User:Conradfrench/Environmental politics

Lead
Original language of 'Democratic challenges' section :

"Climate change is slow relative to political cycles of leadership in electoral democracies, which impedes responses by politicians who are elected and re-elected on much shorter timescales.

In the United States, although "environmentalism" was once considered a White phenomenon, scholars have identified "pro-environment positions among Latino, African-American, and non-Hispanic white respondents," with growing environmental concern especially among Latinos. Other scholars have similarly noted that Asian Americans are strongly pro-environmental, with some variation among ethnic subgroups.

Effectively responding to global warming necessitates some form of international environmental governance to achieve shared targets related to energy consumption and environmental usage. Climate change complicates political ideology and practice, affecting conceptions of responsibility for future societies as well as economic systems. Material inequality between nations make technological solutions insufficient for climate change mitigation. Rather, political solutions can navigate the particularities of various facets of environmental crisis. Climate change mitigation strategies can be at odds with democratic priorities of prosperity, progress, and state sovereignty, and instead underscore a collective relationship with the environment.

The international political community is presently based on liberal principles that prioritize individual freedoms and capitalist systems that make quick and ambitious climate responses difficult. Interest-group liberalism is guided by individual human priorities. Groups unable to voice their self-interest, such as minorities without suffrage, or non-humans, are not included in the political compromise. Addressing environmental crises can be impeded when citizens of liberal democracies do not see environmental problems as impacting their lives, or when they lack the education to evaluate the importance of the problem. The human benefits from environmental exploitation and protection compete. Considering the implications of ecological degradation for future human generations can give environmental concerns a basis in anthropocentric liberal democratic politics.

William Ophuls posits that liberal democracies are unfit to address environmental problems, and that the prioritization of these challenges would involve a transition to more authoritarian forms of government. Others counter this by pointing to the past successes of environmental reform movements to improve water and air quality in liberal societies. In practice, environmentalism can improve democracy rather than necessitate its end, by expanding democratic participation and promoting political innovations.

The tensions between liberal democracy and environmental goals raise questions about the possible limitations of democracy (or at least democracy as we know it): in its responsiveness to subtle but large-scale problems, its ability to work from a holistic societal perspective, its aptness in coping with environmental crisis relative to other forms of government. Democracies do not have the provisions to make environmental reforms that are not mandated by voters, and many voters lack incentives or desire to demand policies that could compromise immediate prosperity. The question arises as to whether the foundation of politics is morality or practicality. A scheme that conceives of and values the environment beyond its human utility, an environmental ethics, could be crucial for democracies to respond to climate change."

Article body
Language to be added :

The roles of democracy and democratic institutions in advancing environmental policy and, in particular, climate policy are mixed, as evidenced by the variation in the environmental progress of different democratic governments. From a theoretical perspective, democratic procedures can effect meaningful reform if public support for these reforms exists, especially when compared with autocratic regimes, as the set of incentives for policymakers to legislate toward these ends in a system deriving legitimacy from the consent of the governed is substantive; for instance, given political responsiveness as a result of electoral accountability, policymakers in democratic governments have reason to consider a wide view of the public interest that incorporates the varied positions of their constituents and work to efficiently create change. On such a view, democracies will likely consider the consequential impacts to most, if not all constituents, caused by climate change. Factors like regime stability and ruler or governing official interests, too, seem better aligned for progress in a democracy; civil unrest is less likely in a state perceived as legitimate, as is graft, both of which appear likely to inhibit climate action.

In contrast, empirical evidence does show inconsistencies in the ways in which democracies address environmental problems. Though the reason for this variation is largely unclear, a number of features of democratic state organization appear to contribute to observed failures to act on climate change, among other environmental issues. Leaders may, in practice, not be motivated by a theoretical public good, but instead expend resources on resolving those policy challenges which are most visible to their electorate. Given the largely intangible nature of climate change as a problem – one that is gradual, invisible, and global – the political opportunity cost of focusing on this challenge or other less visible environmental issues may be high for electorally accountable democratic leaders.

Economic interests and outside influences may also limit the ability of democratic actors to drive meaningful environmental change. In developed democracies, businesses and other groups with economic motivations often hold considerable lobbying power and, therefore, have the ability to forestall climate or environmental progress, which are often unaligned with these groups' financial interests. In developing democracies, environmental reforms are often seen as lesser priorities, given the need for addressing more proximate public concerns, including poverty, infrastructure, and general economic development. Financial incentive can also play a role in preventing the passage of environmental policy outside of the legal realm; some evidence suggests that corruption, present in some form in a number of democratic institutions globally, erodes regulatory ability and public trust in state institutions, reducing the ability of democracies to effectively mitigate carbon emissions and other sources of pollution.

In addition, the problem of popular disinterest in advancing environmental policy presents challenges for the prospects of democratic institutions' ability to drive environmental progress. Despite growing public understanding of the threat posed by climate change, the last decade has seen considerable opposition to pro-environmental policies across broad coalitions and around the globe. Populist movements in Western democracies over the last several years, in particular, have taken positions that actively oppose such policies, and analyses of deliberative modes of participatory democracy have shown results that mirror the interests of those participating and do not necessarily tend towards a more favorable view of environmental or climate action. As redress to these potential shortcomings, means of reforming democratic processes, both theoretical and pragmatic, to correct for what may be short-sighted political interests have been suggested, though these reforms may reduce democratic choice or participation.

Questions of environmental justice, too, may be unanswered by democratic decision-making processes. Not only are those minority groups without meaningful representation in either single-member districts or majority-rule electorates disadvantaged in the realm of political interests, but these same groups are often those most impacted by the effects of climate change and other environmental problems. In addition, recent literature around non-human representation has investigated the ways in which the interests of affected conscious agents, which are definitionally uninvolved in the political decisions of human society, are consistently underrepresented; solutions accounting for this disparity often appeal to reforms that would reduce democratic choice from a traditional perspective, including by giving biological experts greater say in policymaking, though even their ability to determine the interests of non-humans is uncertain. On a global scale, those most impacted by the effects of climate change may have little say in determining policies that would curb emissions or otherwise work to adapt to climate outcomes. Not only do individuals only have the ability to determine climate policy in their own state, but those states that emit the least atmospheric carbon are often most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, while those that emit the most are often least vulnerable, a discrepancy unaccounted for by democratic processes.