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Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), was a landmark decision in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the power to regulate interstate commerce was granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The case was argued by some of America's most admired and capable attorneys at the time. Exiled Irish patriot Thomas Addis Emmet and Thomas J. Oakley argued for Ogden, while William Wirt and Daniel Webster argued for Gibbons.

Background
The acts of the Legislature of the State of New York granted to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton exclusive navigation privileges of all the waters within the jurisdiction of that State, with boats moved by fire or steam, for a term of years. Livingston and Fulton granted a license to Aaron Ogden. Thomas Gibbons operated a competing steamboat service between Elizabethtown, New Jersey and New York City that had been licensed by the United States Congress in regulating the coasting trade; he also took on Cornelius Vanderbilt as his business manager.

Case
Aaron Ogden filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery of New York asking the court to restrain Thomas Gibbons from operating on these waters. Ogden's lawyer contended that states often passed laws on issues regarding interstate matters and that states should have fully concurrent power with Congress on matters concerning interstate commerce.

Gibbons' lawyer, Daniel Webster, argued that Congress had exclusive national power over interstate commerce according to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution and that to argue otherwise would result in confusing and contradictory local regulatory policies.

The Court of Chancery of New York and the Court of Errors of New York found in favor of Ogden and issued an injunction to restrict Gibbons from operating his boats. Gibbons appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which reversed the decision.

Decision of the Court
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Gibbons. The sole argued source of Congress's power to promulgate the law at issue was the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the Court had to answer whether the law regulated "commerce" that was "among the several states." With respect to "commerce," the Court held that commerce is more than mere traffic—that it is the trade of commodities—it is also intercourse. This broader definition includes navigation. The Court interpreted "among" as "intermingled with."

Marshall's ruling determined that "a Congressional power to regulate navigation is as expressly granted as if that term had been added to the word 'commerce'."

The court went on to conclude that Congressional power over commerce should extend to the regulation of all aspects of it, overriding state law to the contrary:


 * "If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations and among the several states is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the Constitution of the United States."

Importance of the case
Steven Redd argues that the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden survived until 1895, when the court began to limit the congressional power with the case of United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). This marked the start of a 40-year period of history during which the Supreme Court limited the federal government's ability to regulate under the Interstate Commerce Clause. During the 1930s the Supreme Court changed course again and began to grant more federal authority under Commerce Clause, going beyond even the authority recognized in Gibbons v. Odgen. The Court went so far as to say that even activity entirely within one state could be regulated by the federal government if the activity had an effect on interstate commerce. See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 US 1 (1937).

However, Strict Constructionists (those who believe that the Constitution must be given the narrowest possible construction) hold a different view of the meaning of Commerce Clause as established in Gibbons that it was limited in scope because the decision could be interpreted to say that navigation only pertained to the federal Commerce Clause because it was necessary to business as it allowed for the interstate transportation of goods. Therefore, under this theory the E.C Knight decision may be viewed not as a radical departure, but as a continuation of the original jurisprudence.

Note that in Gibbons v. Ogden the court specifically stated there are limits upon the federal commerce power, but chose not to put into detail what those limits were aside from goods specifically made, moved, and sold within one state were exclusively beyond the reach of the federal commerce power. This part of the Gibbons ruling stands in direct contrast to the post-New Deal decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

Opinion excerpts
the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution.
 * The power to “regulate Commerce” is:


 * In interpreting the power of Congress as to commerce “among the several states”:

The word “among” means intermingled with. A thing which is among others, is intermingled with them. Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior….Comprehensive as the word “among” is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one.


 * Defining how far the power of Congress extends:

The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with “commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States.”