User:Chicagosds/Iraq Project

Grievances of the Iraqi People against the Occupation:

Lack of reconstruction, destroyed water, education, power, transportation infrastructure

Massive unemployment and structural under-employment

Cuts in food, rent and gas subsidies

Casualty counts, reports from massed attacks against cities like Fallujah and Najaf

House raids, forced quarter of soldiers, check points, daily harassment, shooting at ambulances

Iraqi prisons, torturings, killings etc.

Exploitation of oil revenues by oil companies through shared revenue contracts

Repression of civil society, attacks on unions, women’s groups, students, religious groups etc.

Occupation’s use of chemical weapons, Depleted Uranium, White Phosphorus

Non-violent resistance to the occupation

Union, women’s and student’s groups resistance to the occupation

Some information/resources on the Iraqi Left and the anti-war movement:

What's Left in Iraq? Problems of internationalism and anti-imperialism on the Left by Platypus Affiliated Society http://www.platypus1917.com

In discussion of the Iraq invasion and occupation, seldom mention is made of organizations for progressive politics in Iraq. What potential allies and colleagues exist in Iraq for the American and international Left? What have been the prospects for a Left in Iraq under the occupation, and beyond? How are the prospects for social progress affected by the spiraling violence that is taking place there, the nature of the Iraqi insurgency/resistance, and calls for the withdrawal of U.S. and other international forces? We will present and discuss various groups, political parties and labor unions, etc., that have fought for progressive social politics in Iraq, and their relation to the occupation and the political process that has issued in the present Iraqi government and state. -- Platypus (2/24/07)

"However difficult the task of grasping and confronting global capital might be, it is crucially important that a global internationalism be recovered and reformulated. . . . None of the massive demonstrations against the war featured oppositional progressive Iraqis who could provide a more nuanced and critical perspective on the Middle East, a telling political failure on the part of the Left." (Postone 2006)

"We have to note, with regret, that the Iraqi democratic forces have not received, in their difficult struggle, effective solidarity and support from international forces of the Left." (Iraqi CP 2006)

Theoretical

Moishe Postone, "History and Helplessness: Mass Mobilization and Contemporary Forms of Anticapitalism" (Public Culture 18:1, 2006)

Iraqi Leftist parties

Iraqi Communist Party

http://www.iraqcp.org/ -or- http://www.iraqcp.org/framse1/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Communist_Party

"Letter to Fraternal and Friendly Parties About the Situation in Iraq and the Position of the Iraqi Communist Party" (Jan. 2006) http://www.iraqcp.org/members3/0060125icpr.htm

"Iraqi CP at International Meeting of Workers Parties in Lisbon" (Nov. 2006) http://www.iraqcp.org/members4/0061119wzaaqw2.htm

"Challenges ahead facing Iraq at crucial crossroad point: interview with Iraqi Communist Party Central Committee member Salam Ali" (Dec. 2006) http://www.iraqcp.org/members4/0070104wa21.htm

Workers Communist Party of Iraq / Iraqi Freedom Congress

http://www.wpiraq.net/ -or- http://www.wpiraq.net/english/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Worker-Communist_Party_of_Iraq

http://www.ifcongress.com http://www.infoshop.org/wiki/index.php/Iraqi_Freedom_Congress http://www.answers.com/topic/iraqi-freedom-congress

Organization of Women's Freedom in Iraq http://equalityiniraq.com

A "third pole" in Iraqi politics | Workers' Liberty http://www.workersliberty.org/node/4160

US Labor Against the War: Issued by the Iraqi Freedom Congress http://www.uslaboragainstwar.org/article.php?id=10248

Iraqi Union Calls for a "Freedom Congress" and U.N. intervention http://www.uuiraq.org/english/168.htm

FROM BAGHDAD TO TOKYO | World War 4 Report http://ww4report.com/node/1660

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (member of Socialist International; party of Jalal Talabani, President of Iraq) http://www.puk.org http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriotic_Union_of_Kurdistan

International solidarity and journalism

US Labor Against the War Iraq: Iraqi labor Tour 2005 http://www.uslaboragainstwar.org/article.php?list=type&type=78

"Iraqi Labor Tour in U.S. Stirs Controversy" (Jul. 2005) http://www.indypressny.org/article.php3?ArticleID=2200

"Worker Unions in Iraq: an interview with Amjad Aljawhary" (Aug. 2005) http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=8595

"Iraqi Unions Defy Privatization" (Oct. 2005) http://progressive.org/node/2459/print

"Disunity Threatens Iraqi Labor's Resistance to Occupation" (Nov. 2005) http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/36/15350/printer

David Bacon (journalist) home page: http://dbacon.igc.org/Iraq/IRAQ.HTM

http://www.platypus1917.com

Personal experiences from veterans concerning the Iraqi Occupation:

Composition of the resistance: The Iraqi resistance has largely emerged from the political disenfranchisement and neglect experienced by the Sunni community after the reformation of the Iraqi government into the Iraqi Governing Council in 2003. A majority of resistance fighters have been recruited on the basis of avenging losses to their family or through an Islamist or nationalist ideology.

Instead of having a single strict command and control structure, the Sunni Iraqi resistance has used localized groups operating in a loose collaboration with a few well recognized national groups. Transnational jihadi groups such as al-Qa’ida have not solely held the ideological, religious, or material leadership of the resistance, nor have Syria, Saudi Arabia, or Iran in the same sense “directed” the insurgency. Instead the transnational jihadi groups have entered into the strategic coalition of other resistance groups and have had an enormous sectarian polarizing impact on the Iraqi political landscape.

Former Regime Elements (FREs) associated with the Ba’athist party have provided the insurgency with significant military hardware and knowledge. Many officers in the Ba’athist army walked off with their weapons after Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the army and have formed local insurgency cells. Their wealth of personal contacts and networks that allowed them to survive under Sadaam’s regime imparted a high degree of resiliency onto the insurgency. Contrary to the administration and media reports, FREs do not wish to reinstate the old regime or Sunni hegemony.

Their goals are not to resurrect the old regime but obtain a more prominent Sunni position in the new government and the removal of the US occupation. Many FREs have adopted a Salafist religious taint or have come to abandon their former avowed secularism to solidify cooperation between more Islamist oriented insurgent groups. Shia, while largely excluded from the upper ranks of the Ba’athist party occupied many lower posts with not an insignificant amount of FRE’s being Shia.

Tribal insurgents are the most numerous and the most localized groups within the insurgency. There is no typical tribal member, many Iraqis strengthened their tribal affiliations during Sadaam’s rule as he began to use the tribal structures to divide and rule the country. Some tribes have both Sunni and Shia members and tribal members’ ideological convictions run the gamut from pan-Arab secularism to pan-Islamic Salafism.

A growing number of insurgents are being recruited from Sunni Islamist circles. Islamism has many different currents; political Islamist parties work within democratic structures like the Party for Justice and Development in Morrocco or the current position of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafist tendency advocates a strict Wahabi personal code but a quietist attitude towards the governments they reside under, while the transnational jihadis advocate attacking the crusading forces wherever they have engaged those of Islam and seek to take the fight to their homelands. Disturbingly, they have initiated a program of “Iraqification” building bases among communities of Salafists in Iraq.

Moqtada al-Sadr’s militia forces, the Jaysh al-Mahdi, or Mahdi Army have been the largest Shia force engaged in the insurgency. Al-Sadr’s ascent to power in the Sadr City slums (named after his father) and in other impoverished strongholds was unanticipated by the Shia religious establishment, Iraqi exile parties, and the Occupation. He is viewed as a champion for a significant number of poor Shia, because of his resistance to the occupation, his support for sustaining a unified Iraqi state, his adherence to conservative religious mores, because of the distribution of social services and for the protection of his constituency through his militias. Below is a more detailed summary of the factions within the Iraqi insurgency. Understanding the aims and composition of the Iraqi insurgency is crucial for creating a strategy on how America can withdraw military forces and re-engage within Iraq to prevent the collapse of the country and prevent regional destabilization and war.

Salafist Community:

Salafism is a tradition in Islam that promotes a literal reading of the Quran, Sunnah and Hadiths (the recorded traditions and deeds of the Mohammad). Salafism’s namesake, Salafi, comes from as-salaf as-saliheen, the ‘pious predecessors’, usually interpreted as the Prophet and the first four Caliphs or leaders of the Islamic community, although some Salafists extend the Salaf to include selected later scholars. It is a tradition that rejects doctrinal innovations (bid’ah) that have led to different schools of Islamic jurispendence.1

The Salafist tradition is focused on missionary activity (al-dawa) and reviving purity within existing Islamic communities. It is highly individualistic, where members adhere to strict dress codes, with males having beards and women fully veiled outside of the company of their immediate family. Individuals also have to follow obscure traditions attributed to the Prophet and traditions taken from a strict Quranic interpretation such as sleeping on the ground, rejecting photography, most music and contemporary banking. Salafists can often be seen wearing the antiquated Sarwil pants that are reminiscent of those worn in the time of the Prophet.2

Salafism advances abstention from elections because it believes political parties divide the umma, or Islamic community. Conventional political activism, and even participation in groups that require devotion to leaders is shunned because it distracts its members’ attention from focusing on their personal devotion to Islam. This has pitted Salafism into a deep ideological conflict with political Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas who seek to use the state to foster Islamic culture. Democracy in Salafist discourse is criticized because it represents a departure from the rule of God, which is one of the reasons the Saudi state has embraced Salafism.3

Obedience to Muslim rulers is also a main tenet of Salafism. Revolution and insurrection against Muslim rulers is seen as prohibited from their interpretation of the Quran. Instead Salafist discontent with rulers is expressed through criticism and appeals to address grievances. Rarely are rulers singled out or mentioned by name in criticism by Salafists, and alternative political systems aren’t considered.4 Governments usually appoint Salafists to religious posts and give them authority over Islamic universities or Madrassas and to upkeep religious shrines, and also oversight over religious festivals. Saudi Arabia has been the most notorious in promoting Salafists to positions of power but numerous other regimes have kowtowed to their influence in religious affairs, from “secular” regimes like Algeria to other entrenched monarchies like Morrocco.5

Since an intimate knowledge of the Quran is essential to Salafism, adherents vigorously promote literacy and have established many schools, from kindergartens to Madrasas. All require the memorization of the Quran by students and focus specifically on religious education. Whereas most of the leaders of the political Islamist movements come from an educated middle class, like in the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, most of the “leadership” of the Salafist movement focuses on ulama, or scholars of religious texts.6

Salafism emerged as a reform current within Islam by the political activist, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and the teacher Mohammed Abduh, as an attempt to incorporate “modernist” Western influences within Islam. Originally Salafism wanted to start from the fundamentals of Islam and then begin to incorporate new ideas. After World War I and with the ascension of al-Afghani’s conservative pupil to the position of lead ideologue of the movement, Rashid Rida, Salafism took a sharp xenophobic and fundamentalist turn. Instead it advocated shedding all influences foreign to the original text of the scriptures, a position which has been prominent since Rida’s work in the 1920’s and 1930’s.7

Salafism was catapulted from small renegade groups to positions of influence by the Saudi monarchy under King Faisal. Egyptian Islamic radicals engaged in the beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood (before its reformation and renunciation of violence) like Qutb and al-Bannah were harbored by Saudi Arabia as a counterweight to Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism threatening the Monarchy. Salafism was encouraged in the Madrasas, and continues to be encouraged at institutions like the Islamic University of Imam Muhammad ibn Saud in Riyadh, the Islamic University of Medina and the Ummul Qura University in Mecca. The World Muslim League was another institution founded in 1962 in Mecca that served as a Salafism incubator and distributed Salafist texts.8

Wahabism, which had evolved separately from Salafism in the 19th century by Abd al-Wahab, influenced Salafism once the Saudi Arabian government embraced it. Wahabism influenced Salafist opinions, on Tawid (unity with God), kuffar (unbelievers) and sectarian hostility. In contemporary Salafist thought, Tawid demands one not bestow the holiness of God onto saints, people or graves, bringing it into severe conflict with the Sufi tradition of Islam, a sect that Salafists call polytheist. Similarly, Salafism has adopted the Wahabist view of Christians as Jews, as unbelievers, instead of the traditional view of Christians and Jews as fellow People of the Book. Disdain is also shown towards Shi’a who are accused of polytheism as well.9

Salafism’s ideology does not necessarily espouse violence, however. Salafists focus on individual behavior and “believe that violence should be a last resort and, if used, should be the final stage in a long process of personal transformation, purification, and self-discipline in which each Muslim should engage and which ultimately will lead to the establishment of a pure Islamic state.”10 Instead of killing unbelievers, mainstream Salafists advocate separation under non-Muslim states and influencing the leadership towards greater “Islamic” morality where the leadership is Muslim. The Salafi scholars who advise against denouncing unbelievers and killing them are known as “al-Salafiyya al-'ilmiyya – ‘the scientific or scholarly Salafiyya.’.”11

The scientific Salafiyya also promote conservative Islamic values and promote the enforcement of them when their followers have the ability to do so. This frequently occurs in the slum areas of burgeoning urban centers across the Middle East where the inhabitants are satisfied to have any order at all in their communities. Movie theatres, beauty salons, and places serving alcohol are frequent targets of Salafists where they can operate past the boundaries of the state.

Takfir, a dated concept roughly meaning excommunication, has created schisms within the Salafist community. Originally coined by the 12th century scholar Sheikh Ibn Taymiyyah, takfir was used to strip away legitimacy from the nominally Islamic Mongol invaders attacking Iraq. Since the Shi’a community of Iraq sided with the Mongols to avoid destruction, the Sunni resistors also declared them apostates as well through Takfir.12

In the 20th century, Sayyid Qutb, elaborated upon the principle of takfir and declared that the Egyptian nation had strayed away from Islam, and essentially excommunicated Nasser’s regime and anyone who collaborated with it. Following his ideology the Muslim Brotherhood and other Salafi oriented groups conducted a terrorist campaign against the regime. The campaign was essentially crushed by the Egyptian state and later the Muslim Brotherhood abandoned violence as a means to influence the political realm and began to engage in conventional party politics.

The concept of Takfir however was not crushed, and was globalized as Saudi Arabia harbored and funded the opposition against the Egyptian regime. Almost immediately after the final collapse of the efforts to overthrow the Egyptian regime, the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan and had provided an opportunity for this radical strain of Salafism to attract new followers.

Jihad in Afghanistan was in no way limited to radical Salafists who regularly excommunicated fellow Muslims (these radical Salafists who make up terrorist organizations like al-Qa’ida are referred to as warrior Salafists, or al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya). The Afghanistan Jihad was an acceptable defense against Soviet aggression across the spectrum in Muslim society, but it provided an opportunity for recruitment and growth of the al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya. Saudi Arabia funded al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya groups in Afghanistan because it had become a target itself of takfir for its pandering stance towards Israel and the United States. Veterans from the Egyptian struggle flocked to the Jihad in Afghanistan, and helped form the core of terrorist groups like al-Qa’ida. The spiritual leader of al-Qa’ida, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was a byproduct of this process. He was originally a jihadist against the Egyptian regime and during his stay in Afghanistan he met Osama Bin Laden and laid the ground work for the emergence of al-Qa’ida.13

Salafism has expanded into Iraq through a number of channels. After Saddam’s decisive defeat at the hand of the Americans in 1990, the Shi’a community of Iraq rose in rebellion. Saddam quickly crushed it with the tacit support of the Americans and then attempted to bolster his support among Sunnis through the re-Islamization of Iraqi society. Sunni Mosques received greater funding from Saddam and the enhancement of the Islamic faith campaign, the al-Hamla al-Imaniyah, began in earnest in 1999. Gambling and drinking were restricted, while Islam was emphasized in education and on media programming. Saddam publicly prayed five times a day, and even went so far as to fabricate the deathbed conversion to Islam of the Christian founder of the Ba’ath party, Michael Aflaq.14

Salafism found a foothold in the increasingly religious Iraqi society, but probably more influential to the Islamization of society then Saddam’s hollow campaign was the devastation of the secular middle class by a decade of U.S. sanctions. Before the sanctions, Iraq ranked with Greece in terms of wealth but by the time of the invasion it was around that of Burundi. State support for secular education was slashed, and while millions suffered under brutal poverty and deprivation many found solace in religion.

The draconian censorship regime of books mainly focused on political writings and was much more lenient on religious texts. Many imported texts from Saudi Arabia for religious instruction included the messages of Salafist ideologues prominent in its Madrasas. With the decreased ability of the state to provide education, Salafists were able to provide religious indoctrination through their own network of schools.15

Even considering the circumstances, the radical conservativism of Salafism was never prominent in Iraq and any Salafists who spoke against Saddam’s regime were subject to repression. Salafism never had a stronghold in Iraq, but Salafism found followers within the Sunni triangle and isolated areas within the semi-autonomous Kurdish territory.

Many of the foreign al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya passed through the Jordanian border, much like al-Zarqawi and the future cells of al-Qa’ida in Iraq. Salafism first came to Jordan at the invitation of the Hashemite Monarchy in the 1970’s, who received support from the Muslim Brotherhood against a secular Palestinian uprising. Jordan then became a hotbed of Salafist radicalism in large part due to its acceptance of around 250,000 Palestinian refugees from Kuwait. The Palestinians within the Kuwaiti kingdom largely favored the Iraqi troops over the forces of the Monarchy. Once the invasion had been repelled the kingdom had the Palestinian expelled to Jordan.

A number of impoverished Palestinian refugees adopted Salafism, with many exposed to it through exiled Egyptian radicals accepted by Kuwait, like the Islamic Group, an underground Egyptian Salafi prison group.16 One of the more notorious Palestinian Salafist personalities to come to Jordan from Kuwait was Abu Anas al Shami, who was to become al-Zarqawi’s spiritual advisor in Iraq. Another was Abu Muhamad al Maqdasi,

“Maqdasi was a self-taught Palestinian cleric living in Kuwait. Like many Palestinians who relocated to Jordan, Maqdasi had belonged to an important Kuwaiti Salafi organization called Jamiyat al Turath al Islami, or the Society of Islamic Heritage, which was characterized by a willingness to ruthlessly kill civilians.”17

Once he had arrived in Jordan after being exiled from Kuwait he began recruiting Jordanian veterans of the Afghanistan Jihad and created a jihadist organization named Tawid or Monotheism. He was quickly arrested by Jordanian police and thrown into jail. In Jordanian prisons, the Islamic prisoners were rounded together and isolated from the general prisoner population, creating a breeding ground for terrorist organizations.

It was in a Jordanian prison that Zarqawi, a native Jordanian, found a mentor in Maqdasi. The two struck a friendship quickly and while Maqdasi created the theological basis for Zarqawi’s future terrorist activities, Zaraqawi focused on recruiting other to his cause. Once released from prison, Zarqawi traveled to Afghanistan, meeting al-Qa’ida and the Taliban.

Once in Afghanistan Zarqawi criticized the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden for lack of Islamic Piety, being insufficiently devout. He also criticized Osma Bin Laden’s strategic outlook for focusing on America and Western regimes instead of attacking the nearer enemy of un-Islamic regimes in the Middle East. However, Zarqawi secured funding from al-Qa’ida and found his way into Iraq after the US attacked Afghanistan in 2001. Zarqawi then made his home with the radical group Ansar al-Islam in the northern Kurdish area, autonomous from Saddam’s rule.18

Maqdasi remained in Jordan, and after the US invasion of Iraq he began recruiting for a Jihad in Iraq. He was just recently released again from a Jordanian prison for charges of supporting terrorism, but his ideology has strayed away from Zarqawi’s and Maqdasi has even gone so far to criticize Zarqawi for killing civilians in Iraq.

The US Institute for Peace documented an illuminating story of an Iraqi Salafist leader resisting the occupation. It chronicled ‘Umar Husayn Hadid’s rise to power in the city of Fallujah, “Iraq’s city of a hundred Mosques.” ‘Umar was an electrician from a powerful tribe, albu Mahamdeh, and adopted a Salafist perspective in his teens. In his twenties, when the Ba’athist regime announced the Enhancement of the Islamic Faith campaign, he took the regime at their word and rounded up a group of friends and threatened the owners of local beauty salons and music stores. When he later bombed the only cinema in Fallujah, it was never rebuilt, but in retaliation the Ba’ath party stormed and killed his friend in his sleep. ‘Umar then assassinated the Ba’ath party official responsible and went into exile until the fall of Saddam’s regime.19

When he returned and Fallujah began to resist the occupation he assembled a force to harass US convoys with RPG fire and IEDs. With his success against the coalition, especially after the first siege of Falljuah was repelled in April 2004, his notoriety grew and many flocked to him as a symbol of resistance to the occupation. He became amicable with Zarqawi and lead an affiliated extremist group called the Black Banners brigade. During the second Fallujah siege his group was soundly defeated and ‘Umar escaped. Together, with the remnants of his group, he adopted a takfiri ideology and began to attack Shi’as and non-Muslims. Most of his tribal support was revoked however after an incident where his group killed six Shi’a drivers affiliated with his larger clan. This undercut significantly his reputation and a main base of support from his tribe, which did not support his extremist ideology.20

Salafism in Iraq remains a murky and poorly understood force. Although most Salafists advocate a quietist political attitude and refuse to engage in the practice of takfir, the Occupation’s actions have driven them to resist the insurgency. It is almost certain that an extended conflict in Iraq will radicalize the Salafist communities across the Middle East to turn to the takfir or al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya ideology, much like the Afghanistan Jihad did in the 1980’s. With an increasing number of Salafists pressured into taking arms, against both the American and Shi’a forces, exposure to other groups fighting in Iraq like al-Qa’ida is inevitable. Brutal poverty and unrelenting violence will only solidify sectarian identities and radicalize ideologies. Salafism in Iraq should be viewed, carefully, as holding the potential to become an immensely destructive and explosive force.

1 International Crisis Group, "Understanding Islamism," March 2005, 9. 2 Congressional Research Service, Christopher M. Blanchard, "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salifyya," January 25, 2006, 2. 3 International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder, Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix," September 2004, 5. 4 Interview with Salafi Sheikh Adel al- Moawda, September 9, 2006, http://www.asharqalawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=6413. 5 ICG, September 2006, 3. 6 Ibid., 3. 7 Terrorism Monitor, Trevor Stanley, "Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism," Volume III, Issue 14, July 15, 2005, 8. 8 Ibid, 9. 9 ICG, March 2005, 10. 10 CRS, January 2006, 3. 11 ICG, March 2005, 11. 12 Terrorism Monitor, Hayder Mili, "Jihad Without Rules: The Evolution of al-Takfir wa al-Hijra," Volume IVm Issue 13, June 29, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370047. 13 Ibid. 14 Le Monde Diplomatique, Faleh A Jabar, "How Saddam Keeps Power in Iraq," October 2002, http://mondediplo.com/2002/10/02saddam 15 Partick Cockburn, "The Occupation: War and Resistance in Iraq," October 2006, Verso, 150. 16 Nir Rosen, The New York Times Magazine, "Iraq's Jordanian Jihadis," February 19, 2006. 17 Nir Rosen, Truthdig, "The Many Faces of Abu Masab al-Zarqawi," June 9, 2006, http://www.truthdig.com/dig/item/20060609_abu_musab_al_zarqawi/. 18 Ibid. 19 USIP, Special Report 134, "Who are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq," April 2005, 13. 20 Ibid., 13

Transnational Jihadi Groups Foreign groups like Al-Qa’ida never have dominated the Iraqi insurgency. In actual numbers they compose less than a tenth of the insurgency.1 Jihadis from foreign groups probably never have exceeded this proportion, regardless of previous estimates by the Bush administration, due to the amount of logistics involved in maintaining foreign jihad brigades. They rely on the local population for weapons, aid in being smuggled across borders, intelligence, possibly training and food and shelter. Current estimates by internal coalition sources estimate the number of foreign fighters to be around 1,000.2

One example that clearly illustrated the small numbers of foreign fighters was the occupation’s assault on Falljuah in 2004, where after searching through the rubble and finding over 1,000 dead insurgents the vast majority were Iraqis. After the assault the coalition invented the theory that the transnational groups must have redeployed outside of the city, even though this is extremely unlikely since the jihadis would be the first insurgents to hold their ground and die fighting the “crusaders.”3

It would be a serious mistake to characterize all those who refer to the struggle against the occupation in Iraq as a Jihad as members of the transnational terrorist organizations like Ansar al-Sunnah or al-Qa’ida. There are distinct differences in ideology between Islamist movements and grouping them all under the banner of al-Qa’ida would obscure reality and limit our ability to deal with them.

All Islamists hold general agreement on the right to resist foreign powers in Islamic lands; where a jihad is called to protect against direct aggression on the Sunni umma, or people. These irredentist struggles have been most recently waged in Palestine and Afghanistan.

There is a rough breakdown of Islamists into political Islamists, Salafists and global jihadists. Predictably al-Qa’ida belongs to the latter of the three groups. Every group condones irredentist struggles against perceived non-Muslim aggression. Hamas is an example of a political Islamist tendency participating in an irredentist Jihad in Palestine. Salafists also participate in irredentist jihad’s which have a strong basis in the text of the Quran. Al-Qa’ida and related transnational jihadi groups hold a position more radical, one that endores waging jihads not only on insufficiently Muslim governments, but also on the “further enemy” or the United States, Israel, or any other country waging an attack on the Dar al-Islam or House of Islam.4

The more important transnational jihadi groups operating in Iraq are Tandhim al-Qa’ida (al-Qa’ida in Mesoptamia), Al-Sunnah and its splintered groups and Tawid al-Jihad. Many of the transnational jihadi groups are interconnected through shifting membership, sharing of funds, and transitions of leaders and ideologues.

Ansar al-Islam was the transnational jihadi group that George Bush used in his case for war against Iraq as a terrorist organization that was harbored by Hussein. The network began in August 2001 from a merger between a group named Jund al-Islam and a variety of smaller northern Iraqi jihadi groups. It is largely composed of Kurdish Sunnis and began in the mountainous region of northern Iraq.5

The group became internationalized when Abu Massab al-Zarqawi fled a Jordanian (CS Monitor) prison sentence in December and connected the militants into the transnational al-Qa’ida network.6 Between 300,000-600,000 dollars were secured from the network and the group was able to smuggle and purchase an arsenal of weapons on the Iraqi and regional black markets. The infrastructure of the group expanded to around 600 members, and military training was given to members at their northern Iraq stronghold. Indoctrination training was also given, along with extremely primitive attempts to create poison weapons from several bags of rat poison (an attempt that was greatly exaggerated for US domestic purposes).

After the invasion in March 2003, a joint US and Kurdish PUK pershmerga assault leveled the base which lead to the killing and capture of a majority of its members. In an extremely prototypical way, the surviving leadership dispersed and the group gained a powerful propaganda tool for being important enough to be attacked by the US. Numerous affiliates were formed, with the largest of the groups known as Ansar al-Sunnah claiming sixteen brigades under its command. Ansar al-Sunnah publishes two political magazines and has been recruiting from the Salafist community with calls to jihad and patriotic messages.7

Ansar al-Sunnah is as notorious as Tandim al-Qa’ida for sectarian attacks and radicalism. Both have taken full advantage of media opportunities like internet file sharing, inflammatory tape recordings, and cd and dvds recording footage of attacks and atrocities. Both groups have emerged more centralized through the insurgency, as local jihadi groups have been assimilated and new brigades have been formed from the Iraqi Salafist communities and to perform new tasks like public relations. Ansar al-Sunnah became infamous for its gruesome beheading videos. Although it was not the only group to engage in beheading attacks, it drew harsh criticism from nationalist groups and other Islamist groups after its video filming the beheading of Nepalese workers. The Muslim Scholars’ Association, largely assumed to be a voice of nationalist and Islamist insurgents, strongly condemned the attack.8

Tandhim a-Qa’ida, has received similar criticism for its targeting of “collaborators” (no resistance groups claim attacks that specifically attack civilians). The Ansar al-Sunnah and al-Qa’ida networks represent a shift in the methods and scale of jihads. Sayyid Qutib, one of the founding figures of the Muslim Brotherhood, created the theoretical foundation for targeting collaborators or those who are not sufficiently Islamic.

The doctrinal innovation was the result of Qutib’s theory that today’s historical era represented a return to pre-Islamic barbarism, represented by nationalism as opposed to pan-Islamism. He then improvised that Nasser’s government would therefore be a licit, if not obligatory target for Jihad since he was responsible for reversing God’s sovereignty in place of his own. With Sadat’s ascendancy the struggle continued and intensified, it was also argued that the nearer enemy, Sadat, had to be dealt with before the liberation of Palestine and the battle against the farther enemies, Israel and the US.9

In addition to creating a link with irredentist struggles and attacking the US, Qutib also opined that it was not only a collective duty to conduct Jihad but an individual one. This is not representative of traditional Islamic law, where jihad is not one of the fiver pillars to be followed. Jihad is traditionally seen as a collective duty, where the senior leaders of the umma, or spiritual community call for the defense of Islamic lands. Qutib was arguing that since the state of Egypt was incapable of waging Jihad to liberate Palestine (Sadat made a separate peace with Israel in 1978) that Jihad must become an individual duty. The radicalization of opinion against nationalist Arabs also led to greater rejection of Jews and Christians as People of the Book, to be protected in Islamic lands. Instead they were also thrown into the same category as Nasser and Sadat, as infidels to be combated. Osama Bin Laden’s second lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri is a radical from the Egyptian struggle against the Nasserite state and represents the heavy Qutibist influence in al-Qa’ida.

Once the doctrinal framework was laid for al-Qa’ida was laid, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan emerged, cementing the logistical aspects of the organization. Calling a jihad to defend Afghanistan was nowhere near as controversial as attacking Egypt in terms of religious law. The conflict there was as close to a “typical” jihad as one could obtain in the modern world. An atheistic power invaded Islamic lands for territorial gain and most of the fighters engaged were conservative, non-radical Arab Salafists who saw it as a spiritual obligation to come to the call of the jihad. Other nationalities also took part in the jihad, especially from Algeria and Egypt.

Though unrelated to the radical doctrinaire jihadist views advanced by Qutib, the jihad in Afghanistan set into motion the creation of al-Qa’ida. Global jihad against overwhelming force emerged as a legitimate weapon to be used by Islamists. Previously unradicalized members of the Muslim community had many difficulties reintegrating into their societies after returning from Afghanistan, which created a disaffected, veteran population that created a recruitment base for al-Qa’ida. The success of the global jihad expanded the outlook of those affiliated with Qutib’s thinking and further underlined the ability to wage jihad on the international stage, particularly on the US for its support to Israel and its occupation of areas of the Muslim world.

Al-Zarqawi, the former front man for al-Qa’ida in Iraq fled to there to help begin Ansar al-Islam after unsuccessfully waging a jihad on the Jordanian Monarchy in 2000. While in Jordan al-Zarqawi was influential in the founding of Tawid al-Jihad, another group that has transferred over to fighting the US in Iraq. Once the Ba’athist regime in Baghdad fell, al-Zarqawi began to form the network that would eventually become Tandhim al-Qa’ida, or al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia.10 In 2004, al-Zarqawi took an oath of allegiance to Osama Bin Laden, Tandhim al-Qa’ida now supposedly has 15 brigades under its command with two martyr’s brigades, one supposedly composed entirely of Iraqis.

Al-Qa’ida in Iraq has been desperately attempting to recruit from local communities and “Iraqify” itself. It has been appealing to local Salafist communities and also has undertaken an extensive communication campaign complete with websites, tapes, cds, dvds, emailing lists etc. The organization’s deputy leader is clearly from Iraq, Abdul-Rahman al-Iraqi, and Tandhim al-Qa’ida has another Iraqi on the Mujahadeen al-Shura Council, a jihadi council group, Rashid al-Baghdadi. Suicide bombers being recruited from Iraqis too, in 2005 three hotels suicide bombed by Zarqawi’s organization were all done by Iraqi members.11

Transnational groups like al-Qa’ida have entered into a loose union of convenience with other insurgent groups. Since they are all attacking the US occupation, the ideological gulfs between groups have been papered over and outright combat between the groups has been minimalized. The terrorist networks have not operated with total impunity in Iraq however. After the wave of video taped beheadings in Iraq in 2004-2005, outcry built up in Sunni communities against the tactics, which had nearly ceased by the middle of 2005. Prominent insurgent support groups like the Muslim Scholar’s Association condemned the beheadings, “Zarqawi speaks from the position of revenge. This position by Zarqawi is aimed at provoking sectarian war. If he wants a war, he should fight the occupation forces and not the innocents.” Notably, criticism from Sunni communities about attacks on the January 2005 polling places led to a steep de-escalation of threats and attacks during the December election in 2005 and the November constitutional referendum.12

The US has unsuccessfully tried to drive a wedge between the transnational groups and the other insurgent groups. Serious rifts in ideology are apparent, and competition between different armed groups for power has also occurred. Most nationalist groups still refuse to recognize the legitimacy of Tandhim al-Qa’ida and oppose its presence in their area of operation. During Fallujah’s assault, the Tandhim al-Qa’ida and other transnational jihadis were ordered to leave the Jolan suburb which served as a nationalist stronghold.13

Although the significant differences have sometimes leaded to violence, conflicts are quickly resolved, for example when Tandhim al-Qa’ida killed a Shaykh (tribal leader) of the Albu Baz tribe in Samarra it led to a confrontation between the tribe and Tandhim al-Qa’ida. which was short lived and spilled relatively little blood. Some smaller Iraqi resistance groups have even joined al-Qa’ida’s, Majils al-Shura Mujahidin, a council to further coordinate attack on the occupation.14

The Occupation’s efforts to co-opt nationalist groups have failed. Negotiations between members of the insurgency and the US have been fruitless since the beginning (The first reports from Reuters began around February 2005). A communique released in December of 2005 by the nationalist group Jaysh al-Mujahidin threatened anyone who claims to “represent” the interests of the insurgency and called for those people to come join the insurgents. The Iraqi Islamic Party has also received stinging criticism from insurgent groups for participating within the occupation government and claiming to represent the insurgents’ grievances.15 Most of the major players in the insurgency have agreed that the overriding task is to remove the US from Iraq and that political difference have little relevancy in this stage of the struggle. An International Crisis Group report also attributes some of the cooperation to the growing Salafist influence in the insurgency which essentially shuns political action and campaigning.

Tandhim al-Qa’ida and Zarqawi’s goal remains to incite chaos and sectarian struggle in Iraq. They are pursuing this strategy in order to provide more freedom of movement and generate more followers for the organization. Zarqawi has become more explicit in his rhetoric about attacking Shia, now he openly calls for a war on the Rawafidh, or unbelievers. Using Rawafidh as a pseudonym for all Shia, he legitimizes their attacks due to their supposed support to the occupation; their support of the SCIRI controlled government and Badr Corps crimes against Sunnis.

The social fabric weaving together Iraq’s Shia and Sunni confessions is being torn apart by Tandhim al-Qa’ida and its Shia counterparts in the militias. Iraq visited the edge of the abyss February 22nd 2006 when Tandhim al-Qa’ida bombed the al-Askari Mosque, igniting a week of unabated reprisal attacks that left nearly 400 dead, nearly 500 wounded and tens of shrines and mosques destroyed. Over 22,000 families, or around 137,000 emigrated in Iraq after the bombing to safer more ethnically homogenous areas.16

These mixed areas are the glue holding together the country. Sociology professor Ihsan al Hassan, estimates that of Iraq's 6.5 million married couples, 2 million are Sunni-Shia.17 However the continuing violence are forcing people to affiliate with different sectarian militias and are severely limiting travel and communication in some neighborhoods of Baghdad and other areas between sects. The Anbar province west of Baghdad received the largest influx of confessional emigrants, with over 4,200 families resettling along Sunni lines after the February bombing. Over 3,300 families have been resettled in Baghdad after the February bombings.

Continuing the current policy of physical destruction against Tandhim al-Qa’ida will not solve the problem and will only continue to polarize the Sunni community. The Occupation has “turned the corner” militarily on the transnational resistance many times. On June 6th the coalition killed Zarqawi in an air raid with significant human intelligence on his position, most likely from the Sunni community. Later in June the coalition ran an operation with over 450 home raids looking for further insurgents revealing a few weapons caches and detaining over 750 “Un-Iraqi elements.”18

June 15th marked the death of another senior leadership member of Tandhim al-Qa’ida, Mansur al-Mashhadani, and in early September Iraqi security forces detained Tandhim al-Qa’ida’s number two in command, Abu Humam or Abu Rana. In spite of the military victories won by the occupation, by late summer the usually candid US ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, admitted that “in terms of level of violence, [the death of Zarqawi] has not had any impact at this point.”19

Transnational jihadi groups are resilient and have shown their ability to reform and rebound from massive military losses inflicted by the Occupation. Ansar al-Islam reemerged as a variety of groups after the devastating air strike from US planes that left their northern Iraq stronghold flattened. Tandhim al-Qa’ida has recovered from the loss of its senior circle of leaders and remains an unwelcome fixture in Iraq. Any solution to Tandhim al-Qa’ida’s presence in Iraq must be broader than a military one, and must include honest attempts to address Sunni grievances instead of more half hearted negotiations with insurgents to focus their attention on fighting Tandhim al-Qa’ida instead of the Occupation.

1 International Crisis Group, "Insurgency in Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency," February 2006, 1. 2 Mark a. Steglia, "Why They Hate Us: Disaggregating the Iraqi Insurgency," March 2005, 64. 3 IGC, February 2006, 1. 4 International Crisis Group, "Understanding Islamism," March 2005, 6. 5 RAND Corporation, "Beyond Al-Qaeda, The Global Jihadist Movement, Part One," 2006, 140. 6 Scott Peterson, Christian Science Monitor, "The Rise and Fall of Ansar Al-Islam," October 16, 2003. 7 IGC, February 2006, 2. 8 IGC, "The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil War," February 2006, 16. 9 IGC, March 2006, 15. 10 Steglia, 64. 11 IGC, "Insurgency in Their Own Words," 13. 12 IGC, "The Next Iraqi War," 16. 13 Steglia, 68. 14 IGC, "The Next Iraqi War," 16. 15 IGC, "Insurgency in Their Own Words," 16. 16 BBC, "Iraq Violence: Facts and Figures," 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/5052138.stm 17 Newsweek International Edition, "Love in a Time of Madness," 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11677916/site/newsweek/ 18 Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraq's Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War: Democracy, Deadlock, and Death Squads, Developments in the Summer of 2006," September 2006, 45. 19 Ibid, 45.

Percentage of foreign fighters

Stated goals and tactics of resistance groups

Cooperation between cross religious/ethnic lines

US influence in Iraqi government and militias:

Problems with Iraqi elections

US direct influence with Iraqi government

US influence in state media

Composition and analysis of militias

US influence on other media, isolation inside the green zone, raids, attacks and jailing of independent media

US influence on legal system

US influence on Iraqi army, participation of militias in the government, El Salvador option, US backed Shia death squads

US influence on the economy, CPA orders, IMF restructuring, debt obligations from Sadaam era, importing foreign workers, lack of serious government investment in economy

US influence over constitution and over oil rights

Insurgency and regional responses to US withdrawal

Greater participation by Shia and Sunni militias in government and participation of non-violent means of change

Erosion of legitimacy of Al Qaeda after US withdrawal

Countering influence by Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia

Comparison of Iraq to other post colonial situations where civil war erupted: Rwanda, Sudan, Balkans, Ireland, Kenya, Algeria Analysis of alternative exit strategies:

Consequences of federalism

Iraq Study Group recommendations

US Engagement with Iraq after withdrawal:

US financing of reconstruction, US increased contributions to UN

Limited UN peacekeeping force with restricted mandate and arms

Cancellation of Sadaam era debt

New elections after withdrawal monitored by UN

Reconstruction guided through UN organizations to prevent corruption from current Iraqi forces, engagement through FAO, UNCHR, WHO, UNDP, etc.

Debunk myth of Oil for Food Scandal and other attempts to discredit UN

Engaging other nations in the region to link issues for greater progress in Iraq