User:Corner8/Sandbox

Excerpt borrowed without permission from Charles D. Smith's Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, A History with Documents, 5th edition, (2004 Bedford/St. Martin's) pps. 190-91,204-05.
"Although significant, the U.N. vote in favor of partition did not guarantee the creation of a Jewish state. During the six-month period leading up to Ben-Gurion's declaration of statehood on May 14, the international community was in disarray. United States policymakers were uncertain about the wisdom of their vote and whether partition should be replaced by a U.N. trusteeship. Truman seems to have fluctuated according to the intensity of the advice given him and the direction from which it came. Much depended on the ability of the Jewish commmunity in Palestine to achieve its goals for itself in the face of Arab resistance and a British policy of 'masterly inactivity' designed primarily to lessen the number of its own casualties.

On the Arab side, various plans had been prepared for mobilization if the United Nations approved partition. The mufti, still in Egypt, was determined to control the Palestinian Arab resistance and any aid offered by the Arab states. His forces were led by Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, the son of Musa Kazim, the former mayor of Jerusalem (59). In addition, there were Arab volunteers, mostly non-Palestinians, led by Faqzi al-Qawuqji and funded by the Arab League. Both al-Husayni and al-Qawuqji were veterans of the Arab Revolt of 1936-39, but they were rivals backed by groups deeply suspicious of one another. The mufti demanded control over all funds to ensure that the fate of Palestine remain in Palestinian, most specifically his, hands. The Arab League's refusal to provide loans to him to finance resistance or to agree to create a Palestinian government-in-exile confirmed to him that Arab leaders wished to decide the fate of Palestine. Egypt alone came to the mufti's aid, not so much out of loyalty to Haji Amin as out of suspicion of Abdullah of Jordan's motives in wishing to absorb Jerusalem and central Palestine. Indeed, research on the subject supports the view that Abdullah had reached agreement with the Zionists on a division of Palestine with a view to blocking the possibility of a Palestinian entity. Britain, though hesitant, finally agreed with this objective in order to preserve influence in the area and to undermine pan-Arab aspirations. (60)"