User:Danohuiginn/georgia

LA Mitchell - democracy in georgia since the rose revolution DOI 10.1016/j.orbis.2006.07.007

qs: what is the us interest in georgia - are they interested in democracy-building or cooption? form of democracy in georgia (polsci approaches)

US-georgia relations
may 2005: george bush visits sep 2005: $295.3m aid through millennium challenge account

US aid to georgia often goes direct to the govt., not to NGOs: a demonstration of American confidence in the Georgian government

why? oil transit near to iran and iraq relations with russia us political enthusiasm for rose revolution, and successful democratization (incl. demonstrating that democracy-promotion is not just a cover for other policies, as it's seen to be in iraq)

problems georgia doesn't have: ethnic/civil conflict (85% of pop is ethnic georgian, rest mainly Azeri and Armenian) starvation AIDS religious radicalism, anti-democratic movements (homogenous easterrn orthodox christian) oil, etc (resource curse) anti-western politics

'Georgians often see democracy as an idea from the West, but unlike in many other countries, in Georgia there is virtually no negative sentiment attached to that view"

nb. western education of georgian elite

problems with Georgian democratisation
power concentrated in the president: appoints PM and cabinet, appoints various university provosts, mayors, other positions. can force budgets through parliament (has power to disband parliament if it rejects the budget twice)

partly, this is through saakashvili's constitutional reforms, introduced in a rush in the fortnight after saakashvili was elected, before he took office.

'support for the ruling party, albeit a new ruling party, is still viewed as a prerequisite to any position of power in Georgia'

UNM party's flag became national flag of georgia soon after the rose revolution

less independent forces - NGO leaders brought into government

saakashvili likes to compare himself to David the Builder, 12th century reformer. also admires Ben Gurion, de Gaulle and Ataturk

political economy
vladimer papava: the political economy of georgia's rose revolution orbis 50:4, autumn 2006 doi 10.1016/j.orbis.2006.07.006

90's history of georgia 91-4: decline in production, govt. mainly ignored economics, apparently through simple lack of interest 94-8: reform (bread price rise, reform of national bank, control of hyperinflation, national budget approved by parliament, IMF involvement 99-03: rising corruption, creative accounting. In 2002, the IMF suspended funding for Georgia post-rose: anti-corruption measures (e.g. reform of traffic police, reform of university admissions). But govt. arrested former officials, made them pay to be released. Privatisatoin, new tax code (late 2004) reduciing many taxes and introducing a 12% flat income tax

post-revolution, local governments have been weakened by centralisation of govt. revenue

author claims Russia's georgia policy is being driven by Anatoly Chubais. Chubais has a 'liberal empire' doctrine. Russia is fairly close to Armenia (e.g. arranged a 'debt-for-equity' swap in late 2002), but georgia is geographically in the way of deepening that relationship.

Chubais' company RAO ESS bought the Tbilisi electricity network in summer 2003 (from AES silk road, a subsidiary of a US company). Russian group 'Industrial Investors', through subsidiary Stanton Equities, plans to spend $200m in Georgia, including gold mining operations like Madneuli. Gazprom is also investing. Russian state-owned bank Vneshtorgbank bought controlling stake in United Georgian Bank