User:Dennymaw/sandbox

The First World War was a result of poor communication. On the 28th June Franz Ferdinand was assassinated. Within a month later Serbia had mobilised. Bethman Hollweg had instructed German ambassadors that Russian military measures were threatening.The German ambassador in St. Petersburg was told that unless Russian measures were discontinued it would mean that Germany would mobilise and 'would mean war'(Sheffield,G 2001). There was a flicker of hope when it was hoped that Russia would be talked out of it,they had seen previous crises in 1909 and 1913 averted. This however was not well-timed and war plans and a proclamation of mobilisation was established which consequently caused a tigger effect. Communication was arriving fitfully between all parties involved and was often incomplete. There was an acknowledgement that communication was a possible problem and any solution to the impending crisis was to have a 'pause', that British Foreign secretary Grey had suggested.There were other talks occurring though-Russians had suggested talks with Austria regarding some form of moderation on the Serbs(Keegan,J,1998). Senior Foreign Office officials assured British and French officials they were anxious to preserve peace. Unfortunately there was sabotage. Berchtold in Vienna, heard of Grey's proposal to undertake some form of mediation and informed the German ambassador that he intended to 'declare war tomorrow, or at the latest, day after, to cut away the ground from any attempt at mediation.'(Keegan,J). As it happened Austria- Hungary declared war on Serbia on Tuesday 28th July. An Austrian volley at the Serbs saw Berchtold regard it as an act of war. Stevenson,D (2004) alleges that he wanted a straight forward offensive against Serbia that was uncomplicated by any wider conflict. He hoped acts of diplomacy would work with other problem areas so that he could get on with the Serbian problem. A tripartite division of forces comprising of minimal forces on the Balkan front, a major concentration against Russia in Poland and a 'swing' group that could reinforce one or the other against Serbia, in effect precluded any immediate offensive against Serbia. This was unless Russia guaranteed it would not mobilise. Serbia outnumbered Austria, so it all depended on Russia. However Russia had already done plenty. The previous saturday when news of emphatic support for Serbia had encouraged those in Belgrade to change their minds and reject Austria's note, she had instigated military measures known as 'period preparatory to war' and so had mobilised several military districts. Russian Generals needed little urging for war readiness. All Generals in 1914 saw their responsibility as to prepare for the worst, if the worst came. Worst for them was, in seeking to deter Austria from making war with Serbia, their preparations would invoke Germany into a full mobilisation. That would happen if their partial mobilisation(already in progress) went onto become a full Austrian mobilisation which in turn would lead onto a full German mobilisation, which in effect would equal war. This set in motion much going backwards and forwards between parties stressing their war intentions. On the 30th July a full general mobilisation occurred and got the Tsar's signature for full and partial mobilisation.This was one of the most important decisons of this period. "It effectively shattered any prospect of averting a great European war." (Keegan,J). It was also unnecessary. Russia's security was now threatened by Austria's mobilisation. In fact Austria's war with Serbia effectively stopped its fighting a larger war elsewhere. On the 29th July Hollweg and the Kaiser both were not wanting war. The Kaiser had telegraphed his cousin the Russian Tsar, urging him to sort out any difficulties. As soon as the Tsar got the telegraph he telephoned the War Minister and ordered the cancellation of the general mobilisation, changing it to a partial after all. This should have brought the 'pause'(in search of peace). On the 30th July the British were still trying to arrange for mediation. The French had not taken any substantial precautionary measures, the Austrian troops were mobilised and marching against Serbia only and Germany had no mobilised troops. However to Germany's Falkenhayn a partial mobilsation was seen as threatening as a full and it had given Russia the head start he thought they were missing out on. This he believed would upset the intricate timing of the Schlieffen plan. He wanted to immediately mobilise but Bethman Hollweg did not. Moltke, Chief of Great General Staff wanted 'Kriegsgeffahrzusland' which would be matching Russia's preparations. However he attended a meeting uninvited coming away even more determined to have his way. His army's position meant that they were exposed on the eastern frontier and he expressed extreme concern to Austria's military attache and Conrad in Vienna saying "Stand firm against Russian mobilisation. Austria-Hungary must be preserved, mobilise at once against Russia. Germany will mobilise(Keegan,J).His interference was beyond his duty and was unacceptable, particularly as the Kaiser and the Chancellor were attempting to ensure a localised war against Serbia and so limit objectives. due to the Russo-French convention of 1892 it meant that Germany were in a position that they had to attack if one or the other went to war (Harper, G.)Berchtold was confused but because of the announcement from what he perceived as responsible military, arranged for a general mobilsation. He then set it before the Emperor Franz Joseph who signed it to have it immediately published. Britain and France only discovered about Russian mobilisation on the evening of the 31st July. Germany were not so ill-informed. Moltke was pleased. On the afternoon of the 31st July there had been an ultimatum sent to St. Petersburg and to Paris. "German mobilisation will follow unless Russia suspends all war measures against ourselves and Austria- Hungary"(Keegan,J.) Time factors were imposed. To Russia it demanded twelve hours and a definite assurance to that, to France it included mobilisation means war and required neutrality in a Russo- German war, within eighteen hours. So by the afternoon of the 31st July the fundamental crisis point was established which had begun thirty-four days previously with the murders in Sarajevo.On the 1st August there were still no treaties with anyone claims Harper, and the French were anxious that if they were attacked then the understanding between them would become effective. The 1839 treaty ensured that Belgium was guaranteed neutrality and this would force Britain to act. Britain could give no clear answers. By 2nd August Germany gave Belgium an ultimatum demanding use of its territories in any operations against France. It threatened to treat the country as an enemy if she resisted. This was also time factored, with them being given twenty four hours. by Monday 3rd August Germany claimed French violation and declared war on them. There was also an expiry of the ultimatum to Belgium. August 4th Britain sent an ultimatum demanding termination of German military operations against Belgium, which had already begun, but no offer of termination was received. So at midnight on August 4 Britain, along with Russia and France were at war.As John Keegan wrote in 1998 "If the potentiality of modern communications failed those dedicated to waging war, how much more did it fail those professionally dedicated to preserving peace." He went on to claim that the overwhelming tragedy was that the events preceding the beginning of the Great war and the incapacity to use available communication systems were beyond the "capacity of statesmen and diplomats to control and contain them."