User:Cwn24/Foreign interventions by Cuba

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Cuba intervened into numerous conflicts during the Cold War. They sent medical and military aid into foreign countries on various occasions. The interventionist policies of Cuba during the Cold War were controversial and resulted in isolation. Castro justified intervention into foreign conflicts stating: "Our Revolution is not a revolution of millionaires. Instead, it is one carried out by the poor, and is one which dreams of ensuring the well-being not only of our own poor, but rather of all the poor in this world. And that is why we talk of internationalism."

Cuban foreign policy was largely motivated by both idealism and realpolitik. Cubans felt a duty to spread their revolutionary ideas and aid liberation movements around the world. Also, the Cubans felt a lot of Cold War pressure from the United States and attempted to combat it by making allies across Latin America and Africa. The Cubans felt the Americans were more concerned about their interventions in Latin America, but they felt they had more freedom in Africa. Still, the US was strongly opposed to Cuban involvement in Africa and continued Cuban intervention was a major source of tension between the nations. Cuban intervention was often confidential and all Cuban doctors and soldiers were forced to keep their location confidential.

Within African, Cuba extended support to groups in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Benin, Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire), Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Cuba often worked completely independent of the Soviet Union and at times supported opposite sides. Cuba's foreign interventions were motivated by a desire to protect the territorial sovereignty of smaller nations and to support revolutionary movements similar to its own. Cuba was the only economically lesser developed nation with extensive intervention in Africa. Additionally, Cuba supported the Organization for African Unity and was a strong proponent for its emphasis on border protection and African independence.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and facing the economic difficulties during the Special Period, Cuba continued to maintain a presence in Africa, including the service of many doctors. Cuban medical internationalism was a prominent feature of their interventions alongside military aspects. Medical internationalism consisted of four prevailing approaches: emergency response medical teams sent overseas; establishment abroad of public health systems for providing free health care for local residents; taking in foreign patients to Cuba for free treatment; and providing medical training for foreigners, to Cuba and overseas. All Cuban doctors overseas were volunteers.

Congo Crisis
During the Congo Crisis, Cuba intervened between April and November of 1965 and provided hundreds of personnel to assist the Conseil National de Liberation (CNL), also known as the Simbas, with overthrowing the Congolese government. The CNL was fighting against the government under Moïse Tshombe that took power of the DRC following the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The Tshombe government was supported by the United States and South Africa. In December 1964, just prior to his time in the Congo, Che Guevara gave a speech speaking out against western imperialism in front of the UN General Assembly. Guevara's speech demonstrated Cuban motives for supporting the CNL against the US back Congolese government. Soon after, Castro decided to send Guevara along with Víctor Dreke and 137 other Cuban soldiers to support the CNL, revolutionary followers of the deceased Patrice Lumumba. Cuba supported the CNL along with the African states of Algeria, Egypt, and Zanzibar, all of whom were especially frustrated by US involvement. The group flew to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and crossed Lake Tanganyika into the Congo. Guevara previously underwent cosmetic surgery and did not tell either the Tanzanians or the CNL that he was coming. While in the Congo, Guevara operated under the code name "Tatu", meaning third. When they arrived, the Cubans were surprised to fight much less fighting and fewer CNL soldiers than expected. Only between 1,000 and 1,500 CNL rebels remained in the region to fight, and CNL leadership initially did not provide the Cubans with any tasks. Guevara struggled to have productive conversations with CNL leader Laurent Kabila. The CNL allowed the Cubans to first began engaging in larger battles in June, but they had only small military successes. The Cubans also trained the CNL soldiers in the guerrilla military tactics used in the Cuban revolution and taught to other revolutionary movements around the world. Both sides faced prejudice and differences with the other, which was made only more difficult by the language barrier. While in the Congo, the Cubans faced harsh conditions and illnesses, and Guevara contracted both malaria and asthma.

The Cubans withdrew in November after seven months for a mixture of reasons. First, Algeria had been another source of foreign support for the CNL, but it underwent a coup in June. In October, the Organization for African Unity met in Accra, Ghana, and demanded the exit of all foreign military presence in the Congo, including the Cubans. Then in November, General Mobutu took power and negotiated peace agreements with neighboring states such as Tanzania. Dar es Salaam had served as a supporter and essential entry and exit point for the Cubans, but they warned the Cubans they would no longer be able to help them. The Léopoldville government also offered independence to all CNL members who renounced support. Finally, throughout their time in the Congo, the Cubans saw marginal military success and faced many setbacks and struggles. The CNL leadership struggled with rivalries and lacked of strong united leadership on the ground. The Cuban mission was forced to eventually make the decision to withdraw.

In November, the Cubans crossed Lake Tanganyika back into Tanzania and flew back home. Guevara considered his efforts in the Congo to be a great failure. Along with the withdrawal of the Cubans, 17 young CNL fighters traveled to Havana with the goal of receiving training and continue the war. However, problems within the Congolese government prevented their return. Some families and close relatives of CNL members also moved to Cuba leading to the development of a shared Cuban and Congolese identity and community. Guevara continued on to Bolivia where he was eventually executed after being captured by a CIA agent.

Guinea-Bissau War of Independence
Cuba was extensively involved in supporting the PAIGC during the independence movement in Guinea-Bissau against the Portuguese. During the war Cuba kept their involvement a secret, but supplied extensive aid, military support, and doctors. Cuba believed that outcomes in Guinea-Bissau would impact Portuguese morale and success in more strategic countries such as Mozambique and Angola. Cuba was also motivated to support anti-imperialist movements and felt it owed Africa for the slaves that helped build Cuba. While helping fight, nine Cubans died in Guinea-Bissau between 1966 and 1974. Cuba’s experience with guerrilla fighting strategy fit well with the war for independence in Guinea-Bissau.

The independence movement in Guinea-Bissau was led by the PAIGC under Amílcar Cabral. The PAIGC was established in September 1956 and became widely respected as one of the strongest independence movements in Africa. Although Cabral was not a Marxist, he was progressive and interpreted the conflict in Guinea-Bissau through the lens of a class struggle. Cabral was widely respected among revolutionaries and officials in Cuba. In 1962, Cabral tried to see if he could receive US support, but the US was too concerned with Portuguese relations and protecting their strategic use of their Azores base. In 1963, Cabral first asked Cuba for help training and educating military officials. Cuba agreed but did not initially fulfill the request. In December 1964, Che Guevara was impressed by Cabral when he made his first trip to Guinea-Conakry, where PAIGC leaders were headquartered. That May, Cuba made its first delivery of supplies to the PAIGC, including medicine, food and arms. Cabral first met Castro at the Tricontinental Conference in January 1966. Cabral explained the situation in Guinea-Bissau and impressed Castro with his knowledge and skills as a leader. During the meeting, Castro promised doctors, military instructors and mechanics to Cuba, and a couple months later Cuba began distributing large amounts of aid. Additionally, following the meeting Oscar Oramas was installed as the new ambassador for Conakry at the request of Cabral.

All Cubans who traveled to help in Africa were volunteers. The presence of Cubans in Guinea-Bissau was secret and the volunteers were instructed to tell their families they were being sent to the USSR to receive training. The average Cuban volunteer stayed 18 months and faced difficult conditions including malaria, parasites and a limited food supply. Cabral requested that the Cuban volunteers were black so that they would blend in with the local population and Cuban presence could remain confidential. Cabral hoped to use the conflict to build a sense of national identity, so he limited the amount of foreign aid that he would accept. Cuban volunteers were the only foreigners that Cabral allowed to fight alongside the PAIGC. Still, both US and Portuguese officials had suspicions about the presence of Cuban troops that were confirmed with the capture of Cuban Captain Pedro Rodríguez Peralta, who was taken as a prisoner of war by Portuguese troops. Peralta was taken to Portugal to be tried while Cuba attempted to negotiate his independence. Portugal claimed Peralta would only be released if Cuba admitted to sending troops to Guinea-Bissau, which it refused to do. Cuba claimed Peralta was only in Guinea-Bissau to visit his colleagues who were doctors helping in the region. Portugal convicted Peralta of serving as a training instructor and advisor to the PAIGC. The Cuban press recognized the capture of Rodríguez Peralta on September 10, 1974, the same day that the Portuguese government recognized the independence of Guinea-Bissau following the Portuguese coup.

A failed attack on the strategically important camp in Madina de Boé led Castro to assign Víctor Dreke to lead the military effort. Dreke was well respected for his fighting in Zaire. Castro also increased the number of troops to almost 60 Cubans. Dreke was an experienced fighter who was well liked and respected by his troops. The US was so impressed with the military tact and skill set that it believed Cuba had sent 7,000 troops with extensive aid and support from the USSR. By January 1966 the Portuguese increased the size of their troops from 20,000 to 25,000 but continued to suffer losses to the PAIGC.

Consistent with behavior across Africa, Cuba never imposed its wishes on the PAIGC. Cuban officials provided Cabral with advice but always respected his ultimate decisions because they respected that it was not their country and they provided unconditional aid without demands. Cuba knew that Cabral was not a true Marxist and did not expect a liberated Guinea-Bissau to be Marxist.

In addition to providing troops, Cuba supplied many doctors to Guinea-Bissau. There were no modern trained doctors in Guinea-Bissau prior to the aid provided by the Cubans in 1968. The doctors provided aid to both soldiers and civilians and were also present at the battle front. The presence of Cuban doctors empowered PAIGC soldiers to fight harder because they had hope of being healed.

Conflicts in Angola
As the Angolan Civil War broke out, Cuban intervention in Angola was a large-scale intervention to support the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Cuba had provided military support to MPLA under the leadership of Agostinho Neto since the early 1960. In late-1974, Cuba sent Major Alfonso Perez Morales and Carlos Cadelo to assess the situation in Angola after receiving requests for military aid. As the South African Border War intensified and more foreign actors entered into the Angolan Civil War, Cuba grew more involved. On 3 August 1975, a second Cuban mission arrived and provided US$100,000 to the MPLA. Apartheid South Africa intervened in support of the FLNA and UNITA. By 15 August 1975, Castro had demanded that the USSR provide more assistance to the MPLA, though the demand was declined. Cuban troops began to depart for Angola on 21 August 1975; important personnel utilized commercial aircraft while standard troops were transported by cargo ships. On 4 November 1975, Castro launched Operation Carlota against FNLA, Zaire, and the SADF at the request of Neto. 4,000 Cuban troops arrived in Angola shortly after on 9 November, and the number quickly grew to 20,000 with Soviet support. Cuba strongly opposed the US supported white minority rule in South Africa so they were strongly opposed to SADF intervention. In the Battle of Quifangondo (10 November 1975), the MPLA, supported by Cuban troops, defeated FNLA supported by the South African Defense Force (SADF). On 25 November 1975, as the FLNA/SADF crossed a bridge, MPLA/Cubans hidden along the banks of the river attacked, destroying seven armored cars and killing upwards of 90 enemy soldiers. By the end of 1975, over 25,000 Cuban troops were deployed into Angola to assist the MPLA. In February 1976, Cuban forces launched Operation Pañuelo Blanco (White Handkerchief) against an estimated 700 FLEC insurgents. This operation succeeded in annihilating the FLEC force. The Cuban troops came to have in the first campaign of 1975–1976 some 400 tanks, and in the final campaign of 1988, near 1,000 tanks.

In May 1977, Cubans played an important role in supporting the MPLA government of Agostinho Neto and foiling the Nitista Plot in which Nito Alves and José van Dunem split from the government and led an uprising. Neto believed the Soviet Union had supported the plot and Cuban soldiers helped defeat the uprising. Cuba sent an additional 4,000 soldiers to prevent further unrest within the MPLA. Thousands of people were estimated to have been massacred by MPLA and Cuban troops in the aftermath of the attempted coup over a period of two years. Amnesty International estimated 30,000 were killed in the purge.

Castro made it clear that the Cubans would not withdraw from Angola until there was no longer an external threat. The United States attempted to leverage the status of their relationship with Cuba on the withdrawal of Cuba from Angola. The US used linkage techniques to argue that the South Africa would leave Angola when Cuba did as well. However, Castro refused to let the US control its position in Africa and maintained Cuba would stay in Angola as long as the MPLA wanted them. Castro claimed Namibia must first be independent so that SWAPO could leave Angola and that South Africa must stop supporting UNITA.

The next major battle involving Cubans occurred in 1988. The crisis began in 1987 with an assault by Soviet-equipped MPLA troops (the People's Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola [FAPLA]) against the pro-Western rebel movement UNITA in the country's south. Soon, the SADF intervened in support of the beleaguered UNITA and the MPLA offensive stalled. Acting independently from Moscow, Havana reinforced its African ally, increasing its deployed number to 55,000 troops, tanks, artillery and MiG-23s, prompting Pretoria to call up 140,000 reservists. In June 1988, SADF armor and artillery engaged FAPLA-Cuban mechanized forces at Techipa, killing 290 Angolans and 10 Cubans. In retaliation, Cuban warplanes hammered South African troops. However, both sides quickly pulled back to avoid an escalation of hostilities and the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale stalemated. Cuban and Angolan military officials met US and South African officials in Cape Verde on July 22, 1988 and agreed to an immediate ceasefire and for South Africa to withdraw all its troops by September 1. 2,077 Cubans had died in Angola by the time the last forces returned home in 1991.

=== Ogaden War === The Ogaden War (1977–1978) began when Somalia attempted to invade Ethiopia while it was undergoing the Ethiopian Civil War. Cuba sent armored cars, artillery, T-62 tanks, and MiGs to assist the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia. Somalia initially invaded the Ogaden during the summer of 1977 and controlled up to 90% of the region after a several initial victories. In November 1977, Cuba deployed 16,000 troops under General Arnaldo Ochoa to support Ethiopia against the Somali invasion. Although Cuba acted independently, the Soviets supported Cuba’s decision to support Ethiopia. The Soviet's helped train 50,000 Ethiopians and sent military hardware. Territorial integrity was a core value for the Cubans, and Somalia’s invasion violated territorial sovereignty agreements under the Organization of African Unity. Castro met Ethiopia’s leader, Mengistu, in early 1977 and decided he liked him as a revolutionary leader and wanted to provide support. Cuba was hesitant to send troops, but did so when it became clear that the Somali invasion would otherwise succeed. Cuban troops and warplanes played a major part in the expulsion of Somalia from the Ogaden region. However, the presence of Cuban troops in the Ogaden region allowed Ethiopia to focus its troops on a violent invasion of Eritrea in the north. Castro was opposed to the battle in Eritrea, so Cuban troops were only permitted on the Ogaden front. Castro attempted to form a socialist federation between Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia, but it was they rejected it. To this day Castro is seen in Ethiopia as a revolutionary hero and beloved for his aid during the Ogaden war. Simultaneously, he is viewed in Somalia as an imperialist and blamed for thousands of Somali deaths. Somalia believes the Ogaden, which is comprised largely of ethnic Somalis, would be a part of Somalia today if were not for the Cubans.