User:CognitiveMMA/sandbox/Collective Social Brain Hypothesis

Following the example of integrating evolutionary and dynamical approaches, the Collective Social Brain Hypothesis posits that humans benefitted from having evolved so that some demographics (agreeable people) that are often in a position of care for the vulnerable such as children or the elderly are predisposed towards type 1 (intuitive) reasoning as applied to the rights of themselves and other vulnerable individuals or groups to social protection and resource provision, as well as applied to their decision to include outsiders into protected in-groups, and on the flip side humans also benefitted from having evolved so that some demographics (disagreeable people) that are sometimes in a position of conflict where required for protection or other purposes, are predisposed towards type 2 (rational methodical) reasoning as applied to their responsibility for social protection and resource provision as well as applied to their decision to exclude out-groups from their protection and provision.

The “social protection and inclusion/exclusion related issues” which the Collective Social Brain hypothesis apply to concern rights to social protection as well as which individuals or subgroups are considered vulnerable and should be protected by the group, and they concern responsibility to provide social protection as well as which groups one excludes from one’s individual responsibility or from the group’s responsibility to protect.

In summary the hypothesis states that humans have innate biases which cause some who tend to perceive themselves as vulnerable to prioritize rights and to believe there is nothing they as vulnerable individuals can do to deserve not to be protected (to deserve violence) and nothing they can do to deserve to have their rights to protection be removed, neither of which are the case with others they don’t see as vulnerable or is the case with those in out-groups, whom they might not assign any rights to at all since type 1 reasoning is effective at coming to consensus by dismissing or ridiculing contrary opinions. Innate biases on the other hand also cause some who see themselves as responsible for that protection, to prioritize responsibility and to believe there are plenty of things both themselves and others can do to deserve not to have their protection (to deserve violence) and to deserve to have their rights removed. Taking responsibility for protection, these individuals might adopt strategies that range anywhere from appeasement to elimination of the opposition since type 2 reasoning is less predictable. These different ways of thinking simply lead to different conclusions that can't be reconciled, regardless of discussion, which is consistent with other research. But this difference in predisposition towards one position and reasoning style or the other is mediated in small groups where there are strong social ties that ensure those who include and advocate for rights care for those who are either required or inclined to protect and provide, and so that those who protect and provide care for those who include and advocate for rights. General problem-solving ability (intelligence) in individuals requires the ability to switch between type 1 and type 2 thinking to use whichever one is optimal. General problem-solving ability at the group level (general collective intelligence) also requires this ability to switch between type 1 and type 2 thinking. Therefore this ability of small groups to switch between type 1 and type 2 thinking is a kind of general collective intelligence of the “Collective Social Brain”, which is created by the personal bonds that can tightly link small groups of the size of the small tribes (up to 150 people) that humans evolved in. Unlike other theories that suggest bias is a bug in human groups, and others theories about how this polarization evolved , this hypothesis suggests that in small groups bias is a useful feature.

A key assumption in this paper is that general problem-solving ability at the individual level, measured by the general intelligence factor (g) requires both type 1 and type 2 reasoning. Another assumption is that type 1 reasoning is required to solve uncomputable problems, which it does by intuitively recognizing patterns of solutions observed in the past, and that type 2 reasoning is necessary to solve computable ones. Another key assumption is that individual general problem-solving ability requires the ability to switch between the two, without which individuals can't reliably converge on the optimal conclusion that their intelligence has the capacity to deduce, with respect to deciding on behaviors capable of optimizing their individual well-being.

Another key assumption is that general problem-solving ability at the group level, measured by the general collective intelligence factor (c) also requires both type 1 and type 2 reasoning, but at the group level, and it requires the ability at the group level to switch between the two, without which irreconcilable polarization must exist, where this polarization prevents groups from being able to reliably converge on a single optimal conclusion, as is consistent with other research identifying an innate collective intelligence related to the Dunbar number. The “social brain hypothesis” posits that the cognitive demands of sociality at group sizes characteristic of humans during their evolutionary history, have driven the evolution of human cognition. Each individual network actually consists of a series of layers that correspond to relationships of different quality, where the quality of social ties falls off quickly as the layers of separation increase.

Defining the key distinction between the two groups as seeing rights as having greater priority with respect to individual and collective well-being than responsibility, or vice-versa, is fundamentally different than identifying one group as caring about individual and collective well-being and the other not caring, which some studies might do. Identifying either group as not caring about the collective well-being and therefore being a perspective that is inherently less valuable is fundamentally biased if it breaks the group’s ability to achieve optimal outcomes as predicted by the collective social brain hypothesis.

Implications of the Collective Social Brain Hypothesis

The collective social brain hypothesis posits that despite the fundamental difference in what is "true" depending on whether one uses type 1 (intuitive or fast) reasoning, or whether one uses type 2 (rational methodical or slow) reasoning, and despite differences in predisposition to use type 1 or type 2 reasoning when it comes to issues regarding social protection and inclusion, depending on whether the individual is agreeable or disagreeable, roups small enough to be connected by deep social bonds of caring can still reliably come to a single collective conclusion. Neither reasoning mode is wrong or right, optimal collective well-being might be attained through either reasoning mode in different contexts. However, social links between individuals in group sizes typical of the tribes humans evolved in can enable groups to prioritize collective well-being and to select whichever “truth” is most consistent with that collective well-being, or to select whatever “truth” is most consistent with avoiding a devastating loss of collective well-being, so that it is possible collectively to reliably converge on one reasoning style or the other as does an individual human brain, thereby defining a “collective social brain”.

Assuming it is true that humans evolved so that in groups some people tend to be agreeable and tend to use type 1 reasoning when it comes to issues of social protection and inclusion, and that some people tend to be disagreeable and tend to use type 2 reasoning when it comes to those same issues, a challenge then arises if type 1 and type 2 reasoning simply come to two different conclusions and cannot be reconciled. Both are needed for an individual or group to have general problem-solving ability, but that requires a means to switch between the two. The collective social brain hypothesis posits that in our evolutionary past, for some people, in particular for many women, it might have been more adaptive to be agreeable because they spent more time in group activities such as gathering, and because they did so with vulnerable children and elders in need of protection. For other people, in particular for many men, it might have been more adaptive to be disagreeable because they had to spend some time in largely solitary activities like hunting small prey, or in activities that involved conflict like war. Assume type 1 (fast or intuitive) reasoning is more effective at coming to agreement. Assume type 2 (rational methodical) reasoning is more effective at solving objectively definable problems with success criteria that don't require consensus. Anecdotally, the difference between type 1 reasoning in agreeable people and type 2 reasoning in disagreeable people is most acute with regards to issues of social protection and inclusion.

The assumption that agreeable people are predisposed towards type 1 (intuitive) reasoning particularly as applied to rights to social protection and provision as well as to inclusion of outsiders into protected in-groups, and that disagreeable people are predisposed towards type 2 (rational methodical) reasoning particularly as applied to responsibility for social protection and provision as well as exclusion of out-groups from protection and provision, might also be worded as the assumption that some demographics are predisposed to intuitively prioritize giving out rights to social protection and provision that others have to enforce and provide for, and some demographics are predisposed to rationally prioritize being selective in deciding for whom they will enforce social protection and whom they will provide for. Any individual can use type 1 or type 2 reasoning to solve any problem, but when it concerns issues surrounding social protection and provision, some will have a bias towards being agreeable, towards a focus on rights, and towards using type 1 thinking, which is better at solving problems that involve coming to a consensus. Others will have a bias towards being disagreeable, towards a focus on responsibility, and towards using type 2 thinking, which is better at calculating (solving objectively definable problems with criteria for success that one can solve alone or at least that don't require consensus). These assumptions, summarized in table 1, remain to be confirmed. Table 1: Assumptions required by the collective social brain hypothesis.

Put in a more colorful example, this assumption states that an agreeable person believes you have rights that should not be questioned, but its the disagreeable person that will actually get into the fist fight or war to secure your rights. However, before they agree to risk their lives in taking on Goliath, they might ask "what did you do ... did you have it coming?" The agreeable person finds this question offensive, firstly because they expect others to also be agreeable, and secondly because they believe all rights of the vulnerable must be protected at any cost. The disagreeable person might find it offensive to be expected to lay their lives on the line without asking this question. Since they are likely to be the one paying the cost, they might not believe limits shouldn’t be placed on the value of any particular right, or that limits should not be placed on the costs that are paid regardless of that value. The collective social brain posits that small groups containing members with deep social ties social links of care between individuals effectively provide a metric of collective well-being that enables groups to switch to whichever reasoning mode is optimal for the collective well-being of the group.

But according to the social brain hypothesis human beings can only effective manage relationships between around 150 people. This means that beyond 150 people or so the social brain hypothesis suggests that any such ties by which small groups are assumed to gain general collective problem-solving ability through the ability to switch between type 1 and type 2 reasoning at the group level, might not work. If so, it would be expected that groups become unable to adaptively switch between these two reasoning modes, where “adaptively” means in a way that improves collective well-being. As a result, group opinions are predicted to become polarized and to lose the ability to reliably converge on a consensus that is reliably adaptive rather than potentially being reliably maladaptive, as is believed by some to be the case, though others suggest polarization might be adaptive.

By definition, adaptation is a process that targets an increase in fitness. Defining collective well-being as the collective fitness of each individual to execute all of their functions, then any group decision-making processes that lack the capacity to make decisions based on what optimizes collective well-being, or any decision-making processes that lack the capacity to adapt themselves according to whatever optimizes collective well-being, are processes through which groups cannot coherently adapt. Any decisions imposed by such decision systems are then disconnected from any coherent adaptive processes and might even be constrained in ways that make them maladaptive. Since with the exception of GCI no system of decision-making existing today defines a metric for collective well-being (collective fitness to achieve all functions), then potentially no system of decision-making which exists today (again with the exception of GCI), from democratic voting, to autocratic rule, is reliably adaptive. If true, no existing decision system aside from GCI can be expected to reliably solve the problem of polarization in a way that adapts groups to improve their collective well-being.

Recognizing the existence of these reasoning styles and their fundamental incompatibility, a General Collective Intelligence platform [14] provides a collective metric for the fitness of any collective reasoning in functioning to achieve a targeted collective outcome related to the collective well-being. This metric defines a coherent sense of collective well-being that potentially enables groups to switch to whichever reasoning mode is optimal.