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Chapter 1: Introduction
The Introduction begins, after the traditional basmalah, with praises to God. Shafi'i says, among other things, that gratitude to God for God's favors can only be paid by receiving another favor from God, by which man is grateful, so that the one who would give God thanks is always in a position of having to give further thanks, since the impulse of gratitude is itself a divine favor. Shafi'i concludes the introductory blessings with a recital of the shahada.

Shafi'i then says that God sent Muhammad as a prophet when mankind was divided into two groups: the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitāb) and those who didn't believe in God (idol-worshippers). The first group, the People of the Book, altered the revelation they had received, and this mingling of "falsehood fashioned by their tongues" with God's revelation meant that they "misbelieved in God." Shafi'i supports this by quoting Qur'an, , , and. The second group, the unbelievers, are further described as those Arabs who created idols and worshipped them, with new idols replacing old ones based only on what the idol-worshippers "found pleasing." Shafi'i says that some Persians also worshipped whatever they wanted.

Thus, all those people were unbelievers, both individually and collectively; they all had in common "the gravest of things: The disbelief in God and committing what He does not permit." But God chose mercy, manifesting to mankind His own chosen religion, and God chose Muhammad as "the One favored above all His creatures through the gift of His mercy and the sealing of His prophecy and the most universal of whatever He sent any messenger with previously." Shafi'i then goes on to recite Muhammad's superiority in religion and virtue. Shafi'i explains that Muhammad's message was directed to the Quraysh first, then to all mankind, making it a universal message to everyone from God. Also, Muhammad's name is to be pronounced in the profession of faith, calling the believers to prayer, and perhaps in reading the Qur'an, in performing acts of obedience and in avoiding acts of disobedience. He concludes this section of the Introduction by invoking blessings from God upon Muhammad and with further commentary on Muhammad's superiority.

Shafi'i then says that it was by virtue of the Book (i.e., the Qur'an), which God revealed to Muhammad, that man was brought from misbelief to belief and guidance. Everything that God revelead in the Qur'an is both a mercy from God and an evidence of God's existence. Shafi'i says that the people are now divided into two classes with respect to knowledge and that their status in learning is determined by how much knowledge they have of the Qur'an. About such knowledge seeking, Shafi'i says:


 * It is obligatory upon him who seeks knowledge to exert his utmost energy in increasing his knowledge, to be patient with every obstacle that may stand in his way, and to be sincere to God in understanding His knowledge&mdash;whether [to be found] in the text [of the Book] or [obtained] by deductive reasoning­&mdash;and to appeal to God for help, for nothing good is obtainable save by God's help.


 * For he who has obtained knowledge of God's commands from His Book, whether as [provided] in the text or through istidlāl (inductive reasoning), and&mdash;had God's help in word and deed in whatever he learned of it&mdash;attains virtue in his spiritual and temporal [life], doubt leaves him, wisdom en­lightens his heart and is entitled to tbe position of imāma: leadership in religious matters.

Shafi'i concludes the Introduction by saying that no misfortune will befall a believer without there being guidance in the Qur'an to indicate what path the believer should take.

Chapter 2: On al-Bayān (Perspicuous Declaration)
Khadduri comments that al-bayān may be either the substance of a Qur'anic communication or the clarification of the substance of such a communication; thus, he translates "al-bayān" as "perspicuous declaration."

What is al-Bayān?
Shafi'i opens the chapter by commenting that the most basic common link between the various meanings al-bayān may have is that they are all "a perspicuous declaration for those to whom they are addressed." Shafi'i then enumerates a number of categories covering "the sum-total of what God has declared to His creatures" in the Qur'an.

The first category includes everything stated explicitly and precisely in the text of the Qur'an. For example, included are the obligations to perform prayer, pay zakāt, perform hajj, as well as the prohibition of adultery, and so on.

A second category comprises obligations established in the Qur'an "but the modes of which" were "made clear by the tongue of" Muhammad. Shafi'i uses the number of daily prayers and the proper amount of zakāt as examples in this category.

A third category comprises what Muhammad "established by example or exhortation, but in regard to which there is no precisely defined rule from God [in the Qur'an]." Shafi'i does not initially provide examples in this category. Rather, he explains that God, in the Qur'an, has required obedience to Muhammad; therefore, if one accepts that one has some duty because Muhammad has established that duty, one must accept the obligation of that duty as imposed by God.

A fourth category comprises what God has commanded humans "to seek through ijtihād," which Khadduri translates as "personal reasoning." Shafi'i emphasizes that man's obedience to God is equally at issue with respect to this category as with all the others, quoting Qur'anic passages to the effect that God tests humans.

In illustration of this fourth category, Shafi'i adduces God's prescription of the Sacred Mosque in Mecca as the qibla. Muslims must turn towards Mecca during their daily prayers. In order to know which direction to turn, a Muslim must make use of landmarks, the stars, or other such means to orient themselves; by reasoning about such things, one can know which direction to turn. What God did not do, however, was allow man to pray in any direction he might wish if the Sacred Mosque happened to be out of sight. Thus, God tests man's obedience by whether man uses his personal reasoning (ijtihād) to deduce in which direction to turn for prayer.

Shafi'i then quotes Qur'an : "Thinketh man that he is to be left aimless?" Shafi'i says that "left aimless" (in Arabic, yutraka sudan) means left without command or prohibition, and he concludes that this verse of the Qur'an means that no one, aside from Muhammad, may make a decision "except by istidlāl" as he describes, nor by istiḥsān ("juristic preference"), because "to decide by istiḥsān means initiating something himself without basing his decision upon a parallel example." Shafi'i elaborates further arguments against istiḥsān in chapter 14.

Shafi'i concludes by explaining how God has required men to call as witnesses "two men of just character." He then indicates that he deals with this issue in another place, viz. chapter 13; he also uses this example from the Qur'an when further discussing the fourth category later in this chapter (see Al-Bayān V below).

The remainder of the chapter provides further explanation or detail on each of the four categories enumerated by Shafi'i in this opening section.

al-Bayān I
This section of the chapter concerns Shafi'i's first category of al-Bayān, viz. the explicit and precise regulations set out in the Qur'an. Shafi'i takes as his first working example Qur'an, which requires, inter alia, fasting for a total of 10 days under certain circumstances during hajj. Shafi'i explains that when the Qur'an summarizes the three days plus seven days as "that is, ten in all," the Qur'an is either stating precisely the fasting requirement in explicit terms of its total duration or simply instructing men that 7 + 3 = 10. Shafi'i also quotes Qur'an, in which God appoints 30 nights for a meeting with Moses then adds 10 to them, so that the total time is 40 nights. Again, Shafi'i says either this is meant to teach men that 30 + 10 = 40, or it's meant to specify more clearly the total duration of Moses' meeting with God. After a further example involving the fasting regulations during Ramadan in Qur'an 2, Shafi'i concludes that all these specific regulations are meant "to state more precisely the meaning, since men surely must have known" that 7 + 3 = 10 and that 30 + 10 = 40.

al-Bayān II
This section explores Shafi'i's second category of al-Bayān, viz. obligations established in the Qur'an but the modes of which were further elaborated by Muhammad. Shafi'i's first example is from Qur'an, in which the duty of ablution before prayer is established. Shafi'i notes that the Qur'anic injunction explains ablution in such a way that it must be distinguished both from "cleansing with stones" (istinjā‘) (i.e., cleaning after defecation) and from purification from ritual pollution (i.e., purification when junub). Although Muhammad himself performed ablution in the required manner three times, it was only required one time. Thus, the legal requirement is for one washing, with Muhammad's three being optional. Shafi'i also cites inheritance regulations from Qur'an 4, but says that they are so textually explicit that they require no further comment.

al-Bayān III
Shafi'i further illuminates his second category of al-Bayān by citations to Qur'anic passages ordering prayer at fixed times, payment of zakāt, and the hajj and ‘umra pilgrimages. Yet it was "by the tongue of" Muhammad, rather than explicit Qur'anic textual commands, that God, according to Shafi'i, promulgated the precise number of prayers, the appropriate amount and proper timing of the payment of zakāt, and the various duties associated with the pilgrimages.

al-Bayān IV
In this section, Shafi'i turns to the third category of al-Bayān, namely what was provided in the sunna that doesn't have explicit textual license in the Qur'an. Shafi'i mentions here that he will later in the Risāla set out a proof showing that "Wisdom is the sunna of" Muhammad, so that Qur'anic passages referring to the Qur'an and Wisdom should be taken to mean the Qur'an and the sunna of Muhammad.

Shafi'i then suggests that the duties stated in the Qur'an can be defined by the following three categories. First, there are commands or duties stated in the Qur'an so explicitly and precisely that "nothing further&mdash;in addition to revelation (tanzīl)&mdash;was needed." Second, there are obligations flowing from God's command to obey Muhammad; Muhammad then stated precisely what duties are binding, who they bind, and when they are binding. Third, there are duties specified only in the sunna, without explicit textual license. Thus, the three categories enumerated in this section track Shafi'i's explication of al-Bayān at the beginning of the chapter, as well.

Shafi'i continues, "Everything [in the sunna of the Prophet] is a clear explanation for the [divine communication in the] Book of God." Therefore, if one accepts as binding what is laid down in the Qur'an, one should accept the sunna of the Prophet. Accepting the duties explicitly established both in the Qur'an and in the sunna, one should accept all of them as imposed by God, regardless of whether they appear in the Qur'an itself or in the sunna. Shafi'i does not deny that there are different reasons for accepting duties stated in the Qur'an and in the sunna, but he does deny that there is any distinction in terms of authoritativeness.

al-Bayān V
In this important concluding section of the second chapter, Shafi'i discusses the fourth category of al-Bayān he had identified at the opening of the chapter: duties flowing from ijtihād, or "personal reasoning." He adduces in this section, again, the example of the qibla. Even though you may not be able to see the Sacred Mosque in Mecca (for example, because you are too far away for it to be visible), you are still obligated to turn towards it when you pray. In order to determine in what direction you should turn, you can make use of any landmarks, stars, or other such aids to reason about your position relative to Mecca. This is, says Shafi'i, ijtihād. He adduces two further examples, one involving the Qur'anic command concerning two witnesses and one concerning the Qur'anic injunction against killing game when on pilgrimage.

In the third example, the killing of game while on pilgrimage, Shafi'i quotes the following passage from :


 * Kill not game while in the sacred precincts or in pilgrim garb. If any of you doth so intentionally, the compensation is an offering, brought to the Ka'ba, of a domestic animal equivalent to the one he killed, as adjudged by two just men among you.

Shafi'i explains that the "equal compensation" referenced in the Qur'anic passage (in Pickthall's translation above, "equivalent" compensation) "literally means the nearest in size to the body [of the game killed]." Shafi'i says that all the Companions of the Prophet who expressed an opinion about this command agreed that the compensatory offering must be as near in size as possible to the killed animal. Shafi'i explicitly rejects the idea that compensation in price (i.e., paying a sum equivalent to what the killed animal is or would be worth) is sufficient to fulfil the Qur'anic injunction. Having secured the rule to be applied (compensation in kind measured by body size), the question then becomes one of actually selecting an animal as compensation. This is where ijtihād is applied, in deciding what concretely counts as "equivalent" compensation in a particular case where the prohibition against killing game has been violated.

Shafi'i emphasizes that his examples illustrate his point that "no one at all should [given an opinion] on a specific matter by merely saying: It is permitted or prohibited, unless he is certain of [legal] knowledge, and this knowledge must be based on the Qur'an and the sunna, or [derived] from ijmā‘ (consensus) and qiyās (analogy). The subject dealt with in this chapter belongs to analogy, on the strength of which the right direction in prayer, just character, and equal compensation are to be determined." In the important passage that follows, Shafi'i turns his attention to analogy itself, rather than further examples of analogies as above.

Shafi'i defines analogy as the method of reasoning "through which indications are sought from parallel precedents in the Qur'an or the sunna" when determining such things as, in his examples above, the direction one should turn in prayer, just character, and equal compensation. Such indications are sought from the Qur'an and/or the sunna because those "are the authoritative sources of the truth."

Furthermore, two conditions govern whether, and if so the degree to which, an analogy conforms to precedent. First, God or Muhammad must have prohibited some act by an explicit text in either the Qur'an or the sunna, or they must have permitted it "by an [implied] reason." In the absence of any explicit textual command or prohibition, if such an "implied reason" is found, "the act should be prohibited or permitted in conformity with the [implied] reason of permission or prohibition." Second, some act may be considered "analogous to only one aspect of a certain precedent and analogous to another aspect of another precedent, but neither the latter nor the former provides a close analogy. In such a case, analogy should be applied to the closest one as I have stated [in] the example of the killing of game." However, in Shafi'i's discussion of the killing of game, the only criterion he offers for judging analogical "closeness" is literalness of interpretation. In other words, when deciding whether compensation in kind or compensation in price was the correct rule to apply, Shafi'i settled on the rule that more closely conformed to the literal meaning of the passage: "Of the two meanings, the literal is the more appropriate."

Having set out some of the key principles governing the use of analogy, Shafi'i states that there are essentially two categories of views about legal knowledge: "one of them is ijmā‘ (agreement) and the other is ikhtilāf (disagreement)." He defers discussion of the two until later (viz., chapters 11 and 15); however, he concludes with another warning about casual expression of opinion on legal matters:


 * It is the duty of those who have [legal] knowledge never to express an opinion unless it is based on certainty. There are cases where men have discussed matters relating to [legal] knowledge when, if only they had abstained from so doing, abstention would have been more appropriate and safer, I trust.

Chapter 3: On Legal Knowledge
Having been asked what "[legal] knowledge" is and how much people should know of it, Shafi'i divides "[legal] knowledge" into two kinds. The first is "for the general public, and no sober and mature person should be ignorant of it." Shafi'i adduces as examples, among other things, the number of daily prayers (five), fasting during the month of Ramadan, and payment of zakat. Shafi'i says that this kind of knowledge can be found either textually in the Qur'an or "generally among the people of Islam." It's the kind of knowledge that gets passed down from generation to generation, back to Muhammad himself, "nobody ever questioning its ascription or its binding force upon them. It is the kind of knowledge which admits of error neither in its narrative nor in its interpretation; it is not permissible to question it."

The second kind of legal knowledge "consists of detailed duties and rules obligatory on men, concerning which there exists neither a text in [the Qur'an], nor regarding most of them, a sunna. Whenever a sunna exists [in this case], it is of the kind related by few authorities, not by the public, and is subject to different interpretations arrived at by knowledge."

When asked if the second kind of knowledge is equally obligatory as the first, or if the second kind is merely supererogatory, or if there is actually a third kind of knowledge "derived from a narrative (khabar) or analogy," Shafi'i answers that there is in fact a third kind. Shafi'i says of this that not even all specialists can obtain this knowledge, but they should nevertheless not neglect it, either. "If some can obtain it, the others are relieved of the duty [of obtaining it]; but those who do obtain it will be rewarded."

Shafi'i spends several pages then expounding another example (viz., the "going forth" in jihad) of this third kind of knowledge, a "collective (kifāya) duty." A collective duty, he says, is one "the fulfilment of which is intended to be collective; whenever they are performed by some Muslims collectively, those who do not perform them will not in error." However, if no one, or an insufficient number of people, performed the collective duty, the whole community would be in error. Those who do perform the collective duty, and thus satisfy the requirement for the community, will be rewarded for having done so, while those who did not perform the duty will not be in error.

Note to self and anyone else: The write-up of this could be expanded by citing the Qur'anic passages and hadith that Shafi'i cited and by further explicating his example.

Chapter 4: On the Book of God
The long opening section of this chapter focuses on Arabic as the language of the Qur'an. Shafi'i begins by responding to a suggestion that "[t]here are in the Qur'ān Arabic and foreign [words]." Shafi'i first says that although someone may have expressed that opinion, those who accepted it "by [sheer] submission (taqlīd) to his authority, leaving the matter of proof up to him and to those who have disagreed with him" have "neglected [their duty]," thus warning against taqlīd. But, says Shafi'i, perhaps the person who suggested that there were foreign words in the Quran simply meant that "certain particular [words] . . . are not understood by some Arabs." This would be understandable, Shafi'i thinks, because "[o]f all tongues, that of the Arabs is the richest and the most extensive in vocabulary."

Shafi'i compares an Arabs' knowledge of Arabic to jurists' (fuqahā) knowledge of the sunna. No scholar, says Shafi'i, knows the whole of the sunna. Some know more than others, but in the aggregate, when all the jurists' knowledge is put together, "the entire sunna would be known." A scholar who knew most of the sunna would not, however, resort to a scholar who knew only a tiny fraction of it, if the former wanted to complete their knowledge of the sunna. Rather, they would seek out someone like themselves, who knew a larger portion of the sunna. Similarly situated are both the scholars and the public with respect to the Arabic language. None of them knows everything about the Arabic language, yet "[n]o part of it will be missed by them all." If you want to discover what you're missing about Arabic, you don't go to someone who has a slight grasp on the language; rather, you go to an Arab. Shafi'i explains:


 * for no one can learn [this tongue] save he who has learned it from [the Arabs], nor can anyone be as fluent [in this tongue] as they unless he has followed them in the way they learned it. He who has learned it from them should be regarded as one of the people of that tongue.

The difference, however, between knowledge of the sunna among scholars and knowledge of Arabic among scholars and people is that knowledge of Arabic more widely distributed "among the majority of Arabs."

Shafi'i then argues, citing a handful of Quranic texts in support, that the "people of [the Prophet's] tongue" may not become followers of any prophet or religious leader who didn't speak Arabic and that "all other tongues should follow his tongue, and all the peoples of earlier religions should follow his religion." With respect to what obligations Muslims have vis-a-vis Arabic, Shafi'i says:


 * It is obligatory upon every Muslim to learn the Arab tongue to the utmost of his power in order [to be able] to profess through it that "there is no God at all but God and Muḥammad is His servant and Apostle," and to recite in it [i.e., the Arabic tongue] the Book of God, and to utter in mentioning what is incumbent upon him, the takbīr, and what is commanded, the tasbīḥ, the tashahhud and others.

Shafi'i further says that all Muslims should endeavor to call "the attention of the public to the fact that Qur'ān was communicated in the Arab tongue." Although he describes this as "advice to [all] Muslims," Shafi'i also says it's a duty for Muslims that must not be disregarded, for "[i]ncluded in faithfulness is that the truth shall be explained to them. Both the fulfilment of what is right and faithfulness to the Muslis are [embodied in our obligation of] obediene to God. And obedience to God embraces all good."

Finally, Shafi'i alludes to what follows in the remainder of the chapter by explaining that when God addressed the Quran to Muhammad in Arabic, He did so in accordance with the variety of ways Arabs use Arabic. He explains further:


 * It is [God's] divine disposition to express something, part of which is literally general which is intended to be obviously general with the first part [of the phrase] not needing the second. [Something] "literally general" means that [the concept of] the particular is included in the general; that is indicated by some [of the words] expressed. Also "literally general" means [only] what is particular, with the word literally recognized in its context to mean what is not literally

so. Knowledge of all of this is to be found either in the beginning of what is said or in the middle or at the end.

The remainder of this chapter expounds upon the various ways statements can be general or particular while including categorically general meanings, particular meanings, or excluding one or the other.

General Declaration of the Book Intended to be General in Which the Particular Is Included
Shafi'i first gives several examples of "general declarations in which no particular is included." His examples are Quran ("Allah is Creator of all things, and He is Guardian over all things"),  ("Allah is He Who created the heavens and the earth"), and  ("And there is not a beast in the earth but the sustenance thereof dependeth on Allah"). Since God created every single thing in existence, and since God is responsible for sustaining all living creatures, the Quranic examples are "general declarations in which no particular is included." In other words, no particular things in existence are specified or referred to in the first two examples, and no particular living creatures in the third example, because the general statements (that God created everything and that God sustains all living creatures) include all the particulars in their sweep.

Shafi'i then turns to examples of general declarations that include particular declarations. His first example is Quran "(It is not for the townsfolk of Al-Madinah and for those around them of the wandering Arabs so stay behind the messenger of Allah and prefer their lives to his life"). This is a general declaration because it contains a command that applies to all those who take part in jihad, that they should not prefer their lives to Muhammad's. A particular declaration is included in it, because it "specifies those men who [take part] in the jihād, whether they are able to fulfil the jihād [duty] or not," meaning that not all dwellers of Medina and not all Beduins would take part but only a group of them. Among other examples given from the Quran of general declarations in which a particular declaration is included is Quran ("...of the feeble among men and of the women and the children who are crying: Our Lord! Bring us forth from out this town of which the people are oppressors!"). This example is a general declaration insofar as a statement is applied to an entire group of people, namely the oppressed ("the feeble among men and of the women and the children"), but it's a particular declaration because "not all the people of the town were wrongdoing; there lived among them Muslims [too], but they were a few among many others." In other words, the verse includes a particular declaration because it specifies only a subset of the people of the town referred to, not everyone in the town, and then it applies a statement that holds for that entire subset (thus being a general declaration, too).

The Explicit General Declaration of the Book In Which the General and the Particular Are Included
Shafi'i's first (of two) examples in this section is from Quran : "O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another. Lo! the noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct." Khadduri translates "the best in conduct" as "the most godfearing." First, the verse contains an explicitly general declaration because it addresses "all souls . . . whether in the time of the Prophet or before or after him" and tells them that all "were created male or female, and [made] peoples and tribes." The particular is included in the sentence, "Lo! the noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct [the most godfearing]." Shafi'i explains that the particular is included here because "fear of God is obligatory on [the person] who can comprehend it and who belongs to those who are mature of the descendants of Adam, excluding the beasts, the lunatics and children who have not yet come of age, including those who can comprehend what fear of God means." In other words, only a subset of all mankind can even be regarded as god-fearing or not god-fearing, so the statement in the Quran about who is the noblest of all mankind can only apply to that subset.

The Explicit General Declaration of the Book Intended To Be All Particular
Shafi'i gives four examples, although he concedes that the first example is clearer or easier to understand than the others. Only the first and fourth examples will be addressed here. The first example comes from Quran : "Those unto whom men said: Lo! the people have gathered against you, therefore fear them. (The threat of danger) but increased the faith of them and they cried: Allah is Sufficient for us! Most Excellent is He in Whom we trust!" Shafi'i explains the verse as explicitly general but intended to be purely particular as follows. The verse is explicitly general because it refers twice to "people" (an-nās), a term that "may either be applied to [a minimum of] three persons or to all the people or to any number between three and all." Further, "[t]he meaning commonly implied by this word [i.e., people] is general, applying to all people." Yet it's clear from the verse that not all people everywhere, or even all the people living in the town where Muhammad was located, are referred to in this verse by the term "people" (and "men" in Pickthall's translation). Rather, three particular groups of people are referred to. First, there were with Muhammad people other than those gathered to fight against him, namely Muhammad's people (his followers). Second, there was the group of people arrayed against Muhammad and his followers. Third, there were those who informed Muhammad about the group arrayed against him, with this third group separate from those fighting against Muhammad and those who were with Muhammad. Shafi'i says: "[Legal] knowledge conveys certainty that the whole people did not gather against them, nor inform them, nor were they [i.e., the informed] the whole of the people." Thus, a term that is general (an-nās) is made in this verse to refer only to particular groups of people, not generally to the whole to which it could be applied.

Shafi'i's fourth example comes from Quran : "[the fire] whose fuel is of men and stones." The term "men" (in Pickthall's translation, which, again, is the Arabic word an-nās) is one generally applied to all people, but in this verse can only apply to some particular people, not all of them. In other words, not every person will be the fuel for the fire of Hell. This follows because of what Quran says: "Lo! those unto whom kindness hath gone forth before from Us, they will be far removed from thence [hell]." Since only some people will go to Hell, the term "men" (or "people") in Quran refers only to a particular group, not to all, despite its being a general term.

Category [of Declaration] the Meaning of Which Is Clarified by the Context
One of Shafi'i's examples in this section comes from Quran : "Ask them (O Muhammad) of the township that was by the sea, how they did break the Sabbath, how their big fish came unto them visibly upon their Sabbath day and on a day when they did not keep Sabbath came they not unto them. Thus did We try them for that they were evil-livers." Although the subject of the verse is established as "the township that was by the sea," when the verse says "they did break the Sabbath" it obviously means "the people of the town, since the town [itself] can neither transgress nor deviate from the sabbath or other [matters]. Thus by transgression [God] meant the people of the town whom He tried for their violation [of the Sabbath]."