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The government of Alberto Fujimori belongs to a period in Peru's history from July 28, 1990 to November 21, 2000, in which that country was under a mandate divided into three stages (two immediate reelections) headed by Alberto Fujimori. With a time of 10 years and 116 days in office, the often called Fujimorato became the second longest consecutive presidential term in the Peru's republican history (the first was the Augustus B. Leguía's Oncenio).

Towards the beginning of his term, Fujimori ruled by degree with total power by dissolving Congress and ordering the restructuring of the judiciary (1992-1993).

In November 2000, after the disclosure of corruption scandals to win the elections, suspicions of arms trafficking, and bribes to parliamentarians, Alberto Fujimori resigned from the presidency from Tokyo, Japan. His resignation was not accepted by Congress and the legislative body decided to instead impeach and remove Fujimori from power due to moral incapacity. A presidential transition began and Valentín Paniagua, President of Congress, succeeded Fujimori and headed a transitional government.

Transition period and takeover
In the 1990 general elections, Alberto Fujimori, Mario Vargas Llosa, Luis Alva Castro, among others, were candidates for the presidency. Vargas Llosa and Fujimori, the two frontrunners, headed to a runoff election where Fujimori ultimately won with 62.4% of the vote.

After being elected, Fujimori traveled to New York, where he met with authorities from the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank to seek economic support and investment. The meeting was held on June 29 at the United Nations headquarters, hosted by Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar and Michel Camdessus (director of the IMF), Barber Conable (president of the World Bank), Enrique V. Iglesias (director of the Inter-American Development Bank) and Hernando de Soto. Fujimori was accompanied by his economic advisors Adolfo Figueroa, Felipe Morris and Luis Valdivieso.

Subsequently, Fujimori traveled to Tokyo and met with Emperor Akihito and Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu. Kaifu announced the dispatch of a mission to establish solutions to the serious economic crisis in Peru. Before returning to Lima, Fujimori held meetings with his economic advisers in Miami, including Adolfo Figueroa, Felipe Morris, Carlos Boloña, Carlos Rodríguez Pastor Mendoza and Hernando de Soto.

On July 19, Fujimori announced his appointment of Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller as Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance. Fujimori later announced subsequent appointments to the other ministries. The opposition criticized Fujimori's trip, accusing him of leaving Peru's fate with foreigners and being a puppet of large international organizations.

The inauguration ceremony was held on Saturday, July 28, 1990 in the Congress of the Republic of Peru. Dignitaries in attendance included presidents Carlos Saúl Menem of Argentina, Jaime Paz Zamora of Bolivia, Patricio Aylwin of Chile, Virgilio Barco of Colombia and Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez. In an address to the nation, Fujimori harshly criticized the corruption and mismanagement that occurred during the presidency of his predecessor, Alan García, and presented a path to economic recovery.

Economic crisis and Fujishock
A team of seven technicians accompanied Fujimori during the presidential campaign and transition period to advise on economic matters, which the press called the group of seven samurai. This team included Santiago Roca, Adolfo Figueroa, Óscar Ugarteche, Esteban Hnylicza, Guillermo Runciman, Fernando Villarán de la Puente and Martha Rodríguez. This group was replaced by new advisors such as Hernando de Soto, Carlos Rodríguez Pastor Mendoza, Carlos Boloña Behr and finally Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller.

Although Fujimori as a candidate dismissed the idea of an economic shock, he changed his position following the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund. On August 8, 1990, the Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller, went on national television announcing a price restructuring, which would be known as the "fujishock". This government measure made it possible to control inflation, but caused the devaluation of the salaries for the majority of the population. It was the first of many reforms of liberal tendencies and some of clientelist capitalism, which caused the elimination of price control and the subsequent change of currency to the new sun (a million intis).

From the economic adjustment of August 1990, the functions of the State were redefined and the market assumed a new and fundamental role in Peru's economy, following the recommendations of the Washington Consensus, which proposed tax reform, rigorous fiscal discipline, firm financial and commercial liberalization, the establishment of a competitive exchange rate, privatization of companies, the elimination of barriers to foreign direct investment, among others.

Although it managed to stabilize economic life and allowed Peru's reintegration into the international financial system, as well as the privatization of state companies in the hands of foreigners, it also caused massive layoffs of workers and public employees, as well as the suppression of protections for inefficient national industry, which led to its bankruptcy and high unemployment rates. As a result, union activity was minimized and informal economic activity increased. On the other hand, the reduction of the State and the liberation of the national economy encouraged foreign investment. As a result, in 1994 the Peruvian economy grew by 13%, despite the massive layoffs that occurred.

Massacre of Barrios Altos[edit source | edit]
Main article: Massacre of Barrios Altos

On the night of November 3, 1991, a cock stroke was carried out on the first floor of the building located at Jirón Huanta No. 840 to raise funds to repair that building. At approximately 11:30, six armed and hooded individuals entered the building after getting out of two vehicles.

The attackers covered their faces with balaclavas and ordered the meeting attendees to lie on the floor, where they were shot indiscriminately for about two minutes, killing 16 of them including a 9-year-old boy, and seriously injuring four other people, one of whom was permanently paralyzed. Then, the attackers left in two vehicles. During the investigation, the police found 111 shells and 33 bullets of the same caliber at the crime scene. Judicial investigations and press reports revealed that the subjects involved in the crime worked for military intelligence; they had been members of the Colina Group that was already known for perpetrating an anti-terrorist program on orders from the government of Alberto Fujimori. It was later verified that the attackers were looking to attack a meeting of hiking subversives that actually took place on the second floor of the building (while the cock stroke and the attack was taking place on the first floor).

Massacre of Santa[edit source | edit]
Main article: Massacre of Santa

The Santa Massacre was a massacre of peasants carried out on May 2, 1992 by the Colina Group in the province of Santa in the department of Áncash, in the mountains of Peru, within the framework of the internal armed conflict that took place between 1980 and 2000. Carlos Alberto Barrientos Velásquez, Roberto Barrientos Velásquez, Denis Atilio Castillo Chávez, Federico Coquis Velásquez, Gilmer Ramiro León Velásquez, Pedro Pablo López Gonzales, Jesús Manfredo Noriega Ríos, Carlos Martín Tarazona More and Jorge Luis Tarazona More died in the massacre. After carrying out the massacre, members of Grupo Colina, a death squadron operating outside the Peruvian Army, painted pro-hikers graffiti, as part of a false flag operation. Currently, all the members of the Colina Group are imprisoned.

Attack on Tarata[edit source | edit]
Main article: Attack in Miraflores of 1992

The 1992 attack in Miraflores consisted of the explosion of a car bomb in block 2 of Tarata Street, in the heart of the aforementioned district of Lima, carried out on July 16, 1992 by the terrorist group Shining Path. The explosion was part of a major campaign of attacks in the city of Lima during the time of terrorism.

The place where the event occurred is a commercial area within a middle class district (some upper-middle sectors) of Lima. Two vehicles, each equipped with a ton of explosives, exploded on the aforementioned street at 9:15 p.m., killing 25 and injuring about 200 people. The shock wave destroyed or damaged 183 houses, 400 businesses and 63 parked cars. The attack was the beginning of a series of week-long hiking attacks against the Peruvian State, which in total caused 40 deaths and left the capital in distress.

La Cantuta Massacre[edit source | edit]
Main article: La Cantuta Massacre

It took place in Lima on July 18, 1992. In La Cantuta Massacre, the dean professor of the Faculty of Biology Hugo Muñoz Sánchez and nine students from the Enrique Guzmán y Valle National University of Education (known as La Cantuta due to the name of the area where it is located) were kidnapped and disappeared by a paramilitary squadron (Grupo Colina), belonging to the Peruvian Army on the grounds that they were Terrorists.

Crisis of the Hurtado Cabinet[edit source | edit]
In February 1991 (two hundred days after his inauguration) Minister Hurtado Miller resigned from his positions; the resignation came after a political scandal, due to disagreement within the cabinet3over the publication of an alternative stabilization program that had been prepared by the Minister of Industry, Tourism, Integration and International Trade Negotiations, Guido Pennano Allison, in which a gradual execution was proposed. Likewise, the continued failure in the fight against inflation and the crisis caused by a cholera epidemic. At the same time, all the members of the cabinet made their position available.

President Fujimori, in an attempt to quickly end his first government crisis, on February 16, 1991, took the oath of office of the second cabinet, which was headed by the independent Carlos Torres y Torres Lara as premier and minister of Foreign Affairs and his main novelty was the appointment, as head of the Ministry of Economy, of Carlos Boloña Behr, also without political affiliation. In addition, 3 new ministers were appointed, the rest remained in their portfolios.

Relationship with Congress and Self-coup d'état[edit source | edit]
Alberto Fujimori, at the beginning of his mandate (July 28, 1990), asked Congress for legislative powers in accordance with article 188 of the 1979 Political Constitution, and as established in article 211 of the same, issued extraordinary measures to implement a proposal for economic stabilization.

Regarding these "shock" measures, Carlos Torres y Torres Lara (minister of labor at the time) told Congress on August 30 that "the supreme decrees (issued by the Executive under article 211, paragraph 20) have similar validity as the laws and, therefore, can modify the laws (approved by the Legislative)." Immediately, several of the parliamentarians protested and a month later, the Chamber of Deputies approved by 68 votes the questioning of the minister. Meanwhile, the parties of FREDEMO (Freedom Movement, Popular Action and Popular Christian Party) allied with Cambio '90 to support Torres and Torres Lara; finally the chamber did not reach 91 votes to censor it. The academy and the main constitutionalists mentioned that what the minister said was in accordance with the Constitution.

On the other hand, on September 15 of the same year, Fujimori decreed a selective pardon to release some prisoners as accused and thus minimize the excess prison population. The problem was that the constitution of 1979 empowered Congress to exercise the right to amnesty and not the Executive, so several parliamentarians effectively questioned the validity of that pardon. In relation to the above, the Executive Branch sanctioned a supplementary appropriation to which the Bicameral Budget Commission opposed. In Congress there had been no debate about the credit because Cambio ’90 and the APRA had not given the quorum. In the midst of the controversy provoked, the session of Congress on October 10 was lifted at the initiative of the Executive and no vote was taken on the permit for Fujimori to travel to the meeting of the Presidents of the Andean Pact. In this regard, the newspaper Expreso on October 14 demonstrates a clear recognition of the conflict between Congress and the Executive Branch along with an indication of the future tensions that this may generate, by indicating that:

"President Fujimori denies encouraging or leading the confrontation between the powers of the State but the reality is stronger than his words. Like it or not, he is immersed in a double conflict: with the legislative one hand and with the judicial one on the other ... Of course the president may be tempted to skip legality by the club, removing the judges by decree or closing Congress."

In December 1990, another conflict arose when Fujimori partially promulgated the 1991 Budget Law; that is, when it did not publish the articles subject to observation. Faced with this fact, Congress called itself to an extraordinary legislature in January, declared null and void the law published by the Executive and published the full budget. After that, President Fujimori suspended, under article 211, three of the articles of the law approved by Congress, in this way, he managed to expand the powers of the Executive.

In February 1991, the Council of Ministers opposed the proposal to "democratize" the government's decisions and completely modified it before it was published.

In May 1991, Fujimori announced in Congress the signing of the anti-drug agreement that he had agreed with the United States. Congress reacted by questioning the cabinet, but absolutely nothing could be achieved because at that time opposition to Fujimori was not enough. On the other hand, Congress provided powers to the Executive for 150 so that it could legislate in the areas of employment generation, private investment and pacification (Law 25327). "Between June and November 1991, the Executive issued 117 legislative decrees under Law 25327, of which 83 were promulgated between November 3 and 15, just before the deadline. In the following weeks, Congress repealed or modified 28 decrees of central importance, most of which had to do with pacification." While Congress opposed several of the norms related to pacification, critics of the government denounced Fujimori for attempting a "white" coup, through the legislative center when attacking the Constitution.

On November 30, 1990, the Minister of Economy and Finance Carlos Boloña said that the Aprista and left sectors of the Chamber of Deputies "acted by political slogan" when they rejected the request for delegation of powers in tax matters. Bologna announced that the Council of Ministers would send the bills that were intended to be issued under those powers. In the same speech, Bologna affirmed that within two days the projects would be in a position to be debated by Congress and said "[The congressmen] said that in 48 hours they would approve them, that is, with the speed of lightning [...] we will see if they do it" and maintained that parliamentarians "must approve without distorting the projects, without introducing exemptions and other measures that favor certain companies, sector or person."

On December 1, 1991, discrepancies between the executive and legislative branches became more noticeable. Fujimori attended the Annual Conference of Executives, in which he referred to the salaries of the congressmen. There should be no sacred cows in Peru (...) not even parliamentarians. Let them learn that their cards are for presentation, but not for perks or for privileges or means of pressure. That is why it is regrettable that (...) while all Peruvians live the crisis firsthand, for those parliamentary gentlemen sacrifice is either a thing of the past, authority a simple word in their speeches and a greeting to the flag inserted in the Budget law (...) This is a sample of sterile parliamentarism (...) nothing else can be said when we learn that the salaries of each deputy and senator have been increased to exceed two thousand new suns (...) I would be the first to justify an increase of this nature if all parliamentarians really worked, without leaving the sessions without a quorum and giving laws that kick the ball to the wrong bow

Speech by Alberto Fujimori of December 1, 1991 published in the newspaper El Peruano On December 3, the Chamber of Deputies censored Enrique Rossl Link, then Minister of Agriculture, for inefficiency with 114 votes in favor. Days later, Congress had on its agenda the questioning of Carlos Boloña, Minister of Economy. After that, the constitutional accusation against Alan García for illicit enrichment was revealed, a fact that diverted the attention of the legislative chambers.

On December 6, in a speech by the National Police, Fujimori publicly wondered if there would not be a lobby of drug launderers in Congress. That same night, the Senate condemned such accusations and approved a motion in which it morally disqualified Alberto Fujimori, such a motion was taken to the Chamber of Deputies. This represented for some deputies the window of opportunity to replace Fujimori with San Román, while for others it could provoke a military coup so they preferred not to intervene.

At the end of this month, Congress and Fujimori again maintained tense relations on the budget. Fujimori observed 41 articles of the Budget Law and sent the observation a few hours before the deadline of December 31. In January 1992, Congress promulgated the original Budget.

Self-coup d'état and closure of the congress[edit source | edit]
Main article: 1992 Self-coup

The opposition, which exhaustively reviewed the package of legislative decrees issued by the Executive, was offended because the president had observed more than ten autographs of law given by the Legislative. Also, a Senate commission was investigating cases of human rights violations, for which Fujimori was tried and is currently in prison.

Faced with the refusal of Congress to grant it broad powers to legislate without oversight, Fujimori decided, on April 5, 1992, to dissolve the Congress of the Republic, intervene in the judiciary, take over media - broadcasters, television channels and newspapers of national diffusion.This generated tensions in both the Executive and the Legislative. Fujimori was premised to fulfill his electoral promises. This action was carried out by the Head of State through a television broadcast at the national level. This would occur hours before the Assembly will carry out the revision of decrees, which would give many prerogatives to the military to eliminate terrorism that was considered an excess and a violation of human rights. This measure taken by the president was widely accepted by the Peruvian population 80% of support for this decision. However, while the President's measures were accepted within Peru, abroad the different organizations looked with suspicion at what was happening in the country. They considered it "a rupture of the democratic order" with a stability to conclude business or agreements with international and / or transnational organizations.

The deposed Congress of Peru continued to meet initially in secret and then meet at the Lima Bar Association. The first rule of Congress was to declare Alberto Fujimori's vacancy and appoint Vice-President Máximo San Román as Constitutional President of Peru. Máximo San Román took office on April 21, 1992, in the auditorium of the Lima Bar Association and received the Presidential Band of Peru from former President Fernando Belaunde Terry.

Government of Emergency and National Reconstruction 1992-1993[edit source | edit]
After the closure of the Congress7began the self-styled Government of Emergency and National Reconstruction, in which Fujimori had absolute control, since the legislative power was dissolved and the Judicial Branch intervened. For the president, this type of government was important, because according to him his only obstacle was the Congress that did not let him govern. Fujimori called it obstructionist opposition, but he also called it corrupt. With the closure of Parliament, the president was in charge of finding solutions to terrorism and the economic crisis. That is why it needed the change of the Constitution to give new coordinates to the Peruvian political system. Although Fujimori from the beginning of his government proposed measures to at least partially solve the economic crisis as we will see in the following table. Then it was noticed that he needed the change of rules to execute solutions at different implementation speeds that until before the closing of Congress he did not have.

For the formation of his Cabinet and the appointment of members for institutions such as the BCR, Gustavo Pastor indicates that there was interference from foreign governments and international organizations. At the time, the written press and the parliamentarians on duty criticized this interference, due to the feeling of a lack of autonomy of the government and of being manipulated by other groups outside the country. Newspapers like La República provided columns in which it was speculated that Peru would be governed by foreign forces who had influence in the creation of policies. Despite this situation, the president continued his plans and together with a "coalition [executive power, armed forces and a team of independent professionals] of powers he proposed to implement a long-term political project that should ensure the development, modernization and pacification of the country. This civic-military regime, little interested in the rule of law and Peruvian political institutions, is known as "Fujimorismo""(Pastor, 2012).

Capture of Abimael Guzmán[edit source | edit]
NPP General Antonio Ketín Vidal and NPP Colonel Benedicto Jiménez agree that Fujimori and Montesinos were unaware that on September 12 the house where Abimael Guzmán was suspected of hiding would be operated on. There was a government plan to assassinate the ringleader, but Vidal and Jiménez disagreed. General Antonio Ketín Vidal made it clear that neither Alberto Fujimori nor Vladimiro Montesinos were aware of the capture of Abimael Guzmán. This is how he told it: When we arrived at the house of Los Sauces, and when I heard the noise of voices of women coming from the second floor, I decided to climb the stairs of the house we called "The Castle." And, oh surprise, I saw Abimael Guzmán and Elena Iparraguirre. I approached him and said: "I am General Antonio Ketín Vidal, head of the Dincote. I officially inform you that you are detained," then he stood up and reached out to me: "Manuel Abimael Guzmán Reinoso," he replied. "Well, you have to understand that in life you win and lose. You have lost, take a seat," I told him. Okay, I know how to lose and I also know that you can be killed. But the people, what they have here (pointing to their temples with a finger), that, nobody takes it away," Abimael Guzmán replied.

Then I coordinated with Benedicto Jiménez to, before the media arrived in Los Sauces, get ahead of the Dincote with Abimael Guzmán and Elena Iparraguirre. Minutes later we headed for the Dincote and there I decided to inform the foreign press about the facts, because I wanted to free myself from any misfortune. I also communicated with Channel 2, which launched the scoop. Until that moment, President Alberto Fujimori did not know about the capture of Abimael Guzmán. Vladimiro Montesinos, neither. Soon, I phoned the Government Palace to tell President Fujimori about the capture of Abimael, but the assistant told me: "My general, the president is not there, he is outside Lima," he told me. "What do you mean, it's not found? It's urgent!" I insisted. But the assistant told me again that it was impossible. There was no way to communicate with the president. Then I found out that I was in Iquitos. Then, at 11 and 15 at night, Montesinos, heard from the news about Guzmán's fall, called me on the phone and asked me with garlic and onions: "Hey, fuck! Is it true what's coming out on television or are you fucking me?" he thundered on the phone. "Of course it's true," I replied. "Fuck, you haven't even warned me!" he shouted at me and hung up the phone. Minutes later I called Montesinos to ask him to give me President Fujimori's phone and thus inform him personally of the capture. Montesinos replied that he had already communicated with Fujimori. Antonio Ketín Vidal The plan was to kill Guzmán. Benedicto Jiménez disagreed. According to what he said: General Vidal once told me, before Guzmán's capture: "Commander, if Guzmán falls, should he die or not? I replied: "My general, we are guided by certain principles and you know that there is a bedside book called The Art of War, by Sun Tzu, and I have trained my people with that mentality. The enemy must be captured alive, because dead does not serve us. And, second, dead he would be a martyr, as Sun Tzu says. And so far our forces aim to capture him alive. The idea was to keep Guzmán alive. During operations, one of the most difficult parts is decision-making. When I made the decision to hit the Los Sauces house, I knew that I was taking on a challenge, because Guzmán had already escaped from the Buenavista Street residence, and if I ran away a second time, I was beheaded.

Benedicto Jiménez

The Political Apparatus of the Regime[edit source | edit]
The TRC report shows that since 1993 the power of Montesinos and SIN has been increasing markedly. Among other things, this resulted in the influence it came to have and deploy, especially after 1995, until it clearly became the political apparatus of the regime. Among the functions that, illegally, he performed de facto, controlled by Montesinos were: directing electoral campaigns, spying (telephone interception) and sabotaging the political opposition, monitoring and controlling the media (especially TV) to comply with their own agenda, producing laws for Congress to approve and drafting rulings of the Judiciary (and then also of the National Elections Jury).

Democratic Constituent Congress[edit source | edit]
In May 1992, Alberto Fujimori attended the XXII General Assembly of the Organization of American States in Nassau, Bahamas; at the summit he committed to restoring constitutional rights in the country, as well as to convene a Democratic Constituent Congress to guarantee the balance of powers and effective citizen participation in the elaboration, through elected representatives, of a new social contract.11

On November 22, 1992, elections were held for the Democratic Constituent Congress (CCD), in which the Cambio 90 party, in coalition with the New Majority, obtained an absolute majority by obtaining 44 of the total of 80 seats and this because parliamentarians opposed participating in those elections, which only caused Fujimorismo to have a majority of members in the legislative branch.

With the change in Parliament and the new decisions that were made, the political environment had a great change in the rules of the game, among them the country's Constitution was changed. In this way Fujimorism would change the economic structure and that of national security. Simultaneously, and following the protocols "The Constitution was immediately ratified by a referendum presented to the population as a kind of validation of the good results of the Fujimori government in economic matters and in pacification" (Pastor, 2012).This is how the new changes are accepted by the population.

"Among the main political changes introduced in the 1993 Constitution, we can mention presidential reelection, the review of the forms of scrutiny, the redefinition of political representation according to the different regions of the country, the interruption of the process of administrative decentralization, the hardening of the penalties linked to the crime of terrorism, the redefinition of the economic role of the State, among others" (Pastor, 2012).At the beginning of January 1993, having formally reinstated the 1979 Constitution, the CCD confirmed Fujimori as head of state.

1993 Constitution[edit source | edit]
Main article: Political Constitution of Peru (1993)

The Democratic Constituent Congress approved on September 4, 1993 the Constitution that should be submitted to a referendum. The Peruvians approved it on December 31 by 52.9% of votes in favor and 47.1% against and it was promulgated on December 29, 1993.

In general terms, the 1993 Constitution did not vary much from the 1979 Constitution. Some articles were even preserved textually and, in other cases, there were only variations in the form, but not in the content. However, the innovations proposed are of great importance.

The 1993 Constitution introduces as main novelties with respect to the previous one: the death penalty for terrorist crimes, the immediate presidential reelection for a single term (key point that Alberto Fujimori used to justify his reelection in 1995), the extension of powers to the Executive Branch and especially to the President of the Republic himself, the Parliamentary Unicamerality with a Congress of 120 members (which produced a structural change in the Legislative Power), the Reform of the National Council of the Magistracy, the creation of the Ombudsman's Office, and the establishment of the subsidiary role of the State and liberalization measures economic and wide possibilities of referendum (assuming a position of counselor, but without carrying out a business activity).

In a comparison with the 1979 Constitution: "The 1979 Constitution allowed greater State intervention, while the 1993 one is a letter that limits this intervention. Regarding the 1979 one, he considered that it is more socially and state-oriented, and did not establish restrictions for the State to develop business activity. The 1993 one is more pro-private enterprise (...) says that the State can carry out private enterprise but in a subsidiary way and when it is approved by law. The 1993 market is more favorable for investment because it speaks of a more developed market economy, although with some social brushstrokes."On the other hand, in a more exhaustive analysis:15

Economy

Bridge Cabinet Crisis[edit source | edit]
On August 27, 1993, the President of the Council of Ministers and Chancellor, Oscar de la Puente, resigned along with all the ministers and members of the cabinet, the next day Fujimori accepted the resignation of the Premier and the ministers. This was due to the signing and execution of Supreme Resolution No. 435-92-RE of December 29, 1992. That resolution dismissed, apparently without any foundation, 117 diplomats, under the pretext of "reorganizing" the diplomatic service. At the same time, the number of dismissed gradually and markedly increased, with the retirement age by diplomatic category lowering five years. It was a very radical purge, which compromised a third of the active diplomatic personnel.

Such a measure had already been planned by the Fujimori government previously (since the end of 1990), however, previous foreign ministers had refused to implement it.

The day after the resignation of the Bridge, President Alberto Fujimori accepted the resignation of the Premier. Alfonso Bustamante and Bustamante were appointed President of the Council of Ministers and Efraín Goldenberg Schreiber as Minister of Foreign Affairs. _

Ley Cantuta[edit source | edit]
On December 18, 1993, there was an arrest warrant for the members of the "Hill Detachment," ordered by the judge of the common jurisdiction. There was opposition from the military justice system. Under that situation, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court was responsible for defining jurisdiction. On February 4, 1994, there was discord when 3 magistrates voted in favor of military jurisdiction and 2 in favor of civilian jurisdiction. However, according to the Law, the conflict of jurisdiction between the common and military jurisdictions had to be resolved in the Supreme Court with the favorable vote of four members. This discord had to be resolved under the decision of the Counseling Magistrates of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary (it was assumed that these Magistrates would vote in favor of the common jurisdiction).

In this context, on February 10, 1994, the government promulgated Law No. 26291, called the Cantuta Law. In this way, the trial of nine soldiers accused of the murder of nine students and a professor at the Enrique Guzmán y Valle National University of Education (La Cantuta) passed into the hands of the Military Justice. Seven days later Alfonso Bustamante and Bustamante, Prime Minister and Minister of Industry resigned, disagreeing with the decision of the government and Congress to approve the aforementioned law. After the resignation, Efraín Goldenberg Schreiber was appointed Prime Minister and Liliana Canale Novella as Minister of Industry.

Finally, this law provided the following:20 Article 1: Competitions over civil or military jurisdiction, which are not linked to drug trafficking, are understood to be resolved by the corresponding Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Republic, when they have a simple majority of the votes cast by the members of the Chambers. Future votes will be secret.

Article 2: This Law modifies any provision that opposes it and is immediately applicable to all procedures in the current process, without requiring new votes.

Article 3: This Law enters into force the day after its publication and will be temporarily effective until July 28, 1995.

Law 26291

Reelection[edit source | edit]
Due to the constitutional reform of 1993, Fujimori was able to be reelected for the period 1995-2000, defeating Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in the first round.The elections took place on April 9, 1995. However, the debate around reelection, according to Dr. Fernando Tuesta,Peruvian political analyst, emerges because "Article 112 clearly shows that the spirit and inspiration of the congressmen was to consider the period 1990-1995 as the first government of President Alberto Fujimori. The Diario de Debates shows the words of Dr. Carlos Torres and Torres Lara unequivocally supporting this fact." Finally, Article 112 allowed for one-time presidential reelection. It was approved by the 1993 Constitution.

On the occasion of the 1995 elections, before the strikeout presented against the candidacy of Alberto Fujimori, the JNE declared it unfounded because it considered that the president-in-office was authorized by article 112 of the new 1993 Constitution. That is, President Fujimori was authorized to run for the only possible reelection. In accordance with this position, the Democratic Constituent Congress debated a law to regulate the actions of the President of the Republic as a candidate. Because of this, he promulgated Law No. 26430, called: "Rules applicable to the citizen who exercises the Presidency of the Republic and who applies for reelection." In this way, the CCD assumes that the immediate reelection of engineer Alberto Fujimori was already completed, in 1995.

On the other hand, the Authentic Interpretation Law, in short, tries to modify the Constitution, but not interpret it. In other words, President Fujimori cannot run for president again. Congress, for its part, due to fear of not being able to overcome the obstacles imposed by the opposition, failed to implement a constitutional reform, which was the only possibility that it had.

Electoral results23[edit source | edit]

 * Alberto Fujimori: 64 %
 * Javier Pérez de Cuellar: 22%

Cenepa War[edit source | edit]
Main article: Cenepa War

At the beginning of 1995, there was an armed conflict with Ecuador over the northeastern border region known as Cordillera del Condor. In March, that year, a ceasefire was signed at the Itamaraty presidential palace in Brasilia.

Elections 1995, takeover[edit source | edit]
The 1995 elections took place in a rather particular context. After the self-coup in 1992, these were seen as a "return to democracy" as cited by various authors. Figures such as Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Alejandro Toledo, Ricardo Belmont and Raúl Diez Canseco Terry, among others, participated in this process (Murakami 2007:398). However, it is important to point out how the process went and what areas changed to favor a fraud-free election.

First, the electoral fence was high enough to allow the candidacy of opposition parties (LASA 1995:12). On the other hand, as the LASA report points out, certain modifications were made in order to increase the participation and control of citizens. This is evidenced in the report of the results through a computerized system. An important factor is that the private press was not as regulated as the national press. So, it disproportionately favored the ruling candidate.

Although Pérez de Cuellar led the voting intention, the war with Ecuador played an important role in Fujimori's reelection. The former president, established the slogan "Peru cannot stop" as the main message to promote the benefits of continuity in government. On the other hand, as Murakami points out, the population did not see in the candidates a new alternative. Probably, due to the maintenance of the worn structures of the parties, which failed to capture as a complement to the population, as well as the personalistic and authoritarian figures. Likewise, the perception of compliance and good governance on the part of the citizenry, reinforced the vote for Fujimori. As Pease points out, "the collapse was in 1995 with Fujimori's electoral triumph. When asked why Fujimori triumphs, Tanaka finds that the opposition lacked strength to fight the 1992 coup. A sign of the collapse was that none of the parties that were part of the previous precarious system reached the 5% required by the National Elections Jury in the presidential candidacies of 1995" (2000). Finally, Fujimori manages to reach the presidency under dubious circumstances. In addition, the ruling party had a congressional majority. The circumstances for Fujimori to be reelected were partly given due to control within the government.

Presidents Carlos Menem of Argentina, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada of Bolivia, Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, Eduardo Frei of Chile, Ernesto Samper of Colombia, Ernesto Pérez Balladares of Panama, Juan Carlos Wasmosy of Paraguay, Julio María Sanguinetti of Uruguay and Rafael Caldera of Venezuela were present at the 1995 inauguration ceremony held at the Legislative Palace of Peru. Also present was the United States entourage, made up of Louis Cavazos, Secretary of Education; Chase Untermeyer, director of presidential personnel; Anthony Quainton, ambassador to Peru; Bruce Babbit, Secretary of the Interior and Alexander Watson, Undersecretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

Social discontent at the beginning of 1995[edit source | edit]
In 1995, the government began with much more favorable conditions than those known in the 1980s. There was no hyperinflation anymore, the first injections of external financial capital were given and the economy was beginning to circulate. However, Fujimori did not know how to take advantage of such conditions to create true development. In that sense, it did not generate employment or decrease the levels of poverty in society, two factors that were of paramount importance, since they were the reasons why it was able to be reelected. This situation led to the beginning of the discontent observed in 1995.

There were two factors that, added to the mismanagement of the economy and its planning, increased discontent towards Fujimori:


 * 1) Demetrio Chávez: belonging to a drug cartel that declared that he had direct relations with Fujimori and his adviser Montesinos.
 * 2) General Robles: retired officer who criticized the government and was arrested when acting by the Armed Forces. It was seen before the eyes of public opinion as a crime against individual rights.

The evident clinging to power was another factor that initiated the decline of Fujimori's popularity. Murakami points out how, due to the vast support enjoyed in the 1995 elections, the bench took the idea of staying in the period 5 more years very seriously. Fujimori, instead of worrying about taking advantage of the favorable situation that hit him, was more focused on finding a way to stay in power after 2000. This perception occurred automatically after taking power in 1995 (Murakami 2012: 427).

Chavín de Huantar[edit source | edit]
Operation Chavín de Huantar was a military operation, considered one of the most successful operations worldwide, where 72 hostages were rescued. The hostages were captured for 125 days in the residence of the Japanese ambassador until April 22, 1997 they were released thanks to the military forces.

On December 17, 1996, fourteen members of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), a Peruvian subversive organization of a Marxist-Leninist nature, stormed the residence of the Japanese ambassador in Lima during the celebration of Emperor Akishito's birthday. Seven hundred guests were left lying on the floor threatened by machine guns and grenades. At midnight, the terrorists accepted the departure of women and the elderly and some 380 people were left captive among ministers of state, ambassadors, politicians, businessmen, senior military and police chiefs. After negotiations with the Red Cross, it was agreed to release weightless politicians and some leftist politicians.

During the time of the crisis, the government was willing to negotiate and the Minister of Education, Domingo Palermo Cabrejos, was appointed to dialogue with the terrorists. Additionally, Juan Luis Cipriani, then archbishop of Ayacucho, was part of a negotiating commission. While the negotiations were taking place, the government was training members of the Army and the Special Combat Unit of the Peruvian Navy Marine Force (IMAP), for the secret operation.

The operation lasted 16 minutes and managed to rescue 71 hostages. There were three deaths, including Judge Carlos Giudti who died after being injured. The lives of Lieutenant Raúl Jiménez and Captain Juan Valer were also lost, commandos who lost their lives in carrying out the rescue. One of the hostages, Vice Admiral Luis Giampietri, held inside the ambassador's house played a key role in carrying out the rescue operation. Luis Giampietri was given, among the food and medicine delivered by the Red Cross, a bible and a guitar which had microphones and allowed him to communicate with the military forces. When the Chavín de Huántar commandos began the rescue, 13 emerretistas were on the first floor playing football and the hostages were guarded by a single man on the second floor, making it easier for the rescue to succeed.

Dynamics in Congress[edit source | edit]
In the 1995 elections, Fujimori achieves a victory quite easily, which gives him 67 seats out of a total of 120; that is, an absolute majority in Congress. However, despite the dominant political strength, he did not get the 2⁄3 necessary to be able to make a change in the constitution without having to enter into dialogue with the other political organizations of the time. Opposition to Fujimorism was quite fragmented, it was made up of several minority groups that were divided over time. This created the environment conducive to preparing the possibility of a continuity of government in 2000.

As Degregori and Meléndez point out, the Fujimorista bench had a fairly technocratic profile. More than half of the congressmen who came to power thanks to Fujimori had as a profession economics or some career linked to engineering, unlike what happened with the other organizations. In the case of Union for Peru - the second most important political force - its 17 congressmen were linked to careers in letters, such as law, sociology and journalism (Degregori and Meléndez 2007: 68).

On the other hand, it is remarkable the large number of Fujimorista congressmen whose strong vote was not in Lima, but in other regions of the country. Of the 67 seats they obtain in Congress, 41 of them were members whose strong vote was concentrated in 2 or 3 regions outside the capital. In that sense, Fujimorismo represents a kind of openness and political renewal; however, this process occurs, as Meléndez and Degregori point out in a vertical and authoritarian scheme, given Alberto Fujimori's little interest in building a well-organized political party. (Degregori and Meléndez 2007: 90).

Executive-legislative-judicial relationship[edit source | edit]
The concentration of power on the part of the executive is clear as it undermined other arenas in order to ensure their maintenance in power. A first arena that was totally violated was the judiciary and the public prosecutor's office as Henry Pease points out. With the help of the parliamentary majority, laws were instituted that allowed the "finger" appointment of magistrates by Congress (Pease 2000:16). These judges were also provisional. So, they were subordinate to the aforementioned powers. Let's remember that, being provisional, job renewals would be made in as many as they comply with those requested. Therefore, we can point out that the Fujimorist parliament, together with the executive branch, manipulated this arena. This, in turn, implies that the executive-legislative relationship was very consolidated, above all, due to the large ruling majority.

On the other hand, as seen in the tables, Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría had 67 parliamentarians, while the party that follows it, Union for Peru, had 17 congressmen. This election was very particular as the oldest and most consolidated parties obtained minimum percentages in both the presidential and congressional parties. This is evidenced in the 3.3% that the APRA obtains and the 1.3% that AP obtains in the presidential elections. In addition, the PPC obtains 3%, APRA 6.5%, and AP 3.3% in the congressional elections.

The State and the press between 1995 and 2000[edit source | edit]
Since the self-coup, the media that opposed the government or investigated corruption or drug trafficking were forced to reduce their level of circulation in the country. The purpose of this was to diminish its effect on public opinion. Likewise, television was a political tool widely used by Fujimori to generate a good impression of the government and its achievements with respect to the fight against terrorism. However, from 1996 the situation begins to change. It is the reappearance of talk shows, as is the case of La Clave, with César Hildebrant. These programs filed complaints that linked Fujimori or his adviser to corruption or drug trafficking scandals. The result was a bad perception about the government, mainly about Montesinos.

PROMUDEH[edit source | edit]
On October 29, 1996, Decree Law No. 866 created the Ministry for the Advancement of Women and Human Development (Promudeh), which is currently the Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations (MIMP). The main objective of which was to promote the development of women by reducing the gender inequalities existing in the country and, in addition, the promotion of rights for other minority social groups normally discriminated against in the country so that equity can be generated. His vision is to promote a cultural change where women and men share the same opportunities and own their destiny, in an environment of peace, democracy and solidarity and their mission, promote the development of women and the family, promote activities that favor the human development of the population and priority attention to minors, women, the elderly and people with disabilities at risk or abandonment.

However, in 1996 when Promudeh was created, its functions seemed to be very limited since emphasis was placed on the promotional role of PROMUDEH but not on its leadership capacity on issues related to social and gender inequality (only a leading role is explicitly mentioned in issues related to children and adolescents).

Decree 866 proposes as a mission of this new ministry "to promote the development of women and the family, promote activities that favor the human development of the population and priority attention to minors at risk." To achieve this objective, this mission is operationalized into 4 key objectives:


 * 1) Promote equity in access to occupation, health and education for the Ministry's target groups of competence.
 * 2) Strengthen the role of women and the family in society, as well as in programs aimed at their development and in the fight against poverty.
 * 3) Formulate and implement care policies aimed at preventing, caring for, promoting and rehabilitating minors at risk.
 * 4) Promote civic values and norms of behavior in accordance with the principles of ethics, morality, solidarity and peace; as well as promote access to information, culture, recreation and sport, as means of personal and collective development.

As can be seen, the norm explicitly identifies women and minors at risk as target social groups. A generic allusion is made to "the family" and the "human development of the population." There is no clear identification of the rest of the target groups. However, by mentioning the state entities that would become part of Promudeh, it can be concluded that this Ministry will be responsible for women, children, adolescents, older adults, people with disabilities, population affected by political violence (which was very present in the Fujimori government), and indigenous population.

Corruption[edit source | edit]
Degregori maintains that "the objective of the regime was the depoliticization of the electorate, the classic bread and circus." (101:2012). This statement materializes in the purchase of various television channels, as well as the written press and the promotion of the chicha newspapers. Regarding television, the first talk-shows such as Laura Bozzo's program, among others, appear towards the end of the nineties. So, "there were no political programs; the police notes opened the news, followed by "human issues"; not even electoral propaganda paid in cash was allowed." (100-101:2012). Because of this, different figures such as César Hildebrandt, Nicolás Lúcar, Eduardo Guzmán and Jaime de Althaus; resign from their positions for alleged incompatibility. In short, politics took second place. Likewise, the politicization of most newspapers was exceptional.

From these two means, Fujimori began to deploy what we will call a political strategy that had three axes. (Degregori 102:2012). To begin with, massive propaganda was promoted in favor of the government. Secondly, there was "a massive and unprecedented campaign of defamation and slander against opposition candidates" (102:2012). The latter was evidenced in the campaign to feminize opponents. Finally, the "old fears or the inoculation of new ones" prevailed and revived. (102:2012).

Finally, the Vladivideos represent the fall of the Fujimorist government. These were delivered by Fernando Olivera and Luis Ibérico on September 14, 2000. Likewise, the first Vladivideo was one in which Montesinos gave 15,000 dollars to Alberto Kouri in order to integrate the 90/Nueva Mayoría bench of Change. So, we see that part of the corruption in that government involved the purchase of politicians either to vote in favor of pro-government proposals or to join its bench. The appearance of these videos created a climate of widespread discontent and demonstrations. Because of this, on the 16th of the same month, Fujimori gives a message to the nation where, among other things, he calls for new elections. The following days, many politicians, including Montesinos, left the country and resigned from their positions. In addition, on November 13, 2000, Fujimori traveled to Brunei to attend APEC that was taking place in that country. After that, on the 17th of the same month he traveled to Japan and it was from there that he sent a fax with his resignation from the presidency of the country on November 20, 2000.

Pandolfi Cabinet Crisis[edit source | edit]
On June 4, 1998, the President of the Council of Ministers, Alberto Pandolfi, resigned after the interference of the military in the peace negotiations with Ecuador.With him, the full cabinet resigned; the resignation was approved and Javier Valle Riestra, an opposition congressman, was appointed as President of the Council of Ministers. Ministers continued in their portfolios, except Jorge Camet Dickmann (Economy), who was replaced by Jorge Francisco Baca Campodónico.

Cabinet Valle Riestra[edit source | edit]
The appointment of Javier Valle Riestra (APRA) as President of the Council of Ministers caused surprise in the Peruvian political class, since it had opposed re-election. Valle Riestra announced that its mission would be to "strengthen democracy and respect for human rights."

In July of the same year, the chief of staff twice signed the lists in which Peruvians ask for a referendum to repeal a law that empowers the president to run for a second reelection in the 2000 elections. Valle Riestra resigned from the premiership on August 8, 1998, after indicating that his efforts to democratize the country are not viable, he also indicated that the president of parliament, Víctor Joy Way, had disrespected him by telling him to start working. Along with him, Defense Minister César Saucedo resigned. After weeks of resignation, Alberto Pandolfi was reappointed as President of the Council of Ministers on August 21, 1998.

Peace with Ecuador[edit source | edit]
After Jamil Mahuad became Ecuadorian president in August 1998, negotiations began with Ecuador to obtain a definitive solution to the conflict. In October 1998, the Brasilia Act was signed, in which Ecuador and Peru accepted the fixing of the border in a 78-kilometer stretch according to an opinion of the guarantors of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol. In a symbolic act, Peru ceded to Ecuador as private property (that is, without any sovereignty) a square kilometer of land where Tiwinza is located. The treaty brought opposition from several members of the government and the military leadership, which had to be reorganized as a result of this. Likewise, the opposition denounced a manipulative and insincere handling of the conflict with Ecuador.

Pandolfi Cabinet Crisis II[edit source | edit]
On January 4, 1999, Alberto Pandolfi resigned from the premiership for the recovery of economic growth; Alberto Fujimori appointed the next day the then head of the Legislative Victor Joy Way as President of the Council of Ministers.25

Joy Way Cabinet[edit source | edit]
In early 1999, once Joy Way took office, criticism began by cabinet members. The then Minister of Labor Jorge Mufarech said on television that in customs there is a corruption network that facilitates smuggling and for which, according to him, the Peruvian State did not receive about 10 billion dollars in 10 years. The controversy unleashed led to the resignation of all ministers. On April 15 of the same year, the ministers said goodbye to the cabinet: Julio Salazar Monroe (Defense), Jorge Mufarech (Labor) and Carlos de Romaña y García (Health).

In October of the same year, the premier resigned after revealing that he was going to run for Congress in the elections of the following year. After the approval of the resignation, Alberto Bustamante Belaúnde, an expert in Human Rights, was appointed President of the Council of Ministers; along with Joy Way Miriam Schenone (PROMUDEH), Antonio Paucar (Transport), Daniel Hokama (Energy and Mines), Javier Villanueva (Interior) and Alfredo Quispe (Justice), Ludwick Mayer (Fishery), Tomás Gonzales (Presidency) left.

Third Period: from July to November 2000[edit source | edit]
Alberto Fujimori's third government began on July 28, 2000, after two turbulent electoral rounds that grabbed the eyes of Peru and the world, reaching the final result of President Fujimori's second consecutive reelection. This government, marked by political instability and scandals that were mediated, lasted just under 4 months, concluding with the unseemly resignation by fax of President Fujimori from Japan, the same one that was not accepted by Congress, which dismissed him from office arguing the cause of "moral disability."

To understand the political phenomenon that developed in that bumpy period, below we will make a brief review of the previous political context, emphasizing the previous campaign and the 2000 elections. This will serve to know in what situation the different political actors arrived on the stage of the 2000 elections. Doing this will allow us to better understand the events of Fujimori's third government period, which cannot be understood in isolation because it is framed within a larger political process: The Fujimori dictatorship of the 1990s.

Fujimori's first period had been marked by the self-coup of April 5, 1992, which had massive popular support, the economic readjustment measures called "the Fujishock," and the militarized confrontation with the subversive groups of the radical left that fought through violence and terror to take political power in the country. Likewise, the opposition forces were weakened by their own internal struggles, were unable to agree with each other to structure themselves into more forceful blocs that facilitate the role of opposition and carried the rejection of the population in general, who felt fed up with traditional politics to whom they blamed for the crisis of the 1980s and who saw represented in the opposition parties.

This government was successful in stabilizing the economy and won social support in the fight against terrorism with the capture of the Shining Path leader in 1992, thus generating a sense of order, security and confidence in the population. Therefore, it is not surprising that in 1995 the population bet on re-electing Fujimori. The speech in this campaign was aimed at the most impoverished social segments, segments with which the ruling party had an outstanding debt, since it had not been able to reduce poverty or unemployment with the same success that it had with the fujishock measures and the confrontation with terrorism. These became their social base. (Murakami, 2012).

In 1995 Alberto Fujimori was reelected for the first time as president of the republic, already under the legal framework of the 1993 constitution, which was the result of the work of the Democratic Constituent Congress of 1992, after the self-coup. In a little questioned election, Fujimori defeated the candidate and former UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar, who did not present himself as an opposite or different alternative to the Fujimorist program in terms of the program. The differences between the two proposals were of form and not of substance, with a Pérez de Cuellar who was not exactly a charismatic candidate who summons masses, regardless of his unquestionable professional and academic merits. Fujimori was the clear winner of the election, but his days of success were coming to an end.

At this time in the regime, the figure of presidential adviser Vladimiro Montesinos had consolidated among the men of confidence closest to the president. From the first days of his political life Fujimori interacted with Montesinos, whom he viewed with great esteem for his inherent charisma and his great ability to obtain the expected results in complicated contexts. Montesinos, a lawyer by profession and Arequipan by birth, maintained close relations with the armed forces, an institution of which he would have been a part. In addition, he was close to the U.S. government, specifically the CIA and the DEA, for whom he served as an informant for many years before the 1990s and with whom he coordinated the management of international pressure. By 1995, Montesinos had managed to distance those close to the president who could be uncomfortable, including President Santiago Fujimori's younger brother, thus affirming Fujimori's position as Fujimori's "right hand." (Degregori, 2012).

During this second government, Fujimori needed to consolidate the economic reform he had initiated, make it reach his humble social base. However, the conflicts within his close circle in government, hand in hand with the international situation of recession and economic entrapment made this task much more difficult than had been anticipated. However, it still had broad popular support because the opposition had not been able to capitalize on this situation and attract popular support. (Murakami, 2015).

Fujimori's style of government of taking emergency measures, reactively, to control the crisis, the same that had been so useful to him between 1990 and 1995, ceased to be useful in these times of greater stability. Times that required a more programmatic and planned style of government, prioritizing medium- and long-term projects, whose results could not be appreciable only after a certain time, but that would allow consolidating an institutionality in the reforms implemented in the face of the emergency inherited from the previous government. However, Fujimori did not understand or did not want to understand this and clung to his old ways in which he had confidence for the results obtained so far.

This approach complicated the image of the government before the population, since it failed to demonstrate the promised results of poverty reduction. In addition, the international community was beginning to denounce the dictatorial forms of government, which it considered less and less timely, demanding concrete actions that demonstrate the will of the government to make a transition back to democracy. (Murakami, 2012).

In this difficult context, barely a year after the second Fujimorist administration, the issue of the third reelection would begin to emerge as a central problem of the regime. It all begins with the statements of a group of pro-government congressmen of weight to the media, where they indicated that they had hope of seeing Fujimori participate in the 2000 elections (Diario Expreso 22-24 January 1996). The issue of Fujimorista reelection had already been a focus of controversy in the Constituent Congress of 1992, where the ruling party established during the debate on the constitutional article that regulates reelection, that the prohibition of reelection would prevent Fujimori's participation in 2000, since that of 1995 would have been his second reelection, thus reaching the maximum possible reelections according to the precept established in the constitution that allowed until consecutive reelection.

Apart from that, Fujimori already planned to participate in the 2000 election. His intention was to win the election and resign from the presidency after the first year of office. Thus, his heir Francisco Tudela could finish supervising the transition to democracy, but within the parameters that Fujimori had predetermined for it. Montesinos was one of the main promoters of this idea. The strategy was to build the authorization for the second reelection as far as possible from the elections, in order to be able to counteract the political cost of that decision with the successes that his administration obtains. To do this, in the middle of 96 I promoted two laws that its majority in Congress approved. These laws allowed him to double and distort the interpretative meaning of the constitution, empowering him to participate in the elections. The argument was that while Fujimori's first election occurred with the 1979 constitution, that election was not affected by the 1993 constitution, nor could it count towards the determination of the limit of reelections. In that order of ideas, the election of 95 would have been the first time that Fujimori was elected with binding effects to the fundamental norm of 1993, with the reelection of 2000 being the first reelection accountable for purposes of the limit imposed by the Constitution. This thesis obtained the name of "true interpretation" and was prepared by Torres y Torres Lara, a trusted man of the regime and renowned jurist. (Diario La República, August 16, 1996). However, the argument was not sustainable because this interpretation had already been discarded by the ruling party in the RCD.

The opposition tried a series of legal mechanisms to try to prevent this major violation of democracy between 1996 and 1999. Appeals of unconstitutionality were filed against the laws, an attempt was made to call a referendum to dismantle this cheating authorization, the ruling candidacy was filed from all ends of the opposition, etc. But the strength of the ruling party in Congress and its control over the Constitutional Court allowed him to affirm the "true interpretation" proposed by Torres and Torres Lara. Fujimori's candidacy was officialized on January 1, 2000 in the face of the confusion of nationals and foreigners when the National Elections Jury acquitted the reelectionist candidacy of all blemishes. (Diario El Comercio, January 1, 2000). Montesinos was key in the control of the National Elections Jury to achieve this objective.

The campaign[edit source | edit]
That's how the electoral campaign begins. In addition to Fujimori, Alberto Andrade of Somos Perú, Luis Castañeda of National Solidarity and Alejandro Toledo of Peru Posible participated in that election as main contenders of the opposition. Despite attempts to consolidate a single opposition candidacy, the personal interests of the different candidates prevailed and they decided to run independently. During the campaign, all opposition candidates were victims of aggression by the population in their proselytizing acts, although these aggressions would not seem to be spontaneous. In addition, there were serious threats and campaigns of media smear or "slending." This was done through the famous "chicha newspapers," a series of popular newspapers that, as was later learned, were orchestrated by Montesinos with the purpose of demolishing the image of the opposition candidates. The rest of the formal press was also subject to Fujimori's control, with few exceptions such as the newspaper La República. These anti-regime media were constantly boycotted by the ruling party. The strategy was to link the candidates with the ghost of Alan García in the mind of the electorate, presenting them as their puppets, evoking the fear of the crisis of the 80s and the current rejection of the population to traditional parties. (Fowks, 2015).

Looking ahead to the election, the March polls showed Fujimori's clear leadership over the other opposition candidates, who arrived worn out by the demolition campaign. The only one who had a chance of defeating Fujimori at that point was Alejandro Toledo, a candidate who had not been totally demolished by the regime's media machine because at the beginning of 2000 he did not show greater indications of being able to raise his figures, that is, he did not represent a threat to Fujimori and, therefore, he was underestimated. The non-confrontational position with the Toledo regime at that time helped these results. While the media machine focused mainly on Castañeda and Andrade, Toledo had a surprising growth in capturing the votes that the other two were losing. If in the 90s there was talk of "electoral tsunami", Toledo represented an electoral "huaico", growing in the voting intention of Peruvians by leaps and bounds, very similar to what happened in 1990 between Fujimori and Vargas Llosa. This despite some scandalous uncoverings involving the candidate of the chakana with Zarai Toledo, Toledo's alleged extramarital daughter.

If in January 2000 Toledo only had a shallow 7%, by February it would already have 10% that indicated an upward trend. Already in March the peruposibilista candidacy would make the definitive leap, reaching 27% of voting intention and consolidating itself as the "avatar" of the opposition. In the last poll of April 2, 2000, Fujimori had 40% against 35% of Toledo, predicting a final photograph for the first round of elections. (Fowks, 2015).

Elections 2000[edit source | edit]
For the conduct of the elections, observers from the Organization of American States headed by former Guatemalan President Eduardo Stein, representatives of the Carter Center, the National Democratic Institute, the International Federation of Human Rights, among other organizations, arrived who denounced the lack of full democratic guarantees of the elections.

Fujimori won the first round with 45.82% of the valid votes, an amount that placed him in a second round against Alejandro Toledo, who obtained 36.97%. However, the process was not very transparent and rumors of fraud ran throughout the country.

The opponent Alejandro Toledo announced that he would ignore the results in the face of "a process so flawed and so irregular" that they do not lead to the realization of a second round. Likewise, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Transparency association and various European ambassadors denounced the official data.The government of the United States28, European ambassadors and the representative of the OAS Eduardo Stein called for a second round, while denouncing irregularities in the official computer system.The observation missions of Belgium, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands maintained that Fujimori's candidacy was unconstitutional, and that the resources of the State had been "abusively and on a large scale put at the service of a candidate".

Toledo symbolically resigned from the candidacy, although I do not formalize it before the JNE, and made a call encouraging the population to vice their vote in the second round. The observer mission of the OAS, an institution that channeled international pressure, decided to withdraw from the electoral process due to the refusal to postpone the date of the second round and the suspicious incidents of the first, an unprecedented event in the region that questioned the legitimacy of the election. International pressure was overwhelming, dictatorial forms would no longer be tolerated. A shift towards democracy was demanded and concrete evidence was required to show that it was taking place. In addition, Montesinos was losing the support of the CIA, a fundamental element for the management of the international situation. The adviser had been involved with arms sales to the FARC and links to drug trafficking, situations that neither the CIA nor the DEA would tolerate, despite having had close ties with Montesinos until that moment. (Murakami, 2012).

The second round took place on the originally scheduled date, which formalized the withdrawal of the OAS observer mission. This ended up winning Fujimori with 51% of the votes against 17% of Toledo. There were 29% null/white votes.

Thus, with this obscene result, against all odds, Fujimori was re-elected in the midst of a deep political crisis, accusations of corruption at all levels of the executive, the links of the ruling leadership with drug trafficking had become more evident since in 1996 the drug kingpin known as "Vatican" publicly accused Montesinos of being involved with him. At the time, those accusations did not raise much commotion in the population that had faith in the government and, by extension, in Montesinos. However, by the 2000 elections the link with drug trafficking was a reality that many Peruvians knew and even accepted. Added to this, the scandal of electoral fraud, the resounding fall in the approval of the population to an historic low and, as if that were not enough, the irregular and criminal management of Montesinos were increasingly exposed in their real dimension.

Montesinos' U.S. allies turned their backs on him for having been involved in an arms sale scandal to the FARC, the delivery of a large fund destined for the fight against drugs by the DEA was annulled and the American government demanded the separation of Montesinos as a requirement for any future aid. Efforts to save the president's adviser ended up giving a mafia image to the ruling party, both on the local and international fronts. (Taylor, 2000).

With this outline of the context in which the third "Chinese" government is framed, the body of this monograph will be developed in the terms that were exposed above. It has been deliberately omitted to analyze the results of the parliamentary elections in this introduction, since this will be analyzed in chapter 1.

Fujimori faced Alejandro Toledo and Alberto Andrade in the elections. The results were:

First round[edit source | edit]

 * Alberto Fujimori: 49%
 * Alejandro Toledo: 43 %
 * Alberto Andrade: 8 %

Due to allegations of fraud that existed after the first round, Toledo announced, on May 18, 2000, that he would not appear in the second round, but he did not do so in front of the National Jury of Elections.

Second round[edit source | edit]

 * Alberto Fujimori: 74 %
 * Alejandro Toledo: 26 %

Takeover[edit source | edit]
The inauguration, held on July 28, 2000, was attended by Presidents Gustavo Noboa of Ecuador and Hugo Banzer Suárez of Bolivia; the Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Luigi Enaudi; as well as Vice Presidents Marco Maciel of Brazil, Gustavo Bell of Colombia, Carlos Quintanilla Schmidt of El Salvador, Mariano Rajoy of Spain, Juan Francisco Reyes of Guatemala, Gladys Caballero of Honduras, Luis Hierro López of Uruguay and Elias Rodríguez of Venezuela; the Foreign Minister of Argentina, Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini, the Minister of the Interior of Chile, José Miguel Insulza, the Vice President of the Council of Ministers of Cuba, José Ramón Fernández, the deputy chancellor of Malaysia, Leo Toyad, the former Minister of Finance of Japan, Hiroshi Mitsuzuka; ministers of Russia and Cuba.The leaders of the other Latin American countries excused themselves from attending the ceremony.

Chapter 1: political actors[edit source | edit]
This chapter will make a general description and try to establish the internal psychological details of the different political actors that sustained the political process of Fujimori's third government. First, it will be developed to the Congress of the Republic. Secondly, the presidency of the republic will be developed as head of the executive power and those apparatuses of the executive linked to the political role of the executive, official or extraofficial. This will be explained in detail in the section dedicated to the presidency and executive. In addition, the press will be developed as a political actor. In this case, the analysis will discern between Fujimori's press and the pro-opposition press, touching each individually, but without going into the detail of which media specifically integrate each bloc, since the different media have been changing their opinion regarding the regime in this final period of the dictatorship. Explaining the position of each of the media according to each of their actions would be a tedious task that escapes the objectives of this monograph. It is enough to identify a pro-Fujimori press block and a pro-opposition reduced bloc.

The Congress of the Republic[edit source | edit]
The 2000 elections were subject to an amendment to the electoral law. This had been under discussion since March 1999 because the law in force at the time prescribed the single electoral district system for the election of parliamentarians. That is, all Peruvians voted for the same list of candidates that was conceived as a national list. In that sense, it was possible (and in fact there was) that entire departments would run out of representative because they could not reach the number of votes that candidates from other more populated departments obtained. Thus, Lima had more than 50% of the parliamentarians and Huancavelica had none. This system was contrary to the Peruvian democratic tradition and already in 1999, 3 parliamentarians proposed changing the single electoral district to multiple or at least mixed electoral district to guarantee the representativeness of parliament. (Caretas, March 31, 1999).

On April 9, 2000, Peru elected its parliamentarians through the preferential proportional voting system, assigning the following configuration to the unicameral parliament of 120 seats:


 * Peru 2000: 52 representatives
 * Peru Possible: 29 representatives
 * Independent Moralizing Front: 9 representatives
 * We are Peru: 8 representatives 6
 * Peruvian Aprista Party: 6 representatives
 * National Solidarity: 5 representatives
 * Union for Peru: 3 representatives
 * Popular Action: 3 representatives
 * Let's move forward: 3 representatives
 * Independent Agrarian Front: 2 representatives.

The ruling party in parliament[edit source | edit]
Although this result gave the ruling party a simple majority, it did not give it a sufficient majority to maintain the autocratic style of government that it had been imposing. In addition, the ruling party that lacked an organic political party had established an electoral alliance called Peru 2000, composed of the Frente 2000 and Vamos Vecino movements, led by Absalon Vásquez for the participation of the year 2000. The alliance was completed by Fujimori's movement, Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría where the Fujimoristas most loyal to Alberto resided. This would be problematic for the president.

This alliance evidently spares space for C90-NM militants on the congressional list and, consequently, Fujimori's ability to control the bench in parliament. 26 congressmen of the ruling party belonged to the Vásquez movements, leaving only half of congressmen to nuclear Fujimorism. Those close to Vásquez came with their own agenda, which although it was related to Fujimori's interests, was the germ of discord that would later appear within the bench. Vasquez himself felt Fujimori's heir in the presidency, despite the fact that for the latter his ideal and predetermined heir was Tudela. (Fujimori, 2003). These types of contradictions worsened as the government advanced.

Another problem of the alliance was that Frente 2000 was involved in a scandalous uncovering that revealed a blatant falsification of more than a million signatures for the electoral registration of the candidacy. This scandal did not impact the 2000 election, since the population was too polarized between Fujimorism and Anti-Fujimorism so that this uncover can significantly diminish the forces of Fujimorist voters, who rejected the veracity of this data or considered it irrelevant to determine their vote. What did happen as a result of this scandal was the establishment of a milestone in the internal relations of the Peru 2000 front. The ruling party was beginning to fall into the internal struggles that had once consumed the opposition, diminishing strength and ability to maneuver from the executive. (Murakami, 2012).

The opposition[edit source | edit]
See also: Antifujimorism

The opposition was made up of the rest of the political forces that achieved representativeness in parliament, the main ones being the bench of Peru Posible, the Independent Moralizing Front and the Peruvian Aprista Party. The opposition entered the new government worn out by the media demolition that occurred in the campaign, fragmented by individual interests and with the only slogan of jealously monitoring the ruling party to destabilize the regime that was plunged into a deep political crisis, product of the turbulent conditions of the election, international pressure, the unmasking of Montesinos and his clandestine operations and his own internal struggles in the legislature and in the circle of confidence of the president. (The Republic, April 15, 2000).

Although they shared a clear objective, the opposition benches lacked specialized technical cadres in Congress that would allow them a forceful political apparatus. In that sense, despite the widespread political will to reject Fujimori that transcended the classic barriers of the right and left, the opposition could not establish itself as an organic institution that confronts the government efficiently in protection of the rights of Peruvians. Otherwise, it was instead a cluster of small nuclei of diverse voices that denounced the irregularities of the government without being able to take positive actions that impact Fujimori's power, as evidenced by the congressional debate newspapers and the votes. Nor had they been able to capitalize on Fujimori's conjunctural moment and popularity to gain support from the population, which continued to be adverse to them thanks to the regime's media management and the inability of the opposition to connect with the people. (Express, August 18, 2000).

It is worth mentioning that a massive demonstration was organized on July 27, 2000 in rejection of the opposition-led reelection, the remembered march of his 4. However, it was infiltrated by SIN agents who violated it, causing the "momentum" of connection between the population and the opposition to be lost, so this event would end up being anecdotal and without real consequences on Fujimori and his new government, which was premiering between riots and chaos. (Morey, 2004).

March of the four of his[edit source | edit]
Main article: March of His Four

On July 25, 2000, they arrived in Lima from different parts of the country to participate in the first date of the massive march in front of the Congress of the Republic of Peru, the day on which the elected congressmen assume their position and the same day on which the opposition legislators could declare the presidential vacancy if they manage to gather a sufficient majority of 61 congressmen.

It was central to July 28, which coincided with the celebration of the National Holidays in Peru and the swearing in of Fujimori as president for the third consecutive time; on that day popular mobilizations were unleashed during which important public and private places (such as the media) were attacked. In the middle of the protests, the headquarters of the Banco de la Nación was burned, in which were 6 security guards, who died intoxicated by smoke. Other guards survived by escaping to the street through the windows of the upper floors.

The highest point of opposition participation in parliament is delimited by fugitive congressmen. This phenomenon will be analyzed in the second chapter in more depth, but it is mentioned here to graph the level of representatives that the opposition had placed among its candidates for Congress, individuals without an ideology or principles. People capable of betraying the confidence of the popular vote that gave him a seat in exchange for gifts or silences.

The Executive, its president and the political role of its intelligence advisor[edit source | edit]
The executive was led by Fujimori and his leadership of friends and advisers, among whom Vladimiro Montesinos still stood out. Montesinos had been a key man throughout the government and had earned Fujimori's unconditional trust. All the important decisions were consulted to him to receive his point of view as an intelligence man and, despite the strong evidence against him by a series of murky and even criminal manipulations, Fujimori kept him close until almost the end of his days as president. (Degregori, 2012).

This suggests that Fujimori was aware of Montesinos' extralegal actions, otherwise it cannot be understood because he continues to defend him at the expense of his own image when the evidence of links with drug trafficking and Colombian guerrillas was practically irrefutable.

As already mentioned, Fujimori's style of government was reactive. It was comfortable for him to take drastic measures to stabilize crisis situations, obtaining considerably valuable results, as he demonstrated in his first period. It was characterized by pragmatism, the heavy hand and the reluctance to dialogue with the opposition in decision-making. However, wanting to continue maintaining that style at this point in government, having initiated a third term the way it was doing and with all the questions that fell on him, local and international, was obtuse. (Murakami, 2012).

His ministerial cabinet was headed by Federico Salas, but this was already a symbolic figure maintained only so as not to deepen the crisis. The cabinet in general had taken on a secondary role in the government, centralizing power in the figure of Fujimori. Since the style of government did not seek to include the opposition, it is idle to point out that none of the ministers belonged to the opposition. In addition, none of the members of the opposition with sufficient training to serve as minister of state would have agreed to join the cabinet.

For his part, Montesinos was in a very complicated situation. Having done all the dirty work of the regime, the time was coming to face the consequences. His role as intelligence advisor and head of the SIN had led him to accumulate a lot of power in exchange for getting involved in crimes as serious as murder, arms and drug trafficking, corruption, espionage, among a long list of others. However, Montesinos' power had also allowed him to structure a network of contacts loyal to him very valuable. Among the personalities at his disposal were high commanders of the armed forces, judges and prosecutors, public officials of all levels, businessmen, journalists and Fujimori himself, which would allow him a considerable range of action, beyond his pariah situation in the eyes of the people. ( Bowen, 2003).

Its decline is linked to the international pressure that fell on the regime after the 2000 election and its distancing from its allies in the CIA and the DEA, who finally turned their backs on it and began to pressure the government to separate it from the state apparatus. They took away his political armor and only then could he be persecuted for his actions.

However, it is naive to think that only then, in the twilight of the dictatorship, did we realize Montesinos' actions. It was known, at least since 1996, that Montesinos was a dangerous character and should not be in government. The Vatican's denunciations about the link with drug trafficking, the SIN agents who were tortured and murdered, as Baruch Ivcher would denounce on his channel, all the actions for military of the Colina group, etc. accounted for the criminal and psychopathic nature of the head of SIN. It did not happen that a masterful smokescreen was erected that blinded the population and Fujimori himself until the fall of the regime. Montesinos did what he did in the sight and patience of the government, Fujimori, the Peruvian people and the world. (Ubillus, 2006).

The media[edit source | edit]
As the lines above were advanced, this block is composed of two types of media. The pro-Fujimorism and anti-Fujimorist media. This distinction is made because it is impossible to address the issue of the press in the context studied assuming the supposed neutrality that the media must have. Doing so runs the risk of distorting the political reconstruction that is developing, making this end of the monograph meaningless.

The Fujimorist press[edit source | edit]
This media block is made up of two types of media. On the one hand, there are the formal and mass media. These were the television channels, the most tuned radio stations and the newspapers and magazines that enjoyed prestige for the content of their publications and distribution index. These media are structured as private companies and are run by private, usually for profit. Likewise, the state had its own dissemination mechanisms that it did not hesitate to use when necessary.

These media are subject to regulations with respect to electoral coverage. However, the Peruvian regulations on the subject leave much to be desired, highlighting normative gaps, factual ineffectiveness of abstract normative devices that never materialized in concrete actions of justice and the eminent bias imposed by the editorial line of each media, partialization that should not be presented in electoral contexts for reasons of press ethics. Especially if the control body is made up of representatives of the same media that are being controlled. In this case, the medium is given the responsibility of self-disciplining its content, in particular, in electoral time. This situation that has proven to be at least insufficient to protect the rights of Peruvians in electoral contexts requires urgent reforms.

On the other hand, we find the "middles chicha". These were popular newspapers that began to appear throughout Fujimorismo and populated the stalls with colorful and bell-shaped front pages, always maintaining support for the regime and attacking the opposition with real news, made up or directly false. These media, as would be proven later, were orchestrated mostly by the head of SIN and were part of the regime's media control scheme. Its content became radicalized as the government progressed. Already at the time of the third government, these media systematically attacked the opposition directly on the front pages in an image demolition campaign. They also served to put together smokescreens to cover government scandals. On these means it is not possible to analyze the relationship with the executive, since there was no relationship. These chicha newspapers, in a sense, were part of the structure of the executive, responded to his direct orders and had no inherent subjectivity. They existed as long as there was funding and willingness of the executive to exist. (Fowks, 2015).

The anti-Fujimorist press[edit source | edit]
Despite the executive's efforts to control the press, there were still some media such as the newspaper La República de Mohme that maintained their critical line towards the regime and denounced how much irregularity they could find. These means slowly disappeared until they were a reduced stronghold, accessible only to those who specifically sought them.

Despite the effort invested and the courage shown by these organizations, the role they played was minimal. They were the object of the most sophisticated maneuvers of the executive to censor them, and they ended up getting lost in the diffuse tangle of the pro-Fujimorista press. Therefore, the impact of his publications did not usually put the government in trouble, since they went unnoticed. (Fowks, 2015).

Chapter 2: Dynamics and power games between actors[edit source | edit]
In this chapter, the relations between the executive, individualized in the president and his intelligence advisor, with the other actors that have presented themselves will be analyzed. This will allow a deeper understanding of the political motives for Fujimori's fall.

Relations with the Press[edit source | edit]
For Fujimori, presumably on the advice and work of Montesinos, the management of the press was always very important. This was a key tool of his regime, which allowed him to communicate with the population, which allowed him to shape the reality that the population perceived. Initially, media management did not exceed the limits of reasonableness to which every government must submit itself when it manages the media. However, this would change with the self-coup of 1992 and the control exercised by the government over the media tend to deepen. The maximum expression of media control are the "chicha newspapers" that were analyzed in a previous section.

However, the royal press was also subject to the control of the executive. The control mechanisms of the mass media (tv, radio, formal newspapers) took several forms. On the one hand, the state led psychosocial campaigns with widely interpretable information that the press used to echo, but that ended up serving as smokescreens or demolition campaigns against opposition forces. Montesinos was skilled at arming psychosocials, which began to become more common as 2000 approached.

Likewise, the state used its different administrative apparatuses (SUNAT, INDECOPI and the like) to exert implicit pressure on the media. Depending on how favorable his statements about the regime were, the impetus that public officials would have when auditing or resolving cases involving media companies was decided. This was particularly effective, because deep down, most media are conceived as companies and profit is the maxim that directs their decisions. To avoid conflicts with the bureaucracy, a good number of media took a pro-Fujimorista position that guarantees them the favor of the bureaucrats.

The most vile method used by the ruling party to control the average was again bribery. Not satisfied with the indirect pressure he exerted through the bureaucracy, Montesinos bought senior officials of various media in the same room of the SIN where he bought congressmen, judges, prosecutors and anyone else who is interested in buying, all recorded for his own. (Fowks, 2015).

On the other hand, the methods used against the anti-Fujimorist press were different. In the case of the newspaper La República, for example, it was usual that when an uncomfortable cover for the regime came out, the SIN went out to buy all the printed editions and thus silence the voice of Mohme and his company. As is evident, these strategies were quite effective, since the voice of the opposition in the press was practically nonexistent, lost among chicha and psychosocial newspapers of pishtacos and draws eyes. (Conaghan, 1999).

All these tactics were escalating in intensity and magnitude as the 2000 elections approached, with the electoral campaign for those elections being the maximum manifestation of media control that this country has witnessed. By the chicha newspapers, Fujimori was prosecuted and sentenced to 8 years in prison. However, in 2015 the supreme court would acquit him of this conviction.

Relations with parliament[edit source | edit]
As previously developed, parliament presented a considerable challenge for Fujimori. His bench was split, which was a problem in itself because Vasquez was already mobilizing his machinery in order to assert himself as a successor to the regime. In addition, he did not have the majority he needed to sustain his style of government. At this juncture, the strategy of the ruling party was to diminish the opposition by bribing or blackmailing its parliamentarians so that they move factually to Fujimorism and vote according to what the president needs. This desperate measure accounts for the cornering faced by the regime, increasingly obsessed and criminal in its grip to power. These operations, of course, remained in the skillful and Machiavellian hands of Montesinos, who recorded all the bribes as a personal security mechanism. (Taylor, 2000).

After the transfugism promoted by the executive, Congress was configured as follows:


 * Peru 2000: 64 representatives
 * Peru Possible: 25 representatives
 * Independent Moralizing Front: 9 representatives
 * We are Peru: 7 representatives
 * Peruvian Aprista Party: 5 representatives
 * National Solidarity: 2 representatives
 * Union for Peru: 3 representatives
 * Popular Action: 3 representatives
 * Let's move forward: 2 representatives.

Having the ruling party the absolute majority that it had so desperately sought, regardless of the perverseness of the means used or the betrayal of moral principles it made to obtain it, it tried to restore political stability, although this was already impossible with him in power and the political environment falling apart. (Pease, 2001).

Relations with Montesinos[edit source | edit]
To finish exposing the dynamics between Fujimori and Parliament, a brief account must be made of the last days of the relationship between the president and his adviser. This relationship was decisive in the president's decisions and had a direct impact on the decisions made towards parliament. During the second period Fujimori had been pressured to remove Montesinos and this had worn out the friendship of both, since Fujimori proposed to change his position, thereby removing enough power. Montesinos did not take this with pleasure and exerted pressure using his contacts in the armed forces to support him to maintain his post. Although he succeeded, the distance between the two had begun. (Murakami, 2012).

With the beginning of the new management, the distance would be further strengthened. Fujimori again tried to change positions to Montesinos, who rejected the proposal to move to the Ministry of Defense. In this context, Montesinos had the loyalty of all the congressmen he had convinced to join the ruling party. That is, the absolute majority depended on Montesinos, who served as the manager of the parliament.

The dynamics between the two began to stain with strangeness, although Fujimori still trusted Montesinos' intentions, so he took into consideration the information he gave him to make decisions. This led him to sharpen tension with the United States, a country that already looked at Montesinos with suspicious eyes, despite having been his contact in Peru for many years. (Degregori, 2012).

As already mentioned, international pressure was quite intense at the beginning of the government. This had been increasing progressively over time and had reached the breaking point, which had a direct impact on Montesinos. The repeated absence of evidence to demonstrate the democratization of Peru, as the president had promised to do, ended up filling the patience of the United States, who had been acting as mediators between Fujimoristas and opposition in the democratization process. What happened is that democratization involved reforms that cut Montesinos' power, so he used his network of contacts to block the advance of it. This situation was observed by the United States, who would finally lower its finger after his involvement in the sale of weapons to the FARC, an enemy of the United States, was confirmed in July 2000. This further marked the distance between Fujimori and Montesinos. (The Republic, July 19, 2000).

On September 14, 2000, Congressman Fernando Olivera would release the first of several videos that irrefutably demonstrated the purchase of congressmen made by Montesinos. In the video Montesinos was seen giving 15,000 dollars to Congressman Alberto Kouri and subsequently, the voting records of Congress show that his vote was always in the sense of the executive, proving the institutionalized corruption that was lived then. This fragmented event definitely the ruling bench in parliament between the people of Vásquez and the people of Fujimori, who would not collaborate in parliament again except for the vacancy of the presidency of Congress to the fall and flight of Fujimori. Montesinos also had some infiltrators in the ruling party and the opposition who were still loyal to him, which made him dangerous for both. (In the Corruption Room, 2004).

vladivideos scandal[edit source | edit]
See also: Vladivideo

Shortly after his election in 2000, and through the purchase of a video by opposition groups, evidence of the acts of corruption carried out during his government by Montesinos, his most loyal adviser, came to light on September 14 of that year. It was through hidden camera videos that Montesinos ordered to be recorded and in which he appeared bribing members of other parties to support Fujimori. At that moment the last crisis of his government broke out: Fujimori was forced to call new general elections on September 17, both for the election of a president and a new Congress of the Republic. In these elections, he said, he would not participate actively as a candidate.

In early October 2000, the plenary of Congress approved a constitutional reform in which article 112 on presidential reelection was modified. Similarly, two special transitional provisions were incorporated for the president, vice presidents and congressmen elected in the 2000 general elections to complete their term on July 28, 2001. Then, Congress approved a Legislative Resolution so that in the Annual Period of Sessions 2000-2001, the First Legislature ends on October 15 and the second begins on October 16, modifying the rules of procedure of Congress. Thus, on November 2, 2000, the constitutional reforms on reelection were approved in a second vote and the transitional provisions were incorporated into the Constitution.

On October 23, Francisco Tudela van Breugel-Douglas, First Vice President, irrevocably resigned from office because he disagreed with the inclusion of conditions for the holding of new general elections.

This uncovering was the coup de grace to the Fujimori government. Faced with this, there was no longer room for recovery. Two days later, Fujimori would announce to the nation that he would end his mandate early in July 2001, when he would call new elections in which he would not participate and that he would deactivate SIN. However, he did not pronounce on Montesinos. Probably for fear of his reaction. The latter was a monumental political clumsiness, since now all the negative charge of Montesinos was projected on him as an accomplice and cover-up of the acts of the former. (Murakami, 2012).

Finally, in September 2000 Fujimori decides to remove Montesinos from his post. This generates a chaotic situation that may have ended in a coup d'état. However, the timely intervention of the United States facilitated Montesinos being welcomed as a political persecuted in Panama, where he would leave on the 25th of that month, thus reducing the risk of a military coup that further reverses the situation of democracy in the country.

On October 22, Montesinos would return to Peru using his network of contacts to do so. When this happened, a surreal situation was generated, almost a movie, in which Fujimori personally took to the streets, leading a squadron of police officers and, wearing a glamorous black leather house in the style of the American rebel, would direct the search for Montesinos that was captured closely by the press. Fujimori raided Montesinos' house and several other localities throughout the country, violating Montesinos' rights by not having the company of a real prosecutor to develop the raid. For the occasion, Fujimori would have turned to a trusted man to interpret the prosecutor so that he could manipulate what he found on the Montesinos grounds, making sure that there is nothing to incriminate him. For this action, Fujimori was later sentenced to prison. Although evidence was never found to link it to Montesinos' acts of corruption, it is presumed that these did exist but were destroyed by Fujimori. (Gonzales Arica, 2005).

In the days following the Montesinos hunt show, a small coup attempt occurred that did not reach greater, since there was already a given date for the 2001 election and a military coup was disproportionate and out of context. What is theorized is that this was orchestrated by Montesinos as a distraction to facilitate his escape to Venezuela on the yacht of a well-known national businessman, demonstrating once again that his power was still in force. (Murakami, 2012).

As can be seen, the entire management of parliament in this period fell into the hands of Montesinos, however, the generalized political crisis and international pressure ended up overflowing the resources of the presidential adviser, making his situation of empowerment unsustainable. For his part, when Montesinos ran out, Fujimori was completely isolated from parliament. Its absolute majority quickly dissolved, returning to its initial number of congressmen. In addition, Vasquez's faction turned against him, further weakening his position.

Fall of his Government[edit source | edit]
In the midst of the political chaos and instability of his government, Fujimori traveled on November 13 to the APEC Summit in Brunei Darussalam, in his capacity as President of Peru. At the end of this conference, it was planned to pass through Kuala Lumpur and then arrive in Tokyo and from there undertake a trip to Panama for the 10th Ibero-American Summit. However, Fujimori did not stay at the closure of APEC and traveled to Singapore, while rumors circulated in Peru that Fujimori was seeking political asylum in Malaysia, news that was immediately denied by the Government Palace.

On November 19, from the Japanese capital and fearing that he would be criminally denounced for the acts of corruption of his government and alleging an explicit lack of guarantees for his physical integrity; Fujimori faxed the Congress of the Republic his formal resignation and then sent a message to his supporters, announcing that he was resigning from the Presidency of the Republic; the letter was announced on the 20.36. Before this, Ricardo Márquez Flores, Second Vice President of the Republic, resigned from office.

On the 21st of the same month, Congress met, did not accept the resignation, declared Fujimori's permanent moral incapacity and the presidential vacancy. Likewise, the resignations of the two vice presidents were accepted and the legal succession was proceeded, in which Valentín Paniagua, then president of Parliament, assumed as transitional president.

Fujimori's third government was marked by the escalation of irregularities committed by Montesinos in the different areas of government. The purchase of congressmen and the media control strategy are a clear example of what has been said. These actions could not be ignored by Fujimori, who had involvement in them at least as an accomplice. It is from this involvement that the president assumes a hesitant position before the removal of Montesinos, which will end up costing him dearly on the international front.

Fujimori fears that Montesinos may react histrionically to an eventual separation from the government, which could lead to the disclosure of Fujimori's true level of involvement with the irregular and illegal managements that have been described in this work, actions that were intended to maintain control of political power at all costs. This thesis is supported by Fujimori's performance on Montesinos' return, when he takes advantage of the panic to get rid of all the evidence he could find, masking the act in a police chase in the best Hollywood style, but without assuming clear leadership in the judicial persecution of it, making his capture a failure.

In this period, the intention of the ruling party had left behind the interest in making a democratic government, which governs thinking about the development of the country and the maximization of the exercise of the rights of Peruvians. This mainly due to pressure from Montesinos. However, it is Fujimori's timid attitude towards the decision to remove him from government that confirms Fujimori's willingness to cling to power as the main objective. Montesinos was the one who empowered the exercise of autocratic power that Fujimori had structured during 10 years of government. He had placed his trust in him and, although by the 2000 elections it should already be evident to Fujimori that Montesinos meant a real danger to his goal of clinging to power, it also represented the only opportunity he could glimpse to achieve it. Even if that meant continuing to climb in the string of illegal actions that Montesinos carried out under the pretext of consolidating the regime.

Congress[edit source | edit]
The following served as President of the Congress of the Republic of Peru:

Judiciary[edit source | edit]
The following served as President of the Supreme Court of Peru:

References[edit source | edit]

 * 1) ↑ "Hernando De Soto". The Globalist. Accessed on April 15, 2021.
 * 2) ^ Velarde, J. (January 1, 1992). The economic program of August 1990: Evaluation of the first year. Economic Research Consortium. p. 18.
 * 3) ^ Carlos Amat y León, Minister of Agriculture and Gloria Helfer, Minister of Education, in October and December 1990, respectively, officially resigned for disagreeing with the "shock policies."
 * 4) ↑ Diario Expreso October 14, 1990.
 * 5) ↑ "Minister Bologna". Weekly summary: RS. December 1991.
 * 6) ^ On the night of April 5, 1992, or when the "Chinese" became a dictator.
 * 7) ^ "Address by President Fujimori on the closure of the Congress." Archived from the original on July 9, 2017. Accessed on May 12, 2017.
 * 8) ↑ coalition [executive power, armed forces and a team of independent professionals] of powers aimed to implement a long-term political project that should ensure the development, modernization and pacification of the country. This civic-military regime, little interested in the rule of law and Peruvian political institutions, is known as "fujimorismo."
 * 9) ^ Pastor, Gustavo. "The twenty years of Fujimori's "self-coup": the emergence of "Fujimorism." 2012. Archived from the original on April 17, 2018.
 * 10) ↑ Source: Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Final Report. Lima: CVR, 2003. For more information on some aspect of the source visit the following link: http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/
 * 11) ^ "Fujimori commits to the OAS to restore constitutional rights." ABC.ABC. April 15, 1992. p. 29. "After these elections, which will take place in no less than five months, a democratic constituent congress will be established that will guarantee the validity of the principle of balance of powers and effective citizen participation in the elaboration, through elected representatives, of a new social contract."
 * 12) ↑ "amériquelatinepoliticaloutlook". Archived from the original on September 10, 2016.Accessed on June 3, 2017.
 * 13) ^ "The twenty years of Fujimori's "self-coup": the emergence of "Fujimorism". Archived from the original on September 10, 2016. Accessed on May 3, 2017.
 * 14) ^ "What a cabmios the political constitution of 1993 generated." Accessed on April 5, 2016.
 * 15) ↑ Jump up to: a b http://archivo.elcomercio.pe/politica/gobierno/lo-positive-lo-negative-constituciones-79-93-noticia-963032
 * 16) ↑ http://www.pcm.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Constitucion-Pol%C3%ADtica-del-Peru-1993.pdf
 * 17) ↑ Oscar de la Puente Raygada.
 * 18) ↑ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on June 16, 2017. Accessed on July 10, 2017.
 * 19) ↑ http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/
 * 20) ↑ https://www.deperu.com/legislacion/ley-26291-pdf.html
 * 21) ^ Fujimori reelected by a wide margin.
 * 22) ↑ http://blog.pucp.edu.pe/blog/fernandotuesta/1999/12/27/la-illegal-postulacion-de-fujimori/
 * 23) ↑ https://www.web.onpe.gob.pe/modElecciones/elecciones/SUMEN/GENERALS/10.pdf
 * 24) ^ The Government of Peru falls amid differences about the conflict with Ecuador.
 * 25) ↑ New Prime Minister for Peru. (broken link available on the Internet Archive; see history, first version and latest version).
 * 26) ↑ "In the sights of international observers." El País. April 10, 2000.
 * 27) ^ "Fujimori borders on his reelection amid growing suspicions of fraud." El País. April 11, 2000.
 * 28) ↑ Jump up to:a b "The United States trusts Transparency and demands a second round." El País. April 11, 2000.
 * 29) ^ "The leader of the opposition in Peru calls for a "civil revolt" against fraud." El País. April 13, 2000.
 * 30) ↑ "The traps of the Peruvian official computer system." El País. April 12, 2000.
 * 31) ^ Only two presidents will celebrate Fujimori's third five-year term.
 * 32) ↑ Banzer will attend Fujimori's inauguration.
 * 33) ^ Toledo called for preventing Fujimori from taking office.
 * 34) ^ Hard clashes between Fujimori's opponents and the Police.
 * 35) ^ "Fujimori stays in Japan while Parliament is considering his dismissal." El País. November 17, 2000.
 * 36) ^ Fujimori confirmed his resignation and could stay in Japan.
 * 37) ^ Paniagua assumes the presidency of Peru.

Bibliography[edit source | edit]

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