User:CanonLawJunkie/Office (canon law)

In the canon law of the Catholic Church, an office or ecclesiastical office is a stable function established by divine or ecclesiastical ordinance for a spiritual purpose. Clerics, as well as lay Catholics, are capable of holding ecclesiastical office. To hold ecclesiastical office, one must be in communion with the Catholic Church and have the requisite qualities required by law for the fulfilment of the office. However, as disciplinary non-constitutive law, this may be dispensed for a just cause, so that even an unbaptized person could hold an ecclesiastical office if the person is otherwise qualified. If an office requires the "full care of souls" (plena cura animarum), only a priest may be validly appointed to the office. He must be a priest at the time of appointment.

A person is appointed to office either by free conferral, election, or postulation. Presented candidates must be appointed by competent authority. Once a person has received canonical mission to an office, the person must take possession of that office. Once the office has been taken possession of, the person has the full exercise of the rights, obligations, and powers of the office, unless suspended. One can loose an office by expiration of term, transfer, removal, deprivation, or renunciation (resignation). When an office does not have an occupant (office-holder), the office is said to be vacant. If the office of bishop of an episcopal see is vacant, the see is called sede vacante.

Definition
According to canon 145 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law: §1 An ecclesiastical office is any post which by divine or ecclesiastical disposition is established in a stable manner to further a spiritual purpose.

§2 The duties and rights proper to each ecclesiastical office are defined either by the law whereby the office is established, or by a decree of the competent authority whereby it is at one and at the same time established and conferred.

Ordinary power
(Lat. ordinarius, i. e., judex)

An Ordinary in ecclesiastical language, denotes any person possessing or exercising ordinary jurisdiction, i. e., jurisdiction connected permanently or at least in a stable way with an office, whether this connexion arises from Divine law, as in the case of popes and bishops, or from positive church law, as in the case mentioned below. Ordinary jurisdiction is contrasted with delegated jurisdiction, a temporary communication of power made by a superior to an inferior; thus we speak of a delegated judge and an ordinary judge. A person may be an ordinary within his own sphere, and at the same time have delegated powers for certain acts or the exercise of special authority. The jurisdiction which constitutes an ordinary is real and full jurisdiction in the external forum, comprising the power of legislating, adjudicating, and governing. Jurisdiction in the internal forum, being partial and exercised only in private matters, does not constitute an ordinary. Parish priests, therefore, are not ordinaries, though they have jurisdiction in the internal forum, for they have not jurisdiction in the external forum, being incapable of legislating and acting as judges; their administration is the exercise of paternal authority rather than of jurisdiction properly so called.

There are various classes of ordinaries. First, they are divided into those having territorial jurisdiction and those who have not. As a rule ordinary jurisdiction is territorial as well as personal, as in the case of the pope and the bishops; but ordinary jurisdiction may be restricted to certain persons, exempt from the local authority. Such for instance is the jurisdiction of regular prelates, abbots, generals, and provincials of religious orders making solemn vows; they can legislate, adjudicate and govern; consequently they are ordinaries; but their jurisdiction concerns individuals not localities; they are not, like the others, called local ordinaries, ordinarii locorum. Superiors of congregations and institutes bound by simple vows are not ordinaries though they may enjoy a greater or less degree of administrative exemption. The jurisdiction of local ordinaries arises from Divine law or ecclesiastical law. The pope is the ordinary of the entire church and all the faithful; he has ordinary and immediate jurisdiction over all (Conc. Vatic., Const. "Pastor æternus", c. iii). Bishops are the pastors and ordinary judges in their dioceses, appointed to govern their churches by the Holy Ghost (Acts, xx, 28). Certain bishops have, by ecclesiastical law, a mediate ordinary power over other bishops and dioceses; these are the metropolitana, primates, and patriarchs. In a lower rank, there is another class of ordinaries, viz., prelates who exercise jurisdiction in the external forum over a given territory, which is not a diocese, either in their own name, as in the case of prelates or abbots nullius or in the name of the pope, like years and prefects Apostolic until the erection of their territories into complete dioceses.

Local ordinaries being unable personally to perform all acts of their jurisdiction may and even ought to communicate it permanently to certain persons, without however, divesting themselves of their authority; if the duties of these persons are specified and determined by law, they also are ordinaries, but in a restricted and inferior sense. This is vicarial jurisdiction, delegated as to its source, but ordinary as to its exercise, and which would be more accurately termed quasi-ordinary. In this sense vicars-general and diocesan officials are ordinaries; so also, in regard to the pope, the heads of the various organs of the Curia are ordinaries for the whole Church; the cardinal vicar for the Diocese of Rome and his district; the legate a latere, for the country to which he is sent. Finally, there are ordinaries with an interimary and transitory title during the vacancy of sees. Thus when the Holy See is vacant, the ordinaries are the College of Cardinals and the cardinal camerlengo; when a diocese the chapter and also the vicar capitular, and in general the interimary administrator; so, too, the vicar, for religious orders. These persons possess and exercise exterior jurisdiction, although with certain restrictions, and this in virtue of their office; they are therefore ordinaries.

In practice, the determination of the persons included under the term ordinary is of importance in the case of indults and the execution of rescripts issued from Rome. Since the decrees of the Holy Office dated 20 February, 1888, and 20 April, 1898, indults and most of the rescripts, instead of being addressed to the bishop, are addressed to the ordinary; and it has been declared that the term ordinary comprises bishops, Apostolic administrators, vicars, prelates or prefects with separate territorial jurisdiction, and their officials or vicars-general; and also, during the vacancy of a see, the vicar capitular or lawful administrator. Thus the powers are handed on, without intermission or renewal, from one ordinary to his successor. (See JURISDICTION.)

See the canonical writers on the titles De officio judicis ordinarii. 1. I, tit. 31, and De officio ordinarii, 1. I, tit. 16, in VI; SÄGMÜLLER, ''Lehrbuch des kathol. Kirchenrechts'' (Freiburg, 1909), §60, 87 sq.

A. BOUDINHON.

Full care of souls
(Lat. cura animarum), technically, the exercise of a clerical office involving the instruction, by sermons and admonitions, and the sanctification, through the sacraments, of the faithful in a determined district, by a person legitimately a ppointed for the purpose. Those specially having cure of souls are the pope for the entire Church, the bishops in their dioceses, and the parish priests in their respective parishes. Others may likewise have part in the cure of souls in subordination to these. Thus in missionary countries where espiscopal sees have not yet been erected, those who labour for the salvation of souls are in a special manner sharers of the particular responsibility of the Vicar of Christ for those regions. In like manner, a parish priest may have curates who attend to the wants of a particular portion of the parish, subordinate to himself. The object of the cure of souls is the salvation of men, and hence it is a continuation of Christ's mission on earth. As the Reedeemer established a church which was to govern, teach, and sanctify the world, it necessarily follows that those who are to assist in the work of the Church must obtain their mission from her alone. "How shall they preach, unless they be sent?" (Rom., x, 15).

The canonical mission of a priest is derived from the Apostolic succession in the Church. This succession is twofold: Holy orders and authority. The first is perpetuated by means of bishops; the latter by the living magistracy of the Church, of which the head is the pope, who is the source of jurisdiction. Both elements enter into the mission of him who has cure of souls: Holy orders, that he may offer sacrifice and administer the sacraments, which are the ordinary channels of sanctification employe d by the Holy Ghost; and jurisdiction, that he may teach correct doctrine, free his subjects from sins and censures, and govern them in accordance with the canons of the Church. The power of Holy orders is radically common to all priests by virtue of the ir valid oridination, but the power of jurisdiction is ordinary only in pope, bishops, and parish priests, and extraordinary or delegated in others. It is plain, then, that while valid orders may exist outside the Catholic Church, jurisdiction cannot, as its source is the Vicar of Christ and it is possessed only so far as he confers it or does not limit it. The duties of those who have cure of souls are all carefully defined in the sacred cannons. (see Pope; Bishop; Parish Priest.)

We have here touched only upon what is common to the idea of a pastor of the faithful. It is plain that the closer the bond exsisting between the subordinate members of the hierarchy and their superiors, and between pastors and their people, the more ef fective will be the work done for the salvation of souls. If the pastor be earnest in preaching and admonishing, unremitting in the tribunal of penance and visitaion of the sick, charitable to the poor, kind yet firm in his dealings with all the members of his flock, observant of the regulations of the Church as to his office and particularly that of dwelling among his people (see Residence, Ecclesiastical), that he may know them and bring them succour at all times; and if, on the other hand, the people be truly desirous for their own salvation, obedient towards their pastor, zealous to obtain and employ the means of sanctification, and mindful of their obligations as members of a parish to enable their pastor to institute and improve the parochial insti tutions necessary for the proper furtherance of the object of the Church, we shall have the true idea of the cure of souls as intended by Christ and as legislated for in the canons of His Church.

WILLIAM H.W. FANNING

Canonical provision
Canonical Provision is a term signifying regular induction into a benefice, comprising three distinct acts - the designation of the person, canonical institution, and installation. In various ways a person may be designated to fill a vacant benefice: by election, postulation, presentation, or recommendation, resignation made in one's favour, or approved exchange. In all cases confirmation by the proper ecclesiastical superior of the selection made is required, while letters of appointment, as a rule, must be presented. Reception of administration by a chapter without such letters brings excommunication reserved to the pope, together with privation of the fruits of the benefice; and the nominee loses ipso facto all right to the prelacy. Ordinarily greater benefices are conferred by the pope; minor benefices by the bishop, who as a rule has the power of appointing to all benefices in his diocese. The pope, however, owing to the fullness of his jurisdiction, may appoint to any benefice whatsoever. These extraordinary provisions became common in the eleventh and subsequent centuries, and met at times with stern opposition. In 1351 an English statute (Statute of Provisors) was enacted, designed to prevent the pope from exercising this prerogative. Similar enactments were made in 1390 and in later years. At present only in certain defined circumstances does the Supreme Pontiff make use of this right. The bishop's power is further restricted at times to confirming an election or postulation; or to approving candidates presented by one who enjoys the right of presentation by privilege, custom, or prescription.

Canonical institution or collation is the concession of a vacant benefice by one who has the authority. If made by the sole right of the prelate, it is free; if made by legal necessity, for example, after due presentation or election, or at the command of a superior, it is styled necessary. An ecclesiastical benefice cannot be lawfully obtained without canonical institution.

Installation, called corporal or real institution, is the induction into the actual possession of a benefice. In the case of a bishop it is known as enthronization or enthronement. Corporal institution, according to common law, belongs to the archdeacon; by custom to the bishop or his vicar-general. It may take place by proxy: the rite observed depends much on custom. To installation belong the profession of faith and oath, when prescribed. (See BENEFICE; INSTITUTION, CANONICAL; INSTALLATION.)

ANDREW B. MEEHAN.

Election
ADD EXCESS CONTENT TO canonical election

In the elections or deliberations of any assembly, majority signifies a higher number of votes. There is an "absolute majority when the number of votes exceeds half the number of the voters; a "relative majority" when the votes for the one candidate, or party, numerically exceed those given to any other. There are also certain special majorities required in certain cases, such as that of two-thirds required for pontifical elections.

Election (Lat. electio, from eligere, to choose from).—This subject will be treated under the following heads: I. Juridical Concept; II. Electors; III. Persons Eligible; IV. The Act of Electing: Forms and Methods; V. After Election; VI. Elections Now in Use.

I. JURIDICAL CONCEPT.—In its broadest sense election means a choice among many persons, things, or sides to be taken. In the stricter juridical sense it means the choice of one person among many for a definite charge or function. If we confine ourselves to ecclesiastical law, canonical election, in a broad sense, would be any designation of a person to an ecclesiastical charge or function; thus understood it includes various modes: postulation, presentation, nomination, recommendation, request or petition, and, finally, free collation. In a narrower sense, election is the canonical appointment, by legitimate electors, of a fit person to an ecclesiastical office. Its effect is to confer on the person thus elected an actual right to the benefice or charge, independently of the confirmation or collation ulteriorly necessary. Hence it is easily distinguished from the aforesaid modes that only in a broad sense can be termed election.

(a) Postulation differs canonically from election, not as regards the electors, but as regards the person elected, the latter being juridically ineligible on account of an impediment from which the superior is asked to dispense him. For instance, if in an episcopal election the canons designate the bishop of another see, or a priest under thirty years of age, or one of illegitimate birth, etc., no actual right would be conferred on such a person, and the ecclesiastical superior would be in no wise bound to recognize such action; hence the electors are then said to postulate their candidate, this postulation being a matter of favor (gratia), not of justice. (b) Presentation, on the contrary, differs from election not in respect to the person elected but to the electors; it is the exercise of the right of patronage, and the patron may be a layman, whereas the electors to ecclesiastical dignities must be clerics. In both cases the right of the candidate is the same (jus ad rem); but while an election calls for canonical confirmation, presentation by a patron leads to canonical institution by a competent prelate. Moreover, when the right of patronage belongs to a moral body, e.g. a chapter or an entire congregation, presentation may have to follow along the lines of election. Though frequently called nomination) the designation of bishops and beneficed clergy by the civil authority in virtue of concordats is in reality presentation, and results in canonical institution. (c) Correctly speaking, nomination is the canonical act by which the electors propose several fit persons to the free choice of the superior. The role of electors in nomination is the same as in election properly so called; as election, however, can fall only on one person, so nomination cannot confer on several a real right to a benefice—rather, their right is real inasmuch as it excludes third parties, though none of them possesses the jus ad rem (c. Quod sicut, xxviii, De elect., lib. I, tit. vi). (d) Recommendation is the name applied to the designation of one or several fit persons made to the superior by certain members of the episcopate or clergy, chiefly in view of sees to be filled (see Bishop). It differs from election and nomination in that the bishop or members of the clergy do not act as electors; hence the persons designated do not acquire any real right, the Holy See remaining perfectly free to make a choice outside of the list proposed. (e) Still further removed from election is simple request, or petition, by which the clergy or people of a diocese beg the pope to grant them the prelate they desire. The authors of this petition, not being properly qualified, as in the case of recommendation, to make known their appreciation of the candidate, it is needless to say the latter acquires no right whatsoever from the fact of this request. (f) Finally, free collation is the choice of the person by the superior who confers canonical institution; it is the method most in use for appointment to inferior benefices, and the practical rule for the filling of episcopal sees, apart from some well-known exceptions. Evidently, where free collation obtains, election, properly so called, is excluded.

II. ELECTORS.—Electors are those who are called by ecclesiastical law or statute to constitute an electoral college, i.e. to designate the person of their choice, and who have the qualifications required for the exercise of their right to vote. The law appoints competent electors for each kind of election: cardinals for the election of a pope; the cathedral chapter for the election of a bishop or a vicar capitular; and the various chapters of their order, etc. for the election of regular prelates. In general, election belongs, strictly speaking, to the college, i.e. the body, of which the person elected will become the superior or prelate; if this college have a legal existence, like a cathedral chapter, it can exercise its right as long as it exists, even if reduced to a single member, though, of course, such a one could not elect himself. Electors called upon to give a prelate to the Church must be ecclesiastics. Hence laymen are excluded from all participation in a canonical election; it would be invalid, not only if made by them exclusively (c. iii, h.t.), but even if they only cooperate with ecclesiastics, every custom to the contrary notwithstanding. Ecclesiastics alone, and those only who compose the college or community to be provided with a head, can be electors. This is well exemplified in the cathedral chapter, all of whose canons, and they alone, are episcopal electors. Other ecclesiastics have no right to associate with the chapter in the election of a bishop, unless (a) they are in full possession of this right and it is proved by long prescription; (b) hold a pontifical privilege, or (c) can show a right resultant from the foundation of the chapter or the church in question. To exercise their right, the electors, whoever they may be, must be full members of the body to which they belong, and must, moreover, be in a condition to perform a juridical, human act. Hence natural law excludes the demented and those who have not reached the age of puberty; ecclesiastical law debars (I) canons who have not attained full membership in the chapter, i.e. who are not yet subdeacons (Council of Trent, Sess. XXII, c. iv, De ref.), and (2) religious who have not made their profession. Moreover, in punishment of certain offenses, some electors may have forfeited their right to elect, either for once or permanently, e.g. those excommunicated by name, those suspended, or those placed under interdict. The Constitution of Martin V, "Ad evitanda scandala", permits the excommunicated known as tolerati (tolerated) to take part in an election, but exception may be taken to them, and their exclusion must follow; if, after such exception, they cast a vote, it must be considered null. Apart from censures incurred, privation of an active share in elections occurs frequently in the ecclesiastical law affecting regulars; in common law and for the secular clergy, it exists in only three cases: Electors lose the right to elect, for that time, first, when they have elected or postulated an unworthy person (c. vii, h.t.); second, when the election has been held in consequence of an abusive intervention of the civil authority (c. xliii, h.t.); finally, when it has not been made within the required time. In all these cases the election devolves upon the superior (c. xli, h.t.).

III. PERSONS ELIGIBLE.—Those persons are eligible who meet the requirements of common ecclesiastical law, or special statutes, for the charge or function in question; hence, for each election it is necessary to ascertain what is required of the candidate. In general, for all kinds of elections, the necessary qualifications are mature age, moral integrity, and adequate knowledge (c. vii, h.t.); for each charge or function dependent on an election these conditions are defined with more precision and fullness. Thus, neither a layman nor an ecclesiastic who is not yet a subdeacon can be elected bishop; and no regular can be elected superior, etc., unless he has made his final profession. Some of the aforesaid requirements are easily verified, e.g. the proper age, adequate knowledge, the latter being presumable when the law formally exacts an academic degree (Council of Trent, Sess. XXII, c. ii, De ref.); others, especially an upright life, must usually depend on negative evidence, i.e. on the absence of proof to the contrary, such proof being positive offenses, particularly when they have seriously impaired the reputation of the person in question or called for canonical punishment. It is principally candidates of censurable morality who are termed unworthy; the sacred canons constantly repeat that the unworthy must be set aside. Such unworthy persons are: (I) all outside the Church, viz. infidels, heretics, and schismatics; (2) all who have been guilty of great crimes (crimina majora), viz. the sacrilegious, forgers, perjurers, sodomites, and simoniacs; (3) all whom law or fact, for whatever reason, has branded as infamous (infamae juris aut facti); (4) all under censure (excommunication, suspension, interdict), unless said censure be occult; (5) all whom an irregularity, particularly a penal one (ex crimine), debars from receiving or exercising Holy orders. Those also are excluded who, at the time of election, hold several incompatible benefices or dignities without dispensation (c. liv, h.t.); or who, at a preceding election, have already been rejected as unworthy (c. xii, h.t.), and all who have consented to be elected through the abusive intervention of lay authority (c. xliii, h.t.). There are other cases in which regulars cease to be eligible. The legislation here described was meant for the episcopal elections of the thirteenth century and aims at abuses now impossible.

THE ACT OF ELECTION: FORMS AND METHODS.—In this matter, even more than in the preceding paragraphs, we must consider special laws and statutes. Strictly speaking, the common ecclesiastical law, which dates from the thirteenth-century Decretals, considers only episcopal elections (lib. I, tit. vi, De electione et electi potestate; and in VI°). Since an election is held to appoint to a church or an ecclesiastical charge or office that is vacant, it is obvious that the first condition requisite for an election is precisely the vacancy of said church, charge, or office, in consequence of death, transfer, resignation, or deposition; any election made with a view to filling an office not yet vacant is a canonical offense. When an election becomes necessary, the first step is to convoke the electoral assembly in some specified place, and for a certain day within the legal time-limit. The place is ordinarily the vacant church or, if it be question of an election in a chapter, wherever the deliberations of the chapter are usually held. The time-limit set by common ecclesiastical law is three months, after the lapse of which the election devolves upon the immediate superior (c. xli, h.t.). In an electoral college, the duty of convoking the members belongs to the superior or president; in a chapter this would be the highest dignitary. He must issue an effectual summons, for which no special form is prescribed, to all the electors without exception, whether present in the locality or absent, unless, however, they be too far away. The distance considered as constituting a legitimate excuse for absence (see c. xviii, h.t.) should be more narrowly interpreted today than in the thirteenth century. It is unnecessary to convoke electors publicly known to be incompetent to exercise their electoral right, e.g. canons excommunicated by name or not yet subdeacons. So binding is this convocation that if even one elector be not summoned he can, in all justice, enter a complaint against the election, though the latter is not ipso facto null by reason of such absence. Such an election will stand provided the unsummoned elector abides by the choice of his colleagues or abandons his complaint. As no one is bound to use a right, common law does not oblige an elector to attend the assembly and take part in the voting; the absent are not taken into consideration. As a general rule the absent cannot be represented or vote by proxy unless, according to the chapter "Quia propter" (xlii, h.t., Lateran Council, 1215), they are at a great distance and can prove a legitimate hindrance. Moreover, they can choose as proxy only a member of the assembly, but they can commission him to vote either for a particular person or for whomsoever he himself may deem most worthy.

On the appointed day the president opens the electoral assembly. Though the common law requires no preliminary solemnities, such are frequently imposed by special statute, e.g. the Mass of the Holy Ghost, which should be attended by all the assembled electors and those not prevented from assisting; also the recital of certain prayers. Moreover, the electors are often obliged previously to promise under oath that they will conscientiously vote for the most worthy. However, apart from such oath, their obligation is none the less absolute and serious. These preliminaries over, the electoral assembly proceeds, if necessary, to verify the credentials of certain electors, e.g. those who act as delegates, as happens in the general chapters of religious congregations. Then follows the discussion of the merits (tituli) of the candidates. The latter need not have previously made known their candidacy, though they may do so. The electors, nevertheless, have all freedom to propose and sustain the candidates of their choice. Frank and fair discussion of the merits of candidates, far from being forbidden, is perfectly conformable to the law, because it tends to enlighten the electors; indeed, some maintain that an election made without such a discussion would be null or could be annulled (Matthaeucci, in Ferraris, "Bibliotheca", s.v. "Electio", art. iv, n. 5). It is more accurate to say that the election would be vitiated if the presiding officer were to oppose this discussion for the purpose of influencing votes. However, though the law strictly prohibits cabals and secret negotiations in the interest of certain candidates, the line between illicit manoeuvring and permissible negotiating is in practice not always easily recognizable. [See the Constitution "Ecclesiae" of Innocent XII (September 22, 1695), on the elections of regulars (in Ferraris, art. iii, no. 26), also the regulations that govern a Conclave (q.v.).]

The discussion concluded, voting begins. Actually there is only one customary method, i.e. secret voting (scrutinium secretum) by written ballots. The common ecclesiastical law (c. Quia propter, xlii, h.t., Lateran Council, 1215) admits only three modes of election: the normal or regular method by ballot, and two exceptional modes, namely, compromise and quasi-inspiration. Recourse to lots is especially prohibited; nevertheless, the Sacred Congregation of the Council (Romana, Electionis, May 2, 1857) ratified an election where the chapter, equally divided between two candidates in other respects fit, had drawn lots; just about as was done for the Apostolic election of St. Matthias. As to the two exceptional methods: (I) Election by quasi-inspiration takes place when the electors greet the name of a candidate with enthusiasm and acclamation, in which event the ballot is omitted as useless since its result is known in advance, and the candidate in question is proclaimed elected. However, modern custom in this matter differs from ancient habits, and it is wiser, even in the case of such apparent unanimity, to proceed by ballot. (2) Compromise occurs when all the electors confide the election to one or several specified persons, either members of the electoral college or strangers, and ratify in advance the choice made by such arbitrator or arbitrators. Formerly this exceptional method was often resorted to, either to terminate long and fruitless sessions, or when there was a lack of exact information concerning the candidates; it is minutely regulated by the law of the Decretals. The compromise must be agreed to by all the electors without exception, and can be confided to ecclesiastics only. It may be absolute, i.e. leaving the arbitrators quite free, or conditional, i.e. accompanied by certain reservations concerning the manner of election, the persons to be elected, the time-limit within which the election should be held, and so on.

The normal or regular method by ballot, according to the law of the Decretals was necessarily neither secret nor written. The law "Quia propter" (see above) merely calls for the choice of three trust-worthy scrutineers from among the electors. These were charged with collecting secretly (in a whisper) and in succession the votes of all; the result was then drawn up in writing and made public. The candidate who had obtained the votes of the more numerous or sounder party (major vel sanior pars) of the chapter was declared elected. However, this appreciation, not only of the number but also of the value of the votes, led to endless discussions, it being necessary to compare not only the number of votes obtained, but also the merits of the electors and their zeal, i.e. the honesty of their intentions. It was presumed, of course, that the majority was also the sounder party, but proof to the contrary was admitted (c. lvii, h.t.). The use of the secret and written ballot has long since remedied these difficulties. If the Council of Trent did not modify on this point the existing law, at least it exacted the secret ballot for the elections of regulars (Sess. XXV, c. vi, De regul.). According to this method the scrutineers silently collect the ballots of the electors present; when occasion requires it, certain members are delegated to collect the votes of sick electors beneath the same roof (e.g. at a conclave or at one of the regular chapters) or even in the city (for cathedral chapters), if the statutes so prescribe. This accomplished, the scrutineers count the number of ballots collected, and if, as should be, they tally with the number of electors, the same officers proceed to declare the result. Each ballot is in turn opened, and one of the scrutineers proclaims the name inscribed thereon, then passes it to the second scrutineer for registration, while the third, or secretary, adds up die total number of votes obtained by each candidate. As a general rule, election is assured to the candidate who obtains the majority of votes, i.e. an absolute, not merely a relative, majority; however, certain statutes require, e.g. in a conclave, a majority of two-thirds. When the electors are odd in number, a gain of one vote ensures the majority; if the number be even, it requires two votes. In calculating the majority, neither absent electors nor blank ballots are taken into account; whoever casts a blank vote is held to have forfeited his electoral right for that ballot. If no candidate obtains an absolute majority, balloting is recommenced, and so on until a definitive vote is reached. However, not to prolong useless balloting, special statutes can prescribe, and in fact have provided, various solutions, e.g. that after three rounds of fruitless balloting the election shall devolve upon the superior; or again, that in the third round the electors can vote only between the two most favored candidates; or, finally, that in the fourth round a relative majority shall suffice (Rules of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars for congregations of women under simple vows, art. ccxxxiii sq.). Other special regulations provide for the case of two candidates receiving the same number of votes (the voters being of even number), in which event the election is decided in favor of the senior (by age, ordination, or religious profession); sometimes the deciding vote is assigned to the presiding officer. For all these details it is necessary to know and observe the special legislation that covers them.

When the final vote is obtained, whatever its character, it should be made public, i.e. officially communicated to the electoral assembly by the presiding officer. The decree of election is then drawn up; in other words, the document which verifies the voting and the election. The role of the electoral college thus fulfilled, the election is closed.

The principal duty of an elector is to vote according to his conscience, without allowing himself to be actuated by human or selfish motives, i.e., he must vote for him whom he deems the most worthy and best qualified among the persons fit for the office in question. External law can scarcely go farther, but moralists rightly declare guilty of mortal sin the elector who, against his conscience, casts his vote for one who is unworthy. In order, however, to fulfil his duty, the elector has a right to be entirely free and uninfluenced by the dread of any unjust annoyance (vexatio) which might affect his vote, whether such annoyance be in its source civil or ecclesiastical (cc. xiv and xliii, h.t.).

V. AFTER ELECTION.—We are confronted here by two hypotheses: either an election is or is not disputed. An election may be disputed by whoever is interested in it, in which case the question of its validity is referred to the superior, in accordance with the same rule as for judicial appeals. Now, an election may be defective in three ways, i.e. as to the electors, the person elected, or the mode of election. The defect concerns the electors if, through culpable neglect, one or more of those who have a right to participate in the election are not summoned; or if laymen, excommunicates vitandi, or unauthorized ecclesiastics are admitted as electors. The defect lies with the person elected if it can be proved that he was not fit (idoneus), in which case he may be postulated, or that he was positively unworthy, in which event the election is invalid. Finally, the defect concerns the form or mode of election when the legal prescriptions relative to balloting or compromise have not been observed. The challenged election, with proofs of its imperfection, is judged canonically by the proper ecclesiastical superior. If the alleged defect is not proven, the election is sustained; if it be proven, the judge declares it, whereupon the law provides the following sanctions: An election made by laymen, or with their assistance, is invalid (c. lvi, h.t.); the one at which an excommunicated person has been admitted to vote, as also that to which an elector has not been invited, must be closely investigated, but is not to be annulled unless the absence of the excommunicated person, or the presence of the unsummoned elector might have given a different turn to the vote. The election of a person who is not unworthy, but simply the victim of an impediment, may be treated indulgently; that of an unworthy person is to be annulled, while the electors who, knowing him to be such, nevertheless elected him, are deprived for that time of the right to vote and are suspended for three years from the benefices they hold in the vacant church in question. Finally, the election wherein the prescribed form has not been observed must be annulled. In all of these cases the right to elect (bishops) devolves upon the Holy See (Boniface VIII, c. xviii, h.t., in VI°); the only case in which it devolves upon the immediate superior is when the election has not been made within the prescribed time-limit.

If, on the contrary, the election meets with no opposition the first duty of the presiding officer of the electoral college is to notify the person elected that choice is made of his person. If he be present, e.g. in the elections of regulars, the notification takes place immediately; if he be absent, the decree of election must be forwarded to him within eight days, barring legitimate hindrance. On his side, the person elected is allowed a month within which to make known his acceptance or refusal, the month dating from the time of receiving the decree of election or the permission of the superior when such is obligatory. If the person elected refuses the honor conferred upon him, the electoral college is summoned to proceed with a new election, under the same conditions as the first time and within a month. If he accepts, it is his right as well as his duty to demand from the superior the confirmation of his election within the peremptory limit of three months (c. vi, h.t., in Vic'); but if, without legitimate hindrance, he allows this time to pass unused, the election has lapsed. From the moment of his acceptance, the person elected acquires a real, though still incomplete, right to the benefice or charge, the jus ad rem to be completed and transformed into full right (jus in re) by the confirmation of the election; it is his privilege to exact this confirmation from the superior, just as it is the latter's duty to give it, except in the event of unworthiness, of which fact the superior remains judge. However, until the person elected has received this confirmation, he cannot take advantage of his still incomplete right to interfere in any way whatever in the administration of his benefice, the punishment being the invalidity of all administrative acts thus accomplished and privation of the benefice itself. The ecclesiastical legislation on this point is very severe, but it concerns episcopal sees only. In the time of Innocent III (1198-1216) those elected to an ordinary episcopal see had to seek the confirmation of their election from the metropolitan only. Bishops outside of Italy who had to obtain from Rome the confirmation of their election (metropolitans, or bishops immediately subject to the Holy See) were authorized (c. xliv, h.t.), in cases of necessity, to enter at once on the administration of their churches, provided their election had aroused no opposition; meanwhile the confirmation proceedings went their ordinary course at Rome.

At the Second Council of Lyons, in 1274 (c. Avaritiae, v, h.t., in VI)), elected persons were forbidden, under penalty of deprivation of their dignity, to meddle in the administration of their benefice by assuming the title of administrator, procurator, or the like. A little later, Boniface VIII (Extray., Injunctae, i, h.t.) established the rule still in force for entering on possession of major benefices and episcopal sees, according to which the person elected must not be received unless he present to the provisional administrators the Apostolical Letters of his election, promotion, and confirmation. The Council of Trent having established the vicar capitular as provisional administrator of the diocese during the vacancy of the see, it became necessary to prohibit elected persons from entering on the administration of their future dioceses in the capacity of vicars capitular. This was done by Pius IX in the Constitution "Romanus Pontifex" (August 28, 1873), which recalls and renews the measure taken by Boniface VIII. In this Constitution the pope declares that the law "Avaritiae" of the aforesaid Council of Lyons applies not only to bishops elected by chapters, but also to candidates named and presented by heads of states in virtue of concordats. He rules that chapters can neither appoint temporarily vicars capitular nor revoke their appointment. He also forbids them to designate as such persons nominated by the civil power, or otherwise elected to a vacant church. Offenses against this law are severely punished, by excommunication specially reserved to the pope and by privation of the revenues of their benefices for those dignitaries and canons who turn over the administration of their church to a person elected or nominated. The same penalties are pronounced against said elected or nominated persons, and against all who give them aid, counsel, or countenance. Moreover, the person elected or nominated forfeits all acquired right to the benefice, while all acts performed during his illegitimate administration are declared invalid.

We may now return to the confirmation of the election according to the law of the Decretals. It belonged to the immediate superior. It was his duty to extinguish all opposition by summoning the elected person to defend himself. Even if there were no opposition the superior was bound to summon, by a general edict posted on the door of the vacant church, all who might possibly dispute the election to appear within a fixed period; all this under penalty of the nullity of subsequent confirmation (c. xlvii, h.t., in VI°). The superior had to examine carefully both the election and the person of the one elected, in order to satisfy himself that everything was conformable to law; if his investigation proved favorable he gave the requisite confirmation whereby the elected person became definitively prelate of his church and received full jurisdiction. While the law did not bind the superior to any strict time-limit for the granting of confirmation, it authorized the elected person to complain if the delay were excessive. All this legislation, especially elaborated for episcopal elections, is now no longer applicable to them; however, it is still in force for inferior benefices, e.g. canonries, when they are conferred by way of election.

VI. ELECTIONS NOW IN USE.—Election, considered as the choice made by a college of its future prelate, is verified first of all in the designation of a pope by the cardinals (see Conclave). The election of bishops by chapters is still, theoretically, the common rule, but the general reservation formulated in the second rule of the Apostolic Chancery has suppressed in practice the application of this law; episcopal elections, in the strict sense of the word, occur now in only a small number of sees (see Bishop). Finally, the prelates of regulars are normally appointed by election; the same is true of abbesses. (See the Council of Trent, Sess. XXV, c. vi, De regul.) The common ecclesiastical law provides for no other elections. There are, however, other ecclesiastical elections that do not concern real prelates. Religious communities of men and women under simple vows proceed by election in the choice of superiors, superiors general, assistants general, and usually the members of the general councils. In cathedral churches it is by election that, on occasion of the vacancy of a see, the chapter appoints the vicar capitular (Council of Trent, Sess. XXIV, c. xvi, De ref.). It is also according to the canonical form of election that colleges, especially chapters, proceed in appointing persons, e.g., to dignities and canonries, when such appointment belongs to the chapter; to inferior benefices to which the chapter has a right to nominate or present; again in the appointment of delegates on seminary commissions (Council of Trent, Sess. XXIII, c. xviii, De ref.), or in bestowing on some of its members various capitulary offices, or making other such designations. The same is true of other ecclesiastical groups, e.g. the chapters of collegiate churches, etc., also of confraternities and other associations recognized by ecclesiastical authority. In the latter cases, however, there is no election in the strictly canonical sense of the term.

A. BOUDINHON

Postulation
(Lat. postulare, to request)

A postulation is a petition presented to a competent ecclesiastical superior, that he may promote to a certain dignity a person who is not strictly eligible on account of some canonical impediment which is usually dispensable. Such impediments are, for example illegitimate birth, defect of requisite age, or the condition of a person, such as a bishop, even a titular one, or a regular, who cannot accept a new dignity without leave of their ecclesiastical superior. When a postulation is simultaneous with an election, it is required that the votes be twice the number sufficient if the person were canonically eligible. Occasionally, the Holy See dispenses with the necessity of postulation by granting an indult of eligibility to the person in question, or by empowering the electors to proceed to a choice without having recourse to a formal postulation. Postulation is called solemn, when it is addressed to the superior who can dispense with the defect in the candidate. It is called simple, when the superior in question can not dispense in the canonical impediment yet his consent is required for the candidate's promotion, such as is the case with regulars promoted to the episcopal dignity, who need the licence of their religious superior to accept the charge. Postulation is employed only for those who have a dispensable defect, and in the petitionary document all impediments must be expressed under pain of nullity. After a postulation has been signed and sealed, presented to, and accepted by, the proper superior, those making it can not recede from, nor change, it. The person in whose favour the postulation has been made must signify within a month his willingness to accept the dignity offered.

LAURENTIUS, Institutiones Juris Canonici (Freiburg, 1903); FERRARIS, Bibliotheca Canonica, VI (Rome, 1890), s. v. Postulatio.

WILLIAM H. W. FANNING.

Devolution
(Lat. devolutio from devolvere)

Devolution is the right of an ecclesiastical superior to provide for a benefice, when the ordinary patron or collator has failed to do so, either through negligence or by the nomination of an improper candidate. There is no permanent loss of right in such a case, but only for the time being and for that particular instance. The right of devolution passes to the bishop of the diocese when the chapter or private individuals who have the right of patronage do not present a new and acceptable beneficiary within six months of the vacancy. When the bishop himself is negligent, the right devolves upon the metropolitan. Where, however, the right of appointing belongs to both the bishop and the chapter, if only one of the parties has been found wanting in the exercise of the right, the law declares that the power of nomination remains to the other. When there is a vacancy in an episcopal see, the metropolitan appoints a vicar capitular to rule the vacant diocese, if the cathedral chapter has failed to elect such an official within eight days. In case of negligence on the part of metropolitans or exempt bishops, the right devolves upon the pope of providing for the benefices not conferred within the legal time or when the election was uncanonical. Chapters having power to elect an archbishop, bishop, or abbot must do so within three months, or the appointment devolves upon the Roman pontiff. The same holds for the case where an election was not celebrated according to canonical prescriptions. Custom, however, allows a second election by the chapter when the first has been declared void. In countries where a concordat exists between the Holy See and the civil government, the right of devolution is often either to be held in abeyance or certain restrictions are placed upon it. In France no right of devolution was recognized by the State. In some ecclesiastical provinces of Germany and of Holland and Belgium, it is expressly stipulated that in the event of an uncanonical election of an archbishop or bishop, the chapters are to be allowed to proceed to another election. In case the right of presentation to archiepiscopal and episcopal sees has been conceded to the civil government, the latter does not lose the right by the nomination of an unacceptable candidate, nor does the election devolve upon the pope when a bishopric has not been filled within the canonical term of three months, unless such has been expressly stipulated in the concordat. When the pope, himself, does not exercise the right of devolution within the canonical term of months, the power of conferring the benefice returns to the ordinary patron. Canonists deduce this conclusion not from any explicit law, but from the common regulations governing the provisions for filling benefices and dignities. In practice this custom is observed by the Holy See. Historically, the law of devolution does not seem to be more ancient than the Third Council of the Lateran (1179) for benefices, and the Fourth Council of the Lateran (1215) for elective prelacies. The object of the law is both to provide through higher authority a remedy for the correction of abuses or negligences on the part of inferiors and also to punish them for the improper use of their powers.

KREMSKI, De Jure Devolutionis (Berlin, 1853); LAURENTIUS, ''Institutiones Jur. Eccl. (Freiburg, 1903); WERNZ, Jus Decretalium'' (Rome, 1899), II.

WILLIAM H. W. FANNING.

Simony

 * cf. Simony

Taking Possession
(Lat. installare, to put into a stall).

This word, strictly speaking, applies to the solemn induction of a canon into the stall or seat which he is to occupy in the choir of a cathedral or collegiate church. It is the symbolical act (institutio corporalis) by which a canon is put in possession of the functions which he exercises in the chapter, and by which the chapter admits him. The ceremonies of this installation are regulated by local usage; very often they consist in the assignment of a staff in the choir and a place in the hall in which the meetings of the chapter are held. At the same time the dean invests the new canon with the capitular insignia, puts the biretta on his head, and receives his profession of faith and his oath to observe the statutes of the chapter. The term installation is also applied to the institutio corporalis, or putting in possession of any ecclesiastical benefice whatsoever (see INSTITUTION, CANONICAL); or, again, to the solemn entry of a parish priest into his new parish, even when this solemn act takes place after the parish priest has really been put in possession of his benefice. The corresponding ceremony for a bishop is known as enthronization (q.v.).

AYERR, De symbolica canonicorum et canonicarum investitura (Göttingen, 1768); MAYER, Thesaurus novus juris ecclesiastici (Ratisbon, 1791-1794); FERRARIS, Prompta bibliotheca, s.v. Canonicatus, II (Paris, 1861), 134-138; HINSCHIUS, System des katholischen Kirchenrechts, II (Berlin, 1878), 700.

A. VAN HOVE

Suspension

 * cf. user:CanonLawJunkie/Suspension (canon law)

Transfer
By transfer is understood an exchange of offices made with the consent of the legitimate superior. The trans- fer of bishops is dealt with in can. 430. Canons 193 sqq. treat of transfers in general. First mention is made of the legitimate superior, who is entitled to transfer one from one office to another. In case of episcopal transfers the legitimate superior is the Holy See. Formerly such transfers were made at synods. 41 The inferior clergy was transferred with the consent of the bishop. 48 The new Code requires that the superior who negotiates the transfer must enjoy the right of accepting resignations as well as the right of removal and promotion. Hence it is evident that, concerning minor offices, it is the bishop who is entitled to make transfers, not those who have the right of presentation (patroni) or election.

However, transfers, like resignations, should not be made without reason, because, unless there is a promo- tion to a better office, transfers are generally looked upon as odious and degrading. Hence § 2 justly requires a reason, but also distinguishes between voluntary and in- voluntary transfers. The former may be made at the express wish of the office-holder. For instance, a pastor advanced in years, or in poor health, or beset by serious troubles, may ask for a transfer to another parish, or even to the post of assistant.

Here the question arises whether parish priests may exchange places. The Code, 48 as far as we can see, touches that question only in connection with the ex- change of benefices, but does not exclude an exchange of offices. Hence if made for reasons of utility or neces- sity, and with the consent of the Ordinary, such an ex- change would be lawful.

An involuntary transfer, being odious and generally disgraceful, 44 not only requires reasons acknowledged by

p

41 C. 37 (Cartha*. IV), C. 37. Q- 44 Cf Smith, Elements I, n. 394-

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Original from UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

CANON 194 169

law, but also the legal procedure prescribed in the IVth Book."

The terms transfer and privation have been explained above (can. 183). Transfers 1 * of bishops were not un- usual in the Middle Ages, even against the will of the prelates. The pope clearly has the right to transfer bish- ops from one see to another. As the appointment is ad- duced by human factors which depend finally on the Supreme Pastor, so a change must be considered possible and dependent on the same cause. The spiritual mar- riage (connubium spirituale) which is supposedly con- tracted between the bishop and his diocese, cannot be urged against this right. Mysticism in the law is dan- gerous and to stretch that mystic symbol would lead to absurdities. Moreover, the assumption that there is only a matrimonium ratum would suffice to vindicate the right of the Pope to solve it Now-a-days, however, transfers, properly so-called, are generally made only with the consent of the one transferred and for reasons

10 Cfr. Rdffcutud, I, a, n, 46. i« Cfr. title 7 »° DecrcUlt: de

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UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

■

478 ECCLESIASTICAL PERSONS

of evident utility or necessity affecting either the person of the bishop or the diocese. 17

The bishop who resigns must be duly informed of the acceptance of his resignation by the S. Cong. Consistori- alis. The bishop who is transferred must be certain that the translation was made in public consistory, and the bishop deprived of his bishopric must be certain that that penalty was inflicted. Here again, therefore, the question of certainty arises. But here the certainty required must be limited to juridical knowledge; for the resignation must be accepted by the Pope, on whose will the accept- ance depends. Transfer, too, depends on the same fac- tor; and privation is a judiciary act which must be as- certained judicially. Hence in all these cases an official document, or at least official notice, is required. If the notice of acceptance, resignation or transfer is trans- mitted by telegraph or telephone, it must be done by persons acting in an official capacity, in other words, by the Secretariate of State. 18 Hence we believe our term (§3) "authentic notice" is a correct translation. The rest of the canon will be explained in connection with the office of vicar-general.

Deprivation
(Lat. degradatio).

A canonical penalty by which an ecclesiastic is entirely and perpetually deprived of all office, benefice, dignity, and power conferred on him by ordination; and by a special ceremony is reduced to the state of a layman, losing the privileges of the clerical state and being given over to the secular arm. Degradation, however, cannot deprive an ecclesiastic of the character conferred in ordination, nor does it dispense him from the law of celibacy and the recitation of the Breviary. Degradation is twofold: verbal, i.e. the mere sentence of degradation; and real or actual, i.e. the execution of that sentence. They are not two distinct penalties, but parts of the same canonical punishment. Degradation is a perpetual punishment, and the clergyman so punished has never any right to release from it. It differs from deposition in so far as it deprives, and always totally, of all power of orders and jurisdiction and also of the privileges of the ecclesiastical state, thus in all things subjecting the delinquent to civil authority. While a bishop, even before his consecration can inflict deposition or pronounce a sentence of verbal degradation and can reinstate those so punished, it is only a consecrated bishop who can inflict actual degradation, and only the Holy See which can reinstate ecclesiastics actually degraded.

Solemn degradation owes its origin to the military practice of thus expelling soldiers from the army; the Church adopted this institution in order to remove grievously delinquent clerics from the ecclesiastical order. The first mention of clerical degradation is found in the eighty-third Novel of Justinian; subsequently it was adopted with its external solemnities by early medieval councils as a repressive measure against heretics. It did not originally differ from deposition, and degraded ecclesiastics were still privileged and remained exclusively subject to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The laity, however, complained that churchmen, even when degraded, secured in this way impunity for their crimes. Hence, Innocent III (c. viii, Decrim. falsi, X, v, 20) made it a permanent rule that clerical offenders, after degradation, should be handed over to the secular power, to be punished according to the law of the land. Degradation cannot be inflicted except for crimes clearly designated in the law, or for any other enormous crime when deposition and excommunication have been applied in vain, and the culprit has proved incorrigible. According to the Council of Trent (Sess. XIII,c.iv, De ref.), a bishop, when inflicting degradation on a priest, must have with him six mitred abbots as associate judges, and three such prelates for the degradation of a deacon or subdeacon. If abbots cannot be had, a like number of church dignitaries of mature age, and skilled in canon law, may take their place. All these must give their vote, which is decisive, and must be unanimous for the imposition of so grave a penalty.

The ceremony of actual degradation consists chiefly in bringing before the ecclesiastical superior the culprit vested in the robes corresponding to his order; in gradually divesting him of his sacred vestments, beginning with the last he received at his ordination; finally, in surrendering him to the lay judge (who must always be present) with a plea for lenient treatment and avoidance of bloodshed. The words pronounced by the ecclesiastical superior during the ceremony, also other rubrical details, are laid down by Boniface VIII (c. Degradatio, ii, de poenis, in VI) and by the Roman Pontifical (pt. III, c.vii). Degradation is now rarely, if ever, inflicted; dismissal, with perpetual deprivation, takes its place.

For bibliography see Deposition.

.

Renunciation
(Lat. renuntiare).

A canonical term signifying the resignation of an ecclesiastical office or benefice. It may be defined as the abdication of a clerical dignity made freely and spontaneously, for just reasons, into the hands of the legitimate superior who accepts it. Generally speaking, any ecclesiastic may renounce his dignity whether his office be perpetual or temporal. To be valid, the resignation must be free, that is, not extorted by fear, or threats, or fraud. It must be made into the hands of the superior who had conferred it, that is of the pope for bishops and holders of major benefices; of the ordinary for parish priests and all incumbents of minor benefices. As to the pope himself, he may abdicate his dignity, but, as he has no earthly superior, his resignation must simply be declared canonically (see ). Before a renunciation is canonically valid, it must be accepted by the legitimate superior, for otherwise it would work great detriment to the Church. Moreover, no one is at liberty to resign his office unless he is certain of revenues for his competent support. A resignation may be absolute or conditional. The latter term is used for renunciations that are made in favour of a third person, or with reservation of a pension, or when incumbents exchange benefices. The causes for which resignations are lawful are given in verse in the "Corpus juris canonici" (cap. x, "de renunt", 1, 9);

Debilis, ignarus, male conscius, irregularis,

Quem mala plebs odit, dans scandala, cedere possit. Therefore, one may justly resign on account of ill-health, want of proper knowledge, consciousness of guilt, clerical irregularity, ill-will of the people, or scandalous behavior.

S MITH, Elements of Ecclesiastical Law, I (New York, 1895); T AUNTON, The Law of the Church (London, 1906), s. v. Resignation; S ANGUINETTI, Juris ecclesiastici institutiones (Rome, 1896).

W ILLIAM H.W. F ANNING

Vacancy
The state of being vacant, free, unoccupied: a term applied to an office or position devoid of an incumbent, as a vacant benefice, bishopric, parish, professorship, etc. Vacancies occur by the voluntary act of the incumbent or by compulsion. Generally speaking any cleric, even the pope, for just reasons may resign his office, the resignation being effective when duly accepted by the competent superior. As the pope has no superior, Celestine V, who renounced the papacy, published a special Constitution (L. I, tit. 7 in 6°) declaring that the College of Cardinals is competent to accept the formal abdication of the pope. Under certain conditions with approval of proper authority, an exchange of benefices or offices is permitted. Certain acts, licit or illicit, are equivalent to tacit renunciation, for example, when one accepts a promotion, makes a solemn religious profession, violates the canons concerning a plurality of benefices, renounces the clerical state. Under compulsion one loses his incumbency by death or removal. Some vacancies are provided for before they actually occur; for example, coadjutors may be named with the right of succession, the pope may make an appointment to go into effect at the death of the present incumbent, an exercise of the so-called jus praeventionis, at one time quite common. Removal ordinarily is a punishment, and no one should be punished without cause (sine culpa, nisi subsit causa, non est aliquis puniendus. Reg. 23 in 6°). The cause is usually, though not always, a crime committed. When removal is a penalty, the crime for which it is inflicted must be proven juridically. If the reason for dismissal be merely unfitness (causa non crimonosa), a juridical trial is not generally obligatory, though certain formalities are necessarily observed to establish the existence of sufficient warrant for removal, as well as to give the occupant an opportunity of being heard. This is particularly true of the administrative removal of parish priests or rectors in accordance with the Decree "Maxima cura" (S.C. Consist., 20 Aug., 1910). This decree permits such removal (without juridical trial) on account of insanity; inexperience or ignorance of such nature as seriously to impede a pastor in his work; deafness, blindness or other ailment, physical or mental, incapacitating a rector for a long time, unless provision can be made for a coadjutor; hatred or ill will on the part of the people, though unjust and not universal; loss of reputation among men of repute; maladministration of temporal affairs; continual neglect after one or two admonitions of parochial duties of moment; disobedience after warning of the bishop's precepts in grave matters.

Some, like removable rectors, are transferable at the will of the bishop. Care however should be taken not to transfer such persons against their will to inferior posts, as this would be considered a punishment. Vicars-general and deans lose their office by the death or resignation of the bishop or the cessation for any reason whatever of his jurisdiction. A vicar capitular or administrator of a vacant see retains his office till the papal Bulls appointing a new bishop are duly presented. No serious change of moment in the status of a diocese is permitted during an interregnum in accordance with the prohibition: Ne sede vacante aliquid innovetur (Decr. L., III, tit. 9).

In liturgy a Sunday is said to be vacant when no mention of it is made in the Office or Mass; such are the Sundays that fall on the feast or the Octave of Christmas, St. Stephen, St. John Evangelist, Holy Innocents, Epiphany or the vigil of Epiphany. Days too are liturgically vacant or free when unoccupied by a feast, privileged vigil or privileged ferial office; they are days to which no special Office is assigned.

ANDREW B. MEEHAN