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Concorde Flight 4590 crash
On 25 July 2000, Air France Flight 4590, registration F-BTSC, crashed in Gonesse, France after departing from Paris-Charles de Gaulle en route to John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City, killing all 100 passengers and 9 crew members on board the flight, and 4 people on the ground. It was the only fatal accident involving Concorde.

According to the official investigation conducted by the Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile (BEA), the crash was caused by a metallic strip that fell from a Continental Airlines DC-10 that had taken off minutes earlier. This fragment punctured a tyre on Concorde's left main wheel bogie during take-off. The tyre exploded, and a piece of rubber hit the fuel tank, which caused a fuel leak and led to a fire. The crew shut down engine number 2 in response to a fire warning, and with engine number 1 surging and producing little power, the aircraft was unable to gain altitude or speed. The aircraft entered a rapid pitch-up then a violent descent, rolling left and crashing tail-low into the Hôtelissimo Les Relais Bleus Hotel in Gonesse.

On 6 December 2010, Continental Airlines and John Taylor, one of their mechanics, were found guilty of involuntary manslaughter, but on 30 November 2012, a French court overturned the conviction, saying mistakes by Continental and Taylor did not make them criminally responsible.

Prior to the accident, Concorde had been arguably the safest operational passenger airliner in the world in passenger deaths-per-kilometres travelled with zero, but had a rate of tyre damage some 30 times higher than subsonic airliners from 1995 to 2000. Safety improvements were made in the wake of the crash, including more secure electrical controls, Kevlar lining on the fuel tanks and specially developed burst-resistant tyres. The first flight with the modifications departed from London Heathrow on 17 July 2001, piloted by BA Chief Concorde Pilot Mike Bannister. During the 3-hour 20-minute flight over the mid-Atlantic towards Iceland, Bannister attained Mach 2.02 and 60000 ft before returning to RAF Brize Norton. The test flight, intended to resemble the London–New York route, was declared a success and was watched on live TV, and by crowds on the ground at both locations.

The first flight with passengers after the accident took place on 11 September 2001, landing shortly before the World Trade Center attacks in the United States. This was not a commercial flight: all the passengers were BA employees. Normal commercial operations resumed on 7 November 2001 by BA and AF (aircraft G-BOAE and F-BTSD), with service to New York JFK, where mayor Rudy Giuliani greeted the passengers.

Other accidents and incidents

 * 12 April 1989: A Concorde of British registration, G-BOAF, on a chartered flight from Christchurch, New Zealand, to Sydney, Australia, suffered a structural failure inflight at supersonic speed. As the aircraft was climbing and accelerating through Mach 1.7 a "thud" was heard. The crew did not notice any handling problems, and they assumed the thud they heard was a minor engine surge. No further difficulty was encountered until descent through 40,000 feet at Mach 1.3, when a vibration was felt throughout the aircraft, lasting two to three minutes. Most of the upper rudder had become separated from the aircraft at this point. Aircraft handling was unaffected, and the aircraft made a safe landing at Sydney. The UK's Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) concluded the following four causal factors:
 * The skin of the rudder had been separating from the rudder structure over a period of time before the accident.
 * Moisture had been seeping in past the rivets in the rudder, degrading the bond between the skin and the structure.
 * Production staff had not followed procedures when modifying the rudder.
 * The procedures required for the rudder modification were difficult to adhere to.


 * 21 March 1992: A Concorde of British registration, G-BOAB, on a scheduled flight from London to New York, also suffered a structural failure inflight at supersonic speed. While cruising at Mach 2, at approximately 53,000 feet above mean sea level, the crew heard a "thump". No difficulties in handling were noticed, and no instruments gave any irregular indications. This crew also suspected there had been a minor engine surge. One hour later, during descent and decelerating below Mach 1.4, a sudden "severe" vibration began throughout the aircraft. The vibration worsened when power was added to the No 2 engine, and it as attenuated when that engine's power was reduced. The crew shut down the No 2 engine and made a successful landing in New York, noting only that increased rudder control was needed to keep the aircraft on its intended approach course. Again, the skin had become separated from the structure of the rudder, which lead to most of the upper rudder becoming separated inflight. The (AAIB) concluded the following four causal factors:
 * The skin of the rudder had separated from the rudder structure, causing a breakup of the upper rudder.
 * During a recent repair of that rudder, repair materials seeped into the structure and weakened the bond between the structure and the skin.
 * The large size of the prior repair to the rudder made it difficult to keep the repair materials from entering the structure.
 * The severity of the effect of repair materials leaking into the structure had not been appreciated before this accident.