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History
Borders and political authority in the Western Pamir had always been contested by imperial powers. For many decades the emirates of Kokand and later Bukhara held political authority over the region until the Western Pamir was colonized completely by Russia in 1896. Although Russia and the British empire in 1896 denominated their shared border through the Pamir, which resulted in the creation of the Wakhan corridor, other regional powers like China and Afghanistan, but also the ruling elites of Badakhshan, Bukhara, Kashgaria and Kashmir equally worked for expending their influence in the Pamir. So the Sarykol range has been demarked de-facto as Eastern border in 1894 between the Qing empire and the Russian empire. This imperial history still has relevance nowadays as it determined contemporary South-eastern borders of the autonomous region Gorno-Badakhshan.

Soviet Union
The Tajikistani Badakhshan as distinctive polity with its contemporary Western borders and the Russian designation GBAO was created only in 1925. The Soviet Orientalists' obsession with categorization of peoples led to the fixation of among others the identity category of Pamiris, or 'Mountain Tajiks' in the Soviet ethnogenesis. During the Soviet Union a lot of resources had been allocated to Gorno Badakhshan as borderland of the Soviet Union, for instance through privileged access to higher education and the construction of infrastructure like the Pamir highway in 1935, which is still remembered nowadays as a time of modernity. Therefore, people from the Pamirs used to have facilitated upwards mobility and access to political offices in the Tajik SSR. In scholarly discourse this is regarded as a measure to saveguard loyalty to state socialism of the subjects at the strategically important Soviet 'frontier'.

Since Independence
Many politically active Pamiris later joined the democratic political movement La’al-e Badakhshan during the Tajik Civil war, which demanded autonomy and democratic rule for the region. Regionalism was an important structuring factor in the Tajik Civil war, so that the Ismaili identity became a key marker of mobilization. La'al-e Badakhsan joined the United Tajik Opposition in 1997. Because of that they were subsequently targeted by the popular front, which constituted the later government and then excluded from the political sphere of independent Tajikistan.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the Ismaili development organization AKDN delivered supplies to Gorno-Badakhshan from Kyrgyzstan, which prevented the starvation of the population during the Civil war. While the AKDN itself frames this engagement as temporary measure, many of the inhabitants demand a permanent presence of humanitarian aid. Many see it as continuation from the provisioning of goods during the Soviet times. This shared experience of Soviet and Ismaili development aid together with the neglect and crackdown by the Tajik state led to people perceiving themselves as Pamiri rather than Tajik.

Whereas the government of Tajikistan celebrate the ceding of land as diplomatic victory, many Tajikistani scholars, opposition and parts of the population contest the existence of a 'dispute' alltogether, seeing Badakhshan's territory in its entirety belonging to Tajikistan. Instead, the ceding of land belong to Kuhistani Badakhshan in 2011 to China by some, especially in Gorno-Badakhshan was perceived as territorial loss and sparked anxieties about further encroachments of the Chinese state.

Political violence
The violent clashes between Tajiikistani military and the GBAO population in 2012, 2014, 2018, 2021 and in 2022 are peaks in the steady militarization of the region. Spectators assess these actions by the government to gain full political control over the formerly autonomous Gorno-Badakhshan, as well as over the informal opium trade, culminating in the assassination of several influential local leaders. This violates the Tajik peace accord.

In May 2022 Tajik government forces killed 40 civilians protesting against the torture and murdering of the youth representative Gulbiddin Ziyobekov. Many of the protestors, but also journalists and human rights activists were detained in the subsequent cover-up. Additionally the government seized properties and kidnapped even oppositional Pamiris abroad. Some human rights activists describe the situation as 'ethnic cleansing'. Genocide watch is stressing the polarization and the persecution of Pamiris through the goverment.

Demography
The population living in Gorno-Badakhshan as of 2019 is estimated at 226,900. The largest city in Gorno-Badakhshan is Khorog, with a population of 30,300 (2019 est. ); Murghab is the second largest, with about 4,000 residents.

According to the State Statistical Committee of Tajikistan, most inhabitants of Gorno-Badakhshan identify as Pamiris. The remainder of the population perceive themselves as either Kyrgyz or of other nationalities.

Most people living in the Pamir are multilingual, as different languages are used in different situations. Gorno-Badakhshan is home to a number of distinct languages and dialects of the Pamir languages group. The Pamiri language speakers represented in Gorno-Badakshan are speakers of Shughni, Rushani, Wakhi, Ishkashimi, Sarikoli, Bartangi, Khufi, Yazgulyam, and Oroshani. Vanji, formerly spoken in the Vanj River valley, became extinct in the 19th century. There is a sizable population of Kyrgyz speakers in the Murghab district. Russian and Tajik are also widely spoken throughout Gorno-Badakhshan. Many Eastern-Iranian languages spoken in Gorno-Badakhshan are on the endangered list of the UNESCO.

The majority religion in Gorno-Badakhshan is Ismaili Shi'ite and adherence to the Aga Khan is widespread. Still, there are also Sunnis Muslims in Gorno-Badakhshan. The Tablighi Jama’at, a fundamentalist Sunni missionary movement conducted da'wa in the 2000s. The government banned and persecuted this movement among others as part of their wider campaign against non-state Islam.

The Pamiris are increasingly being marginalilzed in linguistic and religious terms, as they deviate from the vision for nationhood of the Tajik state. In 2009 the year of I'mam Hanafi Islam was celebrated, but a majority of Pamiris are followers of Ismaili Shia Islam. Subsequently religious institutions had to be reregistered leaving all institution ousted not fitting the state's religious beliefs. The 2010 law on language requires all documents to be made in Tajik. This creates difficulties for the many inhabitants of Gorno Badakhshan who don't speak Tajik to access state services. Facing this marginalization Pamiris express their distinctive identity against western Tajiks along secterian lines, even though there is considerable difference in ethnicity, religion and language amongst themselves.

Transport
Even though connectivity is promoted in Gorno-Badakhshan, as the "Golden gate of Tajikistan" local traders largely do not profit from the rise of trade. Instead logistic companies and elites from Dushanbe dominate the long distance trade, as the Pamiris are increasingly excluded from central posts and have to obtain visas from Dushanbe to travel to China, which is very costly. In June 2022, after local protesters blocking the road were imprisoned, some even killed, a Chinese company started the modernization of a Pamir highway section at the cost of 200 mil. USD.