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The Tokaimura Nuclear Plant

The Tokaimura Nuclear Plant located in Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan was founded in 1966. It served as a fuel conversion company and producer of nuclear reactor fuel rods until 1999. There have been two Tokaimura nuclear accidents to date. The first accident was an explosion on 11 March 1997 at the Dōnen plant. The second accident occurred on 30 September 1999 in a JCO plant and was classified a serious criticality accident. Both incidents were due to a lack of safety culture, improper training of technicians and procedural handling errors. This facility shut down after the last incident in 1999. There are fourteen other nuclear facilities in Tokaimura employing approximately one-third of the population.

Why Nuclear Power in Tokaimura?

Nuclear power has become an important energy alternative for natural-resource poor Japan to limit dependence on imported energy. Tokaimura's location and available land space made it an ideal investment for nuclear power production. This facility was established to provide Tokaimura's electricity and nuclear fuel conversion needs. Nuclear power provides approximately 30% of Japan’s electricity today.

Foundation of Tokaimura Nuclear Plant
The Tokaimura plant was commissioned in 1966, decommissioned later and reestablished in the 1970s. It is located in the village Tokaimura approximately seventy miles from Tokyo. It served as Japan's first commercial nuclear power plant. Nearly one-third of Tokaimura’s population rely upon nuclear industry related employment. Originally, the Tokaimura plant was established as a small-scale fuel preparation plant and not associated with electricity production or manufacturing operation routines.

The Production Process for Nuclear Power at Tokaimura
The Dōnen plant served as a bitumen solidification facility, disposing of low-level radioactive waste through combining it with asphalt in drums. The second facility owned by JCO converted enriched uranium hexafluoride into uranium dioxide fuel. This served as the first step in producing nuclear reactor fuel rods for neighboring power plants.

Handling nuclear products imposes extreme risks to technicians; it requires precision and seasoned employees to safely conduct procedures. The process of combining nuclear products involves a fission process with potential to produce radiation and explosive energy. In order to produce the necessary uranium fuel, a purified chemical procedure with three crucial steps is required. The steps included feeding small batches of uranium oxide powder into a designated dissolving tank in order to produce uranyl nitrate using nitric acid. Next, the mixture is carefully transported to a specially-crafted buffer tank. The buffer tank containing the combined ingredients is specially designed to prevent fission activity from reaching criticality. In a precipitation tank, ammonia is added forming a solid product. This tank is meant to capture any remaining nuclear waste contaminants. In the final process, uranium oxide is placed in the dissolving tanks until purified, without enriching the isotopes, in a wet-process technology specialized by Japan.

The Nuclear Accidents
There have been two Tokaimura nuclear accidents at the nuclear facility at Tōkai. The first accident occurred on March 11, 1997 producing an explosion after improperly heated nuclear waste products caught on fire at the Dōnen plant. Over twenty people were exposed to radiation. The second incident on September 30, 1999 happened at the JCO plant. It was classified a serious criticality accident. The incident resulted in radiation exposure for 667 people and the death of two workers. This incident led Japanese people to question their relationship with nuclear energy.

1997 Accident
 

See also: Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation

On March 11, 1997, the first nuclear-related incident reported in Tokaimura occurred in a Dōnen (Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation) nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. It is sometimes referred to as the Dōnen accident (動燃事故, Dōnen jiko). This facility rendered nuclear fuel by-products inactive and safe to store through combination with asphalt. To render the waste ready for storage, it is heated no higher than 195 degrees. On March 11th, the waste was being processed for storage when the heat control measures failed setting the mixture on fire. Most likely due to improper extinguishing of the fire, a small explosion occurred. The explosion broke windows allowing smoke and radiation to escape into the surrounding area. Plant surveillance confirmed the windows and doors affected by the explosion had not been repaired for a few hours subjecting the surrounding area to radioactivity.

On March 12th in the early morning, Dōnen (PNC) officials confirmed at least 21 workers had been exposed to radioactivity during the incident. Dutch radio news broadcast higher numbers of workers that inhaled the contaminants. In response, officials prohibited entry to the facility and barricaded a 30,000 square foot area around the plant despite reporting no abnormal radioactivity. PNC leadership claimed normal levels of radioactivity in the area the morning of March 13th. A week after the event, meteorological officials detected unusually high levels of caesium 40 kilometers (25 miles) south-west of the plant. Aerial views over the nuclear processing plant building showed a damaged roof from the fire and explosion allowing continued external radiation exposure.

PNC management mandated workers to falsely report the chronological events leading to the fire in order to cover up lack of proper supervision. Dōnen leadership failed to immediately report the fire to the Science and Technology Agency (STA). This delay was due to their own internal investigation of the fire causing hampered immediate emergency response teams and prolonged radioactivity exposure. Dōnen facility officials initially reported a 20 percent increase of radiation levels in the area surrounding the reprocessing plant but later revealed the true percent was ten times higher than initially published. Tokaimura residents demanded criminal prosecution of PNC officials, reorganization of company leadership and closure of the plant itself. Following the public's outcry, the Dōnen nuclear fuel reprocessing plant closed until reopening in November of 2000 when it was reinstated as a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.

Later Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto criticized the delay that allowed radiation to continue to impact local areas. JCO failed to correct the improper handling procedures and substandard training of workers that created the fire and explosion. This failure led to a devastating incident two years later at a JCO plant.

1999 Accident
The second, more serious Tokaimura nuclear accident (Japanese: 東海村JCO臨界事故 Tōkai-mura JCO-rinkai-jiko) occurred on September 30, 1999 in a JCO uranium processing plant. The event was classified a criticality accident. The incident took place in a conversion building operated by JCO (formerly Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Co.) a subsidiary of Sumitomo Metal Mining Company in the village of Tōkai. It was the worst civilian nuclear radiation accident in Japan prior to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster of 2011. The incident exposed the surrounding population to hazardous nuclear radiation after the uranium mixture reached criticality. Two of the three technicians mixing fuel lost their lives. The incident was caused by lack of regulatory supervision, inadequate safety culture and improper technician training and education.

The JCO facility started to dissolve and mix high-purity enriched uranium oxide with nitric acid to produce uranyl nitrate for shipping on September 28, 1999. The highly enriched-uranium in production was improperly prepared for fuel conversion. Pressure placed upon staff to prepare uranyl nitrate for shipping lead to several errors including pouring the solution (uranium oxide in nitric acid). The technicians opted to pour the product by hand in stainless-steel buckets directly into a sedimentation tank. This process inadvertently contributed to a critical mass level incident triggering uncontrolled nuclear chain reactions over the next several hours.

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Nuclear Criticality Event Chronology

JCO facility technicians Hisashi Ouchi, Masato Shinohara, and Yutaka Yokokawa were speeding up the last few steps of the fuel/conversion process to meet shipping requirements. It was JCO's first batch of fuel for that reactor in three years; no proper qualification and training requirements were established to prepare for the process. To save processing time and convenience, the team mixed the chemicals in stainless-steel buckets. The workers followed JCO operating manual guidance in this process but were unaware it was not approved by the STA. Under correct operating procedure, uranyl nitrate would be stored inside a buffer tank and gradually pumped into the precipitation tank in 2.4 kg increments.

At around 10:35 am, the precipitation tank reached critical mass when its fill level, containing about 16 kilograms (35 pounds) of uranium, reached criticality in the tall and narrow buffer tank. The hazardous level was reached after the technicians added a seventh bucket containig aqueous uranyl nitrate and Uranium-235 to the tank. The solution added to the tank was almost seven times the legal mass limit specified by the STA.

The nuclear fuel conversion standards specified in the 1996 JCO Operating Manual dictated the proper procedures regarding dissolution of uranium oxide powder in a designated dissolution tank. The buffer tank's tall, narrow geometry was designed to hold the solution safely and to prevent criticality. In contrast, the precipitation tank had not been designed to hold unlimited quantities of this type of solution. The designed wide cylindrical shape made it favorable to criticality. The workers bypassed the buffer tanks entirely, opting to pour the uranyl nitrate directly into the precipitation tank. An uncontrolled nuclear fission began immediately. The resulting nuclear fission chain became self-sustaining emitting intense gamma and neutron radiation in the nuclear facility.

At the time of the event, Ouchi had his body draped over the tank while Shinohara stood on a platform to assist in pouring the solution. Yokokawa was sitting at a desk four meters away. All three technicians observed a blue flash (possibly Cherenkov radiation) and gamma-radiation alarms sounded. Over the next several hours the fission reaction produced continuous chain reactions.

Technicians Ouchi and Shinohara immediately experienced pain, nausea, and difficulty breathing. Mr. Ouchi received the largest radiation exposure resulting in problems with mobility, coherence and loss of consciousness. Upon the point of critical mass, large amounts of high-level gamma radiation set off alarms in the building causing the three technicians to evacuate. All three of the workers were unaware of the impact of the accident or reporting criteria. A worker in the next building became aware of the injured employees contacting emergency medical assistance; an ambulance escorted them to the nearest hospital. The fission products contaminated the fuel reprocessing building and immediately outside the nuclear facility. Emergency service workers arrived, escorting other plant workers outside of the facilities muster zones.

The next morning, workers ended the nuclear chain reaction by draining water from the surrounding cooling jacket installed on the precipitation tank. The water served as a neutron reflector. A boric acid solution was added to the precipitation tank to reduce all contents to sub-critical levels (boron selected for its neutron absorption properties).

Tokaimura Evacuation
By mid-afternoon the plant workers and surrounding residents were asked to evacuate. Five hours after the start of the criticality, evacuation commenced of some 161 people from 39 households within a 350-meter radius from the conversion building. Twelve hours after the incident, 300,000 surrounding residents of the nuclear facility were told to stay indoors and cease all agricultural production. This restriction was lifted the following afternoon. Almost 15 days later, the facility instituted protection methods with sandbags and other shielding to protect from residual gamma radiation.

Aftermath
Without an emergency plan or public communication from JCO, confusion and panic followed the event. Authorities warned not to harvest crops or drink well water. In order to ease public concerns, officials began radiation testing of residents living approximately 6 miles from the facility. Over the next 10 days, approximately 10,000 medical check-ups were conducted. Dozens of emergency workers and nearby residents were hospitalized and hundreds of thousands of others were forced to remain indoors for 24 hours. Testing confirmed 39 of the workers were exposed to the radiation. At least 667 workers, first-responders, and nearby residents were exposed to excess radiation as a result of the accident.

Ultimately the incident was classified as an “irradiation” not “contamination” accident under Level 4 on the Nuclear Event Scale. This determination labeled the situation low risk outside of the facility. The technicians and workers in the facility were measured for radiation contamination. The three technicians measured significantly higher levels of radiation than the measurement designated the maximum allowable dose (0.05 sieverts) for Japanese nuclear workers. The fatal dose of radiation is 4 Sv intravenously or 10 Sv by exposure. Many employees of the Company and local population suffered accidental radiation exposure exceeding safe levels. Over fifty plant workers tested up to 0.23 Svs and local residents up to 0.15 Svs. Fatal doses of radiation ended the lives of two technicians, Ouchi and Shinohara.

Impact on Technicians
According to the radiation testing by the STA, Ouchi was exposed to 17 Sv of radiation, Shinohara 10 Sv, and Yokokawa received 3 Svs. The two technicians who received the higher doses, Ouchi and Shinohara, died several months later.

Hisashi Ouchi, 35, was transported and treated at the University of Tokyo Hospital. Ouchi suffered serious radiation burns to most of his body, experienced severe damage to his internal organs, and had a near-zero white blood cell count. Doctors attempted to treat him with an radical cancer treatment, peripheral blood stem cell transplantation. He initially experienced increased white blood cell counts temporarily but succumbed to his other injuries shortly thereafter. The leukocytes being produced by transplanted tissues were found to have mutated by the residual radiation present in his body triggering fatal autoimmune responses. At the wishes of his family, doctors repeatedly revived Ouchi when his heart stopped. Despite their efforts, his condition deteriorated into multiple organ failure resulting from extensive radiation damage. He passed away on December 21st, 1999 following an unrecoverable cardiac arrest.

Masato Shinohara, 40, was transported to the same facility where he died on April 27, 2000 of multiple organ failure. He endured radical cancer treatment, numerous successful skin grafts, and blood transfusions via his umbilical cord (to boost stem cell count). Despite his seven month battle, he was unable to fight radiation induced infections and internal bleeding resulting in fatal lung and kidney failure.

Their supervisor, Yutaka Yokokawa, 54, received treatment from the National Institute of Radio-logical Sciences (NIRS) in Chiba. He was released three months later with minor radiation sickness. He faced negligence charges in October of 2000.

Contributors to both Accidents

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the cause of the accidents were "human error and serious breaches of safety principles". Several human errors caused the incident in 1997 including careless material handling procedures, inexperienced technicians, inadequate supervision and obsolete safety procedures on the operating floor. The company had not had any incidents for over 15 years making company employees complacent in their daily responsibilities.

The 1999 incident resulted from poor management of operation manuals, failure to qualify technicians and engineers, and improper procedures associated with handling nuclear chemicals. The lack of communication between the engineers and workers contributed to lack of reporting when the incident arose. Had the company corrected the errors after the 1997 incident; the 1999 incident would have been considerably less devastating or may not have happened.

Victim Compensation and Plant Closure
Over 600 plant workers, firemen, emergency personnel and local residents were exposed to radioactivity following the incident. In October 1999, JCO set up advisory booths to process compensation claims and inquiries of those affected. By July 2000, over 7,000 compensation claims were filed and settled. In September 2000 JCO agreed to pay $121 million in compensation to settle 6,875 claims from people exposed to radiation and affected agricultural and service businesses. All residents within 350 meters of the incident and those forced to evacuate received compensation if they agreed to not sue the company in the future.

In late March 2000, the STA cancelled JCO’s credentials for operation serving as the first Japanese plant operator to be punished by la rfor mishandling nuclear radiation. This suit was followed by the company president’s resignation. In October, six officials from JCO were charged with professional negligence derived from failure to properly train technicians and knowingly subverting safety procedures.

Resulting Legal Suits
In April 2001 six employees, including the chief of production department at the time, pleaded guilty to a charge of negligence resulting in death. Among those arrested was Yokokawa for his failure to supervise proper procedures. The JCO President also pleaded guilty on behalf of the company. During the trial, the jury learned that a 1995 JCO safety committee had approved the use of steel buckets in the procedure. Furthermore, a widely distributed but unauthorized 1996 manual recommended the use of buckets in making the solution. A STA report indicated JCO management had permitted these hazardous practices beginning in 1993 to shortcut the conversion process, even though it was contrary to approved nuclear chemical handling procedures.

As a response to the incidents, special laws were put in place stipulating operational safety procedures and quarterly inspection requirements. These inspections focused on the proper conduct of workers and leadership. This change mandated both safety education and quality assurance of all facilities and activities associated with nuclear power generation. Starting in 2000, Japan's atomic and nuclear commissions began regular investigations of facilities, expansive education regarding proper procedures, and safety culture regarding handling nuclear chemicals and waste.

Efforts to comply with emergency preparedness procedures and international guideline requirements continued. New systems were put in place for handling a similar incident with governing legislature and institutions in an effort to prevent further situations from occurring.

Japan relies heavily on imports for 80% of all energy requirements, due to this shortage, mounting pressures to produce self-sustaining energy sources remain. In 2014, the Japanese government decided to establish the "Strategic Energy Plan" naming nuclear power as an important power source that can safely stabilize and produce the energy supply and demand of the nation. This event contributed to antinuclear activist movements against production of nuclear energy in Japan. To this day, the tensions between the need for produced power outside of nonexistent natural resources and the safety of the nation’s population still remain. Advocacy for acute nuclear disease victims and eradication of nuclear related incidents has lead to several movements across the globe promoting human welfare and environmental conservation world-wide.

See also[ edit]

·       Nuclear power in Japan

·       Tōkai Nuclear Power Plant

·       Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster

·       5 yen coin

·       Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, meant to be the successor to the Tokai reprocessing Plant

References[ edit]

1.     ^ ''"Fires damage Japanese nuclear facility, Tokaimura (1997) - on Newspapers.com". Newspapers.com. Retrieved 10 August2015.''

2.     ^ ''"Japan acknowledges delays in dealing with accident at nuclear power plant, Tokaimura (1997) - on Newspapers.com". Newspapers.com. Retrieved 10 August 2015.''

3.     ^ ''"Greater radiation leak hinted - Tokaimura nuclear accident, Japan (1997) - on Newspapers.com". Newspapers.com. Retrieved 9 August 2015.''

4.     ^ ''"Timeline: Nuclear plant accidents". BBC News. 11 July 2006. Retrieved 17 March 2011.''

5.     ^ ''Charles Scanlon (30 September 2000). "Tokaimura: One year on". BBC News. Retrieved 17 March 2011.''

6.     ^ ''"Nuclear accident shakes Japan". BBC News. 30 September 1999. Retrieved 17 March 2011.''

7.     ^ Jump up to:a b c d e f Memorial University of Newfoundland: “The Tokaimura Accident (28 September 1999)” Archived 9 March 2017 at the Wayback Machine

8.     ^ Jump up to:a b c d e f g Tokaimura Criticality Accident

9.     ^ Jump up to:a b c d ''Michael E. Ryan. "The Tokaimura Accident: Nuclear Energy and Reactor Safety". Department of Chemical Engineering, University at Buffalo, SUNY. Archived from the original on 21 February 2015.''

10.  ^ Makoto Akashi, Director of Research Center for Radiation Emergency Medicine at Japan’s National Institute of Radiological Sciences: “The Medical Basis for Radiation-Accident Preparedness”, The Parthenon Publishing Group Inc., 2002, which states “All three workers saw a ‘blue flash’ and heard the gamma-radiation monitor alarm” (direct link to Google Book page). And “All three observed the Cherenkov light flash” (direct link to Google Book return).

11.  ^ International Atomic Energy Agency: “Report on the preliminary fact finding mission following the accident at the nuclear fuel processing facility in Tokaimura, Japan”, 1999 (See External links, below).

12.  ^ In The Wake of Tokaimura, Japan Rethinks its Nuclear PictureArchived 29 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine

13.  ^ ''Nagayama, Hitomi; Ooi, Jun; Tomonari, Akira; Iseki, Tohru; Arinobu, Tojo; Tani, Kenzaburo; Takahashi, Tsuneo A.; Yamashita, Naohide; Asano, Shigetaka (2002). "Severe Immune Dysfunction after Lethal Neutron Irradiation in a JCO Nuclear Facility Accident Victim". International Journal of Hematology. 76 (2): 157–164. doi:10.1007/BF02982579.''

14.  ^ ''"Tokaimura Nuclear Accident (documentary)". YouTube. Retrieved 23 November 2019.''

15.  ^ Jump up to:a b ''Smith, Sandy (24 April 2001). "JCO employees plead guilty to negligence in deaths at Japanese nuclear facility". Safety Online. Retrieved 21 May 2018.''

16.  ^ ''Schmetzer, Uli (13 October 2000). "6 Arrested In Japan's '99 Nuclear Accident". Chicago Tribune. Retrieved 21 May 2018.''

External links[ edit]
·       What Happened at Tokaimura?

·       Tokaimura Criticality Accident – What happened in Japan

·       International Atomic Energy Agency: “Report on the preliminary fact finding mission following the accident at the nuclear fuel processing facility in Tokaimura, Japan”, 1999 (9.5 MB PDF, here )

·       Criticality accident at Tokai nuclear fuel plant (Japan) Wise Uranium project Categories:

·       Nuclear accidents and incidents

·       Nuclear reprocessing sites

·       Nuclear history of Japan

·       Man-made disasters in Japan

·       Heisei period

·       1997 in Japan

·       1997 industrial disasters

·       1999 in Japan

·       1999 industrial disasters

Citations: