User:Cplakidas/Sandbox/Byzantine-Arab1

"[Byzantium] was the only truly ancient, highly developed, and organized enemy confronting the caliphate" under the Umayyads and their first strategic priority.

9Until the reign of 'Umar II, the Byzantine front had generally been the pre-eminent war theater for the Umayyadcaliphate, both because Byzantium was the largest and probably the richest and most powerful state bordering thecaliphate and because the Byzantine border fronted directly on the Umayyads' metropolitan province of Syria.1 Afterthe catastrophe of the failed second siege of Constantinople of 98-99/717-18, however, the Umayyads for the timebeing abandoned any hopes they may have had of conquering the Byzantines and directed most of their energieselsewhere.118: Thisremained true even when the advocates of expansion came back to power under Yazid

Byzantine retrenchment in Asia Minor: a new strategy
The remaining Byzantine territory in Asia Minor was still threatened by regular Arab invasions, ranging from full-scale expeditions organized by the Caliphs and their governors to smaller, locally-organized raids for booty. Following its successive failures of its armies against the Arabs, however, the Byzantine Empire adopted a new strategy: relying on the protection offered by the natural barriers and with the seat of government secure behind the Walls of Constantinople, the Byzantines abandoned offensive operations and turned to a passive defence, to which they stuck—with the exception of the brief and disastrous attempt of Justinian II to renew offensive warfare in 693—for the next century.

Henceforth, the Byzantine military became pre-occupied with surviving and minimizing the damage caused by the frequent Muslim raids, rather than trying to stop them or engage in retaliatory campaigns of its own. A "deliberate policy of avoidance" of any open battle with the Arabs was adopted, and guerilla warfare employed to harass the Muslim raiders and limit their pillaging. In addition, the nature of the Arab threat, with almost constant raids by highly motivated, rapidly moving and hard-hitting forces, necessitated a far more localized response. As a result, the remnants of the old field armies, the instruments of centrally coordinated offensive warfare, were "scattered among local strongpoints and walled towns or cities, able only slowly to unite and confront invaders as they entered imperial territory". As Haldon and Kennedy write, the Byzantine forces "must have been considerably affected by the decline in population and by the bad communications promoted by the nature of the Arab attacks [...], which took the form of a more or less constant harassment of the defensive forces of the empire and the civil population. Such widely dispersed but frequent attacks overloaded by far the defensive capacity of the available forces: when cities and fortresses had been adequately garrisoned there were few troops left over for offensive operations." Although the Byzantines were still capable of launching offensive campaigns, as demonstrated at in the 680s, the assembly of forces took considerable time and required extensive advance planning.

On the other hand, although Asia Minor was subject to the depredations of the Muslim armies, the Byzantine strategy also meant that "the Muslims were made to fight far from their bases, on terrain and on terms usually of the Byzantines' own choosing" (Blankinship), and any large-scale invasion of Asia Minor soon ran into considerable logistical difficulties.

Both Muslim and Greek historians make it abundantly clearthat the first cause of the Muslims' failure in the great siege of 717-718 was logistical. They were simply too far from their bases to maintain solarge a force.42 As a result, their supplies ran short and they starved. Then, the distance from their bases workedagainst them again in another way: it was much farther to escape. This caused the substantial destruction of theexpedition.43One other factor that strongly favored the Byzantines was their navy, which was always present in some force.Although the Muslim fleet at Constantinople seems to have been larger, possibly much larger,44 it was operating toofar from its bases. Again, it was the Byzantines who could choose the site of the combat and could operate from portsall around Anatolia.

Birth of the Muslim navy, raids in Asia Minor and the Muslim Civil War: 640–661
It is not clear when the first Muslim raid into Asia Minor took place. Michael the Syrian records that it happened as early as 640, was commanded by the future caliph Mu'awiya and reached all the way to Euchaita in the Pontus; Ibn al Athir records that the first such attack occurred in 641, attacked the fortress of Zanda and raided the just beyond the Taurus passes before returning. A couple of years of peace followed, as the Arabs were preoccupied with their conquests in the East and in Egypt. In 643, Mu'awiya led 10,000 men into Asia Minor, and in the next year he reached as far as Amorium. In 646, Mu'awiya managed to catch the Byzantines off guard: the border defences were largely unmanned and were occupied by Arab troops for the expedition's duration. Caesarea in Cappadocia capitulated before the Arabs, who advanced again up to Amorium, which this time withstood their attacks. In 647/648, Yazid ibn al-Chur raided Cilicia, destroying fortresses. In the next year, Habib ibn Maslama raided Cilicia and Isauria, and Mu'awiya led the newly constructed Arab fleet to an attack against Cyprus. The island was occupied, and on his return, Mu'awiya attempted, without success, to capture the island fortress of Arados off the Syrian coast. The fortress fell however in the next year. At the same time, Busr ibn Abu Arta raided Isauria and returned with 5,000 prisoners. Constans II requested a truce of two to three years, in exchange for an annual payment of tribute and the surrender of hostages. Mu'awiya eagerly accepted, as this allowed him to concentrate on the expansion of his navy free from Byzantine attacks.

Despite the truce, two raids are recorded for 651/652: Baladhuri reports that Mu'awiya led a raid that reached as far as Dorylaion, and on his return he razed the fortresses between Mopsuestia and Antioch, while Ibn Wadhih records that Abdallah ibn Sa'd attacked Zanda. After the expiration of the truce, Mu'awiya led his fleet in an attack against Rhodes. The island was captured, while a detachment under Abu'l 'Awar took Kos and raided Crete. On land, the Arabs captured Ancyra. In Armenia, the local population, tired of Byzantine administration and facing Arab attacks, resolved to surrender the country to the Arabs. Constans at the head of his army reimposed Byzantine authority, but as soon as he was gone the Armenians rebelled and evicted the Byzantine garrisons.

In 655, the Byzantine fleet scored a success burning down a part of Mu'awiya's navy in Tripolis, but shortly after, the Byzantines, led by the Emperor himself, suffered a crushing defeat by the Arab navy at the Battle of the Masts. In the same year, Mu'awiya led a land campaign against Cappadocian Caesarea, but failed to take it. Following the murder of Caliph Uthman and the outbreak of the First Muslim Civil War, Arab attacks against Byzantium stopped. In 659, Mu'awiya even concluded a truce with Byzantium including payment of tribute to the Empire. Constans used the breathing space to try and reassert his authority in the Balkans. He campaigned against the sclaviniae there and subdued several of them. Many Slavs were taken prisoners and resettled in Asia Minor.

Muawiyah's assault on Constantinople, 661–678
(include also raids against Sicily from Theophanes) The peace lasted until the end of the Muslim civil war in 661, from which Muawiyah and his clan emerged victorious, establishing the Umayyad Caliphate. In the very same year, Habib ibn Maslamah retook Armenia. In the next year, al-Tabari reports a major Arab victory and the death of several Byzantine generals, but this is not corroborated elsewhere. In 663, Busr ibn Abu Arta led the invasion into Asia Minor, where he also spent the winter. In 664, Busr led a fleet operation against Byzantium, while Abd al-Rahman ibn Khalid led the land invasion against Koloneia in Cappadocia. He too wintered on Byzantine soil. Abd al-Rahman led the 665 invasion as well, raiding Pisidia and wintering there. 5,000 Slavs, resettled thee by Constans, went over to the Arabs, who settled them in Syria.

The Arabs wintered on Byzantine soil in 666 as well as in 667, when Asia Minor was targeted by two invasions, led by Malik ibn Hubayra and Abu Abd al-Rahman. In the next year, Abdallah ibn Qays led a summer raid, while at sea, the Egyptian fleet (under Ibn Hubayra) and the Syrian fleet (under al-Mundhir ibn Zubair) raided Byzantine coasts. In the same year, the Arabs sent aid to Saborios, the strategos of the Armeniacs, who had rebelled and proclaimed himself emperor. The Arab troops, under Fudhala ibn Ubayd, came too late to assist the rebel, who died after falling from his horse, but spent the winter in the Hexapolis around Melitene awaiting reinforcements. In spring, after receiving additional troops, Fudhala entered Asia Minor and advanced as far as Chalcedon, on the Asian shore of the Bosporus across from Constantinople. The Arab attacks on the town were repelled, and the Arab army was decimated by famine and disease. Muawiyah dispatched another army, led by his son (and future Caliph) Yazid, to Fudhala's aid. Accounts of what followed differ. Theophanes reports that the Arabs remained before Chalcedon for a while before returning to Syria, and that on their way they captured and garrisoned Amorium (which was retaken by the Byzantines during winter). The Arab sources on the other hand report that the Muslims crossed over into Europe and launched an unsuccessful attack on Constantinople itself, before returning to Syria. Given the lack of any mention of such an assault in Byzantine sources, it is most probable that the Arab chroniclers–taking account of Yazid's presence and the fact that Chalcedon is a suburb of Constantinople–"upgraded" the attack on Chalcedon to an attack on the Byzantine capital itself.

and the fact that Chalcedon is a suburb of Constantinople–hence lending the capital's, it is most likely that THeophanes' account is correct

Umayr ibn al-Hubab al-Sulami played an instrumental role in the Umayyad capture of an Armenian fortress known as "Ḥiṣn Kamkh" (Kamacha) in 678. He acquired fame during this operation, with al-Baladhuri writing: "... Umair ibn al-Hubab as-Sulami, who climbed the wall [of the fortress] and kept struggling single-handed until the Greeks [Byzantines] gave way and the Moslems climbed up. Thus the reduction of Kamkh was due to Umair ibn al-Hubab and was the thing in which he boasted and others boasted for him. — Al-Baladhuri"

On Arab and Byzantine strategy in 660-680, cf Lilie (1976), pp. 83–96

The peace of 679–692 and the Second Muslim Civil War
The attack on Constantinople was a momentous event. It marked the culmination of Muawiyah's campaign of attrition, pursued steadily since 661. Immense resources were poured into the indertaking, including the creation of a huge fleet. Its failure had similarly important repercussions, and represented a major blow on the Caliph's prestige. As both sides needed time to lick their wounds, negotiations began for a truce, with embassies exchanged between the two courts. These were drawn out until 679, giving the Arabs time for a last raid into Asia Minor under 'Amr ibn Murra, perhaps intended to put pressure on the Byzantines. The peace treaty, of a nominal 30-year duration, provided that the Caliph would pay an annual tribute of 3,000 nomismata, 50 horses and 50 slaves. The Arab garrisons were withdrawn from their bases on the Byzantine coastlands, including Rhodes. Al-Tabari mentions a raid under Malikh ibn Abd Allah into Isauria,, but according to Lilie this could merely be a confusion with the withdrawing of the last Arab garrisons.

Constantine IV used the peace to proceed against the mounting Bulgar menace in the Balkans, but his huge army, comprising all the available forces of the Empire, was decisively beaten, opening the way for the establishment of a Bulgar state in the northeastern Balkans. In the Muslim world, after the death of Muawiyah in 680, the various forces of opposition within the Caliphate manifested themselves. In 683, Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr proclaimed himself rival Caliph in Mecca and brought much of Iraq under his control, while Syria, the main pillar of the Umayyad regime, was also riven by a short civil war raged within the Umayyad clan itself, from which Marwan I finally emerged as the victor. It was fortunate for the Umayyads that Ibn al-Zubayr's control of Iraq was challenged by yet another rebellion, that of al-Mukhtar, which tied down the province's resources. The Caliphate's fivision during this Second Muslim Civil War allowed Byzantium to achieve not only peace, but also a position of predominance on its eastern frontier. The Byzantines were able to use the Muslim dissension to extort enormous amounts of tribute, as well as territorial concessions, from the caliphal government at Damascus. In 685, Constantine IV led his army to Mopsuestia in Cilicia, and made preparations for crossing the border into Syria, where the Mardaites were already causing considerable trouble. The Umayyad Caliph, Marwan's son Abd al-Malik, whose reach was reduced to only parts of Syria at this time, was anxious to avoid a war with the Byzantines as well. Thus he concluded a treaty whereby he obligated himself to pay a tribute of 1,000 nomismata, a horse and a slave for every day.

Under Justinian II, who acceeded in 685, the Byzantines became more aggresive, although at first they kept the peace. Instead, the Empire used the Mardaites to exert pressure on the Muslims: their depredations extended througout Syria and reached a height with their short-lived capture of Antioch in 688. Justinian also launched a few naval raids on the Syrian coast, and demonstratively gathered troops on the border with Syria. Abd al-Malik's position was even weaker now, since forces loyal to Ibn al-Zubayr had suppressed Mukhtar's revolt, and he was forced to renew negotiations with Byzantium. According to Theophanes the Confessor, the agreement of 685 was expanded upon, with Byzantium and the Umayyads establishing a condominium over Cyprus, Armenia and Caucasian Iberia, whose revenue was to be shared between the two states. In exchange, Byzantium undertook to resettle the Mardaites in its own territory. Michael the Syrian however mentions that Armenia and Azerbaijan were to come under full Byzantine control. In reality, as the latter regions were not under the Umayyad government's control at all, the agreement probably indicates a carte blanche by Abd al-Malik to the Byzantines to proceed against the forces of Ibn al-Zubayr there. This arrangement suited both sides: Abd al-Malik would weaken his opponent's forces, and the Byzantines would gain territory and reduce the power of the side that was appearing to be winning the Muslim civil war. Consequently, the general Leontios was sent east, subduing Armenia, Iberia, Caucasian Albania, Boukania and parts of Media Atropatene. Enormous plunder was seized, which was sent back to Constantinople. Justinian's agreement to withdraw the Mardaites has been criticised, already in Byzantine times by Theophanes, as destroying Byzantium's "brazen wall" in Syria and opeing the way for Muslim invasions. REFERENCES However, only a part—some 12,000—of the Mardaites were resettled in Byzantium, where they proved excellent sailors and marines, and the rest remained behind, only submitting to the Caliphate in the reign of al-Walid I (r. 705–715). Their chief effect on the Arab raids seems to have been the disruption of the Umayyad supply lines and the necessity of permanently keeping troops on standby to guard against their raids.

Renewed warfare and the second Arab siege of Constantinople, 693–718
Given the enormous advantages secured by the treaty of 688/689, Justinian's decision to resume hostilities in 693 has been much criticized, already by Byzantine historians like Theophanes and Patriarch Nikephoros. Justinian was probably driven to this step by his own youth and self-confidence, bolstered by the successes of the previous years, as well as by confidence in his new Slavic troops. At the same time, he was undoubtedly aware that the treaty's provisions would not be honoured by Damascus any longer than was absolutely necessary, especially as the Umayyad government was gaining the upper hand in the civil war. As historian Mark Whittow comments, it is indicative of the atmosphere in the Byzantine court at the time that the contemporary Byzantine records strike a triumphalist tone, with documents such as the Apocalypse of Pseudo-Methodios possibly indicating expectations for the reconquest of the lost eastern provinces.

The ostensible reason for the breaking of the peace agreement was Justinain's desire to resettle the population of Cyprus in the Empire, as well as his refusal to accept payment of the tribute in Abd al-Malik's new dinars instead of the Byzantine nomisma. Abd al-Malik's position was still fragile; a defeat against the Byzantines would have meant a relapse into civil war, especially in recently subdued, but not yet pacified, Iraq. He therefore at first resorted to negotiations, and when these met Justinian's refusal, he launched an invasion of Byzantine territory, seeking a decisive battle. The Byzantines, led by Leontios and with a large contingent of Slavs, met the Umayyads at the Battle of Sebastopolis. The battle resulted in a rout for the Byzantines, chiefly due to the defection of the Slavs. The Byzantines tried to recover the situation by attacking in 694 in the direction of Germanikeia and Antioch, but were again defeated. Armenia thereupon reverted to Arab rule, and the path lay open for the resumption of Arab attacks into Asia Minor, which would culminate in the great Second Arab Siege of Constantinople in 717–718.

This time, it was the Arabs who profited from their enemy's internal troubles, as the deposition of Justinian II by Leontios in 695 ushered in 22 years of instability, in which the Byzantine throne changed hands seven times in violent revolutions. Nevertheless, as Warren Treadgold comments, "the Arab attacks would in any case have intensified after the end of their own civil war [...] With far more men, land and wealth than Byzantium, the Arabs had begun to concentrate all their strength against it." For all their superiority, on the other hand, the Arabs were unable to duplicate the deep expeditions into Asia Minor of Mu'awiya's armies a generation before. Arab attacks were now mostly confined to the borderlands of especially Cilicia and Fourth Armenia. According to R.-J. Lilie, the Arabs pursued a deliberate strategy of slowly grinding down the Byzantine border defences to open the way for a campaign against Constantinople on the one hand, or at least incorporating them into the Caliphate on the other.

In 695, Yahya ibn al-Chakham and Muhammad ibn Marwan led raids in the region of Melitene and Fourth Armenia and captured many prisoners. Melitene was targeted again in the next year, by Abd al-Malik's son Walid (the future Walid I). A naval raid also took place, while further north, the province of Lazica was surrendered to the Muslims by its governor, Sergius. In 697, Yahya ibn Abd al-Malik raided Byzantine territory in the east, while in the west, the Arabs finally captured Carthage. A Byzantine expeditionary force was dispatched and recovered the city for a while, but was finally evicted in early 698. On its return home the fleet rebelled, deposed Leontios and installed the admiral Apsimar as Tiberius III on the throne. Tiberius appointed his brother Heraclius as commander-in-chief of the Byzantine armies, who led a successful raid into the Caliphate's frontier zone, defeating the garrison of Antioch in battle. Heraclius was however unable to oppose Walid's counter-raid in 699, or to prevent the capture of Theodosiopolis (Ar. Qaliqala) in Armenia by Abdallah ibn Abd al-Malik in 700. In 701, Muhammad ibn Marwan campaigned against Armenia and seized it. The Byzantines retaliated by crossing the mountain passes and advancing as far as Samosata. After taking great booty and many prisoners, they returned to Asia Minor. In 702, Abdallah ibn Abd al-Malik besieged the fortress of Taranton without success, but in the next year, returning from the fruitless siege, he took and garrisoned Mopsuestia, which became the first permanent Arab stronghold in Cilicia. For the time being, its function was more defensive, i.e. to block any Byzantine advances towards Antioch. In the same year, Baanes Heptadaimon, the Byzantine governor of Fourth Armenia, surrendered his province to the Arabs, but in the next year a large-scale Armenian revolt broke out. The rebels requested and received Byzantine aid, but Muhammad ibn Marwan soon suppressed the uprising brutally. At the same time, the Byzantines under Heraclius scored a significant victory in Cilicia, defeating an army under Yazid ibn Jubair that was besieging Sision. According to Theophanes, the Arab army was destroyed, losing more than 12,000 dead and prisoners.

In 705, Maslama ibn Abd al-Malik, widely celebrated for his campaigns against Byzantium over the next three decades, made his first appearance on the Byzantine front, capturing two forts. In the next year, an Arab army under Maimun al-Gurgumani ("the Mardaite") marched against Tyana, but failed to take the city, while the defenders managed to trap and annihilate a detachment of the Arab army, killing Maimun himself. In another expedition under Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik, the Umayyads captured four minor fortresses. In 707, the Arabs launched a large-scale operation as retaliation for the death of Maimun: Maslama and his nephew al-Abbas ibn al-Walid led a large army against Tyana. The city withstood a long siege that lasted into spring 708, and only when a hastily assembled relief force was defeated, did the inhabitants capitulate. In the aftermath of their victory, the two Arab generals divided their army and raided independently, Abbas marching into Cilicia and then penetrating as far as Dorylaion, while Maslama raided Cappadocia, took a few border fortresses, and finally forced the Mardaites to submit to the Caliphate. In the next year, two Arab raids are recorded, one under Walid's son Abd al-Aziz, of which is only reported that he took a fortress, and another under Maslama and Abbas against Isauria, where they took five fortresses. The Byzantines, however, scored a victory at sea, raiding the Egyptian port of Damietta and taking the Arab admiral Khalid ibn Keisan captive. Abd al-Aziz led the invasion in 710, but nothing specific is known about it. In 711, Maslama and one of Walid's sons raided Byzantine territory and took three fortresses. In the same year, the fortress of Kamacha on the Upper Euphrates fell to the Arabs, and the inhabitants of Sision (Ar. Susana) abandoned their city and migrated further west—according to Baladhuri, they were resettled along the Taurus Mountains. This event shows the success of the Arabs' gradual encroachment in the Byzantine frontier zone, where more and more Byzantine strongholds were being lost, and the Byzantine attempt to form or strengthen another line of defence further west, along the Taurus range.

Indeed, from 712 on Arab invasions reached deeper and deeper into Byzantine territory, and Byzantine resistance seems to have almost collapsed. Thus in 712 Maslama and Abbas captured Amaseia and Mistheia, an army under Marwan ibn al-Walid reached Gangra, and three further frontier fortresses around Melitene fell to the Arabs. The new Emperor, Philippikos Bardanes, tried to strengthen the frontier around Melitene by introducing Armenian settlers there, but to no avail. In 713, Abbas took Antioch in Pisidia, Yazid ibn Abu Habsha raided Isauria, while Abd al-Aziz besieged and captured the fortress of Gazelon, one of the forts taken by Maslama in the previous year, which had been recaptured by the Byzantines. In 714, Abbas raided the Taurus frontier zone and captured three fortresses, among them Heraclea Cybistra, while Maslama launched an invasion through Armenia Minor into Galatia. The Byzantines scored a minor success by defeating an isolated detachment of 1,000 men, but were unable to prevent the Arabs from retuning home with many prisoners and plunder. The Arab general Bishr ibn al-Walid and his troops even wintered on Byzantine soil.

These Arab successes opened the way for a second assault on Constantinople, an undertaking already initiated under Walid but carried out under his successor Sulayman. Arab preparations, especially the construction of a large fleet, did not go unnoticed by the worried Byzantines. Emperor Anastasius III sent an embassy to Damascus under David of Sinope, ostensibly in order to plea for peace, but in reality in order to spy out the Arabs. Anastasius also began to prepare for the inevitable siege: the fortifications of Constantinople were repaired, food stores were brought into the city, and the surplus population evacuated. Anastasius also strengthened his navy, but in 715 the fleet rebelled at Rhodes and, supported by the soldiers of the Opsician Theme, declared a former tax collector emperor as Theodosios III. After brief resistance, Anastasius resigned the throne and retired as a monk. The accession of Theodosios, who by all accounts was both unwilling and incapable, as a puppet emperor of the Opsicians provoked the reaction of the other themes, especially the Anatolics and the Armeniacs. As Byzantium descended into near-civil war conditions, the Arabs began their carefully prepared advance: in summer 716, the general Sulayman led his forces into Asia Minor and the Umayyad fleet under Umar ibn Hubayra set sail along the coasts, while Maslama, as the commander-in-chief, awaited developments with the main army in Syria.

Stabilization of the frontier, raids and the rise of Iconoclasm, 718–750
Following the failure to capture Constantinople in 717–718, the Umayyads for a time diverted their attention elsewhere, allowing the Byzantines to take to the offensive, making some gains in Armenia. From 720/721 however the Arab armies resumed their expeditions against Byzantine Anatolia, although now they were no longer aimed at conquest, but rather large-scale raids, plundering and devastating the countryside and only occasionally attacking forts or major settlements. Thus, under the late Umayyad and early Abbasid caliphs, the frontier between Byzantium and the Caliphate became stabilized along the line of the Taurus-Antitaurus mountain ranges. On the Arab side, Cilicia was permanently occupied and its deserted cities, such as Adana, Mopsuestia (al-Massisa) and, most importantly, Tarsus, were refortified and resettled under Salih ibn Ali. Likewise, in Upper Mesopotamia, places like Germanikeia (Mar'ash), Hadath and Melitene (Malatya) became major military centers. These two regions came to form the two halves of a new fortified frontier zone, the thughur.

Both the Umayyads and later the Abbasids continued to regard the annual expeditions against the Caliphate's "traditional enemy" as an integral part of the continuing jihad, and they quickly became organized in a regular fashion: one to two summer expeditions (pl. ṣawā'if, sing. ṣā'ifa) sometimes accompanied by a naval attack and/or followed by winter expeditions (shawātī). The summer expeditions were usually two separate attacks, the "expedition of the left" (al-ṣā'ifa al-yusrā/al-ṣughrā) launched from the Cilician thughur and consisting mostly of Syrian troops, and the usually larger "expedition of the right" (al-ṣā'ifa al-yumnā/al-kubrā) launched from Malatya and composed of Mesopotamian troops. The raids were also largely confined to the borderlands and the central Anatolian plateau, and only rarely reached the peripheral coastlands, which the Byzantines fortified heavily. In the Abbasid era, the Byzantine front was the only one where the caliphs campaigned in person. As the Islamic scholar Hugh N. Kennedy comments, these expeditions aimed not only at plunder and seizing prisoners, but also fulfilled a political and religious objective: they "should probably be compared with the leading of the Hajj as a symbolic affirmation of the caliph’s importance in the life of the Islamic community".

The Arab raids were largely confined to the borderlands and the central plateau, which were systematically devastated, and only rarely reached the peripheral coastlands. Nevertheless, Asia Minor suffered great devastation from constant raiding. The region, which until Late Antiquity had been highly urbanized, now became a largely agricultural area, as constant attacks during the 7th and 8th centuries led to the destruction, abandonment or reduction of the ancient cities to their fortified cores. Only those sites that remained centres of state or ecclesiastical administration did retain a degree of prosperity, and it is telling that even in the 9th century, Arab geographers refer to most of them as "fortresses" (qila’ or husun), rather than actual cities (madinah). In the words of Hugh N. Kennedy, Asia Minor became "a land of ruined cities and deserted villages where a scattered population looked to rocky castles or impenetrable mountains rather than the armies of the empire to provide a minimum of security".

Nevertheless, under the more aggressive Caliph Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik (r. 723–743), the Arab expeditions intensified for a time, and were led by some of the Caliphate's most capable generals, including princes of the Umayyad dynasty like Maslamah ibn Abd al-Malik and al-Abbas ibn al-Walid or Hisham's own sons Mu'awiyah, Maslamah and Sulayman. In response to the renewal of Arab invasions, and to a sequence of natural disasters such as the eruptions of the volcanic island of Thera, the Emperor Leo III the Isaurian concluded that the Empire had lost divine favour. Already in 722 he had tried to force the conversion of the Empire's Jews, but soon he began to turn his attention to the veneration of icons, which some bishops had come to regard as idolatrous. In 726, Leo published an edict condemning their use and showed himself increasingly critical of the iconophiles, until he formally banned depictions of religious figures in a court council in 730. This decision provoked major opposition both from the people and the church, especially the Pope, which Leo did not take into account. In the words of Warren Treadgold: "He saw no need to consult the church, and he appears to have been surprised by the depth of the popular opposition he encountered". The controversy weakened the Byzantine Empire, and was a key factor in the schism between the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Bishop of Rome.

The Umayyad Caliphate however was increasingly distracted by conflicts elsewhere, especially its confrontation with the Khazars, with whom Leo III had concluded an alliance, marrying his son and heir, Constantine V (r. 741–775) to the Khazar princess Tzitzak. Only in the late 730s did the Muslim raids again become a threat, but the great Byzantine victory at Akroinon and the turmoil of the Abbasid Revolution led to a pause in Arab attacks against the Empire. It also opened up the way for a more aggressive stance by Constantine V (r. 741–775), who in 741 attacked the major Arab base of Melitene, and continued scoring further victories. These successes were also interpreted by Leo III and his son Constantine as evidence of God's renewed favour, and strengthened the position of Iconoclasm within the Empire.

Leo III and the last Umayyads, 718–750
After the failure of 718, for a couple of years the Umayyads did not launch any expedition against Byzantium Raiding was recommenced in 721 by an invasion of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia under al-Abbas ibn al-Walid I, who captured Dabasa (Thebasa) and reportedly took 20,000 prisoners. In the same year, Umar ibn Hubayra, with a Jaziran army, defeated the Byzantines in Armenia Quarta. The campaign of 722 involved Marwan ibn Muhammad (or, according to Ya’qubi, Abd al-Rahman ibn Salim al-Kalbi), who led the larger of the two summer expeditions, Uthman ibn Hayyan al-Murri, who led the smaller. They captured a fortress, identified as Dalisandos in Cilicia. Al-Abbas ibn al-Walid I apparently led another expedition, possibly the winter one, to Paphlagonia. He allowed his troops to disperse and raid freely, and many were attacked and annihilated. In the next year, Uthman al-Murri led the left and Abd al-Rahman al-Kalbi led the right summer expedition. They took the town of Sibora in Armenia Prima and the unidentified fortress of Qaysara. In 724, Marwan ibn Muhammad is reported to have commanded the summer expedition on the right, and to have captured Ikonion and the strategically important fortress of Kamacha on the Upper Euphrates. IS THIS THE SAME AS THE FOLLOWING (BROOKS YES, BLANKINSHIP NO)? In 724, Marwan and the Caliph Hisham’s brother, Sa'id ibn Abd al-Malik, commanded the two summer offensives. Marwan commanded the northern thrust and seized a fortress called Mawasa near Malatya, while Sa'id's Syrian force suffered great losses and lost an entire detachment under Kathir ibn Rabi’a.

Hisham’s son Mu'awiyah headed the huge summer expedition on 725, which comprised specially raised troops, and penetrated deeply into Anatolia. The Arabs took several fortresses and made many prisoners, reaching as far as Dorylaion. In the same year, Cyprus was raided by Maymun ibn Mihran, while the veteran Maslamah ibn Abd al-Malik led the winter expedition from Malatya and scored a major success in taking Caesarea in Cappadocia on 13 January 726. Maslamah led the northern summer expedition in 726, and Asim ibn Abdallah ibn Yazid al-Hilali led the southern one. Mu’awiyah is also reported to have campaigned successfully, probably leading the winter raid. Mu’awiyah led a far more impressive campaign in 727/728, which penetrated deep into Asia Minor and scored several major successes: Gangra in Paphlagonia was captured and razed by his vanguard under Abdallah al-Battal, while Mu’awiyah himself captured the fortress of Ateous on the Sangarius River in Bithynia, and unsuccessfully besieged Nicaea. The Muslims also captured a fortress called al-‘Atasin or al-Ghatasin near Nakoleia in Phrygia, and launched a naval raid under Abdallah ibn ‘Uqba ibn Nafi’ al-Fihri. Mu’awiyah’s campaign marked a high water-mark in Umayyad raiding; henceforth, commitments on other fronts, especially in the Caucasus against the Khazars, would prohibit similarly deep inroads into Asia Minor.

In 728, Mu’awiyah took Semaluos and another fortress known as al-Mawa, while a naval raid under either Abdallah al-Fihri or 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Mu'awiyah ibn Hudayj al-Sakuni also occurred, although nothing further is known of it. In 729, Mu’awiyah raided the north of Asia Minor, while his brother Sa’id led the southern raid, reaching, but not capturing, Caesarea. A fleet from Egypt under Abdallah ibn Abi Maryam raided the coast, but did not achieve any great success.

In 728 he took Semaluos in the Armeniac theme ; in 729 he raided northern Asia Minor, while Sa'Td, coming from the south, reached Caesarea, and an Egyptian fleet harried the coast. In 730 Mu'awiyah took the fortress of Charsianum; in 731 he found the frontier too well guarded to cross in force, and his lieutenant, Battal, was routed; but in 732 he plundered Paphlagonia and penetrated to Acroinon (Prymnessus), though on the retreat his rearguard was annihilated, while his brother Sulaiman reached Caesarea. In 733 the two brothers joined forces

Blankinship 162The Byzantine Front 112-14/730-32Despite the severe deterioration taking place all at once on the Indian, Caucasus, and Transoxianan fronts, thecaliphate persisted in making annual expeditions against the Byzantines, while the latter, for their part, continuedtheir defensive policy. However, the Muslim raids on Anatolia seem to have become somewhat less successful. Thesetbacks on the Byzantine front thus added, if marginally, to the caliphate's military woes.In 112/730, Mu'awiya * b. Hisham*, leading the summer expedition on the right from Malatya, took Kharsianon andburned Farandiyya92 in Kappadokia.93 Theophanes claims the fortress of Kharsianon was taken by Maslama, ratherthan Mu'awiya*, by treachery between Jumada* II 112/September 730 and Jumada* II 113/August 731.94 Thus,since the summer of 112 ended in September 730, Kharsianon appears to have fallen about Jumada* II-Rajab112/September-October 730, judging by synchronization of the Muslim and Greek chronologies. This is one of thefew cases where a clear synchronization of the same event appears in both Muslim and Greek histories.In a report probably referring to 113/731, al-Ya'qubi* asserts that Mu'awiya* b. Hisham* was unable to enterByzantine territory and hence merely guarded the frontier from al-'Amq near Mar'ash.95 This is the only yearmissing from the series of regular expeditions mentioned by the sources. It is tempting to conclude that the shocks of112-13/730-31 had been so great on the other fronts that too few troops could be spared in this year for anysignificant expeditions against the Byzantines commanded by princes of the Umayyad house. However, anexpedition of some sort in 113/731 was commanded by 'Abd Allah* al-Battal*. This campaign evidently failed andled to considerable losses, but became chiefly famous for the death in battle of the hero 'Abd al-Wahhab* b.Bukht.96 This might have occurred under the auspices of Mu'awiya* b. Hisham* in the winter.97In 114/732, Mu'awiya* b. Hisham*, assisted by 'Abd Allah* al-Battal*, led the summer expedition on the left againstthe Byzantines and is reported to have penetrated as far as Aqrun (Akroinon) in the west of Anatolia. Al-Battal*defeated a Byzantine detachment and captured a Byzantine commander, Constantine, in battle. This could possiblyhave resulted from an attempt by the Byzantines to undertake a more active policy by once more meeting theMuslims on the field. A Syrian source says that after Mu'awiya* had departed forBlankinship 163that of al-Battal * and Constantine. Meanwhile, Mu'awiya's* brother Sulayman* led the summer expedition on theright, reaching the vicinity of Kaisareia Mazaka, but achieving no significant success.98The caliphate's military policy on the Byzantine front thus remained completely unchanged despite the disastersoccurring everywhere to the east. Nevertheless, the continuation of the policy here too may not have been free oftroubles, as evidenced by the possible need to curtail the expeditions of 113/731, contributing to a defeat, and by theindication of growing Byzantine resistance in 114/732. Even so, the Byzantine front continued to give the caliph lesscause for worry than other theaters.

The defeat of the Alexandrian fleet at Karameia in Cyprus in 746 was a signal event: in its aftermath, the Egyptian fleets are not mentioned until the second half of the 9th century. Beginning with E. W. Brooks, several scholars assumed that during this entire period, there was no Egyptian navy to speak of. Although Egypt clearly ceased to be a major base for naval activities against Byzantium, but Arabic and Coptic sources clearly mention the presence of an arsenal at Fustat and of naval activity in Egypt throughout the period.

Impact
Byzantine policy was largely dictated by the demands of warfare with the Arabs. This is particularly evident in the Balkans, where the Byzantines were able to proceed against the Slavic settlers only during periods of truce with the Arabs. Since these periods were few and far between, the imperial government could only secure temporary successes there.