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The Kurdish Experience in Iraq

Headline text
Bold textIntroduction:

Kurdistan or homeland of Kurds is a strategic area located in the geographic heart of Middle East. Today, it composes important parts of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi -Kurdistan is the current geographical area of northern Iraq, popularly known as southern Kurdistan. Iraq in context is composed of religious and ethnic divisions, of which at least 95% of the population adheres to some form of Islam (Shia – Sunni). 60 – 65% are said to be Shias, and almost all Kurds (19 % of the population) are Sunni. Today, estimates of the size of the land where the Kurds live constitute a range of 230,000 to 300,000 square miles, of which 18 % is the area occupied by the Iraqi Kurds.

Bold textBackground:

The year 1919 now seems to be lost in distance. No one now seems to be alive who can comment as an eye witness of this fateful year. It will be recalled that Britain occupied Mesopotamia (former Iraq name) and the southern hills of Kurdistan in the autumn of 1918 under the League of Nations mandate. It made some reckless and worthless statements about self-determination of the Kurds, and made individual arrangements with substantial number of chiefs, disturbing the existing balance with-in and between tribes, but augmenting the personal authority of those in whom it rested power, creating a patron-client relationship with each of them.

In late 1918 and early 1919, Britain would have happily gone along with a single Kurdish entity, either autonomous or independent of the Arab Iraq. Indeed the terms of the Treaty of Sevres which allowed for Southern Kurdistan to attach itself to a Kurdistan state to the north, was an attempt made by none other than Britain. Having registered failure of fielding a single leader acceptable to the mosaic of tribes with in its area of occupation, it (Britain) decided to make individual agreements with the chiefs (as mentioned). In December 1922, when the British were in a difficult situation and the Kemalist troops seemingly had an upper hand with the tribes around Rawandus, it was decided to recognise the right of the Kurds living with the boundaries of Iraq to set up a Kurdish government with in those boundaries. But it was left to the different Kurdish elements to arrive at an agreement between and among themselves, as to the form which they wish that government should take. It remained an enigma why the offer was never taken up. That sense of catastrophe was confirmed however, when Britain comprehensively failed to ensure its modest undertakings to the League of Nations.

It should be remembered that Britain had promised to ensure that ethnic Kurds would administer the Kurdish region and that the official language be Kurdish. To the surprise of the many, Britain turned around and signed with the Iraqi government a treaty of independence which did not even mention the Kurds.

Bold textThe Kurdish Uprising (Barzani Kurds):

Barzan, the eponymous home of the Barzanis is an old remote mountainous and economically marginal village located on the northern side of the greater Zap River and in the upper region of Iraqi Kurdistan. Although Barzani’s power was originally founded on their religious authority as Naqshbandi Sheikhs, they also became noted for their fighting abilities.

From 1919 to the mid of 1940s, there was long series of Kurdistan rebellion against the British army and the Iraqi regime especially among the Barzani Kurds, for some form of real autonomy. All attempts by Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji and the Barzanis (Sheikh Ahmed and Mulla Mustafa) however, failed. It is only with the overthrow of the monarchy in July 1958 that encouraged the Kurdish national movement in Iraq to emerge powerfully.

General Qassim’s seizure of power in Iraq raised Kurdish expectations for more equal participation in the state. Hoping to gain some civil and cultural rights to the Kurds, Barzani accepted to assist Qassim in his efforts to eliminate government opposition groups. He also welcomed Mulla Mustafa back from exile, and jointly dealt with many mutual enemies. However, Qassims regime disappointed the Kurdish hopes, and eventually the Kurdish movement erupted gain in 1961.

Qassim’s efforts to bring Barzani to heels failed and war between the latter and successive government continued until March 1970; when the peace agreement between the Kurds and the Ba’th regime was concluded which gave significant cultural, political and economic rights to the Kurds. Although this significant course was supposed to be implemented, it did not however, take into sustainable required steps. Fighting resumed between the Kurdish forces and Iraqi army, in which the Kurdish were overtly supported by the Iranians and covertly by the United States.

Bold textThe Kurdish Political Struggle amidst the Arab Patronage:

In future, it will be difficult to analyse the history and politics of the Middle East(Iraq inclusive) without consideration of the role played by the Kurds and what they are still playing in regional politics. In the past decade, the Kurds and the Kurdish nationalism has been one of the most important issues of Middle East and Caspian Sea region.

The US war against Iraq and its potential consequences have already demonstrated that the Kurds, their nationalism politics and decisions will be a force to be reckoned with not only regionally, but also globally. The 2003 Iraq war has proved to be a major land mark in the development of the Kurdish nationalism in Iraq. It should be noted as well that, although it has been noted as a great opportunity, it could also be taken or considered as a great danger to the Kurds. For example, they hoped that the post Saddam Hussein era would result into a democratic federal Iraq, which would largely solve the long standing Kurdish demand for political, economic, social and cultural rights, even an independent statehood to some of them.

On the other hand, it is assumed too that if the United States withdraws before any arrangements of the sort as for the above wishes, a new oppressive Arab majority in the state might re-impose its will on the minority Kurds.

On 6-7th September 2003, The Ahmed Foundation for Kurdish Studies sponsored an international conference to examine the implications of the 2003 Iraqi war. Dr Mohammed Ahmed an Iraqi Kurd and former official of the United Nations is the founder and president of the foundation. Through his enlightened vision and generous financial support, the Ahmed Foundation has now sponsored a number of international conferences. For the third conference (whose focus was on Iraqi war 2003), the foundation invited eminent scholars with different view points from USA and Europe in a balanced manner.

Mohammed Ahmed has examined the political consequences of the past ethnic cleansing of the Kurds in Iraq. He affirms that, attempts to forcibly assimilate the Kurds and Arabize their region have all polarised inter-ethnic relationships and poisoned the minds of Arabs, fostering among them the enormous belief that the Kurds have no history, no culture, prone to violence and instability in the region and therefore, must be assimilated.

Bold text1932 Iraqi Constitution:

It should be noted that, the 1932 Iraqi constitution provided language, literature and some other forms of cultural expansion. This situation further progressed after 1958, when the Kurdish language was officially recognised as the second language of the country, and was used and studied in schools and universities. This was far a big achievement to the Iraqi Kurds, taking into consideration of the neighbouring countries. What the Kurds have achieved in Iraq however, was a result of a long struggle against official animosity rather than granted by noble government. It is also unfortunate that, the cultural freedom enjoyed in the country is and has been under the mercy of the regime’s mood. Improving when relations between the Kurdish leaders and the government are good, and deteriorating when relations are bad.

Bold textThe Iran - Iraq War:

During the 1980 -1988 Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian-Kurdish rapprochement was once again effected in which the Kurds seized and controlled large portions of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdish parties of Iraq had contracted a technical alliance with the Iranian regime, based on perceived common interests.

Having collaborated with the Iranian government in warfare, the Iraqi government proved to be more brutal by using chemical warfare on the Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988.

The impact of the war on the Kurds was double-edged. On one hand, they suffered alongside the rest of the Iraq’s population perhaps disproportionately so, with many of their settlements in the proximity of Iran-Iraq boundary, subject to destruction as Kurdistan was also a threat of the battle. But the war also presented several benefits to the Kurds, as it provided a much-needed respite from hardship asymmetrical warfare which they had been forced into by the end of 1970s. The Iraqi army units based in north to fight the Kurds were withdrawn from their bases around Kurdistan in the early years of the war, and confined to barracks in major cities. This move allowed the peshmerga to consolidate their hold in Kurdistan mountains, and even to establish their presence in the environs of Erbil and Suleimaniyya.

Bold textEconomic deprivation, assimilation and ethnic cleansing:

Ever since the World War 1, Southern Kurdistan (Iraqi Kurdistan) has been a major target for Arabization and ethnic cleansing, in order to change its Kurdish character. Pull and push factors have been set in motion to expedite the dispersal and assimilation of the Kurdish population. Despite its rich oil fields, fertile agricultural land and abundance of irrigation water, Iraqi Kurdistan has been deprived of major capital investments in order to keep the region underdeveloped, with view of obliging its population to seek employment else where in the country. The resources of the region have been mined to enrich and develop other parts of the country.

Failure to assimilate the Kurdish population through discriminatory practices and Arabization, the government eventually resorted to ethnic cleansing. A great number of Kurdish villages were bulldozed and their population was relocated else where in the country. Arabs from other parts of the country were offered financial incentives to move to homes and farms of the Kurds who were forcibly relocated. The people lost not only their lifetime accumulated savings, but also their jobs, friends, and education of their children. In the absence of financial means to start new life, the displaced Kurds were often forced to undertake any type of work including begging, just to make ends meet. Forcible displacement as a means of settling political scores is both socially and economically harmful, both to the displaced and the society at large. It also hindered social and economic progress as well as inter-ethnic harmony of the society.

Bold textHuman Rights:

Great abuses and violation of human rights has been identified among the Kurdish population as a result of the above displacements. Since 1991, there has been creation of safe haven zones, until 9th April when Baghdad fell to the coalition forces. The expulsion of ethnic minorities mostly the Kurds from Kirkuk province has been continuing during the above period. While the internally displaced Kurds are anxious to return to their homes and farms from which they were forcibly expelled, the current Arab settlers are also refusing to vacate.

The table below shows the number of internally displaced Iraqi Kurds in the safe haven zone by the year 2001.

1	Expelled in the 70s and 80s	372,347 2	Victims of 1988 Anfal campaign	222,939 3	Victims of ethnic cleansing	58,796 4	Victims of internal fighting among Kurds	77,104 5	Returnees from Iranian Refugee Camps	40,155

Source: Mohamed M.A Ahmed and Michael M Gunter (2005), The Kurdish Question and the 2003 Iraqi War P. 43

Bold textGenocide and Chemical warfare:

In mid March 1988, Iraqi planes dropped chemical warhead on the Kurdish town of Halabja. The number of casualties given by different sources varies, but around 5000 -8000 were dead.

There were initially doubts whether the Iraq had used chemical weapons, as the Iraqi government routinely denied it. This was however established beyond doubt by the Belgian toxic expert who visited Halabja a few weeks after the incident. His findings concluded that three types of different poisonous gasses were used in combination. That is: Mustard gas, Cyanide or derivatives and Tabun. This was the first widely publicised case of chemical warfare against the Kurds, but Iraq had been using gas in Kurdistan for almost a year. The first chemical attack on the Kurds reportedly took place in April 1987, when the areas controlled by the Kurdish peshmergas (Kurdish fighters) were bombed. The targets were a peshmerga base and a number of villages. In one attack on the Belisan valley northeast of Erbil, more that 100 casualties were reported, half of them were civilians. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan against which these attacks had mainly directed attempted to draw world attention to them, but met with great scepticism. Very few news media ever reported on them. Immediately after bombing of Balisan valley, ground troops attacked and captured several dozens of wounded. These were allegedly taken to military hospital near Erbil. They were filmed and photographed as Iranian attacks and in the end all were executed.

The most dramatic gas attack however, took place in August 1988 in northeast Iraq. Valleys controlled by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) had been under attack with conventional arms for some time, and were bombed with a variety of chemical agents. Tens of thousand civilians and peshmergas fled in panic across the Turkish border. The KDP later published a list of seventy seven (77) villages that had been hit, and an estimate of 3000 people were killed in these attacks.

Despite the evidence of using chemical weapons on the Kurdish population, no single country in the world at that time condemned such brutal behaviour of the Iraqi government.

After the Iran-Iraq war cease fire agreement, the Iraqi army directed its attention to squashing of the Kurdish movement. In the process, the army routinely used chemical weapons and according to (Lokman I et al 2001), up to 100,000 people may have been killed in this genocide, in what was described as military operation.

It is not surprising that the Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against the Kurds has drawn more international attention than other aspects of the Kurdish policies. It would be a mistake to assume however, that these gas attacks represent the pinnacle of violent repression of the Kurds in Iraq. In terms of sheer number of casualties, the every day disappearance and summary executions have demanded a much higher toll, not to mention convention counter insurgency operations. All this violence should be seen in the context of Iraqi’s overall Kurdish policies. All the gas attacks are only the tip of the ice berg, and are part of a more horrible strategy of overall destruction of Kurdish society.

The disappearance without trace of the 8000 Barzani Kurds, about the same number of those killed by the gas attack of 1988 is also another great and notable atrocity the Iraqi government has committed in the history of its human rights abuse. In 1983, the Iraqi security forces rounded up the men of Barzani tribe from four resettlement camps near Erbil. These people were not engaged in any anti governmental activities. The entire area of Barzani had along with many other parts of Kurdistan been evacuated by the government, and the Barzani who had opted no longer to oppose the government had been moved to resettlement camps. All the 8000 thousand men of this group were then taken from their families and transported to southern Iraq. Thereafter, they disappeared. All efforts to find out what happened to them or where they had gone, including diplomatic inquiries by several European countries failed. The KPD had received consistent reports from sources with-in the military that at least part of this group has been used as guinea pigs to test the effect of various chemicals.

Bold textToppling of Saddam Hussein:

As relations deteriorated between the Iraqi government and Kurdish population, many Kurds concluded that their situation could only be improved with the removal of Saddam Hussein; under whose reign the abuse of human rights had become flagrant. By the start of the military operation against Iraq in February 1991, a coalition formed by the Kurds, Shi’tes and other dissenters declared the removal of Saddam Hussein as their goal. However, this rebellion was grossly miscalculated. As in 1975, the US once again withdrew its support of the Kurds. Only under allied protection, the Kurds managed to escape much more losses than they did. Thousands of victims and over 2 million people were made refugees. The subsequent establishment of a Kurdish enclave in Northern Iraq proved to be no more than a limited guarantee of security, and failed to solve the underlying problems.

Bold textThe Post Saddam era and Future of the Kurds: In the wake of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the Kurds appear to stand at a crucial turning point in their history. This juncture must be without question the most significant but challenging opportunity since the year 1991 to shape their future, and it might be equally indirect significant to those living in adjacent states of Turkey, Iran and Syria.

Despite the relative prosperity it began to enjoy after 1997, from its relative oil sales (as a result of the de facto Kurdish state), the future of this ironically depended upon Saddam Hussein’s remaining in power. Once he is gone, it is unlikely the United States would continue to protect it from the post Saddam Iraqi government. Indeed, both the United States and the regional states all insisted that Iraqi’s territorial integrity be protected. Therefore, there would be no independent Kurdish state.

Faced with harsh realities, the Iraq Kurds turned to federalism as their best realistic hope in the post Saddam Iraq. Neighbouring states are however, very arrogant and much against this move.

Micheal M. Gunter analyses the future of Kurds in the post Saddam era. He finds reasons to be both optimistic and pessimistic. The Iraqi political culture will help to determine the possibility for establishing a federal and democratic regime. The Iraqis however, have very little experience here on background of the past regimes. Iraq in context has been governed by strong men and dictators, and also has deep ethnic, religious and tribal cleavages. The Iraqi Kurdish future therefore, is clouded with considerable uncertainties.

Bold textIn concussion,

It should be noted that, there are still many obstacles in realisation of the Kurdish question in relation to full autonomy and self determination as a solution to their outstanding problems. Apart from deep internal rivalries between their various Kurdish factions, the ideology of the neighbouring countries of (Turkey, Iran and Syria) hosting similar Kurdish population is quite instrumental in deciding their fate. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein too, seems to indirectly work against them, as the United States is much more unlikely to foster any new developments in their favour, taking into consideration of the constant neglect of the Kurds by the United States, in all their previous alliances.

'Bold textReferences:

>1. Lokman I Meho & Kelly Maglaughlin (2001), The Kurdish Culture and Society, New York:       Greenwood Publishing Group.

>2. Mohammed M.A Ahmed,& Michael M. Gunter, (2005), The Kurdish Question and The 2003 Iraq War, Calirfonia: Mazda Publishing Inc.

>3. Chapin Hellen Metz, (2004), Iraq: A country Study, New York: Kessinger Publishing.

>4. Op.cit., Lokman I et al.,

>5. Ibid.

>6. Edmund C.J, (1957), Kurds, Turks and Arabs, London: Oxford University Press.

>7. Op.cit., Mohammed MA Ahmed et al.,

>8. Mc Dowall, (1996), A Modern History of The Kurds, New York: I.B Tauris,

>9. Michael Gunter, (1999), The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis: London: Palgrave Macmillan.

>10. Op.cit., Lokman et al.,

>11. Ibid.,

>12. Ibid.,

>13. Op.cit., Mohammed MA. Ahmed et al.,

>14. Ibid.,

>15. Ibid.,

>16. Ibid.,

>17. Ibid.,

>18. Opcit., Lokman I et al.,

>19. Andreopoulos, G.J, (1997), Genocide: Conceptual and Critical Dimensions, New York: University of Pennsylvania Press.

>20. Op. cit., Lokman I et al.,

>21. Stansfield Gareth, (2007), Iraq: People, History, Politics: Cambridge: Cambridge Ploity Press.

>22. Ibid.,

>23. Op.cit., Mohammed MA. Ahmed et al.,

>24. Ibid.,

>25. Ibid.,

>26. Ibid.,

>27. Op. cit., Andreopoulos G.J,.

>28. Ibid.,

>29.Ibid.,

30. Op. cit., Lokman I et al.,

>31.Ibid.,

>32. Op. cit., Andreopoulos G.J,.

>33.Ibid.,

>34.Ibid.,

>35. Op. cit., Lokman I et al.,

>36. Op.cit., Mohammed MA. Ahmed et al.,

>37.Ibid.,

>38.Ibid.,