaches. Few torpedoes were successfully launched and none struck the carriers. Only six of the 41 attacking torpedo planes survived. by 1020, all the torpedo planes were back on deck ready to take off along with refueled and rearmed fighters. Nagumo turned his carriers into the wind and, within 15 minutes, the entire attack force would be airborne.

Like those of the Midway-launched planes, the sacrifices of the carrier torpedo squadrons had significant, unexpected consequences. In the reverse of a planned coordinated attack, the threat from the carrier's torpedo planes had brought the defending zeros down to sea level and distracted them, along with the fleet's anti-aircraft gunners. The timely, simultaneous, and totally uncoordinated arrival of 54 American dive bombers came as a complete surprise. In the space of only five minutes beginning at about 1025, three 17-plane groups of bombers from Enterprise and Yorktown dived on Soryu, Akagi, and Kaga scoring fatal hits with a total of only nine bombs. In the words of historical novelist Herman Wouk, "It was a perfect coordinated attack. It was timed almost to the second.  It was a freak accident."

The timing of information received by Nagumo that shaped his decisions and led to disaster for the Japanese that morning is summarized below.
 * 0430  Launching commences for first strike at Midway.
 * 0430  Six reconnaissance float planes catapulted from cruisers.
 * 0445  108 first-strike planes launched and on way to Midway.
 * 0500  Reconnaissance float plane No. 4 catapulted from Tone.
 * 0630  Air attack on Midway begins
 * 0700  Leader of first Midway strike recommends a second strike.
 * 0705  Ten planes from Midway attack Akagi with torpedoes.
 * 0715  Admiral Nagumo orders switching armament from torpedoes to bombs.
 * 0728  Tone search plane reports seeing 10 ships, probably enemy.
 * 0745  Tone search plane reports weather at enemy warship location.
 * 0745  Admiral Nagumo orders switching armament back to torpedoes.
 * 0747  Sixteen dive bombers from Midway attack Hiryu with torpedoes.
 * 0750  First-strike planes begin to return to Japanese carriers to land.
 * 0809  Tone search plane reports enemy force is 5 cruisers and 5 destroyers.
 * 0809  Fifteen b-17s from Midway begin dropping bombs from 20,000.
 * 0820  Tone search plane reports enemy force many include a carrier.
 * 0820  Nagumo decides to land first-strike planes before attacking carriers.
 * 0840  First-strike planes from Midway begin to land on carriers.
 * 0918  All first-strike planes are landed.  Nagumo turns north-northeast.
 * 0918  Fifteen torpedo planes from Hornet begin attack on Kaga.
 * 0928  Fourteen torpedo planes from Enterprise begin attack on Kaga.
 * 1000  Twelve torpedo planes from Yorktown begin attack on Soryu.
 * 1015  Torpedo plane attacks end.
 * 1025  Seventeen dive bombers from Yorktown hit Soryu.
 * 1025  Thirty dive bombers from Enterprise hit Akagi and Soryu.
 * 1030  Dive bomber attacks end.

Only the Hiryu, which had become separated from the other carriers during the confusion of the torpedo bomber attacks, had aircraft with which to counter attack. She sent off two waves with a total of 40 aircraft, both of which found the Yorktown. Eight attacking planes were shot down by Yorktown's anti-aircraft and fighter defenses, but she was hit with three bombs and two torpedoes. Shortly thereafter, 24 American dive bombers from Enterprise hit Hiryu with three bombs, causing her to sink. Yorktown remained afloat and salvage appeared possible for three days, but then a Japanese submarine I-168 got through the screen and sank her along with a destroyer.

For several hours Yamamoto sought to engage the American carriers with his powerful fleet of gunboats in a night battle, but Spruance avoided the trap. As Yamamoto withdrew his fleet the next day, American carrier aircraft sank a heavy Japanese cruiser and damaged another.

Bad luck contributed to Japan's intelligence failures that shaped the battle. The American carriers were in the sector for which the search plane from Tone was responsible. If that plane had launched on time instead of thirty minutes late, Nagumo may have learned about the presence of American carriers before ordering the switch from torpedoes to bombs. Unfortunate communication failures supported Nagumo's confidence that there was no imminent threat from enemy carriers. The reports from the single young pilot in Tone's search plane were not timely, clear or complete. A typographical error initially sent the Japanese submarines to the wrong location and, because radio silence was maintained as Nagumo sailed to Midway, he was not informed that the cordon got in place too late to spot carriers that could be moving toward Midway from Pearl Harbor. He had also not been informed that the seaplane reconnaissance from French Frigate Shoals was not in operation because an American seaplane tender had anchored there and refueling by submarine was not possible. Had he known these things, he may have been less confident that the American carriers were only a distant threat and acted accordingly. However, it was a conscious decision rather than bad luck that Yamamoto and Nagumo did not use the 133 planes from the four carriers kept in the rear and sent to the Aleutians. By the time Yamamoto called back the Aleutian carriers, it was too late for them to influence the outcome of the battle. In a near-run thing as this battle was, giving the enemy an unnecessary edge on planes was a serious miscalculation and could have determined the battle's outcome.

In contrast, the Americans enjoyed exceptionally good luck. The delay of a Japanese destroyer to attack a submarine allowed dive bombers from Enterprise to follow it to find the Japanese carriers. Finding the carriers at extreme plane range was within minutes of having to turn back to refuel. The timing of arrival for the three torpedo squadrons and the two dive bombing squadrons who left at different times separated by an hour was by chance. Due to the breaking of Japanese naval code, excellent strategic and tactical decision-making on the part of the Americans, determination and bravery of their pilots, in addition to a great deal of luck, all four Japanese fleet carriers were sunk at the cost of one American carrier. The four carriers were sunk with a total of 13 bombs and one torpedo. American aircraft losses, including land-based planes from Midway Island, totaled 145. The Japanese lost 292.


 * www.immf-midway.com/docs/losses.pdf source for airplane losses

As a result of these catastrophic losses, the Japanese Navy was never again in a position to make an effective strategic initiative. The American victory is regarded as one of the most decisive in history. From that point on, Japan's ability to strike at will was over. The Allies took the initiative only two months later at Guadalcanal, the third of the turning points in the Pacific War.

OLD DRAFT Ascendancy of aircraft carriers BEFORE REORGANIZING!
It became apparent early in the war that control of the air was prerequisite for successful surface action both on land and at sea. For much of the war, Britain and America fought mostly on the seas, where successful Allied naval operations permitted effective reinforcement of troops in the Soviet Union and western Europe and crippled similar efforts by Italy and Japan to support their empires. Aircraft carriers bearing dozens of warplanes delivering bombs and torpedoes supplanted battleships with big guns as the principal warships around which navies assembled task forces for major campaigns.

Land based aircraft as well as carrier launched aircraft fought at sea. Germany's Luftwaffe attacked many convoys, which were protected by the planes from Allied airfields while convoys were within range. As carriers became available, their aircraft provided protection in the ocean areas not covered by land based planes. Japan's successful expansion after the raid on Pearl Harbor was principally achieved by progressively using land-based aircraft to support invasions within striking distance of airbases on previously conquered lands. Land based aircraft contributed significantly to America's defense of Midway Island and Guadalcanal. Until the invasion Guadalcanal and the Gilbert Islands, all Allied invasions in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters had been accomplished within the protective envelope of friendly airfields. In many cases, land-based aircraft that enabled dominating the air was delivered to battle zones by aircraft carriers.

Only America, Britain, and Japan made significant use of aircraft carriers during World War II. The following table shows the number of aircraft carriers the principal combatants operated that had flight decks capable of both launching and recovering aircraft and that were operational sometime between September 1939 and August 1945. As war historian Richard Overy points out, statistics demonstrating material superiority are not by themselves sufficient for explaining why the Allies won the war. But they are an important part of the story.

Historian Symonds' short list of factors enabling the Allies to win the war includes British "grit", Russian manpower, and American industrial strength. [CITATION HERE]. Britain continued alone in Europe against all odds for a year after the fall of France, stubbornly resisting the Axis. Approximately 35 million Soviet Union soldiers fought during the war, as many as the United States, Germany, and Japan combined. She lost an estimated 10 million to combat deaths, many more than any other combatant. America produced more artillery pieces, tanks, ships, and aircraft than all Axis countries combined. Only the Soviet Union produced more tanks and artillery pieces. Overy's list is longer, including with these three... [EXPAND AND INCLUDE CITATION]

Details and sources are provided below in the "Carriers" section.

In the Atlantic theater, transporting troops, aircraft, tanks, oil, food, etc. from or routed through North America or up the West African coast to Britain, Russia, North Africa, and continental Europe was essential for ultimate victory. Allied aircraft carriers screened by corvettes, destroyers and destroyer escorts proved more successful and cost-effective than battleships or cruisers for protecting convoys from attacks by Axis submarines, raiders, and land-based aircraft. By mid-1943, the Axis threat of completely cutting essential supply lines had passed. By this time, however, German battleships and submarines had sunk six British carriers

In the Pacific theater, a powerful fleet of Japanese carriers roamed virtually at will for the first six months of the war. It made destructive raids and supported invasions from Hawaii in the east to India in the west. Beginning in May 1942, however, six major carrier battles were fought between Japan and America during which opposing surface ships did not see or fire their guns upon each other. The first four of these battles, all fought during 1942, thwarted the Japanese attempt in the Coral Sea to isolate Australia, halted the expansion of Japanese control eastward in the Pacific toward Midway Island, and enabled the successful establishment of an American force on Guadalcanal. Each of these battles contributed significantly to shifting the strategic initiative in the Pacific theater from Japan to America. Less than a year after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan had lost six fleet and light carriers in the Pacific, America had lost four, and Britain one. Loss and damage left only eight [?] such carriers operational in the Pacific theater as of September 1942: six Japanese [?], one American, and one British.

In the early years of the war, the combatants risked and lost a high percentage of the their carriers. By the end of 1942 in both theaters, America, Britain, and Japan had lost a combined total of 15 fleet (CV) and light carriers (CVL) compared with the 18 they had had when the European war began in September 1939 and with the 25 they had had in December 1941 when Pearl Harbor was attacked. The following table shows the number of such carriers sunk each year of the war. The total number of escort carriers (CVE) sunk during the war is also shown.

Details and sources are provided below in the "Carrier Construction and Losses" section.

Beginning in December 1942, the effects of America's industrial strength became evident as the country began commissioning about one fleet or light carrier each month for the next two years. America commissioned 28 such new carriers during the war, compared to 14 for Japan and 13 for Britain. This new construction was offset by sinkings and conversions of operational carriers to training vessels. By the end of the war, America had 26[?] operational fleet and light carriers, Britain had 11, and Japan had none. In addition, America built 115 escort carriers for use by both America and Britain in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. Britain built six escort carriers and 19 Merchant Aircraft Carriers (MACs). Japan produced five escort carriers. The Allies industrial capability for shipbuilding enabled them to absorb aircraft carrier attrition significantly better than Japan could. Between September 1939 and August 1945, the Allies commissioned 182 new carriers of all types (fleet, light, escort, MACs) while Japan was able to commission only 19. [THESE NUMBERS NEED TO BE CHECKED AND RECONCILED WITH OTHER TABLES]

Details and sources are provided below in the "Carrier Construction and Losses" section.

At the same time that America, Britain, and Japan began emphasizing aircraft carrier construction, they de-emphasized construction of battleships, the number of which, before World War II, had been regarded universally as the principal indicator of naval power. America repaired and returned to service six of the eight battleships damaged or sunk during Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor but commissioned only eight new battleships during the rest of the war. For the entire war period from September 1939 to August 1945, America commissioned ten new battleships while Japan commissioned only two and converted two existing ones to hybrid aircraft carriers. Britain commissioned five new battleships. Germany, Italy, and France commissioned a total of six. All together, only 23 new battleships were added to combatants' fleets during the war years compared to 55 new fleet and light carriers. During the entire war, battleship guns sank only a single fleet carrier and a single battleship. Carrier launched aircraft damaged, sank, or took part in sinking 19 battleships. Although Japan was first to recognize and exploit the greater effective striking power of aircraft carriers over battleships, she was slow to abandon employment of the latter. It was not until after losses at the Battle of Midway in June 1940 that she changed naval tactics and began leaving battleships out of major naval engagements.

Damage to carriers during combat, collisions, weather, and other causes reduced the number available for operations at any given time. The table below shows the causes for carriers not being operational.

[TABLE OF CAUSES OF DAMAGES- ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC]

Taking sinkings and damage into account, the table below shows the number of operational fleet and light carriers for each combatant at the end of each month. The Pacific theater includes the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic theater includes the Mediterranean Sea.

Details and sources are provided in the "Operational carriers at the end of each month of the war" section.

Successful Allied initiatives at El Alamein, Stalingrad, French North Africa, and Guadalcanal in November 1942 marked strategic shifts for World War II. Aircraft carriers contributed to the success of these operations by protecting convoys of armaments and other supplies to Egypt and Russia, keeping Malta supplied to disrupt Axis supply operations to North Africa, providing air support for troops during the invasion of North Africa, and helping to prevent Japanese troops and supplies from reaching Guadalcanal. After November 1942, new Allied construction resulted in dramatic increases in the number of carriers available for additional strategic initiatives. Overall, aircraft carriers contributed greatly to making 1942 the turning point of the war, 1944 the decisive year, and 1945 one for essentially finishing up, albeit at great cost.

L YOUNG EDITED DRAFT Naval Air Squadrons and Air Crews
Naval Air Squadrons.

Squadrons not permanently tied to a given carrier. Example of a squadron.


 * Royal Navy Air Squadrons
 * 838 squadron history

[DRAFT EDITED BY L YOUNG]

Stanley Laurie. British midshipman Stan Laurie served in five different squadrons at nine different ships and bases. He began his carrier experience in the summer of 1940 aboard the HMS Illustrious, from which he flew Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers on anti-submarine and reconnaissance sorties in the Mediterranean. Upon arrival at Alexandria, Egypt, Laurie was assigned to a different unit, the 824 Naval Air Squadron operating off of another carrier, the HMS Eagle. When damage to the Eagle required her to be dry-docked, Laurie was assigned to a dirt airstrip in the Western Desert, where his crew bombed Italian ground forces and spotted for Allied battleship bombardment in support of the assault on Bardia in January 1941.

In April 1941, with Eagle still in the Mediterranean, Laurie and his crew were ordered to a land base at Port Sudan. From there they bombed Italian destroyers of the Italian Red Sea Flotilla based at Massawa in Italian Somaliland. Sinking and driving the Italian destroyers aground contributed greatly to eliminating the threat to the Suez Canal approaches.

The Eagle was then deployed to the Indian ocean, and Laurie's squadron rejoined her and searched for German merchant raiders, U-boats, and their supply ships. When the battleship HMS Duke of York was commissioned in November 1941, Laurie was assigned as crew for its catapult-launched Supermarine Walrus float planes. Laurie was briefly transferred to 819 Squadron, flying Fairey Swordfish aircraft in mine-dropping operations. Returning to catapult aircraft on the Duke of York, he spotted for the bombardment of Algiers during the Allied invasion of North Africa. He then joined Naval Air Squadron 851 in America, transporting TBF Avenger torpedo bombers from Boston to San Francisco. He then embarked with the Avenger upon the newly commissioned escort carrier HMS Shah, which took Squadron 851 to Ceylon, arriving in March 1944. There Laurie did anti-submarine patrols from the Maldives, Seychelles, Mombasa, and up the Arabian Sea as part of a hunter-killer group guided to targets by Enigma decrypts. Laurie ultimately returned safely to Britain.


 * Naval Aviation Development in World War II–U.S. Navy Versus Royal Navy Experience (second crewman- "naigator/observer")

Organization of this Article
There are many excellent and detailed Wikipedia articles that include narratives of aircraft carrier actions during World War II. These articles generally discuss carrier actions in the context of comprehensive naval engagements and sometimes make it difficult to grasp the contribution made by aircraft carrier operations to the immediate strategic situation and to the ultimate outcome of the war.

This article is intended to report, in one place, information from multiple sources in order to focus on aircraft carrier operations, highlighting their contribution to each country's war effort. Quantitative compilations of carrier forces are intended to indicate each country's strengths and limitations for pursuing strategic options throughout the war.

The organization of the article is intended to provide, in the early sections, an overall, broad-brush appreciation of the naval war and carriers' role in it. Details are intended to be made readily available to he reader through use of footnotes and links to other Wikipedia articles. Extensive detail provided in the later sections and lists in separate articles is intended to provide quantitative support for the earlier sections. While objective counts of warships, aircraft, and personnel do not completely convey strategic situations, they are useful for presenting a starting point for appreciating the relative capabilities of competing naval forces that influenced military decisions.

Lists of warships in this and related articles are arranged to emphasize the relative strengths of opposing navies as the war progressed, especially during the formative 1942 period of the war. Lists include ship names and commission dates to support counts used in the article's tables. This detail is also intended to facilitate identification of any errors that may be present and/or assist with reconciling aircraft carrier counts in this article with counts from other sources. Detailed footnotes regarding carrier lists are included for the same reasons.

There are many ways to present the story of World War II. Each has its advantages and limitations. This presentation views events through the lens of aircraft carrier as they emergence as the principal instrument for achieving naval dominance. Similar detailed war history articles could be written with emphasis on the highly effective and efficient role of submarines during the war or of the courageous role of corvettes during the Battle of the Atlantic, etc.

To help focus on operations of aircraft carriers, the narrative typically includes only carrier names. When other ships are referred to in the article, their names are generally given in footnotes.

Although the article is relatively long, its organization provides ease of navigation to areas of interest. When appropriate, separate articles were used for maintaining lists. This author/editor perceived disadvantages in further breaking the text down into a series of shorter articles.

Criteria For Being Included As An "Aircraft Carrier" For This Article
The number of operational carriers reported in this article includes only those with flight decks capable of launching and recovering aircraft. These types are fleet carriers, light carriers, escort carriers, and merchant aircraft carriers (MAC). The number of these carriers can be used as an indication of a navy's offensive capability. Not all of the MACs had hanger decks and elevators, but they all provided protection and transport services similar to the escort carriers.

Battleships, cruisers, seaplane carriers, seaplane tenders (SPT), fighter catapult ships (FCS), aircraft maintenance ships (AMC),etc., that launched aircraft using catapults and/or recovered them using cranes are not included in the counts. These latter typically carried only a limited number of aircraft, perhaps just one, and were typically used for defensive operations such as scouting for and defending against land-base bombers, submarines, and raiders.

Various sources, hard copy and online, provide conflicting information about the classification and number of aircraft carriers operated during World War II. The counts for operational aircraft carriers used in this article differ from counts included in some other Wikipedia articles. Some of these differences are due to varying definitions for "aircraft carrier." To be counted as an "aircraft carrier" for this article, the ship must have flight decks capable of both launching and recovering aircraft. As a result, USS Langley (CV-1) is included in the counts even though some sources classify the ship as a seaplane carrier. On the other hand, the Japanese seaplane carrier Mizuho is not included as an aircraft carrier for this article even though some sources do so. The Japanese aircraft carrier Akitsu Maru is categorized by some sources as an aircraft carrier, but because of its short deck length and lack of landing mechanisms, aircraft could take off but not land on it. Also, to be counted as an "aircraft carrier" for this article, the ship must have been commissioned as such and not simply be under construction during the war. Finally, there are differences among sources about whether a given carrier is classified as "fleet" or "light.'

NOTE: Allied CVEs typically carried 24-34 aircraft compared to 103 for an Essex-class fleet carrier according to Wikipedia article Escort carrier.

Aircraft Carrier Counts In This Article Compared To Other Sources
Values from some of sources referenced during preparation of this article are shown in the following section for comparison and reconciliation.

The following table shows the number of aircraft carriers of each type that were operational or under construction during World War II as reported in the World War II Database as of 5 Dec 2018. The relatively small number of escort carriers suggests that the list was not intended to be exhaustive.

The following table shows the number of aircraft carriers of each type that were operational or under construction during World War II as reported in the Wikipedia article, List of aircraft carriers of World War II, as of 12 Dec 2018.

Whitehouse's counts for American and British aircraft carriers sunk is consistent with the counts used in this article, 11 and 7 respectfully. For the number of Japanese carriers sunk during the war, Whitehouse reports 22, but this includes the Mizuho, which was a seaplane carrier and not included in the counts for this article. Whitehouse also includesKaiyō, which was badly damaged and grounded but not sunk. This carrier is included in the counts of sunk cariers for this article but not included in some lists prepared by some others. Whitehouse's list also includes the Otaka, another name for the Un'yo.

The counts for Japanese aircraft carriers operational during the war according to this article are shown below along with the counts from the Wikipedia article Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II as of 30-Dec-2018.

The number of aircraft carriers built during the war according to this article differs from values reported by other Wikipedia articles as of 30-Dec-2018, namely Naval history of World War II and Military production during World War II. Some of these differences are likely due to handling carriers that were built in America and transferred to Britain for use as well as what qualifies as an "aircraft carrier." Also, the British and Japanese counts appear to include battleships, cruisers, seaplane carriers, seaplane tenders (SPT), fighter catapult ships (FCS), merchant aircraft carriers (MAC), aircraft maintenance ships (AMC),etc., that launched aircraft using catapults and/or recovered them using cranes.

{| class="wikitable" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; border: none;"

The number of US escort aircraft carriers at the beginning and end of the war according to this article differs from the Wikipedia articles United States Navy in World War II as of 30-Dec-2018. The end-of-war count of fleet/light carriers includes those used exclusively for training. The new construction count for escort carriers shows total construction at US yards less carriers transferred to the UK.

Alternate names for Japanese carriers used by others for the names used in this article include: The presentation of this article could benefit from help from someone knowledgeable about table formatting, including how to center values in cells.
 * Haytaka for Hiyo
 * Otaka for Un'yo
 * Shingo for Jun'yō
 * Utaka for Taiyo

Other Differences Compared to Various Sources
Various sources used to prepare this article sometimes report different values for counts for various items. Most of these discrepancies are not significant for the purposes of this article and a single source is referenced without comparing to values reported by other sources. For example, it is not important for this article whether the number of U-boats losses (not scuttled) during the war was 781 (Morison), 765 (uboat.net), or 783 (Naval Historical Society of Australia). If other Wikipedia editors believe it is appropriate to use a different number from a alternative source from that the one currently used for this article, I propose that this be discussed on this "Talk" page before the change is made.

Content and use of sources for various Wikipedia articles regarding aircraft carriers
Lists for aircraft carriers operational between 1918 and 1945 includes for each carrier its class, hull number, builder, and dates for commissioning and removal from service. The lists includes fleet carriers, light carriers, escort carriers, and merchant aircraft carriers. Carriers are listed by date of commissioning within each country. These lists indicate the location and operational status for each carrier and the total number of carriers immediately available for combat for each combatant for each month of WWII. The lists show their four principal online sources and includes citations for each carrier for the specific section for within each source but not for each fact (which would clutter the table and make it less useful). Links are also included for each carrier to its Wikipedia article.

Timeline of aircraft carriers of the United States Navy lists four online references, including DANSF. There are no specific references. The editor apparently reviewed the text for the four online sources and carrier-specific Wikipedia articles in order to graphically report dates, operational status and other information for each carrier. This is the same as what was done for Lists for aircraft carriers operational between 1918 and 1945 and List of WWII carrier operations.

Timeline for aircraft carrier service includes specific references with page numbers for each event included. The "See also" section contains about 18 "lists." There are also some lengthy footnotes that either explain how the timeline was prepared or that provided some additional historical context for events. "External links" included "Haze Gray and Underway." "Categories" included Aircraft carriers, Transport timelines, and Lists of aircraft carriers. There are 152 citations from many books, articles, and online sources. The top editor is attributed with about 64% of the character count. Article was created in 2008 and is currently getting an average of about 50 views daily.

List of aircraft carriers of World War II include dates, class, displacement, current status, etc., but does not indicate each carrier's operational status for specific periods during WWII as does Lists for aircraft carriers operational between 1918 and 1945.

List of aircraft carriers in service has specific citations for some information but appears to rely mostly on links to other Wikipedia articles (and their citations) as the sources for information. There is a "Summary" table at the beginning of the article that summarizes the detailed information from the lists, below. This is similar to the use of summary tables for Lists for aircraft carriers operational between 1918 and 1945. The top editor is attributed with about 15% of the character count. Article was created in 2006 and is currently getting an average of about 450 views daily.

List of aircraft carriers of the United States Navy for each carrier includes dates, class, service life (determined by editor counting rather than reported in citation?), and ultimate status, but does not indicate each carrier's operational status for specific periods during WWII. One column of the table includes citations for each carrier, but these citations are for entire books or articles but not for sections of references or for specific facts. This is the same as what was done for Lists for aircraft carriers operational between 1918 and 1945

List of aircraft carriers of the Royal Navy for each carrier includes selected dates and specifications. Citations are used for only a small number of facts. The basis for the facts appears to rely principally links to other Wikipedia articles, including the many "list" articles included in the "See also" section.

To-Dos

 * Monthly counts for operational carriers should be rechecked, especially after 1942, by reviewing the reported status of each carrier.

Possible Corrections to Other Wikipedia Articles
Corrections to be made after this article goes live.


 * USS Prince William (CVE-31) Identification should be CVE-31, not CVE-21
 * Washington Naval Treaty "all aircraft carriers then in service or building (Argus, Furious, Langley and Hosho) were declared "experimental""  Should it be Hermes instead of Furious?

TEMP: TO BE MOVED TO OTHER SECTIONS
Carrier Activity in the Atlantic Theater

British Actions

From outbreak of war in Europe in 1939...

British Force H: Toronto Convoy Escorts (note merchant marine loss of life) Raiders: Bismark Malta Madagascar (pacific) Sicily After Italy armistance, dissolved.

Torch

Italy incl Anvil?

Overlord/D-Day

Other?

American Actions

Convoy Escorts (to UK and Russia) (note merchant marine loss of life)

Torch

Overlord/D-Day

Italy incl Anvil?

Other?

Carrier Activity in the Pacific Theater

Japanese Actions

Strategic Set-backs in 1942

Defensive Actions After Midway and Guadalcanal

Desperate Measures of 1944 and 1945

Re-patriotion of Overseas Japanese Personnel Hosho

British Actions

Battle of Taranto the first air on ship attack in history

Indian Ocean early in war. Was there a "carrier battle?"

American Actions

Preparations Prior to Pearl Harbor

Responses to Pearl Harbor April 1942 Doolittle raid with Hornet

Strategic Victories Turning the Tide

Rebuilding and Planning

Possible links

 * List of ships of World War II
 * Indian Ocean raid
 * Naval history of World War II
 * Military production during World War II
 * United States Navy in World War II includes count of carriers at beginning and end of the war
 * Military history of the United States during World War II
 * Pacific War
 * List of aircraft carriers of World War II
 * List of US Navy ships sunk or damaged in action during World War II
 * List of ships sunk by submarines by death toll
 * List of United States Navy losses in World War II

ALSO EACH ARTICLE REGARDING INDIVIDUAL CARRIERS AND INDIVIDUAL BATTLES

Misc links 4/4-16/19:
 * https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Aircraft_Carrier_Squadron_(Royal_Navy)
 * https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far_East_Fleet_(United_Kingdom)
 * https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Pacific_Fleet
 * https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_Fleet
 * https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fast_Carrier_Task_Force
 * https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kantai_Kessen
 * https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Task_force#United_States_Navy
 * https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Battle_of_the_Atlantic
 * https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II/Japanese-policy-1939-41
 * https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_by_country
 * https://www.popsci.com/article/technology/how-panama-canal-changed-shape-war
 * https://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsUboats5.htm
 * https://m.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii/hidden-ulithi-naval-base.html
 * https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bd8_vO5zrjo Battle of Midway 1942 from Japanese Perspective

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=Demjanjuk=

CITATIONS:

Right Wrong Man

At Demjanjuk

later had two more children.M30112009Douglas/>

[format looks incomplete in Demjanjuk article; did this citation get included in text?]

"technicality"

Updates used sources in Demjanjuk Wikipedia article as of 10/10/19, Feigin report, and the 2019 ECHR Judgement.

TIMELINE (Partial):
 * 1941 Drafted into the Soviet Army after Germany invaded the Soviet Union.
 * 194? Captured after a battle in the Eastern Crimea
 * ? POW in s German concentration camp
 * ? Transferred to Trawniki concentration camp
 * 1943 allegedly serving in Majdanek, Sobibor, and Flossenbürg concentration camps, and during the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. From March to September 1943 he was at Sobibor.
 * 1945 joined the Russian Liberation Army
 * 1952 Arrives with family in USA

TEXT:

Intro
[...was a retired Ukrainian-American auto worker]

During Word War II, he was a soldier in the Soviet Red Army, a POW held by the Germans, and later a guard at a Nazi extermination camp.

[According to the Munich state court, Demjanjuk does not have a criminal record.[6]]

Although remaining technically unconvicted under German law due to dying before the appeal of his conviction was heard, the finding of guilt in a 91 day trial on 16 counts as an accessory to the murder of over 28,000 Jews resulted in his being sentenced to five years in prison.



According to historian Professor Lawrence Douglas, who wrote a detailed history of the Demjanjuk case, conviction in the German court was the culmination of determined prosecutorial efforts over thirty years in three countries. He concluded that, in spite of the serious missteps along the way, the German verdict brought the case "to a worthy and just conclusion."

[where he was captured by Germans as a Soviet prisoner of war.]

German treatment of Soviet POWs was typically harsh, and Demjanjuk "volunteered" for transfer to Trawniki concentration camp for special training for service as guards at extermination camps. He was a guard at Sobibor from March to September 1943 where, according to the findings at his final trial, he was found to have aided in the systematic murder of 28,060 persons. After the war,

1977-1979: Special Litigation Unit (SLU)
Where is reference for its work/failures added to Revision as of 2014-10-12T19:54:01 by StayBehind specifically:

"The case caused an outcry and, as a result, a special working group was set up at the immigration authority. This group was to identify other war criminals from the Nazi-era who lived in the United States. This working group was under great public pressure and was not sufficiently prepared for the task of handling a large number of complex investigations. During 1977–1979, the department initiated five cases. All except one were lost. In the case that was won, it later turned out that the alleged Gestapo officer had in fact been a forced laborer. "

Probably one of the cases referred to was Fedorenko and the Gestapo officer/forced laborer was Walus. What were the other three cases? Tscherim Soobrokov?

=Walus= Posted revision 3/24/21 (ok to delete0

Revisions made to 1) achieve NPOV, 2) add content with supporting citations, 3) remove questionable content unsupported by citations, and 4) rely more upon secondary sources. The 2018 template regarding questionable neutrality was removed.

Talk:

This revisions was made to 1) achieve NPOV, 2) add content with supporting citations, 3) remove questionable content unsupported by citations, and 4) rely more upon secondary sources. The 2018 template regarding questionable neutrality was removed:
 * POV|date=April 2018

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Frank Walus was born in Germany of Polish parents and emigrated to the United States in 1963. He worked in a factory in the Chicago area and became US citizen in 1970. In 1973 he was accused of having been a Nazi who beat and killed Jews in Poland during World War II. Prosecution was initiated by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 1977. He was convicted based upon questionable testimony in a bench trial before a judge who appeared visibly hostile to the defense. An appeals court vacated the verdict and ordered a new trial before a different judge. By this time, the new Office of Special Investigations (OSI) had been established in the US Department of Justice. After conducting a lengthy and exhaustive investigation of witnesses and documents, OSI concluded from the evidence that it "could not responsibly go forward with a new trial." OSI dropped the charges, expressed regret that they had ever been filed, and partially reimbursed Walus for his expenses.

Background
Immediately after World War II, Americans chose not to dwell upon the war's atrocities, and cold war threats caused Western governments to recruit former Nazis for intelligence work. This, along with U.S. immigration policies, made it relatively easy for former Nazis to enter the United States and become citizens. In the 1970's, growing awareness and concern about these "quiet neighbors" resulted in the establishment of US government organizations to identify, denaturalize, and deport them. The early work by the Special Litigation Unit (SLU) of the INS was regarded as ineffictive and, according to legal scholar Lawrence Douglas, led "botched litigations." One of these was the Walus case.

Walus expelled a border, Michael Alper, from his home in 1973 after a bitter argument. A year later, Alper told a Chicago Jewish agency that Walus had bragged about his work as a Nazi in Poland. The allegation ultimately reached Simon Wiesenthal, a well known Nazi hunter, who brought the matter to the attention of the INS. Alper was Jewish and his parents had been killed by the Nazis. Nonetheless he and his wife had continued to live with Walus even after Walus' alleged disclosure about persecuting Jews.

By 1976, the INS was under pressure to address public outcries about former Nazis in America. INS sent a grainy, washed-out 1959 photograph of Walus to the police in Israel requesting information. The police put an advertisement including Walus' name in local newspapers requesting any information Polish survivors might have. Some who came forward and viewed the photo said they recognized Walus as a Gestapo officer who had killed Jews in the Polish cities of Kiejce and Czestochowa. In 1977, the US Attorney in Chicago filed suit to revoke Walus' citizenship on the basis that Walus had been a Gestapo officer who committed wartime atrocities and had lied in order to gain entry into the US. Once denaturalized, Walus could be deported.

The trial
Denaturalization was a civil, not criminal matter and Walus was not entitled to a jury trial. Evidence was heard by eighty-three year old judge Julius Hoffman who had a history of injecting himself into cases before him. He interfered with defense attorney Robert Korenkiewicz's questioning of witnesses and declared that "the defendant did commit war atrocities" even before Korenkiewicz had begun presenting Walus' defense.

The INS prosecution was almost entirely built upon witnesses who claimed to have seen Walus in Poland committing atrocities. No documents were presented to support that Walus was in Poland during the war or that he was ever a Gestapo officer.

Walus aserted that he was not in Poland during the war, but was one of the millions of Poles sent to Germany to provide forced farm labor. There was documentary evidence from German archives that farmers had paid for Walus' health insurance there and that his forced service in Germany was continuous starting in 1940. He had worked on four or five farms, and the wives of the farmers where he had worked remembered his being there. Further, as a Pole he could not have been a member of the Gestapo, which restricted its number to members of the "master race" and to people taller than Walus' 5'4" height.

The trial lasted seventeen days. Two mutually exclusive possibilities had been presented. Either Walus had been a Gestapo officer in Poland or a forced farm laborer in Germany. Hoffman decided upon the former, relying upon the eyewitness testimony from the persecuted Poles as well as the claims by former boarder Alper. Hoffman disregarded eyewitness testimony from defense eyewitnesses as well as the defense's documentary evidence. He issued his ruling in 1978 that Walus' citizenship be revoked. Shortly thereafter, the defense located five Polish forced laborers who would testify that Walus was with them in Germany during the war. Some old German residency papers proving Walus was in Germany in 1940 were also located. With this additional evidence, Walus' defense attorneys asked Hoffman for a new trial. He refused.

The appeal
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral argument from Walus' attorneys in 1979. It vacated Hoffman's verdict and ordered that there be a new trial, this time with a different judge. Their ruling noted Hoffman's "disturbing" behavior, especially his cutting off defense efforts to cross-examine witnesses. It also noted the weaknesses of the prosecution's case and observed that the newly found evidence would "almost certainly compel a different result."

Further investigation
The case now came to the newly formed Office of Special Investigations of the Justice Department. Because of obvious weaknesses in the case for prosecution, OSI's new director, Allan Ryan, called for an exhaustive investigation of the evidence. It lasted nine months. OSI investigators traveled to Germany, Poland, and Israel to interview witnesses and search for documents. Efforts were made to locate Kielce and Czestochowa survivors in the US as well overseas. A document analyst was retained in Germany. An OSI historian searched the US National Archives for records. The investigators concluded that witness testimony at the previous trial was of questionable reliability and that there was conflicting evidence about where Walus had been during the war. In light of the uncertainty, the OSI concluded that there was a strong possibility of mistaken identity and that it "could not responsibly go forward with a retrial." One of the two principal IOS investigators had even come to the conclusion that Walus was innocent.

Not going forward to retry the case had some potentially negative consequences for OSI. Simon Wiesenthal had an interest in the case. The Israeli police had cooperated in providing evidence. Several Holocaust survivors had traveled to America from Israel and came to court to emotionally confront Walus, whom they believed to be their former tormentor. OSI had not yet won the confidence of the Jewish community, whose support could be important for the organization's success in prosecuting other cases. This was especially true since the bulk of the evidence regarding Nazi wartime atrocities lay behind the Iron Curtain, and OSI was getting little cooperation from officials in Moscow and Washington. This situation threatened the viability of OSI's mission.

Decision and aftermath
OSI declined to retry Walus. The question then arose whether the government should express regret or even issue an apology to Walus. There was internal disagreement on this, and it was finally agreed that an expression of regret was appropriate. OSI reimbursement of attorney's fees was generally prohibited by law, but Walus was awarded $34,000 to offset other costs he incurred.

From its founding, OSI had been the object of criticism from various groups. It was clear from early on that achieving OSI's goals was going to have to involve a lot of public relations work as well as research and prosecution. Eastern European nationality groups were concerned about OSI's mission since it could be expected to target some from their community. They opposed OSI's use of evidence from the USSR since it had an interest in discrediting Baltic State, Ukrainian, and other emigre groups and might well provide false information and forged documents to achieve their aims. These emigre groups also challenged the use of the lower standard of evidence involved in civil trials compared to criminal trials, even though citizenship revocation and deportation were civil issues and US law at the time did not provide for criminal penalties for crimes committed on foreign soil unless against US citizens. The emigres also feared that OSI might seek to deport anyone who had lied on their entry applications, not just the wartime persecutors that OSI sought to expel. In contrast, Jewish groups were pressing for more determined action by OSI than INS had demonstrated. These various groups viewed the original decision by INS to prosecute Walus, and then the decision by OSI not to retry him, as evidence to amplify their separate concerns about the work of the OSI. The press castigated the government for its original prosecution of Walus. On the other side, Lieut. Col. Menachem Russek of the Israeli national police, Israel's chief investigator of Nazi war crimes, sharply criticized the Department of Justice for not retrying the case. Nonetheless, he said the Israeli police would continue to cooperate with OSI in their efforts to find and deport former Nazis who committed wartime atrocities.

As a result of the Walus case, concerns about mistaken identity led OSI to place greater emphasis upon documentary evidence to support eyewitness testimony in future prosecutions. Greater care was also taken in presenting photographic evidence to potential witnesses.

The personal cost of the litigation to Walus was high. In addition to assaults and receiving death threats, he paid over $60,000 for his defense. He sold his house to pay for his attorneys and subsequently lived with his wife at the home of one of their children.

Personal Life
Walus was born 29 July 1922 to Polish parents residing in Germany His father died in 1932, and his mother moved to the Kielce area in Poland. He was 17 when Poland was invaded by Germany in 1939, and he was forced to go to Germany to work on farms in the area around Neu-Ulm. After the war, he returned to Kielce for ten years, after which he and his wife emigrated to the United States. He worked in an automobile factory and bought a duplex in Chicago's southwest side. Walus died of a heart attack in Chicago 17 August 1994. He had four children.

new
Fedorenko argued in district court that his service at Treblinka had been involuntary and, since he had worked only as a perimeter guard, he had no virtually contact with the prisoners. He had mistreated no one and, therefore, when he lied on his immigration forms about his birthplace and wartime service, it was not about any material fact that would have excluded him from entering the US. Six Treblinka survivors, however, testified that Fedorenko had in fact committed atrocities, namely beating and shooting Jewish prisoners.

revised
Judge Norman C. Roettger did not believe the Treblinka witnesses. He ruled that the 71-year-old had himself been a "victim of Nazi aggression" and that the prosecutors had failed to prove that Fedorenko committed any atrocities while at the death camp. Further, Fedorenko had been a hard-working and responsible US resident and citizen and could keep his citizenship.

new
Since this was a civil rather than criminal case, the government could appeal the decision and did so. Allan Ryan then of the Solicitor General's Office presented the appeal before the Fifth Court on behalf of the INS. He argued that Fedorenko's deception when entering the US was a material fact that justified revocation of citizenship, that the district court had erred in judging the credibility of the survivor witnesses, and that the it erred in its determination that Fedorenko's good conduct in the US after the war was relevant to the decision about revoking his citizenship. The Fifth Circuit Court agreed and, in August 1979, reversed the district court's holding. Fedorenko appealed to the Supreme Court which, in January of 1981, sustained the appellate court's decision. In December 1984 Fedorenko became the first Nazi war criminal to be deported to the Soviet Union.

Principal sources

 * Feigin, Judy, "The Office of Special Investigations: Striving for Accountability in the Aftermath of the Holocaust", U.S. Department of Justice, 2006.
 * Douglas, Lawrence, The Right Wrong Man- John Demjanjuk and the Last Great Nazi War Crimes Trial, Princeton University Press, 2016.
 * Ryan, Allan A., Jr,, Quiet Neighbors- Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals In America, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984.

Timeline
Sam Zutty


 * 1973 INS sets up office in NY to investigate Nazis in US (Sam Zutty)
 * Jan 1977 US Attorney in Chicago files suit against Walus
 * Early 1977 Holzman/Eilbert hearings

Martin Mendelsohn


 * 1977 INS sets up unit to focus on Nazis in US (Martin Mendelsohn)
 * August 1977 US Attorney Southern District of Florida files suit against Fedorenko
 * March 1978 Walus trial begins
 * July 1978 Fedoenko trial begins
 * 25 August 1977 US Attorney in Cleveland file suit against Demjanjuk
 * Late summer 1978 SLU office fully staffed and called Special Liigation Unit (SLU)
 * June or July 1978 Original Fedorenko trial begins
 * May 1979 SLU moved from INS to Justice Department and renamed OSI

Walter Rockler


 * 1979 OSI founded
 * 28 June 1979 Ryan argues appeal at 5th Circuit Court of Appeals re Federenko
 * 15 Aug 1979 5th Circuit reverses district court re Federenko

Allan Ryan


 * Jan 1980 Ryan becomes diector of OSI
 * 15 Oct 1980 Fedorenko case argued before Supreme Court by Attorney General Civiletti
 * Jan 1981 Supreme court decision handed down re Fedorenko

=Originalist Interpretation of the Constitution=

Originalism


 * https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/02/16478/

=Escort Carrier USS Card= [added text and reorganized References to Wikipedia article re Card 11/25/21;

NOTES & QUESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL REFINEMENT OF ARTICLE:
 * Check Y'Blood for early history. Was Card the second US CVE after Bogue assigned HKG missions?
 * How many UK HKGs were there before Bogue?
 * When was first Hedgehog used by US HKGs? By Card?

Check facts at Fold 3:
 * 11 May 1943 got underway from Norfolk VA
 * 14 May 1943 got underway from Tomkinsville NY with TG 21.3 with USS Ludlow and Woolsey (and Bristol?). (Escorting UGS-8A to Gibraltar, per Y'Blood, p. 65)
 * 1 June 1943 arrived Casablanca, French Morocco
 * 9 June 9 1943 got underway from Casablanca with USS duPont, Dickerson, and Herbert which comprise TG 21.3, part of TF 66. Heading SW (Escorting GUS-8 back to US, per Y'Blood p. 65)
 * 10 June 1943 Three destroyers screening ahead; "Card in center as guide." Zigzagging. Anti-sub patrols
 * 12 June 1943 "Card in center as guide" (Is this center of the convoy? Or of the escort group of destroyers?)
 * 13 June 1943 Card altered course to pursue radar contact that turned out to be part of FG 66
 * 14 June 1943 "Card in center as guide"
 * 20 June 1943 "Sighted convoy GUS 8"; (Card apparently operating away from convoy during some periods.)
 * 21 June 1943 "Task Group 21.3 parted company with UGS-8 and TF 66 in compliance with Cinclant Secret Order # 151536 of June 1943"
 * 22 June 1943 "In company with USS Dickerson, USS Du Pont, and USS Herbert, Card in center as guide.'
 * 3 July 1943 Arrived Port Royal Bay, Bermuda. Departed Bermuda for Norfolk VA
 * 5 July 1943 arrived Norfolk VA

The Bogue was the US's first escort carrier used in support of convoys. 24 Feb 1943. 5 Mar 1943 escorted HX-228 as "TU24.4.1 Mid-Ocean Escort Group. [still escorting, not independent HKG.] (Y'Blood HK p. 35) Card left Puget Sound a week after Bogue.

=Combat damage= [COPIED TO MAIN ARTICLE 11/26/21. OK TO DELETE]

Damage to carriers due to weapons systems, collisions, weather, and other causes also reduced the number of carriers available for operations at any given time. Not every incident resulted in significant loss of combat effectiveness or retirement from combat. However, there were at least 229 incidents for which damage was sustained by carriers from enemy weapon systems or causes such as extreme weather (storms, typhoons), collisions, aircraft landing accidents, etc. that resulted in lost operational time. Forty-one of these damage incidents resulted in a carrier sinking. Fourteen incidents of damage involved more than one cause such as a carrier being damaged by both bombs and aerial torpedoes during a single attack. Taking such multiple causes for the 229 “damage incidents” into account, the number of “damage involvements” due to the various causes totaled 243. Consequently, the total for percentages of damage involvements may equal more than 100% of damage incidents. The percentages shown in the tables below indicate the frequency that a given cause was involved in the 229 incidents of damage/sinkings.

Enemy bombs were the leading cause of lost operational time for aircraft carriers during the war. They were involved in 25% of the 229 damage incidents. In addition, bombs were involved in sinking 44% of carriers sunk. The second largest cause for carriers’ lost operational time was attacks by Japan's Special Attack Units, i.e., suicide planes that became known as kamikazes. Although introduced only in the last year of the war, kamikazes were involved in 19% of the total damage incidents. They were less effective for inflicting sufficient damage to sink carriers, however, and were involved in only 7% of carrier sinkings. Torpedoes launched by submarines and by aircraft were both involved in sinking more carriers than kamikazes, even during the final year of the war after kamikazes had been introduced. Torpedoes were also more efficient in sinking carriers as indicated by the higher percentage of damage involvements that resulted in sinking (59% when submarine-launched and 64% when aircraft-launched. The percentage of damage involvements resulting in sinkings also indicates that surface weapons were more efficient in sinking carriers than aerial-delivered weapons even though aerial weapons resulted in more carriers sunk.  Causes other than weapon systems were responsible for 39% of lost time incidents, but accounted for only one carrier sank, an escort carrier.


 * Notes: A very high percentage of IJN lost-time incidents included above involved damage by weapon systems and may reflect under-reporting of damage to IJN carriers from other causes. “Other causes” include storms & typhoons, collisions, aircraft accidents during carrier launchings and landings, mechanical failures, groundings, friendly fire, nearby explosions, and accidents during ship-to-ship refueling.


 * Source: World War II Database

=Update Reference Lists for Phone Hacking Scandal=

There are over a dozen separate but related Wikipedia articles regarding the phone hacking scandal that erupted in 2011. These articles continue to be accessed a total of about 500 times daily. The article with reference lists related to the scandal that was initially posted on Wikipedia in mid-2011 was large and deemed difficult to navigate. It was subsequently broken down into six smaller articles that are now accessed a total of about 25 times daily. It is not clear that the current break-down is easier to navigate that the original, lengthy article. [A reorganization of material might improve navigation and accessibility.]