User:Btphelps/Sandbox/Battle of Stoumont

The Battle of Stoumont was fought during the Battle of the Bulge between elements of the United States and Germany armies during December 18-22, 1945. The Germans goal was to cross the River Muese and capture Antwerp, with the goal of splitting the Allied lines and forcing a cessation of hostilities. The Germans planned to reach the River Muese by the second day, but were delayed by the stubborn resistance of the American forces at a small hamlet named Lanzerath and at Elsenborn Ridge. The Americans were caught by surprise and rushed troops to the region to stop the German advance. The 740th Tank Destroyer Battalion played a key role in stopping the German advance. They were assigned to the battle without any working armor, but were able to scrounge through a repair depot and get three tanks and one tank destroyer operational. They attacked the next morning and disabled three German tanks, blocking the road.

The narrow roads and steep valleys of the forested Ardennes region forced Peiper to spread his column over many miles, negating the advantage he might have enjoyed were he able to muster a large number of tanks at the front. Given the dispersed nature of the vehicles and troops, the situation was very dynamic. Fighting occured in multiple locations and units were at times unaware of conditions elsewhere among the German forces. Stavelot was captured by the Germans twice during the battle.

The Americans rushed reinforcements in from the north and south. The hodge-podge collection of American infantry, airborne, tank destroyer, engineering, artillery forces, and fighter squadrons stubbornly refused to yield and cut off the German's ability to advance. Unable to advance, low on fuel and ammunition, the Germans finally abandoned their vehicles and retreated on foot through the forest east of the Siegfried Line.

American units
Because the Ardennes was considered a quiet sector, considerations of economy of force led it to be used as a training ground for new units and a rest area for units that had seen hard fighting. The U.S. units deployed in the Ardennes thus were a mixture of battle-hardened troops from the 28th Infantry Division and inexperienced troops from the U.S. 99th and 106th Divisions. The positions held by the 99th from Monschau in the north to Losheim in the south included an area that, under normal circumstances, would be defended by three divisions. With insufficient troops to man defensive positions along the entire front, the Americans could only maintain a series of strong points. Each regiment was responsible for protecting approximately 11 km of front, roughly equivalent to one front-line infantry man every 90 m. There were no units in reserve. Lt. Col. McClernand Butler, commanding officer of the 395th, later wrote:

"That is three to four times wider than recommended by Army textbooks. I never dreamed that we would have a defensive position of this size without any backup or help from our division or regiment. When I got to Höfen, I found the area too big to cover in one afternoon. So I stayed in the village overnight."

German units
The Germans committed their best and most well-equipped units to the northern shoulder of the Battle of the Bulge. The 12th SS Panzer Hitler Jugend and the 1st SS Panzer Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler were expected to break through American lines between Monschau, Germany and Butgenbach, Belgium in the Ardennes forest.

The Germans had designated five routes, or rollbahns, through the sector which would give them direct access to the road network and allow them to cross the River Meuse and split the American and British armies.

The 1st SS Panzer was a seasoned unit with about half young, green troops and half combat veterans. An extra battalion of infantry was attached to each of its two infantry regiments. Each specialized combined-arms battle group or kampfgruppe were named for its commanders, SS Sturmbannführers Joachim Peiper, Rudolf Sandig, Gustav Knittel, and Max Hansen.

Kampfgruppe Peiper was intended to be the tip of the spear. He was given command of the best-equipped kampfgruppe and assigned the most important route at the Northern edge of the attack. Reports of the vehicles and men assigned differ depending on the day of the battle, but initially totaled about 600 vehicles, including 38 Panther tanks (Panzerkampfwagen V), 45 Tiger IIs (Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf. B), 45 Panzer IVs (Panzerkampfwagen IV), 10 Jagdpanzers (tank destroyer), 149 half-tracks, 18 105mm and 6 150mm artillery pieces, 30 anti-aircraft weapons, 8 Ostwind (Flakpanzer IV) mounted with 3.7 cm FlaK 43, and various heavy and light duty vehicles, and 3,000 to 4,800 troops. The Tiger II tanks were not well-suited to the Ardennes. They were slow and mechanically unreliable which was aggravated by the hilly terrain and soft, muddy roads that made progress slow. Recognizing their deficiencies, Peiper placed the s.SS.Pz-Abt. 501 and s.Pz.-Abt 506 containing the 45 Tiger IIs at the rear of the column.

Kampfgruppe Hansen had almost 4,500 men and 750 vehicles but limited artillery. Armor support consisted of Panzerkampfwagen IV/70's in the PanzerJager Battalion. Kampfgruppe Knittel consisted of a reinforced reconnaissance battalion, almost 1,500 men and 150 vehicles.

Its job was to loiter behind the spearhead until a breakthrough had been achieved and then to race forward and seize and hold bridges for the main force. Kampfgruppe Sandig contained two battalions of infantry, about 3,000 men and 400 vehicles, including a Stug III (assault gun) battalion. This formation acted as a reserve and was to follow behind Peiper and Hanson (on both roads) and provide support where needed.

Peiper, only 29 years old, commanded the key unit in the operation. He had established a reputation for both brilliance and ruthlessness. His unit was charged with seizing the bridges on the Meuse river between the cities of Liège and Huy. The 6th Panzer Army assigned Kampfgruppe Peiper to Rollbahn C, a route that included narrow, single-lane, unpaved country roads. This route would bring Peiper's forced through First Army headquarters at the Hotel Britannique in Spa, Belgium. Unknown to Peiper, a gasoline depot containing 2,226,000 gallons of fuel also lay near this route on a secondary road between La Gleize to Spa. It was between 125 to 150 km from the Losheim Gap to Huy. German staff officers may have expressed the hope that the advance guard elements of both the 1st SS Panzer Division and the Fifth Panzer Army's 2d Panzer Division would reach the Meuse within twenty-four hours of the launch of the offensive.

Geography
The terrain in the region was characterized by thick pine forests and steep ravines along which streams and all main roads were located. The road along the route was narrow, in many places single-track, at times unpaved. The steel valleys and narrow roads would force the infantry, armored vehicles, and tanks to travel in long lines up to 25 km long at times. Peiper was also reliant on finding intact bridges over the rivers. The route negated any advantage the Germans may have had because they were unable to concentrate their forces. When Peiper reviewed his route on a map, he exclaimed that the road was "suitable not for tanks but for bicycles!"

The General Staff estimated that Wehrmacht forces only had enough fuel to cover one third to one half of the ground to Antwerp in heavy combat conditions. To address the fuel shortage, headquarters provided Peiper with a map indicating the locations of U.S. Army fuel depots, which he was to capture and use to supply his forces. A Tiger II was able to average about .5 mpgus.

German advance


Kampfgruppe Peiper was to penetrate the American lines between Aachen and the Schnee Eifel with the goal of seizing bridges over the Meuse on both sides of the city of Liège. The 6th Panzer Army designated the 1st SS Panzer as the mobile-strike force under the command of SS-Oberführer Wilhelm Mohnke.

Advance delayed
Peiper's kampfgruppe was delayed by almost an entire day due to a platoon of 18 reconnisance soldiers who held the hamlet of Lanzerath and the key route west for about 18 hours. They successfully fought off three frontal assaults during the day, wounding or killing about 93 Germans. Only when they were nearly out of ammunition and about to withdraw were they captured in a flanking maneuver by the Germans at dusk. Peiper arrived in Lanzerath around midnight and was furious when he learned the 3rd Fallschirmjäger Division had stopped their advance west based on unsubstantiated rumors that the woods were heavily mined and full of US soldiers. Buchholtz still had not been taken, and he speedily sent the his Panzerregiment to the northwest where they took Buchholtz and proceeded west to Honsfeld.

Peiper met with his subordinate leaders at 0100, and ordered an advance at 0400. Two Panther tanks led followed by a mixture of Panzerkampfwagen IV tanks, half-tracks, and Panthers followed. The vehicles advanced slowly under black out conditions. German paratroopers walked alongside holding white handkerchiefs to guide the tanks. At 0430 on 17 December, the remainder of Peiper's Kampfgruppe was approximately 16 hours behind schedule when the vehicles departed Lanzerath west toward Honsfeld.

The long column of German vehicles entered Bucholtz at 0500 without incident. An hour later they entered Honsfield. A company from the 3rd Fallschirmjäger Division joined his unit. Peiper was optimistic that the breakthrough was complete and the road ahead to the Muese River clear. But after the delay through Losherheimer Gap and Lanzerath, the vehicles were running low on fuel. Peiper knew there was a fuel depot at Büllingen.

Route west
Kampfgruppe Peiper was assigned Rollbahn C which would take them through Spa. Peiper estimated based on the battle noise that the 12th SS Panzer Division attacking Elsenborn Ridge was advancing slower than planned. He had no radio communications with them. Peiper had been ordered to drive west without regard to any flank protection. At 0800 they captured the American garrison at Büllingen without resistance and seized about 50000 USgal of fuel. He forced the American prisoners to refuel his vehicles.

When the 12th SS Panzer Division failed to capture Elsenborn Ridge in the initial two days as planned, Peiper chose the more difficult Rollbahn D, a secondary road to the south. At 0930 Peiper headed west once again. His line of advance was straight ahead, through Stavelot, Trois-Ponts, Werbomont, Ouffet, Seny, to Huy, a distance of about 50 mi. The poor quality of the roads slowed their advance, but they covered another 5.6 km and captured Moderscheid by late morning with little resistance.

Prisoners of war murdered
17 December noon

The lead elements of Peiper's column reached Ligneuville at about 1300. They quickly captured the town and ate the lunch prepared for the American troops who had evacuated just ahead of their arrival. From Ligneuville the road forked north to Malmedy, Between noon and 1300, Kampfgruppe Peiper approached the Baugnez crossroads, 2 mi southeast of Malmedy. A U.S. Army convoy of thirty vehicles from B Battery of the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, turned right through the crossroads towards Ligneuville and St. Vith, on its way to join the US 7th Armored Division. The Waffen-SS soldiers easily captured the out numbered and poorly armed U.S. soldiers. The gathered about 150 POWs in a field adjacent to the road. Peiper continued west with advance units. About 15 minutes later the guards opened fire on the POWs with machine guns. Individual German soldiers then sought out those US troops who were still living and killed them with a coup de grâce pistol shot to the head. At least eighty-six Americans were massacred. The first three of 43 survivors encountered a patrol from the 291st Combat Engineer Battalion at about 1430.

Advance on Stavelot
17 December evening

At the western end Ligneuville, the lead units of Peiper's column ran onto the vehicle trains belonging to Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division. There was a brief exchange between a couple of Sherman tanks and a tank destroyer, who demolished the lead Panther tank. Slowed for about an hour, Peiper's lead units advanced 15.5 km, bypassing the towns of Mödersheid, Schoppen, Ondenval, and Thirimont. It arrived in Stavelot, a town of about 5,000, at dusk. Peiper knew he had to cross the Ambleve River here. There was one vehicular bridge over the river and the only way to approach it was by the main highway. The steep river banks prevented armored units from any other crossing.

Peiper could see from the heights on the southern bank that the town was filled with hundreds of trucks, while on the opposite bank the road from Stavelot to Malmédy was jammed with vehicles. Unknown to Peiper, most of these trucks were relocating the huge gasoline stores north of Stavelot and Malmédy. The only American unit defending the town was the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion which had been sent from Malmedy to construct a roadblock south of the bridge. Peiper, apparently unsure of the strength of the US forces he faced, decided to wait until daylight to continue his advance. He unwittingly allowing the Americans time to relocate the precious fuel he needed and reorganize their forces.

Halted at Stavelot bridge forty-two miles from the Meuse. ref

Wereth massacre
17 December

In Wereth, Belgium, approximately 6.5 mi northeast of Saint-Vith on 17 December 1944, eleven black American soldiers were captured by elements of Kampfgruppe Knittel. They were stabbed, their legs broken, fingers cut off, and then shot. The German troops responsible for the murders were never identified or punished. After failing to connect with Peiper, members of his battalion murdered citizens in Parfondruy, Renardmont and Stavelot.

At 0930 on 17 December, Peiper sent a section of the Kampfgruppe north towards Spa to reconnoiter, but they encountered strong resistance, improvised by tank-destroyers of the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and lost two Panzer IVs. [TBD]

Americans respond
US First Army Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges and General Troy Houston Middleton of VIII Corps committed combat commands of the 7th and 9th Armored Divisions to the fight.

17 December

Hodges committed the veteran 30th Infantry Division, then refitting near Aachen and holding a sector of the Ninth U.S. Army front between Julich and Altdorf, Germany. At 1115 on 17 December, he ordered the 30th ID to move 18 km south to the vicinity of Eupen, Belgium. They were to block the thrust of Kampfgruppe Peiper and prepare to form and hold a defensive line from Malmedy to Stoumont. At 1630, the division started redeploying towards Eupen, north of Peiper's line of advance. They reached their objective about midnight. Hodges also requested the commitment of SHAEF reserves from Eisenhower, who assigned the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions to him.

Hodges badly needed accurate information about the progress of the German advance. His staff dispatched unarmed Piper Cub spotter planes to track the progress of Kampfgruppe Peiper as it headed west along the Ambleve River Valley.

18 December morning



By 18 December, the surprise factor had been lost. Two days into the offensive, the high ground of Elsenborn Ridge and two of the three routes the Germans planned to use remained within the American fortified defense zones.

A company of the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion and a platoon of 3-inch towed tank destroyers were ordered to outpost Stavelot. Maj. Paul J. Solis, commanding this detachment, began moving his troops into position just before daybreak: two platoons on the south bank of the river (with a section of tank destroyers at the old roadblock); one platoon with three 57-mm. antitank guns and the second section of tank destroyers in reserve around the town square north of the river.

Germans capture Stavelot
18 December Dawn

Four German tanks advanced across the bridge at dawn which were knocked out by M-10 tank destroyers. The Americans lacked the explosives necessary to destroy the bridge. The Germans pushed another tank across the bridge, and they soon established a superior force on the north bank inside the town. The Germans and Americans fought street by street.

The Americans were gradually pushed back until battalion headquarters ordered the troops to evacuate Stavelot and set up a new position on high ground near the road to Spa. In the confusion of constant shelling, units missed the road to Spa and took the road toward Malmedy instead.

18 December early morning

Major Paul Solis, Executive Officer of the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion, commanded a task force comprised of Company A/526 and 1st Platoon of Company A, 825th TD Battalion were sent to Stavelot to assist Captain Lloyd Sheetz of the 291st Combat Engineer Battalion in establishing roadblocks near the Ambléve River. Company C of the 202nd Engineers who had been guarding the bridge left it before midnight. By 3:45 am on Monday, December 18, elements of the 526th Armored Infantry and 825th Tank Destroyer Battalions had passed near the fuel depots and arrived in Stavelot. By about 0345 on Monday, December 18, members of the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion and 825th Tank Destroyer Battalions arrived near Stavelot.

The 526th AIB was ordered to defend the bridge. Captain Charles Mitchell of the 526th did not learn that the bridge was supposed to have been mined for detonation. At 0430 am, Major Solis ordered Mitchell to establish a road block across the river. Mitchell ordered two squads from 2nd to move south of the Ambléve River bridge in their half-tracks on a road named Vieux Chateau. They established a road block and listening post about .5 mi east. They soon reported sounds of troop movement and German armor. Mitchell ordered them back to the bridge where they ran into German panzergrenadiers. The 825th Tank Destroyer Battalion also sent two machine gun teams and half-tracks across the bridge. They set off a flare attached to trip wire and were immediately fired upon by German forces. Both half-tracks were shot up and several men were killed or wounded. A few men were able to swim back across the Ambleve.

18 December morning

Kampfgruppe Hansen was to advance on a road to the south of Peiper with the goal of broadening the front and protect the southern flank. To Peiper's south, the advance of Kampfgruppe Hansen had stalled. Their progress was slow as they got stuck behind the horse drawn artillery of the 3rd Fallshirmjager Division at the beginning. Kampfgruppe Hansen successfully ambushed elements of the 14th Cavalry Group outside of Poteau, Belgium on December 18. SS-Oberführer Mohnke ordered Schnellgruppe Knittel, which had been designated to follow Hansen, to instead move forward to support Peiper.

18 December morning

At 0630, Peiper launched an artillery attack on Stavelot that lasted until 0800, when the Panzers began rolling towards Stavelot. A fierce battle ensued that lasted for two hours when the Germans crossed the bridge at 1000.

Panther made a dash about 0800 which carried it onto the north bank. More tanks followed. For some while the Germans were held in the houses next to the river; an antiaircraft artillery battery from the 7th Armored Division wandered into the fire fight and did considerable damage before it went on its way. A company from the 202d Engineer Combat Battalion entered the town and joined in the fray. By the end of the morning, however, the German firing line had been built up to the point where the Americans could no longer hold inside the village proper, particularly since the hostile tanks were roving at will in the streets. The Germans captured Stavelot by midday.

While the engagement in Stavelot was still in progress, Peiper turned some of his tanks toward Trois Ponts, the important bridgehead at the confluence of the Salm and the Amblève.

"We proceeded at top speed towards Trois Ponts in an effort to seize the bridge there.... If we had captured the bridge at Trois Ponts intact and had had enough fuel, it would have been a simple matter to drive through to the Meuse River early that day."

18 December morning

The 1st Battalion/117th Infantry arrived on the north side of the burning fuel dump east of Stavelot on the morning of 18 December. They left their vehicles and moved down the road toward Stavelot, expecting a tough fight. To their surprise, they encountered light resistance, as Peiper had left only a small force to occupy the town. Three American M-10 tank destroyers from the 823rd TD Battalion were able to pass the burning gasoline and knock out German tanks and half-tracks. The 1st Battalion, 119th IR, 30ID recaptured about half of Stavelot by nightfall. Three M-4 tanks commanded by Lt. Jean Hansen of Co. B, 743rd Tank battalion, arrived in Stavelot at dark. Belgium civilians reported that the 15 tanks that had failed to get past the burning gasoline had moved north toward Trois Ponts and La Gleize. The bridge over the Ambleve River was still in German hands and numerous German tanks and vehicle were observed on the south bank.

Fuel depot missed
18 December noon

Unknown to Pieper, a mile north of Stavelot, on the road to Francorchamps, was a massive US fuel dump with around two million gallons of fuel in 400,000 five gallon jerry cans lining the road as it passed through thick woods.

Retreating up the road towards Spa, Captain Mitchell and a few troops ran into troops guarding the first portion of the gasoline depot containing one of the greatest concentrations of gasoline on the Continent. Depot No. 2 was on the road north of Stavelot connecting Francorchamps to Spa. The jerrycans lining the road for almost 2 mi contained more than 3 e6USgal, enough to fuel Peiper’s vehicles all the way to Antwerp. A column of about 15 German vehicles including tanks were following Mitchell and his few troops up the road.

Mitchell could see the German tanks coming up the road, within 400 yards of the depot. His men tried firing machine guns into the stacks of five-gallon jerrycans without effect. One of the men grabbed a can, spilling its contents. They lit the spilled gas with a match, which ignited 124000 USgal of fuel, blocking the road. Unable to progress off road due to the steep terrain, the German column retreated.

18 December noon

Peiper did not wait for the conclusion of the battle to continue towards Trois-Ponts where the Salm and the Amblève Rivers met. Peiper later wrote, "We proceeded at top speed towards Trois Ponts in an effort to seize the bridge there.... If we had captured the bridge at Trois Ponts intact and had had enough fuel, it would have been a simple matter to drive through to the Meuse River early that day." Peiper was joined by the remaining 11 Tigers of SS Panzer Abteilung 501 (501st SS Heavy tank battalion) at Stavelot. Trois Ponts is the location of three highway bridges, two over the Salm and one across the Amblève. One of the roads was a continuation of the paved highway from Stavelot and leads from Trois Ponts into the valley to the west. This road, via Werbomont, was Peiper's objective.

Due to the lack of communication between Peiper and German headquarters, he still thought that the 3rd Fallschirmjäger Division was in his immediate rear. He believed they would reach Stoumont that evening, so he left only a small holding force in Stavelot. In fact, the 3rd Fallschirmjäger had been held up by both jammed roads and the unexpectedly difficult American resistance at Elsenborn. The Sixth Panzer Army did not expect the advance guard of the 3rd Fallschirmjäger to reach Stavelot before 19 December.

18 December noon

At 1145 the advance guard of Peiper's main column, nineteen or twenty tanks, came rolling along the road. A shot from the lone antitank gun stopped the first German tank, but after a brief skirmish the enemy knocked out the gun.

At La Gleize there was a western exit from the valley, although by a mediocre, twisting road. Nearby, at the hamlet of Cheneux, the Germans found a bridge intact over the Amblève. This stroke of good luck was countered by bad when the weather cleared and American fighter-bombers knocked out two or three tanks and seven half-tracks.

On 18 December at around 11:00 a.m. American sappers blew up the bridge at Trois Ponts.

Peiper soldiers had to look for another way. The German column, stretched for about 25 km, was led by Panthers of the 1./SS-Panzer Regiment 1.

At 1:30 p.m. the tanks drove through La Gleize, and three kilometres later the crew of the first one saw the bridge in Cheneux. Five people were hanging around it, and they were shot with machine gun. As it turned out later, they were Belgian civilians. One woman died on the spot, another died later, and three people were injured.

Attacked by aircraft
18 December afternoon

The first elements of Kampfgruppe Peiper covered the 13 km to Trois-Ponts without resistance and reached the town about 1100. Peiper's tanks were briefly held up by an anti-tank gun but quickly destroyed it. Before he could cross the bridge, the Americans blew it up. Peiper's column continued north and passed through La Gleize without resistance. The weather had cleared however, allowing U.S. Republic P-47 Thunderbolts and British Hawker Typhoons to attack and disable two tanks and five halftracks, blocking the narrow road.

The unit was delayed until 1600 when fog descended and hid them from the fighter-bombers. At about 1800 the Germans advanced southeast through the village of Cheneux and arrived at the small village of Habiemont at dusk on 18 December and were preparing to cross the Neufmoulin Bridge when soldiers of the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion blew the bridge up in their faces. Peiper cursed the engineers, yelling, "The damned engineers! The damned engineers!" Peiper turned north and halted his forces in the woods west of La Gleize about 1.4 km east of Stoumont at Chateau Froidcour. Belgian citizens saw 125 German vehicles including 30 tanks pass headed west. Peiper learned that Stoumont was strongly held and that the Americans were bringing in strong reinforcements from Spa.

18 December afternoon

Shortly after at around 2:00 p.m., as the Panthers were driving down the steep road in Cheneux, they were attacked by four P-47 Thunderbolts from the 386th Fighter Squadron 365th Fighter Group known as the "Hellhawks" from the former Luftwaffe airfield in Cheivres, Belgium.

The mission took place during terrible weather conditions. One of the pilots, Capt. James G. Wells Jr., piloting a P-47D-25 "Betty Girls" that attacked a group of eight Panther, recalled: -


 * We were probably, I don’t know, a hundred yards from them when we released doing probably right around 350 to 400 mph. When we found them, we did a sixty-three and, and each of us picked out a side of this tank column to hit. (…) I just saw tank pieces everywhere. And where the tanks had been was a big gap in the road”

Another group of 34 P-47 Thunderbolts and two British Typhons from the 387th Fighter Squadron attacked the column for about 90 minutes beginning around 14:40.

It was snowing all over Belgium with clouds between 250 and 300 feet covering 90% of the sky - reported Cpt. Neal E. Worley from 365th FG.


 * On my first run I spotted the biggest, tallest, SS officer I ever seen, standing there in his black uniform emptying his pistol at me.

The pilots reported 126 vehicles destroyed, 6 possibly destroyed and 34 damaged. The LSSAH reported three tanks hit (the Panther '131' was a permanent loss), five half trucks and 40 troops wounded.

The German casualties would have been greater, had it not been for the biting fire of two Wirbelwinds from the 10th (Fla)/SS-Pz.Rgt.1. Vehicles built on the Panzer IV chassis, on which a polygonal turret with four 2 cm Flak 38 guns was mounted, were rare in the German army. Only 87 were built.

- Tank crews and grenadiers hide under steel Behemoths – recalled Uscha Karl Wortmann, a crew member of one of them – Both Flakpanzers had opened fire at оnce with their quadruple guns and shoot as much as they can. (…) They can not concentrate on a single aircraft with too many of them attacking. They parry the attack in a general way, intimidating the pilots and thereby preventing a well-aimed strafing run. Enormous amounts of еxplosive shells are spat out by the eight gun barrels, the clusters of shrapnel are testimony to this. (…) Their tank turrets swivel as fast as lightning to the left or to the right as needed to fend off the enemy aircraft. Some of the tankers have removed their internally mounted machine guns and also fire at the aircraft, which simply will not go away.

At a sharp bend, near the destroyed Panther 131, a Belgian pre-war bunker became the shelter of Ostubaf. Jochen Peiper and Stubaf. Gustav Knittel - commanders of two Kampfgruppen separated from the LSSAH. During the air raid, one of the bombs hit a building between the shelter and the tank. The inhabitants Jules Dumont and Maria Goffinet, who was making bread in the cellar, were killed

The column's ride was paralyzed for more than two hours, with disastrous results. The delay gave valuable time for US engineers to prepare the explosives on the bridge over the Lienne River in Habiemont. When the Germans approached it at around 5:00 p.m. it exploded.

18 December evening

SS-Sturmbannführer Knittel crossed the bridge at Stavelot around 1900 against American forces trying to retake the town. Knittel pressed forward towards La Gleize. Peiper and Knittel both faced the prospect of being cut off.

18 December midnight

Around midnight, a German tank entered the square in the middle of Stavelot. The Americans attacked it with bazookas and antitank grenades. The crew backed it into a house, where it became trapped, and they abandoned it. Another German tank was disabled, and two more tanks behind it were unable to pass it. West of the Salm River Stavelot, the 82d AIB took up a blocking position.

The 740th and 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion were deployed from Remouchamps into defensive positions in front of Stoumont alongside elements of the 3rd Armored division, the 30th Infantry Division and the 82nd Airborne Division. On the slope north of the town a platoon of 3-inch towed tank destroyers from the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion made good use of positions above the Germans and were able to destroy two Tiger I tanks and some half-tracks. The two leading companies of the 1st Battalion/823rd had just reached homes on the northern edge of Stavelot when ten German tanks returned from Trois Ponts and counterattacked. By morning, the 1st Battalion had regained control of most of the town. Twice during the afternoon German tank-led formations tried to regain control without success. By dusk the Americans with the assistance of a tank platoon from the 743d Tank Battalion regained control of half of the town.

The 106th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron made a pass over the Stavelot and spotted the German tanks. P-51 Mustangs from the 365th Fighter Group, reinforced by the 390th Squadron/366th and the 506/404th, attacked and crippled several tanks. The rest of the German armor retreated to cover while U.S. infantry and tank destroyers began trying to clear the Germans from town. During the night the German tanks freely roamed across town, free from harassing aircraft. The 118th Field Artillery Battalion set up northeast of Stavelot in support of the infantry and fired over 3,000 shells at the attacking Germans over the next 12 hours.

19 December evening

As the next two bridges on this river turned out to be too narrow for tanks, Peiper ordered a retreat and regrouping. On the morning of December 19, the Germans took a different route towards the Meuse and attacked the village of Stoumont. But this is material for a different ghost.

Sources:

Duel in the Mist: Kampfgruppe Peiper, Stoumont, December 19th, 1944 v. 1 ISBN 978-0955541308 The Devil's Adjutant: Jochen Peiper, Panzer Leader ISBN 978-1873376416* "Men of steel & Devil’s Adjutant” - M.Reynolds
 * "Duel in the Mist 2” - T.Haasler, S.Vosters, R.MacDougall, H.Weber. ISBN 978-0984182060
 * "The Leibstandarte IV/2” - R.Tiemann
 * "Hell Hawks!: The Untold Story of the American Fliers Who Savaged Hitler's..." - Robert F. Dorr, Thomas D. Jones ISBN 978-0760338254
 * "Jochen Peiper" – Patrick Agte
 * "The Ardennes, 1944-1945: Hitler's Winter Offensive"- Christer Bergström ISBN 1612002773

The U.S. forces regrouped. Engineers blew up several bridges ahead of Peiper's advance, trapping the battle group in the deep valley of the Amblève, downstream from Trois-Ponts. Peiper's command was in disarray: some units had lost their way among difficult terrain or in the dark, while company commanders preferred to stay with Peiper at the head of the column and thus were unable to provide guidance to their own units.

18 December -- Stavelot



Americans stop Germans


19 December Morning

The Americans arrived in Stoumont after dark. They sent out a patrol that located the 30 German tanks. Troops in Stoumont mined the road and set up a road block. Two Sherman tanks from C Company, 743rd Tank Battalion disabled the first German tank and two half-tracks to arrive in Stoumont. The 3rd Battalion/119th IR three rifle companies arrived in Stoumont considerably understrength, totaling about 447 troops. It had the support of eight towed TD guns of Company A, 823rd TD Battalion, and two 90mm AA guns from the 143rd AAA Gun Battalion, in addition to the three 57mm anti-tank guns of Battalion HQ.

The Americans withdrew, suffering 267 casualties. About 152 troops left in town were captured.

Americans recapture Stavelot
18 December morning



By the morning of 18 December, Companies A and B/117th IR pushed forward rapidly during the morning, and by 1200 had cleared all of Stavelot north of the Ambleve River except for on German Mark VI tank among homes on the west edge of town. No one was able to flank the tank all day. The 117th Infantry/30th Infantry Division had been deploying on the morning of 18 December around Malmédy. Its 1st Battalion led Lt. Col. Ernest Frankland unit circled through Francorchamps to approach the town from the north. He learned early in the morning from the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion that the Germans controlled Stavelot, but he didn't stop. He ordered the Battalion out of their trucks north of the still-burning gasoline roadblock and started south toward the town.

18 December afternoon

In the afternoon of 18 December, about 150 to 200 Germans unsupported by armor or artillery attempted to flank the the Americans blocking the western exit (towards La Gleize). They attacked across open country 500 yards north of Stavelot. The 3d Platoon of Company C attacked them with small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. Most of the Germans were killed or wounded, and the rest retreated. The Germans tried to break through at Stavelot to gain access to a good straight road to Spa. They counterattacked five times over two days but failed to capture the town.

Trois Ponts defended
18 December morning

Trois Ponts was thinly held by Company C, 51st Engineer Combat Battalion, which had been pulled off a mission operating a sawmill to winterize and strengthen bridges. Armed with eight bazookas and ten machine guns. The 1111th Engineer Group was preparing a barrier line along the Salm River from Trois Ponts south to Bovigny. Maj. Robert B. Yates of the 51st Engineer Combat Battalion constructed road blocks at the approaches to Trois Ponts across the Amblève and at the vulnerable highway underpass at the railroad tracks north of the river. On the morning of 18 December, the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion/7th Armored Division passed through. One 57-mm. antitank gun and its crew which got lost during the move. Yates commandeered the crew and placed the gun on the Stavelot road to the east of Trois Ponts.

19 December noon

Just before noon on 19 December, about 19 or 20 tanks comprising the advance units of Peiper's main column arrived near Trois Ponts. The single 57mm anti-tank gun stopped the lead tank but the gun and gun drew were quickly knocked out. The short exchange of fire alerted the engineer platoons to the west who blew the Amblève bridge and the Salm bridge. The German tank company was discouraged from advancing further and turned back to Stavelot.

Another company of Panzer IV tanks tried to reach Trois Ponts by following a narrow side road on the west bank of the Amblève. The road was almost impassable, and when the column came under American fire they abandoned this approach. Peiper had one route remaining for his column, north toward La Gleize, on the east side of the river.

At Cheneux the Germans found an intact bridge over the Amblève. But the weather cleared and American fighter-bombers knocked out two or three tanks and seven half-tracks, blocking the narrow road for a several hours. When night came the point of armored column was within some three miles of Werbomont, an key road center on the main highway linking Liège and Bastogne. But a squad from Company A, 291st Engineer Combat Battalion, blew up the only bridge. One detachment of half-tracks and assault guns crossed a bridge to the north of Cheneux and swung southwest toward Werbomont. But near Chevron they were ambushed by a battalion of the 30th Division and was destroyed. Few Germans were left alive.

18 December

Radio contact between Peiper and the higher German headquarters had broken down. His armored units did not have the sufficient range over the Ardennes terrain. Peiper had little or no information as to what was happening behind him and where the following kampfgruppen of his own division were located. The Sixth Panzer Army had resorted to tracking Peiper's progress through intercepted American radio messages. A Luftwaffe ultrahigh-frequency radio set was rushed to Peiper by a liaison officer late on 18 December, and sometime during the night of 18-19 December the radio link with 1st Panzer Division headquarters was restored. Peiper may have learned that the 30th Infantry Division was on the move south towards him. But his command remained relatively isolated.

By this time an outpost of Peiper's troops held a light bridge over the Amblève at Cheneux, and the tail was 15 km to the west trying to reopen a rearward line of communications through Stavelot.

Battle for Stoumont
20 December



30th Division arrives
With the assistance of the tanks, artillery, and mortars the 30th Infantry Division reached Targnon 2.5 km east of Stoumont, where they ran into a series of mine fields on the uphill road to Stoumont. As night fell and fog rolled in, the task force was within about 800 yard of the western side of Stoumont. Companies B and C of 1st Battalion moved up the hill north of Stoumont to seize the Sanatorium du Basil, which commanded a position overlooking the road and the town. They displaced the German infantry and captured four 20-mm. guns. The Americans brought up four Sherman tanks to reinforce their advance. The Germans were dug in about 300 yards east, down the hill.

In the early hours of the 19th Peiper's advance column paused outside Stoumont. Peiper knew that American infantry were in Stoumont, but was unsure of their strength. Stopping short of Stoumont, Peiper sent scouts forward. They found that Stoumont was strongly held and that more American reinforcements were moving from Spa to Stoumont. On the morning of the 19th, the American outposts reported 15 German tanks and hundreds of infantrymen forming up on the road outside Stoumont.

About an hour before midnight, the Germans counterattacked and in fierce close quarters fighting supported by armor, successfully ejected the Americans from the main building of the Sanatorium. A group of 11 Americans held an outbuilding and successfully gave- direction to an artillery observer in a foxhole about 50 yard distant. The Germans attempted to exploit their position on the hill to advance north towards the Americans north of Stoumont, but were cut off by accurate American armor and indirect fire. Companies B and C had lost about half their strength overnight, but they still held the roadblock. The 743rd TD was out of ammunition and needed to resupply. Only the understrength 1st Battalion remained in reserve.

740th Tank Destroyer Battalion


The 740th Tank Destroyer Battalion commanded by Lt. Col. George K. Rubel had been assigned to operate the specialized top-secret Canal Defense Light. The Canal Defense Light was primarily useful in desert warfare, and the unit was reconfigured in November 1944 as a medium tank battalion operating M4 Sherman medium tanks and M5A1 Stuart light tanks.

16 December

The army lent the unit nine Shermans and a few M5A1s for familiarization purposes. First Army HQ was displeased to learn of his unit's presence without orders, and assigned the unit to garrison Neufchateau, Belgium, 50 mile behind the front lines. On December 16, they were ordered to turn over its equipment to another unit. Rubel learned of the German's advance on 17 December. He received orders at 1245 the next day to move 94 km north to Sprimont where a huge vehicle repair depot was located, draw all available armor, and prepare to defend the depot.

Rubel was anxious to get into the fight and without orders deployed his unit to Neufchateau.

The vehicle repair depot was only about 12 mi northwest of Peiper’s advance units. Upon their arrival, they discovered the personnel assigned to the depot had left in a hurry, leaving all of their equipment and tools behind. The men of the 740th found only three potentially usable tanks but all were missing essential equipment like radios, machine guns, tool sets, and ammunition. Working through the night, the tankers cannibalized parts from the 25 armored vehicles left in the depot. By morning they had a hodge-podge of vehicles operational, including three M5A1 Stuart tanks, an M10 tank destroyer, a M7 self-propelled howitzers, M8 assault guns, and two M24 Chaffee light tanks. They were assigned to the 30th Division and moved east to join them at Stoumont Station early that afternoon.

Col. Edward M. Sutherland ordered the 1st Battalion, 119th Infantry Regiment commanded by Lt. Col. Robert Herlong, and the 740th Battalion, equipped with only three tanks and the tank destroyer, to advance west of Stoumont Station. At a very sharp curve where the road passed between a steep hill and the river bank, the tanks slowly advanced and in their first action encountered three Panther tanks from the 1st SS Panzer Division. Three of the US armored units knocked out the first three tanks of the German forces, blocking the narrow road and stopping their advance. The Germans retreated 2.5 mi east to Stoumont.

Germans capture Stoumont
Stoumont lay on a bald hill on the north bank of the Ambleve. La Gleize, where the Germans were preparing to attack, was similarly exposed. The road from La Gleize to Stoumont passed through groups of trees until near the eastern edge of Stoumont where the town was bordered by level fields. Peiper's forces would for one of the few times during their advance be able to deploy across open ground, both north and south of the road. The Americans placed three 57mm anti-tank guns and two 90mm anti-aircraft weapons at strategic points around Staumont as anti-tank weapons.

19 December

At 0700 on 19 December infantry from the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment and a company of Fallschirmjäger supported by about 15 tanks attacked Company K and its 137 men on the south side of Stoumont. Only the arrival of Company C, 743rd Tank Battalion, comprising 10 M-10 tank destroyers, slowed the Germans from advancing for a while. Then the Germans attacked Company L to the north of Stoumont and Company I in the center. Company I was soon forced to retreat to the center of Stoumont. The M-10 tank destroyers from Company C disabled five German tanks, destroyed three half tracks, and caused a number of German casualties without suffering a loss. By 1000 the Americans had been largely forced out of Stoumont to the east and north.

Peiper followed this with a Panzer attack, gaining the eastern edge of the town. An American tank battalion arrived but, after a two-hour tank battle, Peiper finally captured Stoumont at 1030. Knittel joined up with Peiper and reported the Americans had recaptured Stavelot to their east.



The American M-10 tank destroyers fired without effect on the thick armor of the German tanks. Panther number 225, commanded by SS Rottenfuhrer Franz Prahm, was the first tank in the column. As Prahm’s Panther rounded the corner of the main road and entered Stoumont, the last remaining American anti-tank gun opened fire. The gunners quickly placed four rounds on Prahm’s Panther, only to have the rounds bounce off the Panther's mantlet. Unhurt, Prahm advanced down the main road where it was his by three shells from one of the 90mm anti-aircraft guns. The first round hit near the left sprocket, the second sheared the 75mm barrel off of the Panther, and the third penetrated the armor where the shell exploded, wounding most of the crew. The tankers bailed out of the burning vehicle.

18 December

On 18 December it became clear that Peiper made the best progress and Mohnke ordered Knittel to follow that battlegroup. After a short meeting with Hansen in Recht, Knittel moved to Stavelot. After leaving instructions for his company commanders he crossed the Amblève River bridge in Stavelot at noon to contact Peiper in La Gleize. Elements of his battlegroup followed during the afternoon and early evening but the American 30th Infantry Division recaptured the northern part of the town, blocking the advance route of the rest of Schnelle Gruppe Knittel and the battlegroup of Rudolf Sandig.

19 December

The next day, 19 December, Mohnke ordered Knittel and the elements of his fast group that did manage to reach La Gleize back to Stavelot to recapture the town and open the advance route which was also essential in supplying battlegroup Peiper with fuel and ammunition. Knittel set up his command post in the Antoine Farm west of Stavelot. The counterattack he deployed failed and that day members of his battalion murdered civilians in Trois-Ponts, Parfondruy, Renardmont and Stavelot. That evening, the Americans demolished the bridge in Stavelot.

Increased pressure from American forces stalled the advance of the Leibstandarte and continued attempts from Knittel and Sandig to recapture Stavelot failed while Peiper had come to a halt in La Gleize. The elements of Schnelle Gruppe Knittel on the western bank of the Amblève River were trapped between Stavelot, Coo and Trois-Ponts.

20 December

On 20 December US Taskforce Lovelady from 3rd Armored Division attacked Knittel's positions from the direction of Trois-Ponts but was halted by a King Tiger tank and some anti-tank guns positioned near Petit-Spai. That evening elements from the 82nd Airborne Division moved into positions near Petit-Spai and cut off the road to Wanne.

21 December

On 21 December elements of the 3rd Armored Division pushed Schnelle Gruppe Knittel out of its positions in Ster, but elements of Kampfgruppe Hansen had reached Petit-Spai during the night, and their counterattack pushed the 82nd Airborne Division back to Trois-Ponts.

Initially, only the divisional reconnaissance and artillery units of the 9th SS Panzer Division were involved in the fighting. but on 21 December the entire division was committed. They tried to break through the defensive positions of the 82nd Airborne Division and failed.

22 December

On 22 December a major attack from the 30th Infantry Division threw Knittel's men out of their positions at the western edge of Stavelot.

23 December

It had become clear that the Meuse River could not be reached and Peiper decided on 23 December to abandon his vehicles and retreat through the woods to escape capture. He left La Gleize with the remaining men. 36 hours later he reached the German lines at Petit-Spai and then Wanne.

25 December

In the early morning of 25 December Knittel cleared his positions on the western bank of the Amblève River and withdrew his men to Wanne. There the Leibstandarte regrouped before moving to the Bastogne area. The Ardennes Offensive ended for Knittel when airplanes from the American 9th Tactical Airforce bombed his command post near Vielsalm on 31 December 1944. He was hospitalized in Germany with serious concussion.

19 December

Peiper ordered Knittel to retake Stavelot. Assessing his own situation, he determined that his Kampfgruppe did not have sufficient fuel to cross the bridge west of Stoumont and continue his advance. He maintained his lines west of Stoumont for a while, until the evening of 19 December when he withdrew them to the village edge. On the same evening the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division under Maj. Gen. James Gavin arrived and deployed at La Gleize and along Peiper's planned route of advance.

During the morning of 19 December the 504th and 505th Parachute Infantry Regiments were ordered out of the Werbomont assembly area to push to relieve the 2d Battalion, 119th Infantry/30th ID.

The Americans dispatched three combat command (CCB) task forces from the north to stop Peiper's advance.

Task Force Lovelady (Lt. Col. William B. Lovelady) was the largest and easternmost group comprised of a complete tank battalion and reinforced by a company of armored infantry. Their job was to cut the Stavelot-Stoumont road. Lovelady was given a complete tank battalion reinforced by an armored infantry company. It was assigned the key role of cutting the Stavelot-Stoumont road. The task force traveled south using the easternmost of three routes and reached the junction of the Trois Ponts-Stoumont roads without meeting the enemy.

It was surprised to encounter a small enemy column of artillery, infantry, and supply trucks on its way to reinforce Peiper's main body. Both Trois Ponts and Stavelot were in American control, so the Americans surprised. They later learned the Germans had reinforced a footbridge and had since the night of December 18 successfully infiltrated reinforcements and supplies, including some gasoline, between the two American-held towns. Task Force Lovelady destroyed the column and established three roadblocks across the main road between Trois Ponts and La Gleize, cutting off the Germans in the area around Stoumont.

Task Force McGeorge (Maj. K. T. McGeorge) was in the center. It advanced along a road built on the side of a ridge which ran obliquely from the northeast with the task of capturing La Gleize.

Task Force Jordan (Capt. John W. Jordan) was the smallest of the three CCB detachments, attempted a thrust from the north via the Spa road, which had given the First Army headquarters so much concern. Task Force Jordan was within sight of Stoumont when the tanks forming the point were suddenly brought under flanking fire by German tanks that had been dug in to give hull defilade. The two American lead tanks were knocked out immediately. The rest of the column, fixed to the roadway by the forest and abrupt ground, could not deploy. Search for some other means of approach was futile, and the task force halted for the night on the road.

Task Force Jordan, the smallest of the three CCB detachments, attempted to advance north along the Spa road. The Germans controlled the three story Sanatorium du Basil on the ridge above Stoumont. Taskforce Jordan advanced towards Stoumont when the lead tanks were hit by flanking fire from German tanks dug in to give hull defilade. Two lead tanks were immobilized and the rest of the column, trapped on the narrow roadway, could not advance further. The task force was halted for the night on the road.

20 December

On 20 December 1944, the 82nd Airborne Division was assigned to take Cheneux back from the Germans. The main body of the 82d Airborne Division advanced east and south in midafternoon. With the 508th Parachute Infantry in support, the 504th and 505th moved along the roads toward La Gleize and Trois Ponts. They occupied small villages to the west and south of Trois Ponts. The 325th Glider Infantry Regiment/82nd AIB, less a battalion holding the village of Hotton, were positioned around Werbomont as reserve. The 82d Airborne Division was to take over the Salm River bridges at Trois Ponts, drive the enemy from the area between the Amblève and the Werbomont-Trois Ponts road, and make contact with CCB when the latter reached Stavelot, thus completing the encirclement of such enemy forces as might be left to the north.

Four Shermans from the 723rd Tank Battalion arrived and pushed into Stoumont from the opposite direction. The German tanks along the road leading to Stoumont came under heavy American tank fire from Stoumont and the nearby village of Roua. The Panthers stopped, buttoned up and held firm along the road with their accompanying infantry already in the outlying buildings of Stoumont. Peiper’s attack had stalled. Once they Americans recaptured Stavelot, the attached engineers dynamited the bridge across Amblève, blowing the only route over which Peiper could receive fuel, reinforcement, and resupply.



The towed tank destroyers, three 57mm anti-tank guns, and two 90mm anti-aircraft weapons were emplaced as anti-tank weapons. Peiper was heavily engaged at Stoumont when he learned of the situation in his rear.

Kampfgruppe Hansen was halted by American resistance at Recht, about 7 km (TBD mi) short of the crossing. Kampfgruppe Knittel was ordered to move north and follow Peiper's route west. It reached Stavelot at midday and by noon its main units had crossed the Ambleve River. The Americans soon recaptured Stavelot. Kampfgruppes Knittel and Sandig tried to force the Americans back, knowing the river crossing was essential for their supply columns, but American infantry and heavy artillery denied them success.

21 December

Small units of the U.S. 2nd Battalion, 119th Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Division, attacked the dispersed units of Kampfgruppe Peiper on the morning of 21 December. They failed and were forced to withdraw, and a number were captured, including battalion commander Maj. Hal D. McCown. Peiper learned that his reinforcements had been directed to gather in La Gleize to his east, and he withdrew from Cheneux, leaving wounded Americans and Germans in Château de Froidcour. As he withdrew, American paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division engaged the Germans in fierce house-to-house fighting. The Americans shelled Kampfgruppe Peiper on 22 December, and although the Germans had run out of food and had virtually no fuel, they continued to fight. A Luftwaffe resupply mission went badly when SS-Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohnke insisted the grid coordinates supplied by Peiper were wrong, parachuting supplies into American hands in Stoumont.

American attacks on Stoumont forced the remnants of the battle group to retreat to La Gleize. Peiper was unable to protect his rear and American troops were able to mount a roadblock at Stavelot on the only possible supply road for ammunition and fuel. Without supplies and with no contact with other German units behind him, Peiper could advance no further. In La Gleize, Peiper set up defenses waiting for relief.

23 December

When Peiper learned he had no hopes of reinforcement, he decided to break through the Allied lines and return to the German lines on 23 December. The men of the Kampfgruppe were forced to abandon their vehicles and heavy equipment, although most of the 800 remaining troops were able to escape.

"The last hope for relief through units of the Division had to be given up. In the last radioed order which was received, Division ordered the encircled forces to fight their way out of the pocket. For unknown reasons the U.S. infantry and tank units of the 30th Infantry Division failed to resume their attack against La Gleize on 23 December, but the situation in the pocket nevertheless remained grave. Ammunition and fuel supplies were practically exhausted and no food supplies had arrived since the first day of the attack. Ammunition and fuel supplies by air on 22 December admittedly had arrived, but only about 10 percent of the supplies dropped by the three planes reached the target area, an amount which could have no effect whatever."

Aftermath
On 24 December, Peiper abandoned his vehicles and retreated with the remaining men. German wounded and American prisoners were also left behind. Peiper recalled that his "forces started breaking out of the pocket during the night of 24 December at about 0200 hours, after all armored vehicles had been blown up. Without encountering resistance, the Kampfgruppe moved southward from La Gleize via La Gleize railway station, crossed the Amblève valley over a small bridge, and in a long, drawn-out column reached the wooded area west of Trois Ponts under most difficult conditions."

To the east of Peiper, the 12th SS Panzer had been unable to defeat the Americans at Elsenborn Ridge. As a result, the division was ordered to pivot south and follow the rollbahn taken by the 1st SS Panzer Division. American troops blocked the division from advancing until it was altogether stopped. On 8 January Hitler gave the authorization to withdraw. The attack was ultimately a failure. The 12th SS had been severely mauled, with only 26 tanks and assault guns and an average of 120 men remaining in each battalion.

Peiper began the offensive with a compliment of about 3,000 men. He left about 50 troops behind as a rear guard to disable the remaining vehicles. The rest of the unit totaling about 800 men withdrew on foot. They crossed the La Venn bridge on the Amblève River towards Trois Ponts and found a bridge across the Salm River. It began to snow again, creating good cover in the dark. Coincidentally, Major General Gavin moved the 2nd Battalion west to Fraiture in the afternoon, which seriously thinned the 504th defensive lines. These lines stretched from Rahier to Cheneux, Monceau, Brume and on to Trois Ponts through heavily wooded terrain. Normal doctrine called for screening a line of this length with at least two battalions at full strength. According to Peiper, 717 men returned to the German lines out of 3,000 at the beginning of the operation.

Peiper's troops abandoned 47 halftracks (Sonderkraftfahrzeug), 7 Panzer IV tanks, 12 Panther G tanks, 1 Panther H tank, 5 Tiger II (King Tiger), 6 Bisons (150mm Howitzer), 3 Puma, 1 Flak half track, 4 Russian 120mm mortars, 1 Flakpanzer IV, 1 Steyr truck, 1 Schwimmwagen, 1 KettenKrad, 1 BWM engine, 3 cars (Steyr 1500), 1 75mm gun, and 1 flak 88mm gun.

In the early morning of December 25, Knittel evacuated his positions on the west bank of the Amblève and he also retreated to Wanne.

Legacy
A monument at Neufchâteau, Belgfium was dedicated.

Monument erected in Bouse, La Paz County, Arizona in 1998:

A memorial to the 743rd Tank Destroyer Battalion was erected in Stoumont on the 75th anniversary of the battle on a site overlooking the valley.