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Definition for Abuse of Dominance
The definition for abuse of dominance hinges from Article 102 (ex Article 82). Abuse alone isn't caught by article 102, but abuse of a dominant position by an undertaking would be caught under article 102. It is imperative that without dominance, the abuse wouldn't breach article 102. An undertaking that isn’t dominant the abuse wouldn’t be caught but, the dominant undertaking that exhibits abusive behavior would be caught under Article 102 as they are given a special attribute than compared to a non-dominant undertaking. Thus it is conclusive that without dominance that the abuse wouldn't breach article 102 as the undertakings is using that dominance to commit that abuse

Hoffman-La Roche v Commission is considered a crucial case as it doesn't specify the abuses such as exploitative, exclusionary and single market abuse that would be committed by undertakings, but rather a concept that amounts to an abuse of dominance. Decisions such as Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission gave similar language that the undertaking must be "competing on it's merits". Normal competition is identified as an undertaking competing on its merits such as lowering prices and/or innovation. Abuse of a dominant undertaking can be identified by not competing on it's merits such as predatory pricing, thus would be identified as abnormal competition behavior.

Per Se Illegality
A more formalistic approach used by the EU courts to assess abuse was known as per se illegality. This approach was normally used on rebate systems or loyalty discounts even though it's a benefit to consumer welfare by lowering prices .However, a dominant undertaking practicing this system to lower prices to extremes such as predatory pricing would be considered anti competitive behavior. The EU faced an Ordoliberalism criticism about the per se approach from the US in Microsoft v Commission, accusing the EU that they protect competitors rather than the competitive process as their too interventionist. There is a distinction in both policies, the United States Sherman act is fearful of false positives where as the EU is fearful of false negatives adding further criticism, towards the interventionist approach. However this intervening approach is able to identify the expanding market which would amount to abuse because of the dynamic market structure, with interaction between producers and consumers from different levels of supply as the choice of the consumer is restricted and wouldn't benefit the consumer. Furthermore the decision in TeliaSonera the court of justice emphasized that article 102 doesn't only protect competitive process but also protect competitors that are just as efficient in the market. The undertaking is able to justify the rebate system if it's objectively justified under defenses such as economic efficiency. But the negative effects from this practice must produce less than the positive effects from the rebate system to benefit consumer welfare.

Effects Based Approach
The EU shifted in approach to an effects based approach to assess abuse thus recognizing deviation from the per se apporach, this is seen in the case of Intel v Commission. An effects based procedure takes into account for a detailed assessment of an economic nature to show reasonable grounds that the dominant undertaking abuse has foreclosure effects on competition. It primarily focuses on the competitive practices used by a dominant undertaking, to which the competitive authority will identify the effects produced from such practice. It will provide factual evidence to the extent of the anti-competitive behavior when it is compared to the competitive effects to that practice. In itself provides a rule of reason approach when assessing abuse. Thus the detailed assessment will show the economic impact of the undertaking practice to avoid false positives and to provide an effective interventionist approach. This not only shows the likely economic impact that abuse will have to consumer welfare but it eliminates the criticism of needing a detailed assessment for the abuse committed. It also clears the distinction between protecting the competitors rather than the competitive process, as the goal for competition law is to protect the integrity of the single market, thus the competitive process is examined to protect consumer welfare.

An effects based analysis takes into account of both consequential and deontological thinking into their assessment. Consequential thinking implies an undertaking to be deemed abusive if the behavior outweighs the consumer welfare benefit. The undertaking could justify their behavior if the pro-competitive effects outweigh the anti-competitive effects. Furthermore, consequential thinking promotes total welfare rather than consumer welfare. This shows that the effects felt by consumers are not classed collectively but based on preferences and these preferences are subject to change or bias. Deontological thinking looks at the competition process rather than the result of that abuse. However, this approach protects the competitive process regardless of the outcome to the actual effects to consumer welfare. However deontological thinking implies a critical thinking in this which is categorical thinking.

The European Union can objectively justify with an economic based analysis applying both consequential and deontological approaches. Collectively the European Union is able to practice both of these approaches to the suitable context of the case whilst both of these approaches when combined are able to avoid each other disadvantages. The single market is always dynamic thus the EU would need to accommodate to this dynamic market as there isn't a single value to assess abuse of dominant undertakings. The assessment performed by the European Union takes into account factual evidence along with an economic assessment showing an analysis of deontological whilst using the categorical thinking to be able to show the likely consumer harm inflicted to the single market and ultimately consumer welfare.