User:Dominic Mayers/sandbox/Notes on epistemology

This is work in progress to try to capture what is epistemology and improves Epistemology. At this stage, it is only a few notes on different aspects that are related to epistemology. My recent thoughts is that what is "central" in epistemology is far from being clear. Even the centrality of knowledge is questionned: some say it is understanding, not knowledge, that is central.

Epistemology as a branch of philosophy
William P. Alston wrote:

Main questions of epistemology
Brian C. Barnett wrote:

John Greco wrote:

Later, in a section entitled "Foundationalism and Coherentism", he wrote:

Alvin I. Goldman wrote:

In the Introduction to a part entitled "Externalism and Internalism", Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske wrote:

Alvin I. Goldman with a more externalist view, wrote: Noah Lemos wrote:

The main questions in the references given in Epistemology
The references are the entries Epistemology in the three encyclopedies SEP, IEP and Borchert.

In SEP, Steup, Matthias and Ram Neta wrote:

In IEP, David A. Truncellito wrote:

In the Borchert, Earl Conee and Richard Feldman wrote:

On central concepts
Laurence Bonjour, while discussing Sosa's virtue epistemology, wrote:

Brian C. Barnett wrote: and later and again later : Eric Schwitzgebel wrote: In the context of Bayesian epistemology, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger wrote: John Pollock and Joseph Cruz wrote:

In the context of Bayesian Epistemology, Alan Hajek and Stephan Hartmann wrote (expressing caveats with their approach):

978-2-8399-1562-5

Review of Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel
I will not review all the articles in this book, but only those that seems related to epistemology or at the least written by an author that is often cited in epistemology oriented papers.

Common Sense and Skepticism : A Lecture by Keith Lehrer
Lehrer is known among epistemologists as one of the best proponents of a coherence theory of knowledge, but his contribution in the book is more about Thomas Reid and his theory of common sense, which is also an area of interest for Lehrer. I will not go into much details. Essentially, Lehrer argues that we must trust our faculties, in particular, our faculty of perception. He goes into a theory of exemplars to make sense of Moore's argument that waving hands is a "proof" that they exist.

Engel on pragmatic encroachment and epistemic value by Duncan Pritchard
Pragmatic encroachment is the rejection of what Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath describes as epistemological purism: Pritchard argues (and says he follows Engel here) that intuitive arguments in support of pragmatic encroachment are misleading. He also says Anyway, after having read quickly the article, it seems to be an argument that non epistemic factors can influence epistemic factors, but this does not imply that knowledge is not entirely determined by these epistemic factors and therefore epistemic purism still hold, even though non epistemic factors can influence knowledge.

Review of Thomasson's Phenomenology and the Development of Analytic Philosophy
it is likely that a better comprehension of the link between continental and analytic philosophy will shade some light on the birth or renaissance of epistemology. This should complete Floridi's account of this renaissance. Here is a passage in Thomasson's Phenomenology and the Development of Analytic Philosophy. We know Ryle for his distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that. This is a part of Ryles's larger program of finding a method for philosophy. He wrote (p. 117):

and (p.119)

and (p.119)

and (p. 121)

and (p.123) To be continued, because how Ryle saw a solution to skepticism in his externalist view is important.

History of knowledges, the plural
Floridi notes that Sir William Hamilton wrote:

Peter Burke wrote:

Knowledge by acquaintance
Thomas Vinci wrote: "Russell offers sense-data and universals as examples of things known by acquaintance."

Recollection and genetic epistemology in Floridi
Floridi seems to have a deep analysis of the different problems about knowledge and as a part of that analysis he mentions recollection:

Review of Floridi's The Renaissance of epistemology
Floridi covers the perspective of many philosophers. The review presents these views together with general points.

Introduction
In the introduction, Floridi presents epistemology as the outcome of a reaction against idealism in favor of an anti-metaphysical and naturalist approach: "At the turn of the [20th] century there had been a resurgence of interest in epistemology through an anti-metaphysical, naturalist, reaction against the nineteenth-century development of Neo-Kantian and Neo-Hegelian idealism." Floridi says this reaction is seen in  Hermann von Helmholtz, G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, William James and C.S. Peirce It is in the introduction that Floridi says that "The interwar renaissance of epistemology, however, was not just a continuation of this emancipation from idealism. It was also prompted by major advances in mathematics, logic, and physics which engendered new methodological concerns (as in the influential tradition of French philosophers of science: Duhem, Poincaré, Bachelard).
 * Helmholtz (1821 – 1894) scientifically reinterpreted Kant in Franz Brentano's (1838 – 1917) phenomenology and Ernst Mach's (1838–1916) neutral monism, says Floridi.
 * SEP on Brentano says : "A central principle of Brentano’s philosophy [...] was that philosophy should be done in a rigorous, scientific manner." This seems to explain why Floridi says it was a scientific reinterpretation. The SEP article adds that Brentano stated:  The SEP article says also that Brentano argued that the right procedure [in psychology] consisted in observing and describing the relevant phenomena and establishing the general laws on the basis of induction. The article continues : the particularity of Brentano’s method lies in the fact that psychology is based mainly on observation that is performed from a first person point of view. The phenomenology of Brentano,  mentioned in  Floridi's statement,  is described as follows in the SEP article :  The central aspect of Brentano's descriptive psychology or phenomenology is the notion of intentionality and of intentional object. The intentional object exists in the mental. So, interestingly, Brentano had an idealistic side. One can say that he was a realist, because he believed in objective objects besides the intentional objects, but the link between them was not understood by his students, in particular Husserl.
 * G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, in the British philosophy, rebutted Hegelianism.
 * William James and C. S. Peirce, in America, proposed a new pragmatist epistemology that directed attention away from the traditional a priori and toward the natural sciences.

The two faces of skepticism
It starts by stating two questions. K : Is knowledge possible ? KK : Is an epistemology that answers K possible ? Floridi suggests the intuitive image that K is a bottom-up question whereas KK is a top-down question. Floridi says "But one can never be in a position to establish an answer to (K) if no satisfactory reply to (KK) can be provided. Questioning the possibility of epistemology rests on the problem of the criterion (Sextus Empiricus 1976: II.2) [...]’. The problem of the criterion is discussed by Cling. Next, Floridi discusses Husserl's view.  The natural question is what is the link between  the sceptic argument, Husserl's view and  anti-naturalism.  Dan Zahavi presents Husserl's anti-naturalism as seen by Roy, Petitot, Pachoud, and Varela. Zahavi also presents Evan Thompson's adaptation of Husserl's view to progress in science.So, again, what is the link between the sceptic argument, Husserl's view and anti-naturalism? I have the vague impression that Floridi's point is that it is a fallacy to claim that the sceptic argument leads us to an idealistic view with, say Hegel's dialectic or Husserl's phenomenology, as the methodology to bring knowledge. But, it would also be a fallacy to claim that it leads to naturalism with the scientific methodology as the way to gain knowledge. Besides, I do not see a fundamental distinction between the scientific methodology and dialectic or phenomenology in the following sense that in all three cases we have no clue why it works. In all three cases, to explain why it works, we need strong meta-physical assumptions. I must grant, however, that today's way to gain knowledge is science. So, it's natural to replace dialectic or phenomenology by the scientific method, but it's the same meta-physical and epistemological pattern and the sceptical argument leads us to this pattern, either in the form of a dialectical, phenomenological or scientific methodology. More to the point, Hegel believes, [...] his dialectical method [is] genuinely scientific. As he says, “the dialectical constitutes the moving soul of scientific progression”. A similar statement can be found for Husserl's phenomenology. This is bad news for our objective to explain the scope of epistemology as covered in the Wikipedia article: unless a specific form of naturalism is considered, it's not so much the naturalistic approach that explains this scope, because the response to the eternal sceptic argument has always been a form a scientific methodology that supposedly explains how knowledge is gained.
 * The view point of Floridi is that Husserl, strongly influenced by the notion of intentionality of Brentano, his teacher, criticised naturalism and concluded that "the only correct way of dealing with K is by means of principled and convincing arguments".

A complement to Floridi
Martin Curd and Stathis Psillos wrote:

Definition of naturalism
Here is a description of naturalism.

A parenthesis about naturalism in Hume and Kant
There might be a lot to say on the subject. Here, I simply present a short quote from Ilya Kasavin and Evgeny Blinov about a chapter of Heiner Klemme in a book that Ilya Kasavin edited.

Anti-naturalism and the foundational problem in German-speaking philosophy
The section first says that Kant's a priori approach is not a "justification" for scientific knowledge, despite Kant's claim, and that Kant did not consider the possibility of an epistemology, a theory that could answer the question of the possibility of knowledge. It continues "In 1807, the Kantian philosopher Jakob Friedrich Fries addressed this issue in his Neue oder anthropologische Kritik der Vernunft." This is the well known Fries's trilemma, which the section briefly explains. It says that in the 1910s and 1920s there was a Fries's renaissance, particularly in the work of Leonard Nelson.
 * Nelson (1882-1927) was a German Philosopher. In his 1912 address "Die Unmoglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie" (The Impossibility of "The Theory of Knowledge"), after having argued for the impossibility of a theory of knowledge he said  Floridi says that "Drawing on Fries’s analysis, Nelson came to object to the entire project of an epistemology in the Cartesian, antisceptical, and justificatory sense, and to favour a more descriptive and psychologistic approach (Nelson 1930, 1965)." My understanding is that Nelson used a skeptical argument, not against knowledge, but against a view on knowledge. The above quote gives an idea of his view on knowledge, which he says is  robust against this skeptical attack, not that we cannot doubt its explanatory value.

Floridi continues on Nelson and says "Despite his criticism of foundational debates, Nelson’s ‘naturalised epistemology’ contributed greatly to reawakening philosophers’ interest in the foundational issue in the late 1920s and early 1930s. One philosopher especially influenced by his work was Moritz Schlick."


 * Schlick, says Floridi, endorsed the Cartesian requirement that there be an absolutely certain foundation of knowledge. He also accepted that it was ‘self-evident that the problem of the foundation of all knowledge is nothing else but the question of the criterion of truth’ (Schlick 1979: II, 374) and supported a correspondence theory of truth. ... So he came to defend a foundationalism according to which there are objective facts, external to the knower’s doxastic states, that are accessible by the knower and capable of justifying the knower’s beliefs in a way that is sufficient for knowledge. He had a theory of protocol propositions (basic statements) and more senses related ‘affirmations’ (Konstatierungen) (used to test the basic statements) that constituted the empirical basis of science.

It appeared to critics such as Otto Neurath similar to a philosophy of intuition; they argued that it was beset with solipsistic difficulties and contained unacceptable metaphysical theses.


 * Neurath's approach is that the epistemic justification of science was not to be achieved by means of an appeal to external facts or alleged intuitions, but internally, through logical coherence (which did not necessarily exclude some ordering relations), instrumental economy, pragmatic considerations of social and scientific ends, a rational use of conventions by the scientific community, and a constantly open and public debate. Following Duhem, Neurath argued that, given an apparently successful theory, rival explanations can be made to fit the same evidence that supports it, and that in replacing or revising a theory, hypotheses and observation statements come under scrutiny as whole networks, not individually. Practical expedience rather than absolute truth was determinant. Floridi continues : Neurath summarised his position in a famous analogy: ‘We are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship [the system of knowledge] on the open sea, without ever being able to dismantle it in dry-dock and reconstruct it from its best components’ (Neurath 1983: 92).

Though, Floridi does not go into it, I found useful to read Zolo's Neurath versus Popper, because they seem to have similar positions. For example, Popper's swamp metaphor is very much like Neurath's ship metaphor. It is interesting that the first distinction that Zolo mentions is related to the fact that Popper saw the empirical basis as a part of objective knowledge. Neurath criticized Popper on that respect. Zolo writes "Still more significantly, Popper had ignored the relationship between a language and the individual users of it. This had led to his failure to recognise the historical variability and pluralism of scientific languages and to his supposition of the existence of a universal, semantically pure, scientific language."

An obscure paragraph
The following paragraph in Floridi's paper is obscure to me.

He seems to interpret the metaphor and what it expresses as a part of coherentism, because he describes it as a point common to both Neurath's and Hegel's coherentism. Also, I believe that "former’s holistic and non-subjectivist ‘pan-internalism’" refers to Hegel's view, but he does not describe it here, unless he refers to Hegel's position just stated as being similar to Neurath's view. He had a similar statement in chapter 6 of Logic of Information. It makes sense to assume that Floridi refers to Hegel, because just after he says "In Neurath, this tendency was reflected in his project for an International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (1938–70)." If my understanding is correct, Floridi puts coherentism in the same boat as Cartesian foundationalism and Kantian reconstructionism : forms of "epistemological totalitarianism".

End of obscure paragraph—continuing
Ok, enough about that obscure paragraph, Floridi says Schlick, who was presented earlier, was firmly hostile to Neurath’s coherentism. The section ends with "Neurath’s coherentism found an ally in the pragmatist movement, which was equally anti-Cartesian. Quine’s fallibilist and holistic, naturalised epistemology can be interpreted as its latest development (Quine 1969, 1992). Another philosopher deeply influenced by the ‘Fries Renaissance’ was Popper (Popper 1962, 1979). He mentions the influence of Popper.
 * Schlick's view is that, if epistemic statements are not based on a specific set of more basic protocol propositions ultimately rooted in sense-experience of the world, all propositions may be regarded as in principle corrigible and their truth can only consist in their mutual agreement within the system of knowledge. Schick argued that such coherence provides too little – truth can be equated to logical consistency only in a formal system but not in an empirical science, since a coherent tale may otherwise become as acceptable as a scientific fact. Moreover, the absence of coherence leaves it utterly unclear what propositions may need to be revised, eliminated, or adjusted, and how.

The first sentence
The section begins by going back to the previous section. The sentence "Coherentism in epistemology is a natural ally of anti-realism in ontology, ..." is interesting. I find it interesting, because the previous section is a lot about coherentism and, among other things, says that Neurath was opposed to Schilk's Cartesian search for a solid foundation and found an ally in the pragmatist movement, which was equally anti-Cartesian. Schilk's Cartesian search for a solid foundation does not refer to the specific approach used by Descartes : Schilk used a special notion of "objective facts, external to the knower’s doxastic states, that are accessible by the knower and capable of justifying the knower’s beliefs in a way that is sufficient for knowledge." That was not Descartes's approach. Anti-Cartesian should be understood in the same way, in reference to a search for a solid bed rock foundation. The point is that coherentism, as seen by Neurath, is against any thing shaky such as a supposedly existing solid foundation, but in doing so it also rejects realism as being pointless and metaphysical. It is interesting, because realists see this external reality in the opposite way.

This interesting sentence continues " ... and both [coherentism in epistemology and anti-realism in ontology] find a fertile environment in idealistic philosophies, whose claims about the contradictory nature of appearances in defence of a monistic supra-naturalism may easily make use of the sceptic’s dualist anti-naturalism (Hegel 1802)." To help interpret this second part of the sentence, here is the definition of supranaturalism in webster913.com : The state of being supernatural; belief in supernatural agency or revelation; supernaturalism. That second part of the sentence refers to Hegel's idealism. The overall sentence says that not asking for epistemic foundation allows one not to ask for realism and both find support in idealism, but what it says about idealistic philosophies after, starting with "whose claims about the contradictory nature of appearances",  is obscure.

Hentrup says that it is in the source given, (Hegel 1802), that "engaging with G.E. Schulze’s Neo-Humean challenge to Kant’s critical project, that Hegel first develops the link between skepticism and negativity, finding that “skepticism is in its inmost heart at one with every true philosophy”". What is this dualist anti-naturalism of the sceptic that Hegel seems to make use of? Well, I read what Hentrup wrote about Hegel's 1802 paper and I found no clue what it could be. This quote illustrates the difficulty

"First let us reconsider the debate about naturalism amongst contemporary interpreters of Hegel. Some, notably including Frederick Beiser, see Hegel and the German idealists as naturalists while others, including Sebastian Gardner, see Hegel and the idealists as anti-naturalists. On inspection, the nature of this interpretive division will turn out to be more nuanced than it initially appears. This points us towards a less polarised way of considering how Hegel stands vis-a-vis naturalism. [...] That is: naturalism has various strands, so that any particular philosopher might incline towards naturalism along one or several strands of the cluster but not others. Spicer includes the following strands, amongst others: 1. Rejection of the idea of ﬁrst philosophy; 2. Belief that philosophy is continuous with the sciences; 3. Disbelief in supernatural entities/processes; 4. Physicalism about the mind; 5. Opposition to non-naturalism about ethics/values; 6. Rejection of a priorism. If a philosopher can incline towards naturalism along some strands of the cluster but not others, then how naturalistic or anti-naturalistic a philosophy is is not an absolute matter but one of degree."

This point of view of Dan Zahavi might also give a context :

List of common authors
In epistemology as theory of justified true belief
 * SEP : Epistemology in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
 * IEP : Epistemology in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
 * Bor : Conee and Feldman, Epistemology in Borchert, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy
 * BD : Sven Bernecker (Editor), Fred I. Dretske (Editor), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology
 * Res : Rescher, Nicholas, Epistemology an introduction to the theory of knowledge.
 * Bon : Bonjour, Laurence, Epistemology : Classic Problems and Contemporary Response
 * Lam : Lammenranta, Markus, Theories of Justification in Handbook of Epistemology
 * Sho : Shope, Robert K., Analysis of knowing in Handbook of Epistemology

In other aspects of epistemology
 * SSF : Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich, AND Luc Faucher, Reason and Rationality in Handbook of Epistemology
 * Bri : Avrum Stroll, Epistemololy in www.Britannica.com

Review of Yuri Cath's Knowing How
introduces it as usual, by referring to skills such as knowing how to drive a bicycle, but it gets more complicated. Apparently. Ryle (1949) has defined it as anti-intellectualism (meaning it cannot be knowing-that) and abilitism  or  dispositionalism (meaning there must be a dispositional state). He says this was the "traditional view", which was seriously challenged for the first time by Stanley and Williamson’s (2001) paper  ‘Knowing  How’, which rejected the two sides of Ryle definition and provided an argument for his own definition: S-W "provided a linguistic argument for an intellectualist view according  to  which  knowing  how  to  Φ  is  a  matter  of  knowing  a  proposition  that  answers  the  embedded  ‘how  to  Φ’  question." The key point, as far as the scope of Cath's article is concerned, is that it reviews the "explosion  of  new work  on  knowledge-how" that the S-W paper steered between 2009 and 2019 (and also before when useful). So, I am not convinced that this will provide us with the most general picture on Know-how. I don't think that we should accept blindly the importance given by Cath to the literature that he covers in his review, though I have no doubt that the issue raised is central. It's definitively a valid start.

Argument based on what we expect from common language
One S-W argument is that common language suggests that how to digest is not a know-how. Similarly, if, say Alice, annoys Bob at some occasions, but does not know why, even if she beliefs that she knows why, she does not really know how to annoy Bob. So, in order to respect these subtleties the definition gets more complicated. With more arguments of this kind, the following definition is suggested: S knows how to Φ if and only if S has the ability to Φ intentionally. He says that this definition has been criticized for being both too strong and too weak, using some other arguments based on common language.

To argue that it is too strong, cases of know-how (acknowledged in terms of common language) are given that fails to respect the definition. For example, someone knows how to do a pudding, but then the mondial reserve of sugar is destroyed. The person still knows-how, but has lost the ability to do a pudding. Cath says "A common  strategy  in  replying  to  such  cases  (Fridland  2015,  Löwenstein  2017,  Markie 2018) is to appeal to Hawley’s (2003) influential idea that knowing how to Φ  does entail reliable success in action, but only in contextually relevant counterfactual circumstances, where usually these will be circumstances deemed to be normal." But other examples are raised where the limitation in the know-how occurs in normal circumstances, such as computational limitation, one knows how to factorize numbers, but cannot factorize large numbers. (Personnally, I think, and cryptographers will agree with me, the person does not really know how to factorize large numbers. Thus, the issue is superficial, a simple lack of precision when we say that we know how to factorize numbers.)

Subtle linguistic analysis
Besides the common interpretation of the language, a formal linguistic analysis can also help us clarify the definition of know-how. The sentence "Mary knows how to ride a bicycle" belong to a group of sentences that can be divided in four categories. One sentence in this group is "Mary knows how she could ride a bicycle". This first one has the meaning that we also attribute to "Mary knows how to ride a bicycle". There are three others. "Mary knows how she ought to ride a bicycle", "Mary knows how one ought to ride a bicycle" and "Mary knows how one could ride a bicycle". The analysis says that the first of the these three can also be a valid interpretation of "Mary knows how to ride a bicycle". This analysis allows us to specify that the correct interpretation in know-how knowledge is not the "ought to" but the "could". Consider the  example  of  a  ski  instructor  who  knows  how  to  perform  a  certain  difficult  trick  that  they  have  never  been  able  to  perform  themselves,  and  which  only the very best athletes can perform (S&W 2001, Stanley 2011a). This is an example of "ought to" and therefore is not an example of knowledge how. The other aspect of this analysis is that we never use the interpretation with the pronoun "one", but the interpreration where the hidden pronoun corresponds to the main subject. This last point is going to be important later.

A critic of Rylean's view
Cath wrote "This  issue  connects  with  a  big-picture  worry  for  Rylean  views  which  is  that  they  cannot  account  for  the  epistemic  or  cognitive  dimensions  of  knowledge-how,  given that  the  abilities  (or  dispositions)  that  feature  in  their  analyses  are  not  meant  to  involve  any  states  of  knowledge-that  or  true  belief.  Annas  (2001:  248)  voices  this kind of worry when she suggests that if knowledge-how does not involve any kind of  knowledge-that  then  it  cannot  be  more  than  an  “inarticulate  practical  knack”,  and Bengson  and  Moffett  (2011a,  2011b)  argue  at  length  that  Rylean  views  cannot  account for the cognitive dimensions of knowledge-how."

This critic was ignored for a while, but recent responses to these attacks proposed to "relax the constraint that the relevant abilities not involve any states of knowledge-that, by claiming that these abilities will entail the possession of certain forms of knowledge-that (Löwenstein 2017; Habgood-Coote 2018a). Others, like Elzinga (2019), try to understand the intelligence of knowledge-how without appealing to knowledge-that at all. A common theme in many of these works is to attempt to explain the cognitive or epistemic properties of knowledge-how in terms of the norms regulating actions and abilities."

Review of Maria Rosa Antognazza's history of philosophy
Not yet written

Review of Stroud's Epistemology, the History of Epistemology, Historical Epistemology
Stroud wrote: "Without informed recognition of how the central questions and ideas of epistemology have come down to us, what you say in epistemology is likely to be of very little value. This seems to me to be borne out by a great deal of what has been going on in the subject for a long time. Much of it is really of very little value. An understanding of history is therefore important. But rather than speaking of an historically ‘oriented’ epistemology, I would prefer to call it historically informed epistemology. [...] There is not much sign of this kind of diagnostic interest in current and recent philosophical epistemology. That is due in part to the apparently widely-held assumption that it is pretty well known what the real problems of epistemology are, and we just need to get on with the effort of solving them. There is the further assumption, on the part of many philosophers, not only that the questions are not primarily historical, but that epistemology is simply a different subject from the history of epistemology. [...] questions? These are diagnostic concerns. Attention to philosophical ways of thinking in the past can help reveal how the questions we now regard as epistemological have come to have the significance they have for us. This is something I think we need to understand better than we do before we can be sure we know what the problems really are and what it would take to make progress on them. The same is true, after all, of painting and music. [...] There is a long and still-continuing tradition of understanding perception in a way that I think makes knowledge of the world impossible, or at least impossible to explain. [...] That is why I think philosophical epistemology now needs to get to the bottom of what I see as an impasse. This is where I think history comes into play."

In his Theaetetus Plato argues that knowledge is not the same thing as perception on the grounds that no case of perception as such is a case of knowledge.’ Perception involves a bodily sense-organ, but it is taken to be nothing more than a purely passive affection that usually brings about an effect in the mind. Perception itself cannot be knowledge since knowledge involves belief, which in turn requires an activity of “the mind”. “Knowledge is to be found”, Socrates says, “not in the experiences but in the process of reasoning about them”. It is “not in the experiences that it is possible to grasp being and truth” (Theaetetus 186D). "

Fumerton's view
Richard Fumerton wrote:

Then Fumerton brings Descartes into the debate:

and

In particular, he adds:

After having discussed controversies about the ontological meaning of sentences, he says: Humm! The last statement seems to assume an indirect dualist perspective, but we will see. In any case, he adds:

and comments that the issue is deeper than that: He insists that: Ah, but he then says something that seems to contradict my impression that he assumes indirect dualism: Next, he goes into more details about internalism: He next discusses "the precise nature of the externalist’s thesis". He analyses 8 theses, but keep only two: Next, he argues that Descartes's argument for dualism threatens Ext1. To do so, he first revisits Descartes's argument for his dualism in terms of mind and body. But, before I go into the details, I must say that Descartes's dualism, in Fumerton's view, is not between what is within the brain (or within the skin) and what is outside that region, but between the mind and the body. Others such as Popkin adds that it is also between the mind and the physical world, but it's not so different, because the body is seen as a physical reality different from the mind. For Descartes, the link with the mind was done in some part of the brain. My understanding is that Fumerton argues that Descartes is correct that given that what S knows from a physical perspective about « S is in a state that bears relation R to objects x and y » is not the same as (not equivalent to) what S knows from a mind perspective about « S is thinking that p », then these propositions cannot be analytically equivalent (for S). Hum, but their non equivalence might be due to the difference between the way we learn in these two perspectives. Descartes would be correct, but only about the propositions themselves. Let us see if this is what Fumerton is saying. He wrote: and

Other views
Brie Gertler wrote:

Personally, I don't understand why dualism is opposed to materialism. Yes, materialism in an ontological monism, but there other monisms. For example, physicalism is very frequent among philosophers and it would not be fair to include it under materialism, because it is not so easy to distinguish it from a monism on the mind side. Gertier might discuss these things. I did not check.

Descartes's semantic internalism
Brie Gertler wrote:

Jill Vance Buroker wrote:

and

and

Susana Nuccetelli wrote:

Descartes's dualism and the debate
In the view of Alvin Platinga, except for a few exceptions, no philosophy before Descartes qualifies as an internalist view as defined in the contemporary internalist/externalist debate. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz, while defending the presence of some externalist trend in Descartes' phylosophy, says that philosophers argued, in the form of a criticism, that Cartesian dualism is responsible for internalism in modern philosophy. Descartes is well known for his dualism, but he is mostly known for his skeptic approach. He used this approach, not to deny that the objects of sensory experiences follow precise laws that can be known, but to gain certainty in the mind side, in the cogito, and he used this as a platform for his notion of clear and distinct idea. In that respect,  Descartes was influenced by Plato. However, Descartes argued for a different kind of dualism. The new aspect of Cartesian dualism, with no counterpart in Plato's dualism, is the existence of a real physical world behind the sensory experiences with its own laws and a real mental substance behind our mental experiences and a causal relation between these two worlds. This view, in which the external world is real but known to us only indirectly, is called indirect realism. In that sense, Descartes was the father of modern realism and, for realists, of modern philosophy as well. Descartes's interactionism (interaction between the physical reality and the substance of the mind) was abandoned in the nineteenth century because of the growing popularity of philosophical mechanism. Realism itself was not abandoned, only the coexistence of an independent substance behind the mind was abandoned.

Richard Foley wrote:

Difference between epistemic (conceptual) and ontological (real) divisions
The following attitude attributed to Davidson by Hans-Johann Glock plays an important rôle in understanding different kinds of externalism:

False dichotomy
I used the expression "False dichotomy" to refer some kinds of externalism that, in some ontological perspective, were not opposed to internalism, but that was before I realized that there are many kinds of externalism. So, this section can be seen as a move toward the next section about different forms of externalism.

Richard Fumerton wrote:

and

Man-To Tang wrote:

Christian Skirke says that Husserl's phenomenology does not endorse either internalism or externalism:

Dan Zahavi wrote:

Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith say Phenomenology cannot be understood without the concept of "intentionality":

Christian Skirke wrote:

In that context, Stalnaker's point that there is a kind of incompatibility between objective knowledge and internal subjective knowledge is interesting: "This means that the set of propositions that you know is closed under consequence. But that seems absurd."

Different forms of externalism
Alvin Platinga wrote:

Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz wrote:

Here, Sven Bernecker describes content externalism, which he opposes to justification externalism in a note:

Later, he adds:

Here, Sven Bernecker mentions a few kinds of externalism:

William Alston does not say it explicitly, but he considers different kinds of justification internalism and thus of justification externalism. This can be seenin many sentences such as:

Alston defines externalism in opposition to internalism and thus he defines different kind of externalism through a definition of different kinds of internalism. He defines two different kinds of internalism: "Access Internalism" (AI) and "Perspective Internalism". He defines the subject's perspective "disjunctively as what the subject 'knows, believes, or justifiably believes." He says that "it will make a considerable difference what choice we make from between these alternatives. For the present let's proceed in terms of justified belief."

Timothy McGrew wrote (emphasis mine):

Ryan Nichols wrote:

J. Adam Carter wrote:

J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin W. Jarvis wrote:

The point of view of Joseph L. Cruz is that (justification) externalism is a kind of non doxatic view on knowledge: all doxatic views are (justification) internalist views:

Later, he adds:

Again later, he adds:

Later, he clarifies that the norms exist, but are followed in an automatic manner:

Cruz further explains:

Later, he explains that the norms might not be learned, but innate:

and later:

An interesting point is that, in a next section, Cruz distinguish between justification of knowledge and justification of the norms used to justify knowledge:

He calls then "belief externalism" and "norm externalism" and clarifies internalism with this terminology:

Noah Lemos considers that the debate is about justification:

Later, he adds:

Later, again, he adds:

Referring to Alston, he discusses the problem of circularity when we try to justify and accepts that we must be "practical":

The importance of the different forms of externalism
Robert J. Fogelin wrote:

Fogelin defines his own categories of internalisms and says that there exist, correspondingly, two categories of externalism (defined as opposition to these internalisms). I am not sure his choice of names have been accepted, but he calls "ontological internalism" the internalism that says the warrant must be subjectively accessible to the subject (his words are "in the mind" and qualify it with "provide the immediately accessible evidence needed to provide a secure basis for knowledge") and calls "methodological internalism" the internalism that requires  that the "justified believer base her belief on grounds that justify it".

In the following, Ali Hasan defines a particular form of externalism and a particular form of internalism that make it easy to reject externalism in favour of internalism. First, Hasan defines internalism in a way that does not refer to the physical brain as described by neuroscience, but only requires a subjective or epistemic access to the warrant:

Hasan continues:

This is a form of externalism. Other forms of externalism might require a direct access to the warrant: if knowledge itself is not internal, it might have access to what is not internal. That's not weird because what is the range of the mind if not the range of the knowledge that it contains. It gets a bit complicated because Halan adds:

This allows Halan to defend internalism as follows:

Jonathan Egeland (also Jonathan Egeland Harouny) went through a similar argument, citing Bonjour and Lehrer, and similarly concluded:

Similarly, Gail Fine considers a similar kind of externalism:

Lehrer seems against some form of justification externalism. He began the chapter EXTERNALISM AND THE TRUTH CONNECTION of his book Theory of knowledge with:

He clearly, as early as the year 2000, indicates that justification externalism is not the only kind of externalism:

However, even if justification is not needed, Lehrer claimed that all externalists:

The key point is that knowledge is still a belief, a true belief, but with an extra external warrant, which apparently does not count as a justification. He gives as an example, the externalism of Dretske or Nozick:

He next criticises this general view on externalism.

However, this is a criticism of justification externalism and a self-justified knowledge can be internally justified and not a part of that criticism. In addition, this self-justified knowledge, which avoid the criticism by being internally (self-)justified, can at the same time be (content) external. In what follows, Cruz says that all forms of externalism fail to deal with "this problem adequately", but he refers to justication externalism:

Guy Axtell mentions Sosa as an example of an externalist that accepts the "traditional" internalist requirement:

He further adds later:

It is interesting that this suggests that they all agree that justification is needed for knowledge. So, Williamson and, before him Popper, do not belong in this list. We could add that Plato also is not in this list, if we accept that recollection (anámnisi) is not a justification.

Sven Bernecker wrote:

And later adds:

The claim that all requires that we cover justification is kind of surprising, because some philosophers would say that justification is not needed or, to say it otherwise, that knowledge can be self-justified and self-justification is not really a justification, because there is nothing to do except having the knowledge. In my view, including a self-justification as a justification is only playing with words.

Content versus epistemic externalism/internalism
wrote:

wrote:

Richard Feldman and Andrew Cullison wrote:

Hamid Vahid wrote:

Mahmoud Morvarid wrote:

Here is the abstract of :

In, we have:

They continue:

One point made in is that the argument that opposes access J-Internalism to content externalism also applies to an opposition of mentalist J-Internalism to content externalism. An ingredient in this claim is that two subjects must be duplicates on their justificatory process if they are to be duplicates on their justification, which is not obvious to me (but I am also not clear about what is meant by the justificatory process):

Rowlands's view of the debate
NOTE ADDED: It is not easy to make sense of his informal definition of "supervenience". I suppose the formal one attributed to Jaegwon Kim, which applies to family of properties, makes sense. If we consider that the informal definition also applies to family of properties, even though Rowlands seems to apply it directly to individual properties, it could start to make sense. My intuitive understanding is that "A supervenes on B" means that if one needs A, one is OK with B. Formally,  in every situation x that has a property p in A, you can find a q in B, also a property of x, that is more info than p.  It seems that an example of A being a supervenience of B is when A and B are partitions and B is a refinement of A.

First, it is useful to consider Mark Rowlands's view of Cartesian internalism:

Rowlands later adds:

and later even:

and

Next, Rowlands describes externalism and internalism as follows:

This implies that externalism is not the negation of internalism. Rowlands adds something very interesting:

I am a bit puzzled by the notion that anything can be idealism here, because the whole thing seems to be written in a realist perspective in which there is an external world. Anyway, in support to the idea that externalism is not the opposite of internalism, which is the key point here, Roska-Hardy wrote:

Edmund Husserl's internalism or externalism and Jean-Paul Sartre's externalism
Rowlands, after having introduced Descartes's internalism, goes to Husserl and Sartre:

However, A. David Smith argued that already Husserl was an externalist:

Smith then define disjunctivism, the first of these two positions:

Before, he described de re externalism:

He says that disjunctivism and de re externalism are independent:

Next, referring to de re externalism, he adds:

Donald Davidson's, Hilary Putnam's and Tyler Burge's externalism
Louise Roska-Hardy wrote:

Later, she wrote:

Again, later she add:

Williamson's externalism with mental states
This section asks a delicate question: how can mental states be factive?

Martin Smith wrote:

Later, he continues:

However, the way the cost is analysed gets complicated. Smith considers aspects such speed of switching, frequency of switching and some notion of range.

The related subject of the intersubjectivity (or material) requirement
Zahar wrote:

He explains that otherwise we could:

This is taken up by Boyer:

Externalism and the KK principle
John Heil seems to provide a good context:

He elaborates on this point:

Heil explains that a regress occurs if we also require that there is a justification of "it possesses a property φ". I am not sure this is the usual way a regress is created, but Heil expands on this point:

The question is what is included in "self-evident". There is nothing wrong to say that it includes the (self-)justification of the knowledge and its recognition, that is, in a reflexive manner, that knowledge contains its own justification. Well, Heil is correct that we do not in addition require that this property of being self-justified is recognized, but it would not be a problem to include it in the definition of self-evident. In other words, given that we included the justification of the knowledge in the knowledge itself, we could as well include the recognition of this justification and the extra justification that this justification is included, etc. What is confusing to me is that Heil says that, for any property  φ,  the following criteria for justification is external:

What about the case φ = "p is self-evident for S", just as in the case of Descartes. OK, Heil says that it is "external" with quotation mark. Later, Heil insists: It's not clear why being self-evident is a nonepistemic condition.

Michael Ayers in Knowing and Seeing wrote:

In the next 15 pages or so, Ayers discusses that propositional knowledge must respect something similar (but he does not say it explicitly) to Popper's material requirement. In that view, Popper's material requirement is an externalist concept. In the subsequent section, Ayers explains his view that perception is primary knowledge:

He next explains that he considers that the skeptic argument is wrong when used to reject perceptual knowledge. Interestingly, it is related to Popper's point that the material requirement is usually not problematic, but ignores that individual scientific observations are not ordinary perceptual knowledge and, though the material condition is not problematic, individual scientific observations are often problematic. Perhaps, one of the five modes of Agrippa is being forgotten here: the one that asks if the knowledge is true according to a person or in general. He adds:

Ayers next asks what kind of reliability is needed:

My view, which I am sure has been presented by others (and I have only to see where), is that it's not reliability of the way to gain knowledge that matters, but the reliability when it is used. Both are externalist views, but the latter is connected with value, desire and action, not the former. Whether it is sufficient for knowledge is another story. My impression is that, if it is really reliable no matter the circumstances, it is knowledge, but beliefs are only valid in some circumstances. So beliefs are not knowledge. Knowledge is hidden and not formulated and influences our beliefs. The belief in the law of universal gravitation exhibit knowledge, but is not itself knowledge. We do have that knowledge, but it is behind the belief, not the belief itself. There is something true behind the law of universal gravitation and we know that, but we know it is false in some circumstances. Whatever is true and will remain true is the knowledge.

The debate and skepticism
Guy Axtell wrote:

The debate and Plato
Gail fine wrote:

The debate and creative (non justifiable) induction
If the requirement of internalism is that justification must be internal, one might oppose to internalism, not that justification is external, but that justification is not even possible. That might seem a form of "externalism" in the sense that it is opposed to internalism, but not really, because it might refer to non justifiable mechanisms that bring knowledge to the individual in a way that is internal. This seems to be the case in Louis Groarke's book An Aristotelian Account of Induction: Creating Something from Nothing. In a review of the book, P.C Biondi wrote: The review criticizes some aspects of this description of "recollection".

The entry Internalism and Externalism by Poston in IEP
Ted Poston in of IEP wrote: The JTB account was recent in accordance with Dutant and others. The JTB account emerged with the abandon of truth marker, of infallibility, and the use of weakened truth markers. The resulting focus was on the requirement for discernibility, because infallibility was abandoned. The requirement for discernibility is what Dutant calls the internalist view. So, of course the attack on the internalist view without the infallibilism view by Gettier coincide with the Internalism-Externalism debate. It's not a coincidence. It almost was forced.

Poston distinguishes two categories of externalism (seen as opposition to internalism): either justification is not needed or it is needed, but does not need to be internal:

To understand better what comes next, it seems better to replace "is" by "must be" in the first sentence. It becomes "... the nature of this justification must be completely determined by a subject’s internal states or reasons". There is a subtlety, because, as we will see later, internalism can make use of a basing relation, which is a relation with external supports. It is subtle, because the key point of internalism is still, despite the existence of this basing relation, that the justification must depend on internal factors. With this view, given that it is the negation of internalism, we understand that externalism says that either justification is not needed or the justification is dispensed from using internal factors. In that view, externalism is a weakening of the requirement: there is no need to always be internal. Again, there is the subtlety that the basing relation is not with internal factors. Therefore, in a way, internalism dispenses also itself from always using internal support. One needs to go through the details to understand the distinction between internalism and externalism. Later Poston wrote: I find the previous extract a bit confusing because, even for internalism, a justification only based on logic (of propositions) is implausible. This is why, I guess, Poston does not say that internalism is restricted to logical justification. The extract would be clearer, but a tautology, if it replaced the expression "a term of logic" with the expression "using internal reasons or mental states". It makes it easy to understand that, when externalists accept that justification must use internal supports, they also say that it is not needed.

Poston presents three complications in the debate:

In the case of the first complication, even when justification is not required, Poston seems to say that all epistemologists require that knowledge is analysed in terms of true belief together with something else, but it seems that this fails to consider Williamson's position that knowledge is first. Perhaps one way to understand Williamson's point is that one could define knowledge as inclusive of the doxatic state in such a way that there is no need for justification. If in addition, we argue that the doxatic state is not entirely internal, then this takes care of the basing relation. This seems to say that knowledge is self-justified.

In the case of the second complication, he gives a good example of the distinction between "basing a belief on some reasons" and "having good reasons" and says "this marks the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification": he associates "having" with "propositional" and "basing" with "doxatic". A personal note that help me: this distinction is similar to the distinction between “inductive syllogism” and “induction proper” seen by Groarke in Aristotles's philosophy. It corresponds also to the two phases of science: logical deductive inference from given conjectures and the creative construction of these conjectures. The key point is that the first is logical and the other is not. He next argues, using the idea that basing on [or having] good reasons must be an external relation [i.e., the good reasons must be external], that "internalists should not claim that every factor that determines doxastic [or propositional] justification is internal". He thus concludes that even internalists need a "basing relation" that is external.

The third complication refers to the meaning of "internal":

An intereresting point is that the existence of different meaning of "internal" means that there is a debate among internalists and this debate might be as important, if not more important,  than the debate internalism/externalism. In particular, the point that mental states might be different than brain [or bodily] states is certainly controversial. The next statement could have been controversial, but since it is about "reflexive accessibility" and "propositionally", and there is a use of "in general", it is not that much controversial:

Poston summarized the notions of internalism and externalism as follows:

It should be noted that, in this summary, the case "justification is not needed " of externalism is ignored. It seems that Poston has taken a sense of "justification" that is amenable to an external analysis and thus must now be required by externalists. It will become clear later that, for Poston, externalism says that internal justification (with a basing relation) is not needed for knowledge. In other words, internalism is like a requirement for reflexive justification and externalism denies this.

In the next extract, presenting and discussing a classical support for internalism, Poston emphasizes the need in internalism for non propositional support in the case of basic beliefs and that externalism says it is not sufficient: Here is perhaps one central point:

Alston's externalism has a purpose similar to the purpose of the basing relation. The point is that both Alston and Poston see the need for a connection with external factors. Alston says it is the justification of the internal ground that can be external. Poston says a basing relation is needed to connect with external factors.

Alston, present two other kinds of support for internalism, besides the classical support: deontological and something he calls "Natural Judgment about Cases." I am not covering the deontological arguments here and the "Natural judgment about Cases" seems to repeat the usual arguments for and against naturalism.

I am stopping here, because the whole thing seems to be centered within a view that "external" support (not external to the subject, but external to the propositional belief) or a warrant is needed. This corresponds to the fact that Williamson, Putnam, Popper, etc., who supported a different kind of knowledge that is neither internal or external, are not mentioned nor cited in the entry.

General points not classified
,, and  have been cited in  as sources that present an externalist view.

Role of ordinary language analysis
Ordinary language analysis plays an important role in contemporary epistemology. Here are some extracts on this subject. Jonathan Kvanvig wrote: and later adds: Jonathan Lopez wrote: Riccardo Chiaradonna says the connection between ordinary language and scientific knowledge was considered in the Roman Empire by Galen: Mark Kaplan says that ordinary language philosophy played a role in John Langshaw Austin's philosophy: Michael Bradie wrote that evolutionary epistemology rules out epistemologies based on ordinary language analysis: But, Henk Visser points out that philosophers such as Wittgenstein were aware of the distinction between ordinary language and scientific language: Visser adds next: I find it interesting, a way to address the mind-body problem, as many say.

Laurence Bonjour wrote: However, in the same book, he adds: Andrew Cullison outlines "some of the methods that contemporary epistemologists typically employ":

and

and what he calls the « standard method » :

Alvin I. Goldman wrote:

Jonathan Kvanvig wrote:

Nat Hansen wrote: and later adds: Markus Lammenranta discusses the limitation of ordinary knowledge analysis:

It is also understood that ordinary language analysis is not sufficient. For example,

Notes

Knowledge vs understanding
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for Understanding says:

Christoph Baumberger wrote:

Dutant's new story about knowledge
Dutant (2015) wrote:"[In the new story replacing the justified true belief story], knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible mark of truth. [...] [The mark] is discernible if [...] a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if it has it. Requiring a mark of truth makes the view infallibilist. Requiring it to be discernible makes the view internalist. I call the view Classical Infallibilism." It is strange that discernibility is not required in his definition of infallibility, but apparently he needs it. Anyway, it is just a definition and what I feel should be called infallibility, he calls it classical infallibility. Classical Infallibilists do not have trouble classifying Gettier cases as cases in which one does not know, because, in the Gettier cases, what is discerned as truth does not actually guarantees truth. However, it has a problem in finding something that qualifies as truth. Dutant continues: "Early on, Classical Infallibilists divided into two camps: Dogmatists, who thought that many of our beliefs bear discernible marks of truth, and Sceptics, who thought that almost none does. The two were in stalemate for centuries."We will come back to this later. First, we must determine what he meant by "Early on" and get more context. Dutant continues: "In modern times, however, Dogmatism became increasingly untenable. That revived Probabilist Scepticism, a brand of Scepticism according to which even though we do not know much, we are justified in believing many things. But most strikingly, that spurred Idealism, a brand of Dogmatism that hopes to restore the idea that our beliefs bear discernible marks of truth by adopting a revisionary metaphysics." Most likely, the Probabilist Scepticism of Dutant corresponds to the scepticism of Hume (unless in his definition, Hume was a pure sceptic, because beliefs were not knowledge—Hume did not accept weakened markers of truth for knowledge) and his idealism corresponds to the idealism of Berkeley and Kant at the end of the Enlightenment era. This would mean that he refers to a transition that happened with the birth of idealism at the end of the Enlightenment, a brand of dogmatism because Kant a priori has a mark of truth that is not there in scepticism. So the "stalemate for centuries" ended when the Enlightenment era ended. Dutant continues: "In mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy Idealism fell apart and Scepticism was barred by common sense philosophy and ordinary language philosophy."It's not clear, why he calls this other era analytic philosophy Idealism. I don't think Kant was an analytic philosopher. Perhaps, he simply refers to an era after Kant where logic played a role in philosophy within the idealism perspective. It might be related to the turn to transcendental-idealism of Edmond Husserl in 1913 and it felt apart quickly in the 50s. Actually, it could also be all the logical approach of Bolzano and later of the Brentano school.

Let's go back to the division scepticism/dogmatism. It corresponds to the amount of truth markers allowed: scepticism allow little while dogmatism allow more. A question is how this division relates to the empiricism/rationalism division, which is more often, I believe, cited when we consider the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods. Empiricism is not the same as scepticism, because one has to do with empirical experience and the other with not accepting truth markers.

However, it is difficult to be an empiricist and not sceptical. The idea of empiricism is to reject dogma. It might be full of dogma, but it's the idea nevertheless. Dogma are the only way to consider that knowledge is marked with truth. It's not something that an empiricist would want to say, but in practice the empiricist must face this reality nevertheless and that tends to make the empiricist a sceptic. Well, later we will see that the main claim of Dutant is that Infallibilism leads to Scepticism. So, if this is true, then empiricism or whatever within Classical Infallibilism must certainly lead to scepticism.

Conversely, if you are a sceptic, by definition you are not a dogmatic, so it is reasonable to say that you cannot be a rationalist, because the latter requires premises and premises tend to have dogmatic truth markers,  but that makes you an empiricist by definition. So, under the assumptions used in the previous reasoning, the two divisions are the same. Well, one strong assumption is that premises tend to have dogmatic truth markers. On the contrary, critical rationalism says the opposite, but still it shows a strong connection between these two divisions.

In the transition that ended the stalemate, Dutant argues that both, the dogmatic (usually rationalist) side and the sceptic (usually empiricist) side, of Classical Infallibilism were criticized, but that was not a  rejection of Classical Infallibilism—the notion of discernable truth markers was kept. First dogmatism was criticized because it had too much dogmatic truth markers. That revived Probabilist Scepticism on the other side. This is Hume scepticism, if we understood well. Scepticism was criticized, because somehow these dogmatic truth markers are needed to have (justified) knowledge. That revived idealism, a brand of dogmatism on the other side. This is the Idealism of Kant, if we understood well.

The rejection of Classical Infallibilism, as mentioned before, happened later in the mid-twentieth century. I guess criticism on both sides became too strong and the notion of discernable truth markers had to be abandoned. Dutant explains that which replacement for Classical Infallibilism was used depended on which of its two requirements: discernibility or Infallibility was abandoned. (Ok here we see that Dutant needed a name for the requirement that we have a (dogmatic) truth marker. He called it infallibility.) Some rejected the infallibility requirement and replaced it with a use of weakened truth markers, but others rejected the discernibility requirement. This is the subtle point in Dutant's story: we can either weaken the truth markers (lose infallibility) or say that they are not weakened (keep infallibility), but we cannot discern them well. About those who use weakened truth markers, Dutant wrote:    "Like Probabilistic Sceptics, they held that a mere indication of truth justifies belief—where a mere indication of truth is a property that somehow indicates the truth of a belief without entailing it. What they added was that such an indication, in conjunction with truth, would be sufficient for knowledge. That is the familiar Justified True Belief analysis that Gettier refuted. That is also the source of the Internalist views that insist on a discernible condition on justified belief or knowledge."Well, it's not clear to me that Probabilistic Sceptics such as Hume did not consider  (weakly) justified belief as knowledge. I am not even sure that they would care about such a level of formalization. There might be an anachronism here. It seems very much that this mid-twentieth transition seen by Durant is very much dependent upon what definitions were used, but definitions should not be that important. There is no real difference, except this formal definition, between the modern and the mid-twentieth sceptics. The notion of an internalist view makes sense. A discernment is an internal concept, in a way. About those who reject discernibility, but keep Infallibilism, Durant wrote:  "Others rejected the discernibility requirement instead. They maintained the idea that knowledge requires a mark of truth but they did not require it to be discernible. That is the source of Externalist views in epistemology. The demise of Classical Infallibilism as a theory of knowledge was quick and complete: once they gave it up analytic epistemologists never looked back. Nevertheless it seems to linger on in the way some epistemologists think of evidence."Well, this group is not very clear to me. What does it mean to accept a marker of truth that cannot be discerned. The very notion of a "marker" that cannot be discerned is strange. But Durant refers to them as the analytic philosophers that rejected the discernibility requirement. I suspect that by an acceptance of a "marker of truth" with no discernibility, Durant refers to the acceptance of a notion of truth in logic. It is interesting, in particular, that Popper avoided the notion of truth before he was convinced by the logician Tarski that it was a valid concept.

Also, it will be useful to understand the relation between the division internalist/externalist here and the general notion of internalist versus externalist in philosophy. The internalist view says that we cannot explain the world without considering desires and beliefs. The externalist view says that we don't need that. So, it makes sense to say that a vision of knowledge where belief in a marker of truth is a requirement is classified as internalist.

Short story of the Justified True Belief account
Here is how Durant describes the short story of the Justified true belief definition of knowledge: "Woozley (1949,181-184), Malcolm (1952, 179–80) and Ayer (1956, 21) all took the [previous] infallible mental state view to have sceptical consequences. That was deemed unacceptable and prompted Malcolm, Ayer and Chisholm to defend the idea that fallible justification and truth were sufficient for knowledge. Gettier (1963, 121n) was perhaps the first to note that a formally similar account appeared in Plato. Soon some called the Justified True Belief analysis “traditional” and by 1967 (with Anthony Quinton) the Legend coalesced."I guess that the infallible mental state refers to knowledge with a discernible marker of truth. So, apparently the falling apart in the mid-twentieth century of the analytic philosophy Idealism (with its markers of truth) refers to the work of Woozley, Malcom and Ayer. In principle, the replacement for Classical Infallibilism depends on which of its two requirements: discernibility or Infallibility was abandoned. In this case, it seems that Malcom, etc. opted for the abandon of Infallibility. Also, the JTB view on knowledge seems to be the internalist view, because we keep discernability.

The natural question is what is the other view of knowledge that correspond to the abandon of discernability? It will be interesting to know that. What is the externalist view today, if it is still alive? Well, it seems to be the analytic view, but perhaps not any kind of analytic, but the analytic that reject psychologism and the view of knowledge as belief. Who are the founder of the analytic view, just as Malcolm, Ayer and Chisholm are the founder of the JTB view.

Modifications of Infallibilism and the main claim: Infallibilism leads to Scepticism.
Dutant needs to modify the simple definition of infallibilism given earlier. One of them is to support his main claim: Infallibilism leads to Scepticism. That is not a surprising claim. I might not have much to say about it.

History of Classical Infallibilism
Dutant has a section on Classical Infallibilism in Hellenistic Epistemology and another, section 4, on Classical Infallibilism in Western Philosophy, which has subsections: 4.1. Medieval epistemology, 4.2. Easy cases: Descartes and Locke, 4.3. Open cases: Plato and Kant, 4.4. Idealist Dogmatism (eighteenth to mid-twentieth century), 4.5. Probabilist Scepticism (Oops he gives Popper and Peirce as examples, but Popper simply accepted Hume's scepticism. Perhaps the distinction is that Hume would have rejected total scepticism), 4.6. Induction and Infallibilism

Dutant wrote in section 4.5: "Throughout history we find philosophers who acknowledge the lack of discernible marks of truth while overtly rejecting Scepticism. They are not counterexamples to the New Story. They are Probabilist Sceptics."Well, it's true that with a lower criteria, it's hard to be (formally) a sceptic, because, in a way, the scepticism is hidden in the criteria for knowledge and cannot be stated formally any more. It still a lot around definitions. Yes, they are Probabilist Sceptics, because the markers of truth can be weakened, not really markers of truth formally.

The birth of analytic philosophy
We commonly define epistemology as the theory of knowledge. Because it asks what is knowledge, it seems that epistemology could become the study of anything, i.e., the study of whatever it is decided that knowledge is. In comparison, physics is the theory of the material world, but this material world is defined by the current technology that allows us to observe it. To get to the same status, we would have to define knowledge in terms of the technology that allows us to observe it, but do we observe knowledge? Do we have a technology that has for object knowledge? We can define such a technology and indirectly define knowledge, but will it be the "right" technology to define the knowledge that really epistemology should study? It all depends on the technology. Herbert B. Enderton in its classical textbook A Mathematical Introduction to Logic says that mathematical logic is a "mathematical model of deductive thought". So, here we have a model of some aspect of knowledge, because deduction is part of the dynamic of knowledge. There is a kind of technology in which this model can be interpreted, just as in physics we interpret mathematical models in terms of physical technologies. This was at the basis of analytical philosophy. The deductive part was not sufficient. So, the idea was to find a logic for the inductive part. It's not surprising that analytical philosophy emerged in the early 20th century after mathematical logic became popular through the work of Whitehead, Russell and others. The main founders of analytic philosophy were Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, both experts in mathematical logic. There is also this view:

From Bolzano Wissenschaftslehre (1837) to the Vienna circle (1922)
First, let see how Bolzano himself differentiates his view of logic with his contemporaries' view:

Now, let see Robin D. Rollinger description of Bolzano's position on logic (as viewed in the mid-ninetieth century):

Bolzano answers his own question:

Denis Fisette wrote: "This empiricist orientation, by which Zimmerman characterizes the philosophical position common to all of the Philosophical Society’s founding members, is indeed the common denominator of the history of the Philosophical Society up to the Vienna Circle. [...] This has also been noticed by Neurath in the historical portion of his book, in which logical empiricism appears to be the culmination of these empiricist orientations expressed within the history of Austrian philosophy since Bolzano. [...] In 1914, the Philosophical Society established the Bolzano Commission, whose mandate was to prepare the edition of Bolzano’s complete works, including the manuscripts discovered in Zimmerman’s archives. But only Bolzano’s Paradoxes of the Infinite and the first two volumes of his Wissenschaftslehre were published by the Society." Fisette then quote Neurath (emphasis is mine):

Psychologism in epistemology
David Pitt wrote:

Laurence Bonjour rejects psychologism in epistemology, not in the following sense that there is no psychology in epistemology, but in the sense that it is already a part of traditional epistemology. Specifically, he considers that the role of what he calls minimal psychologism, conceptual psychologism and  meliorative psychologism can hardly be denied by epistemologists, but yet he says these do not seem "to be in any way incompatible with the main thrust of the traditional Cartesian approach to epistemology or to provide any real support for the idea that traditional epistemology should be abandoned."

Matteo Santarelli says:

Giada Fratantonio wrote:

is mentioned by Fratantonio as an expample of Externalism that embraces psychologism. Perhaps the key sentences in Mitova are:

McCain wrote:

Relative truth
Roman Murawski and Jan Woleński wrote:

He continues:

Early criticism of psychologism
Wolfgang Huemer wrote (see https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265563675): "Husserl characterizes logical psychologism as a position according to which the normative rules of logic are based on descriptive laws of empirical psychology."

He then explains that Husserl's view on psychologism was influenced by Fredge: "In 1894, Frege harshly criticized Husserl in his review of Philosophy of Arithmetic. 'In reading this work,' Frege writes, 'I was able to gauge the devastation caused by the influx of psychology into logic' (Frege, 1894/1972, 337). It seems that this critique, even though it was quite harsh, had considerable influence on Husserl, for he said more than three decades later in a conversation with Boyce Gibson that  '[i]t hit the nail on the head'. "

He also explains that Husserl did not at first understood Bolzano. Husserl stated in 1939 that  when he first read Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre he "mistook, however, his original thoughts on presentations, propositions, truths `in themselves’ as metaphysical absurdities". Husserl suggests that Bolzano's philosophy was not well known. Herbert Spiegelberg wrote:  “Andrew Osborn visited Husserl 1935 in the Black Forest to ask him about Frege’s influence on the abandonment of the psychological approach of the Philosophie der Arithmetik. Husserl concurred, but also mentioned his chance discovery of Bolzano’s work in a second-hand book store.”

In https://www-jstor-org.wikipedialibrary.idm.oclc.org/stable/pdf/2107768.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A668fca51c021946de3494fdc6717755b Robert Hanna mentions a typical expression of Frege's attack in 1918-19 on the heresy of "logical psychologism":

"Not everything is an idea. Otherwise psychology would contain all the sciences within it, or at least it would be the supreme judge over all the sciences. Otherwise psychology would rule even over logic and mathematics. But nothing would be a greater misunderstanding of mathematics than making subordinate to psychology. Neither logic nor mathematics has the task of investigating minds and contents of consciousness owned by individual men."

Robert Hanna says that Frege's critique of psychologism goes at least as far back as The Foundations. of Arithmetic, second revised ed., trans. J. L. Austin (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1980), pp. v-vii, 33-38; first published in 1884.

Timeline of philosophers, inventors and scientists
I started to create this table to have a view of the research context of the philosophers, including its scientific part. However, I got intrigued by the three worlds philosophy of Bernard Bolzano as early as 1837. So, the table as a bias around Bolzano and its influence. It is also strongly influenced by the duality between rationalism and empiricism (as seen by Kant). Rationalism (in the form of logic is attacked by Hume) and this creates psychological empiricism. Kant says he proposes a synthesis with his view that the mind constructs the world based on a priori + things in themselves, but can never access things in themselves. Hegel (not mentioned) gets rid of things in themselves. The next phase, introduced by Peirce, is pragmatism which has two components: knowledge is problem oriented and fallibilism. In Peirce, these two components can not be separated. I am not sure what is analytic philosophy, which seems another phase. It's described in Analytic philosophy as a philosophy that put the emphasis on language and make use of mathematical logic and mathematics and to a lesser degree natural science. This is in opposition to continental philosophy.

Timeline of philosophers with a position on Justified True Belief definition of knowledge
I found the article The analysis of knowledge in SEP useful. It says that the existence of JTB as a classic notion of knowledge is a legend created by its attackers.

Epistemic logic and Gettier
Prof. Robert Stalnaker wrote in his lecture notes for Modal Logic in Fall 2009 : "Epistemic logic  began  in  1962  with  Jaakko  Hintikka's  classic  book  "Knowledge  and   Belief".  The  basic  idea  has  been  taken  up  in  non-philosophical  applications  such  as   theoretical computer science, where it turns out to deliver a way to understand how  a  distributed  system  works  at  a  certain  level  of  abstraction. [...] When I was in grad school, the project of patching the justified true belief analysis of knowledge  was  fashionable,  because  it  was  so  well  defined  as  to  what  you  have  to   do. [...] Edmund  Gettier's  famous  three-page  paper  –  in  which  he  challenges  the  justified   true belief analysis of knowledge with counterexamples – was very close in time to  Hintikka's work in formal semantics. Kripke developed modal logic and Hintikka was  the one who applied framework to knowledge. "

The view of Nicholas Rescher is also interesting. He accepts JTB though he knows about counter-examples:

Stalnaker wrote (also in his lecture notes):

Review of chapter 1 of A. J. Ayer's The Problem of Knowledge (1957)
Ayer wrote: "This preoccupation with the way things are, or are to be, described is often represented as an enquiry into their essential nature. Thus philosophers are given to asking such questions as What is mind? What sort of a relation is causality? What is the nature of belief? What is truth? The difficulty is then to see how such questions are to be taken. [...] This distinction between the use of an expression and the analysis of its meaning is not easy to grasp. Let us try to make it clear by taking an example. Consider the case of knowledge. A glance at the dictionary will show that the verb ‘to know’ is used in a variety of ways. [...] We may discover the sense of the philosopher’s question by seeing what further questions it incorporates, and what sorts of statement the attempt to answer it leads him to make. Thus, he may enquire whether the different cases in which we speak of knowing have any one thing in common; [...] He may maintain that there is, on the subjective side, no difference in kind between knowing and believing, or, alternatively, that knowing is a special sort of mental act. [...] is there anything thinkable that is beyond the reach of human knowledge? [...] And in that case does it follow that what is known is necessarily true, or in some other way indubitable?" (Here "necessarily true" is not the same as "(simply) true". He will say later that it must be true, but not necessarily true.) He continues: "Surely some of our claims to knowledge must be capable of being justified. But in what ways can we justify them? In what would the processes of justifying them consist?"

Common features of knowledge
In this section, Ayer seems to conclude that to "know-how" does not imply that what is known must be the case: "But can it reasonably be held that knowledge is always knowledge that something is the case? If knowing that something is the case is taken to involve the making of a conscious judgement, then plainly it cannot. [...] we must allow that what we call knowing facts may sometimes just be a matter of being disposed to behave in certain appropriate ways; [...] There is a sense in which knowing something, in this usage of the term, is always a matter of knowing what it is ; and in this sense it can perhaps be represented as knowing a fact, as knowing that something is so. [...] But once again, if we are prepared to say that knowing facts need not consist in anything more than a disposition to behave in certain ways, we can construe knowing how to do things as being, in its fashion, a matter of knowing facts. Only by this time we shall have so extended our use of the expression ‘knowing facts’ or ‘knowing that something is the case’ that it may well become misleading."

Does knowing consist in being in a special state of mind?
Here Ayer confines himself to the case know-that and seems to have concluded that to know-that, whatever is that must be true : "Suppose that we confine our attention to the cases in which knowing something is straightforwardly a matter of knowing something to be true, the cases where it is natural in English to use the expression ‘knowing that’, or one of its grammatical variants. Is it a necessary condition for having this sort of knowledge, not only that what one is said to know should in fact be true, but also that one should be in some special state of mind, or that one should be performing some special mental act? [...] the verb ‘to know’ is used to signify a disposition or, as Ryle puts it, that it is a ‘capacity’ verb.! To have knowledge is to have the power to give a successful performance, not actually to be giving one. [...] It is indeed true that one is not reasonably said to know a fact unless one is completely sure of it." At this stage, Ayer seems to have concluded that, in addition, to know-that one must be sure about that. I guess this is the belief part. Only the justified part is missing. But, before, Ayer adds some details about "being sure": "It is not certain that to have a feeling of conviction is even a sufficient condition for being sure ; for it would seem that a conscious feeling of complete conviction may co-exist with an unconscious feeling of doubt. [...] The fact is, as Professor Austin has pointed out, that the expression ‘I know’ commonly has what he calls a ‘performative’ rather than a descriptive use. To say that I know that something is the case, though it does imply that I am sure of it, is not so much to report my state of mind as to vouch for the truth of whatever it may be."

Discussion of method : philosophy and language
At this point, Ayer clarifies that his method is to consider linguistic usage, but not in a social manner : "Thus the proof that knowing, in the sense of ‘knowing that’, is always knowledge of some truth is that it would not otherwise be reckoned as knowledge. [...] For it would not matter if the popular practice were different from what we took it to be, so long as we were clear about the uses that we ourselves were ascribing to the word in question."

Knowing as having the right to be sure
Ayer now introduces the justification requirement by stating that something is missing: "it is possible to be completely sure of something which is in fact true, but yet not to know it. [...] For instance, a superstitious person who had inadvertently walked under a ladder might be convinced as a result that he was about to suffer some misfortune; and he might in fact be right. But it would not be correct to say that he knew that this was going to be so. [...] But while it is not hard to find examples of true and fully confident beliefs which in some ways fail to meet the standards required for knowledge, it is not at all easy to determine exactly what these standards are. [...] I conclude then that the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing that something is the case are first that what one is said to know be true, secondly that one be sure of it, and thirdly that one should have the right to be sure. This right may be earned in various ways; but even if one could give a complete description of them it would be a mistake to try to build it into the definition of knowledge, just as it would be a mistake to try to incorporate our actual standards of goodness into a definition of good."

Knowledge before Gettier
Pierre Le Morvan put in question the claim that the traditional view of knowledge was justified true belief (JTB) until Gettier. He cites many authors that also disagreed with this historical view that knowledge was traditionally seen as JTB: "A few have dissented from this near-consensus. Mark Kaplan (‘It’s Not What You Know That Counts’), Panayot Butchvarov (Skepticism in Ethics), Alvin Plantinga (‘Justification in the Twentieth Century’), John Turri (‘Knowledge Judgments in “Gettier” Cases’), Maria Rosa Antognazza (‘The Benefit to Philosophy of the Study of its History’) and Julien Dutant (‘The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis’) stand out for their dissent." He found that Dutant and Antognazza made very good case against this view. Antognazza further developped her view in a book chapter co-authored with Michael R. Ayers.

Naturalistic Epistemology
Quine in Epistemology Naturalized wrote:

Jeff Malpas wrote:

and

Richard F. Kitchener explains that Russell was a supporter of naturalistic epistemology. He wrote: "What I am claiming is that there can be found running throughout much of Russell's work (especially after 1919, when he took a psychologistic turn), an account of the nature of knowledge and epistemology that is naturalistic in spirit, in fact, psychologistic in  spirit, an account that anticipated several of the features to be found in Quine's later and canonical program of NE [naturalistic epistemology]. [...] Now, throughout his long career, Russell was fairly consistently committed to a certain version of scientism-towards looking to science for answers to questions about the nature of the world, the nature of the mind, and the nature of knowledge (a view we can call metaphysical scientism). Russell was not opposed to [this possibly scientifically limited] metaphysical speculations about reality. [...] There was for Russell no possibility of philosophy as a 'first philosophy' since there is no philosophical standpoint higher than science from which to make epistemic pronouncements [...] no such thing as philosophical truth (as distinct from scientific truth). "

However, Kitchener also suggests that Russell accepted that philosophy as a science could make its own hypotheses yet to be verified by science. Kitchener wrote: "Philosophy, therefore, is generalized science. In other places, [Russell] suggested that the task of philosophy might be to suggest hypotheses that could then be empirically validated." This would explain what Kitchener meant by his previous sentence "Russell was not opposed to metaphysical speculations about reality.".

Kitchener also says that Russell was a founder of analytic philosophy: "Philosophers typically classify Russell not only as an analytic philosopher but as one of the founders of analytic philosophy and for good reasons, for one thing he always insisted upon was that his method of philosophizing (and the one others should follow) was the method of analysis. This method of analysis is a version of the older version of the method of analysis/synthesis (MAS). [...] Although the downward part of the analysis-synthesis method is well-known and represents a well-worn mode of thought, the upward step of analysis is less familiar. How do we perform an inductive inference and arrive at a geometrical axiom? How do we infer the cause of something? How do we decompose an entity into its parts? How, in short, do we come up with these initial hypotheses? Aristotle invoked a process of intuition-intuitive induction (epagoge)-and lodged it in nous."

It should be recalled that Gettier wrote his article that popularized Justified True Belief in 1963. Naturalistic epistemology was seriously considered by Quine in 1969. It was a way to recover from Hume's sceptical argument. He wrote: "The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, s could be used. Quine ends the chapter with "And a more emphatically epistemological topic that evolution helps to clarify is induction, now that we are allowing epistemology the resources of natural science." So, for Quine, evolutionary epistemology can be seen as a part of naturalistic epistemology. Well, there are people (should find references) that see evolutionary epistemology as a disguised form of metaphysical position. This is compatible with Popper's view that the theory of evolution is a metaphysical program. For many, it is seen as the most important part of naturalistic epistemology. Quine did not mention belief in this chapter. The term "belief" occurs in other chapters, but not "true belief", not even "justified" alone, certainly not "justified true belief".

However, Quine wrote in his  1978 (first edition in 1970) book Web of Belief : "In some aberrant uses that pretend to be especially deep, the words 'knowledge' and 'truth' become tinged with a mystical aura. There need be no mystery about either one of them. Truth is a property of sentences; it is the trait shared equally by all that would be rightly affirmed. And knowledge, in its clearest sense, is what we have of those truths if our beliefs are solidly enough grounded." In the same book, the role of evolution is also mentioned: "Our readiness to draw the distinction in practice, in so many cases, is simply a mani­festation of our flair for projectible traits; and we surmised in Chapter VII that this flair is in part an inherited result of evolution."

The theistic view
Alvin Plantinga wrote:

The view of Bas C. Van Fraassen
Bas C. Van Fraassen discusses and refutes two ways that were used to recover from "Hume's sceptical disaster" and present his own preferred way, the third way. The first way was to find general rules of inference and to justify them. He even refers to Hans Reichenbach saying that we have a method that will lead us to the truth if any rule will: "It can be shown that if it is possible at all to make predictions,the inductive inference is an instrumentto find them; and the inference is justified because its applicability represents a necessary condition of success", but he says that even that is refuted. The second way is naturalistic epistemology, an epistemology that makes use of what we "know" from science, without trying to justify this knowledge when it is used to justify an inference. He also refutes it. He refers to these two ways as "traditional epistemology". His preferred way is summarized in his conclusion: "We supply our own opinion, with nothing to ground it, and no method to give us an extra source of knowledge. Only the 'empty' techniques of logic and pure math are available either to refine and improve or expose the defects of this opinion. That is the human condition. But it is enough." This third way makes no use of beliefs. A sufficient criterion for rationality is consistency. He wrote: "[...] for this status of rationality-not good reasons, not a rationale, not support of any special sort, not a pedigree of inductive reasoning or confirmation, nothing is needed above and beyond coherence. [...] To this I would add that the concept of reasons for belief in traditional epistemology does not answer to the ordinary employment of such phrases on which it is ostensibly based. If I advance a view and you ask me for my reasons for holding it, I will try to select something that I think you also believe (or perhaps something that you, and not necessarily I believe) which will count as support for you. Thus conceived the concept of reason is limited to the context of dialogue, where it displays a certain relativity, and does not point to any kind of hierarchy in my own beliefs."

Perdomo wrote:

Different kinds of naturalism
Hans-Johann Glock wrote:

Inmaculada Perdomo wrote:

Contemporary philosophy and the concept of representation
Steven Levine wrote:

Epistemology always existed
Many present the view that epistemology is as old as philosophy itself. Here is one example among many.

From natural philosophy to science and epistemology in the 19th century
William Whewell coined the term scientists in 1833. However, if we believe Sidgwick, H., science  was still a branch of philosophy in 1772 up to the end of the 19th century (1876), because at that time he wrote: The description of the programme "From Natural Philosophy to Science" of the Center for the History of Philosophy and Science of Radboud University mention "Until the gradual emancipation of the modern scientific disciplines in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, “natural philosophy” was the name that covered most of what we would nowadays call scientific activity." Of course, "most of what we [...] nowadays call scientific", Maxwell theory, General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics was not known until after the late 19th century. It is these advancements in science that prompted the  emergence of science out of philosophy.

The last mentions of Natural Philosophy in the 19th century
James Clerk Maxwell. On the marriage record (1858), Maxwell is listed as Professor of Natural Philosophy in Marischal College, Aberdeen. Between 1860 and 1871, at his family home Glenlair and at King’s College London, where he was Professor of Natural Philosophy, James Clerk Maxwell conceived and developed his unified theory of electricity, magnetism and light.

The name 'natural science' instead of 'natural philosophy' appear in a report issued at Cambridge in 1868 (emphasis mine): "But [Cambridge] University possessed no means of teaching those subjects, and a Syndicate or Committee was appointed, November 25th, 1868, to consider the best means of giving instruction to students in Physics, especially in Heat, Electricity and Magnetism, and the methods of providing apparatus for this purpose. [...] The Syndicate reported February 27th, 1869. [...] pointing out that [...] 'no reason can be assigned why other great branches of Natural Science should not become equally objects of attention, or why Cambridge should not become a great school of physical and experimental, as it is already of mathematical and classical, instruction.'"

Epistemology as a modern discipline
In his article Epistemology of the journal Historical Materialism, Wal Suchting wrote   :

So, Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) did some work on epistemology, but it was before Ferrier coined the English name in 1856. We need to look at his work in Theory of Science (1837) as described in https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bolzano/#EpiSci to see in which way it was epistemology.

In https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2018.1525798, the work that was done on epistemology by  Husserl (1859-1938) around 1906-07  is mentioned: "Husserl scholars and phenomenologists in general often do not give sufficient weight to epistemology. To some extent, it is simply overlooked that Husserl’s phenomenology at its most fundamental level is an epistemological endeavour. Husserl, however, is quite clear on this. While it may be true that Husserl does not often explicitly address the systematic role of epistemology, when he does so, he unambiguously states that phenomenology at its most basic level is epistemology. To be more precise, phenomenology at its basic level has to be epistemology. This is because 'epistemology is the discipline that is supposed to make all scientific knowledge reach final evaluation of its definite knowledge content, to make all scientific knowledge reach ultimate foundation and final completion.'  In this sense 'all of philosophy depends on epistemology.'" In https://iep.utm.edu/ferrier/: "Ferrier was also the first philosopher in English to refer to the philosophy of knowledge as Epistemology." We also have in https://www.britannica.com/biography/James-Frederick-Ferrier "Ferrier's Hegelian epistemology (a word that he introduced into English) and ontology are based on the concept of the unity of the act of knowledge, which combines the knowing subject and the object known." John Carriero explains Ferrier's view on epistemology: "The Institutes of Metaphysics [published in 1854-56] was Ferrier's most ambitious contribution to philosophy. The work contains four parts-the Introduction, the Epistemology, the Agnoiology and the Ontology. The Introduction defines the aims of philosophy and the method to be used in the work. Philosophy is a body of reasoned truth, which excludes mathematics and natural philosophy from its scope. It ought to be true and it ought to be reasoned, but it is more important that it should be reasoned than that it should be true. [...] Ferrier divides philosophy into three parts [Ontology, Epistemology and Agnoiology]. Ontology is first in the order of nature, but last in the order of inquiry. It asks the question 'What is?' or 'What is true?' Epistemology asks the question 'What is knowledge?' Agnoiology asks the question 'What is ignorance?'" So, we see that at the time epistemology comes in, science or natural philosophy is separated from phulosophy. Carriero continues: "In actual fact, two thirds of the Institutes are devoted to epistemology. In discussing this subject, he maintains that the question 'What is knowledge?' does not mean, as Theaetetus supposed, 'What are the different kinds of knowledge?', but 'What is the one feature that is common and peculiar to all varieties of knowledge ?'" Every proposition in the body of the work is supposed to be demonstrated either from first principles or from the preceding propositions, and each is contrasted with a false counter-proposition, which is asserted in one form or another by popular opinion or psychology, which he now conceives as the arch-enemy of philosophic truth. It is to be feared that the demonstrations are often based on equivocations, and that the meanings of the different propositions are often indistinguishable one from another, as he sometimes openly admits."

However, it seems that it's later that a new kind of epistemology was created: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235223112_The_Renaissance_of_Epistemology_1914-1945/citations

Review of Martinich and Stroll's Epistemology in Britannica
Martinich and Stroll wrote an article in Britannica on epistemology. Here are some summary points :
 * Regarding Justified True Belief. The article endorses the view that Plato had the JTB perspective on knowledge and that it was generally accepted until Gettier's paper in 1963: (See )
 * Its long list of authors (not counting ancient Greeks) does not includes those supporting evolutionary epistemology such as Karl Popper, Konrad Lorenz, and Jean Piaget.
 * Epistemology as a discipline. "Why should there be a discipline such as epistemology? Aristotle (384–322 BCE ) provided the answer when he said that philosophy begins in a kind of wonder or puzzlement." (This title ... as a discipline ... gives hope that we will learn about the branch of knowledge in higher education, not the concept: when books started to be written specifically in that branch, when universities started to have programs in epistemology, etc. Unfortunately, the section is about the concept of knowledge in philosophy, which of course is as old as philosophy itself. The section says nothing about epistemology as a discipline.)
 * The nature of knowledge. "[O]ne of the basic questions of epistemology concerns the nature of knowledge."
 * "As Gilbert Ryle (1900–76) pointed out, there are important differences between know that and know how."
 * "The expression know what is similar to know how in that respect, insofar as one can know what a clarinet sounds like without being able to say what one knows."
 * "For the most part, epistemology from the ancient Greeks to the present has focused on knowing that. Such knowledge, often referred to as propositional knowledge, raises a number of peculiar epistemological problems, among which is the much-debated issue of what kind of thing one knows when one knows that something is the case. [...] The list of candidates has included beliefs, propositions, statements, sentences, and utterances of sentences."
 * "[T]wo points should be noted here. First, the issue is closely related to the problem of universals—i.e., the problem of whether qualities or properties, such as redness, are abstract objects, mental concepts, or simply names. Second, it is agreed by all sides that one cannot have 'knowledge that' of something that is not true. A necessary condition of 'A knows that p', therefore, is p."
 * In what follows, the first three distinctions are categories of knowledge: there is only one thing, knowledge, and each distinction presents two view on knowledge. The fourth distinction does the same but for epistemology itself. The fifth is the distinction between knowledge and certainty.
 * Distinctions(1)—Mental and nonmental conceptions of knowledge. "According to Plato (c. 428–c.348 BCE ), for example, knowing [episteme?] is a mental state akin to, but different from, believing [doxa?]. Contemporary versions of the theory assert that knowing is a member of a group of mental states that can be arranged in a series according to increasing certitude. At one end of the series would be guessing and conjecturing, for example, which possess the least amount of certitude; in the middle would be thinking, believing, and feeling sure; and at the end would be knowing, the most certain of all such states. Knowledge, in all such views, is a form of consciousness. Accordingly, it is common for proponents of such views to hold that if A knows that p, A must be conscious of what A knows. That is, if A knows that p, A knows that A knows that p."
 * "Beginning in the 20th century, many philosophers rejected the notion that knowledge is a mental state. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), for example, said in On Certainty, published posthumously in 1969, that “ ‘Knowledge’ and certainty belong to different categories."
 * "Such philosophers then observe that it is possible to know that something is the case without being aware that one knows it [and we are usually aware of a mental state such as pain]."
 * "Some philosophers [...] claim that one can ascribe knowledge to someone, or to oneself, only when certain complex conditions are satisfied, among them certain behavioral conditions."
 * "A well-known example of such a view was advanced by J.L. Austin (1911–60) in his 1946 paper 'Other Minds.' Austin claimed that when one says 'I know,' one is indicating that one has the proper credentials and reasons to assert [when needed] that such and such is the case."
 * Distinctions(2)—Occasional and dispositional knowledge. "A distinction closely related to the [mental vs nonmental distinction] is that between “occurrent” and “dispositional” knowledge." (It's not clear what is mental and not occurent and what is occurent and not mental. So, it seems to be the same distinction. This impression is perhaps due to the way mental vs  non mental is discussed. One could have argued that mental means associated to an individual, whereas non mental means knowledge that hold independently of an individual and thus without any individual mind or mental.)
 * Distinctions(3)—A priori and a posteriori knowledge. "The distinction [between a priori vs a posteriori] plays an especially important role in the work of David Hume (1711–76) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). [...] Knowledge [...] is a posteriori in the sense that it can be obtained only through certain kinds of experience."
 * "The differences between sentences that express a priori knowledge and those that express a posteriori knowledge are sometimes described in terms of four additional distinctions: necessary versus contingent, analytic versus synthetic, tautological versus significant, and logical versus factual."
 * Necessary means that the proposition is logically true, i.e., true in all interpretations. Otherwise, it is contingent, i.e., true in some interpretations only. Analytic is a special case of necessary: the proposition is true by definition of the subject, more precisely, the predicate applied to the subject is included in the definition. Tautological is even more specific. Logical is the same as necessary if the applied logic is complete and sound. If it is sound, which is always the case, then logical implies necessary.
 * "These distinctions are normally spoken of as applying to “propositions,” which may be thought of as the contents, or meanings, of sentences that can be either true or false." (This is the usual approach inspired by logic: the meaning is given in terms of interpretation and two sentences that have the same true interpretations have the same meaning.)
 * Necessary a posteriori propositions. "In [...] Naming and Necessity (1972), the American philosopher Saul Kripke argued that, contrary to traditional assumptions, not all necessary propositions are known a priori; some are knowable only a posteriori." (This is related to the laddered structures of laws: what are the observations related by a law depend on other laws.)
 * Distinctions(4)—Description and justification. "Throughout its very long history, epistemology has pursued two different sorts of task: description and justification." (In some sentences, the article associates justificatory with normative. In this case, it becomes the distinction between descriptive—we describe what scientists do—and normative—we tell scientists what they should do to reach the objective, i.e., truth. It's as if the distinction is between justification and no justification and the latter is called descriptive.)
 * "An example of a descriptive epistemological system is the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). Husserl’s aim was to give an exact description of the phenomenon of intentionality, or the feature of conscious mental states by virtue of which they are always “about,” or “directed toward,” some object. [...] Wittgenstein stated that 'explanation must be replaced by description,' and much of his later work was devoted to carrying out that task. Other examples of descriptive epistemology can be found in the work of G.E. Moore (1873–1958), H.H. Price (1899–1984), and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), each of whom considered whether there are ways of apprehending the world that do not depend on any form of inference and, if so, what that apprehension consists of (see below Perception and knowledge). Closely related to that work were attempts by various philosophers, including Moritz Schlick (1882–1936), Otto Neurath (1882–1945), and A.J. Ayer (1910–89), to identify “protocol sentences”—i.e., statements that describe what is immediately given in experience without inference."
 * "The normative approach quickly takes one into the central domains of epistemology, raising questions such as: “Is knowledge identical with justified true belief?,” “Is the difference between knowledge and belief merely a matter of probability?,” and “What is justification?”"
 * Distinctions(5)—Knowledge and certainty. "Moore observed that [...] a sentence such as 'I knew for certain that he would come, but he didn’t,' for example, is self-contradictory, whereas 'I felt certain he would come, but he didn’t' is not. On the basis of such considerations, Moore contended that 'a thing can’t be certain unless it is [true, thus] known.' It is that fact that distinguishes the concepts of certainty and truth: 'A thing that nobody knows may quite well be true but cannot possibly be certain.' Moore concluded that a necessary condition for the truth of 'It is certain that p' is that somebody should know that p. Moore is therefore among the philosophers who answer in the negative the question of whether it is possible for p to be certain without being known. [... more arguments ... ] Moore is thus among the philosophers who would answer in the affirmative the question of whether it is possible for p to be known without being certain." (So, Moore argued using linguistic usage that "being certain" implies "somebody knows", but the converse is false. But, I am not sure what we do with this. )
 * "Other philosophers have disagreed, arguing that if a person’s knowledge that p is occurrent rather than merely dispositional, it implies certainty that p." (It does not seem a valid opposition, because it can still be the case 'somebody knows' does not imply 'certainty', even if 'somebody knows in a occurrent manner' implies 'certainty'.)
 * "The most radical position on such matters was the one taken by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. Wittgenstein held that knowledge is radically different from certitude and that neither concept entails the other. It is thus possible to be in a state of knowledge without being certain and to be certain without having knowledge." (However, the article does not explain the notion of truth in Wittgenstein late philosophy.)
 * The origins of knowledge. "It is highly significant that Plato should use mathematical (specifically, geometrical) examples to show that knowledge does not originate in sense experience; indeed, it is a sign of his perspicacity."
 * Innate and acquired knowledge. "The problem of the origins of knowledge has engendered two historically important kinds of debate. One of them concerns the question of whether knowledge is innate—i.e., present in the mind, in some sense, from birth—or acquired through experience. The matter has been important not only in philosophy but also, since the mid-20th century, in linguistics and psychology."
 * Rationalism and empiricism. "The second debate related to the problem of the origins of knowledge is that between rationalism and empiricism. [...] One thus might define rationalism as the theory that there is an isomorphism (a mirroring relationship) between reason and reality that makes it possible for the former to apprehend the latter just as it is. Rationalists contend that if such a correspondence were lacking, it would be impossible for human beings to understand the world. [...] Rationalists hold that human beings have knowledge that is prior to experience and yet significant. Empiricists deny that that is possible."
 * "Empiricists must explain how abstract ideas, such as the concept of a perfect triangle, can be reduced to elements apprehended by the senses when no perfect triangles are found in nature. They must also give an account of how general concepts are possible. It is obvious that one does not experience “humankind” through the senses, yet such concepts are meaningful, and propositions containing them are known to be true. [...] According to the rationalist, the only way to account for the child’s selection of the correct concept is to suppose that at least part of it is innate."
 * Skepticism. "For every argument there seems to be a counterargument, and for every position a counterposition. To a considerable extent, skepticism is born of such reflection." (Actually, I don't see any argument in support of logical justification of laws, except that people would like that it exists, but there is good arguments against it. The authors might not have Hume's scepticism in mind.)
 * "Ironically, skepticism itself is a kind of philosophy, and the question has been raised whether it manages to escape its own criticisms." (This illustrates that they consider a general scepticism, not only scepticism towards justification of laws.)
 * "But however it is understood, skepticism represents a challenge to the claim that human beings possess or can acquire knowledge." (This is true if we say that knowledge requires logical justification, but why should it require logical justification? In practice, we accept theories, because we experience their usefulness in terms of technologies and procedures, not because of logical proofs.)
 * "In giving even that minimal characterization, it is important to emphasize that skeptics and nonskeptics alike accept the same definition of knowledge, one that implies two things: (1) if A knows that p, then p is true, and (2) if A knows that p, then A cannot be mistaken (i.e., it is logically impossible that A is wrong." (Not sure about that. It depends what kind of truth we are talking about. If we are talking about truth based on the experience that the theory is useful, then yes, but it certainly not yes if truth means justified in a proof.)
 * "One variety of radical skepticism claims that there is no such thing as knowledge of an external world. According to that view, it is at least logically possible that one is merely a brain in a vat and that one’s sense experiences of apparently real objects (e.g., the sight of a tree) are produced by carefully engineered electrical stimulations." (But, of course, this would easily be refuted, because it is a weird assumption and we must pick the most reasonable assumptions. Also, it is not a scepticism towards justification of laws, but directly towards the observations and the laws themselves.)

The history of epistemology
This is the longest section of the article. In this section, it is said that knowledge was defined as justified true belief by Plato. It starts without any notion of justified true belief though: Plato uses the allegory of the cave to explain the relation between experiences of the senses and knowledge. The article continues with "reason is used to discover unchanging forms through the method of dialectic, which Plato inherited from his teacher Socrates." There is no notion of justified true belief at this stage of the argument. But, the question is asked "how should knowledge in general be defined?" The article then says "In the Theaetetus Plato argues that, at a minimum, knowledge involves true belief." The article further argues that knowledge must be justified and attributes the argument to Plato in the Theaetetus. Then it states "Although there has been much disagreement about the nature of justification, the Platonic definition of knowledge was widely accepted until the mid-20th century, when [...] Gettier produced a startling counterexample." (Note: In my view, if there has been disagreement about justification, then most likely there has been disagreement about what is truth as well. So, there has been disagreement about what is knowledge. So, there must has been disagreement about what is the widely accepted Plato's definition.) Next, the article attributes to Aristotle an argument that knowledge must be identical to its object, based on the premise that knowledge must be true belief. So, it seems that knowledge being a true belief would have been self evident for Aristotle. Then the article presents in more details Aristotle's view: "Aristotle says that the intellect, like everything else, must have two parts: something analogous to matter and something analogousto form. The first is the passive intellect, the second the active intellect, of which Aristotle speaks tersely." The article then presents the different forms of scepticism that followed Aristotle. The scepticism of the Pyrrhonist is (it seems to me) very similar to Hume's scepticism. It basically says that a general rule for justification would require its own justification and this would lead to infinite regress. Interestingly, the article says that it is not "strictly an epistemology, since it has no theory of knowledge and is content to undermine the dogmatic epistemologies of others, especially Stoicism and Epicureanism." Perhaps the point being made here is that it offers no theory of justified true belief and thus no theory of knowledge: a theory that says knowledge is fallible is like no theory of knowledge. The articles says "Pyrrho himself was said to have had ethical motives for attacking dogmatists: being reconciled to not knowing anything, Pyrrho thought, induced serenity (ataraxia)." Then the discussion turns around a rejection of scepticism and an understanding of knowledge in terms of God by St. Augustine. Much of the following discussion in the article is about the possible roles, if any, of God in knowledge, roles that are compatible with science (i.e., natural philosophy). The distinction between knowledge (in the mind) and the object that is known is often central in the discussion, especially because knowledge must be "true". Next, the duality empiricism vs rationalism of the modern era is discussed. Finally, the article discusses contemporary philosophy: "Contemporary philosophy begins in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Much of what sets it off from modern philosophy is its explicit criticism of the modern tradition and sometimes its apparent indifference to it." The article makes an important distinction between "Continental philosophy, which is the philosophical style of western European philosophers, and analytic philosophy (also called Anglo-American philosophy), which includes the work of many European philosophers who immigrated to Britain, the United States, and Australia shortly before World War II." It seems that epistemology emerges as a discipline at that time, but this is not a point made in the article.

Episteme (scientific knowledge) and Noûs (inaccessible true knowledge)
Some authors say or suggest that in ancient Greek philosophy "episteme" meant scientific knowledge while other authors says that it meant true knowledge that could not be accessed. For example:

D. W. Hamlyn wrote: "Aristotle frequently says that we think that we have scientific knowledge (episteme) when we know the cause or reason why. [...] There is however an immediate problem how the first premises or first principles of an argument which amounts to demonstration can be known. [...] Aristotle provides this explanation in the last chapter of the Posterior Analytics, and there maintains that we come as a result of experience to an awareness or intuition of the first principles, so that we know them not by episteme but by nous."

Nicholas Rescher wrote "Pragmatism as a philosophical doctrine traces back to the Academic sceptics in classical antiquity. Denying the possibility of achieving authentic knowledge ( epistêmê ) regarding the real truth, they taught that we must make do with plausible information ( to pithanon ) adequate to the needs of practice. However, pragmatism as a determinate philosophical doctrine descends from the work of Charles Sanders Peirce."

Beardsley wrote: "Knowledge (episteme), as distinct from mere opinion (doxa), is a grasp of the eternal forms; and Plato clearly denies it to the arts, as imitations of imi­tations (Republic 598 - 601). So the poet is placed on the sixth level of knowledge in the Phaedrus (248D), and Ion is said to interpret Homer not by 'art or knowledge' (532c) but in an irrational way (cf. Apology 22), for he does not know what he is saying or why he might be right or wrong."

Michael V. Wedin wrote: "Posterior Analytics extends syllogistic to science and scientific explanation. A science is a deductively ordered body of knowledge about a definite genus or domain of nature. Scientific knowledge (episteme) consists not in knowing that, e.g., there is thunder in the clouds, but rather in knowing why there is thunder."

David N. Sedley wrote: "Stoic epistemology defends the existence of cognitive certainty against the attacks of the New Academy. Belief is described as assent (synkatathesis) to an impression (phantasia), i.e. taking as true the propositional content of some perceptual or reflective impression. Certainty comes through the “cognitive impression” (phantasia kataleptike), a self-certifying perceptual representation of external fact, claimed to be commonplace. Out of sets of such impressions we acquire generic conceptions (prolepseis) and become rational. The highest intellectual state, knowledge (episteme), in which all cognitions become mutually supporting and hence “unshakable by reason,” is the prerogative of the wise. Everyone else is in a state of mere opinion (doxa) or of ignorance." This quote is ambiguous as to whether it means scientific knowledge.

Donald Morrison wrote: "Simplicius clearly believes that tekmeriodic proof is not only a way for someone who already knows the principles of physics to teach them to others; it is also the natural way for physicists to discover the principles of physics themselves. Simplicius, like Eustratius in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, stresses that tekmeriodic proof gives one a grasp (gnôsis) of the principles, without giving one scientific knowledge (episteme) of them. By contrast, Philoponus calls apodeictic and tekmeriodic proofs both epistêmonikê gnôsis."

Eckhard Kessler wrote: "There are at least two treatises which document the selective use of the text made by the philosophers of the school. The first is that of Archangelus Mercenarius,80 who uses Aristotle’s statement that only parts of the soul, and not the soul in its totality, are the subject of the natural philosopher as an argument in the discussion on the immortality of the soul. The second is that by Cesare Cremonini, who in De paedia, an introductory treatise to his commentary on the Physics, refers to Aristotle’s remarks in the beginning of the De partibus on the role of paideia and episteme in the sciences."

Larry Laudan wrote: "As far back as the time of Parmenides, Western philosophers thought it important to distinguish knowledge (episteme) from mere opinion (doxa), reality from appearance, truth from error. By the time of Aristotle, these epistemic concerns came to be focused on the question of the nature of scientific knowledge. In his highly influential Posterior Analytics, Aristotle described at length what was involved in having scientific knowledge of something. To be scientific, he said, one must deal with causes, one must use logical demonstrations, and one must identify the universals which 'inhere' in the particulars of sense. But above all, to have science one must have apodictic certainty. It is this last feature which, for Aristotle, most clearly distinguished the scientific way of knowing."

See also citation on Aristotle below.

Scott Carson wrote: "Aristotle’s treatment of phronêsis (Nicomachean Ethics VI.5 1140a24–b30; cf. 1141b8–1143a5) is similar in many respects to Plato’s, but in his account the knowledge that we obtain of virtue is not the equivalent of scientific (demonstrative) knowledge (episteme): unlike episteme, which is concerned with necessary truths, phronêsis is always concerned with contingent truths."

Scott Carson also wrote: "By the time Plato wrote the Theaetetus, he had clearly settled on an antisophistic conception of knowledge and expertise that takes the life and methodology of Socrates as its model, though even in that arguably late dialogue there is no clear line of demarcation drawn between sophia and episteme (knowledge). Since, for Plato, all knowledge, whether of mathematical objects or normative concepts such as the virtues, involves cognitive grasp of purely formal entities, there is less demand in his epistemology for a clear and concise differentiation between the two types of mental states and their proper objects. Aristotle, by contrast, drew rather sharp distinctions not only between episteme and sophia, but also among those rational faculties and phronêsis (practical wisdom), techne (art, skill), and nous (intelligence, understanding). [...] Thus sophia is associated with both techne and episteme, but it marks off a superlative kind of knowledge in which the knower not only fully understands the consequences of the principles of his craft but also fully understands the natures of the principles themselves. There is thus a sense in which sophia encompasses both the necessary truths that follow from demonstrations (the domain of episteme) and the necessary truths that are the first principles of the demonstrative sciences (the domain of nous)."

Allan B. Wolter wrote: "On the other hand, the genuine interest in the logical structure of “science” (episteme), as Aristotle understood the term, led to an inevitable comparison of systematic theology with the requirements of a science such as Euclid’s geometry. [...] Avicenna agreed with Averroes that Aristotle’s metaphysics was meant to be more than a collection of opinions (doxa) and had the character of a science (episteme) or body of demonstrated truths, where “demonstration” is understood in the sense of the Posterior Analytics."

Benjamin Pryor wrote: "Order of Things [...] proceeds by way of an account of two profound breaks in the coherence of knowledge about man and of the way those breaks affect modern knowledge and give it resources with which to freely think new possibilities. The first break occurred between [two views on episteme:] the Renaissance and the classical epistemes. Foucault uses the word episteme to designate the regularities that account for the coherence of knowledge in a given period. The Renaissance episteme was coherent—one could speak truly about nature and link one’s speech to the world—because of its dependence on resemblance and similitude for the organization of what counted as knowledge and true perception. But this understanding of the relationship between language and the world, between the signifier and the signified, is ultimately broken—similitude becomes deceptive."

Roberto Torretti wrote: "It is usually taken for granted that the book is patterned after Aristotle’s conception of a true science (episteme). This must consist of a collection of universal statements (theorems) obtained by deductive inference from self-evident premises (axioms) and definitions using a few self-explanatory terms (primitives)."

Anthony Quinton wrote: "However, a certain disquiet about the inductivist flavor of the positive support that his theory allows a hypothesis to derive from the failure of attempted refutations is expressed in Popper’s leanings toward a rather skeptical view of the status of unrefuted hypotheses: “Science is not a system of certain, or well-established, statements.... Our science is not knowledge (episteme): it can never claim to have attained truth, or even a substitute for it, such as probability.... We do not know: we can only guess.” (The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Ch. 10, Sec. 85, p. 278)."

Malcolm Schofield wrote: "The need for a concept of secure rational understanding—epistêmê—on the Platonic model is not denied."

Patrick A. Heelan wrote : "Heisenberg defines noumenal reality as the object of an intellectual intuition (episteme) which, however, is a kind of knowledge we do not possess."

Zeev Perelmuter wrote : "It is generally agreed that the solution is to be found in the enigmatic last chapter of the An. Post., a solution that explains how we get to know first principles despite their being non-demonstrable. Aristotle says that nous is the cognitive state responsible for getting to know archai (100b5-12, cf. 99b 17-19) and describes the process of their acquisition (99b26-100al4). But here we face a difficulty. The process described is not about getting to know immediate premisses of demonstrations; it is that of getting to know universal concepts."

Lakatos wrote:
 * "Schools in the theory of knowledge draw a demarcation between two vastly different sorts of knowledge: episteme, that is, proven knowledge, and doxa, that is, mere opinion. The most influential schools - the 'justificationist' schools1 - rank episteme exceedingly high and doxa exceedingly low; indeed, according to their extreme canons only the former deserves the name 'knowledge'."
 * "The dominance of justificationism in the theory of knowledge cannot be characterized better than by the fact that the theory of knowledge came to be called 'epistemology', the theory of episteme. Mere doxa was not deemed worthy of serious investigation: growth of doxa was regarded as a particularly absurd idea, since in the orthodox justificationist view,' the hallmark of progress was the increase of rational episteme and the gradual decrease in irrational doxa."
 * "The influence of Newtonian success reached even political thought. It created a veritable euphoria among the dogmatists: before Newton the problem was whether it is possible at all to arrive at episteme; after Newton the problem became how it was possible to arrive at episteme, and how one can extend it to other spheres of knowledge. Without appreciating this problem shift one cannot understand eighteenth century thought."

Popper wrote:
 * in paraphrasing Plato, "The difficulties in the way of an understanding of the real world are all but super-human, and only the very few, if anybody at all, can attain to the divine state of understanding the real world—the divine state of true knowledge, of epistēmē." Popper continues, "This is a pessimistic theory with regard to almost all men, though not with regard to all. (For it teaches that truth may be attained by a few—the elect. With regard to these it is, one might say, more wildly optimistic than even the doctrine that truth is manifest.) The authoritarian and traditionalist consequences of this pessimistic theory are fully elaborated in the Laws."
 * "Aristotle, and also Bacon, I wish to suggest, meant by ‘induction’ not so much the inferring of universal laws from particular observed instances as a method by which we are guided to the point whence we can intuit or perceive the essence or the true nature of a thing."
 * "In spite of their individualistic tendencies, they did not dare to appeal to our critical judgment—to your judgment, or to mine; perhaps because they felt that this might lead to subjectivism and to arbitrariness. Yet whatever the reason may have been, they certainly were unable to give up thinking in terms of authority, much as they wanted to do so. They could only replace one authority—that of Aristotle and the Bible—by another. Each of them appealed to a new authority; the one to the authority of the senses, and the other to the authority of the intellect."

Bruce J. MacLennan wrote : "We will be especially concerned with logical positivism’s view of knowledge, which is, roughly: (1) the only real knowledge is scientific knowledge; (2) by a process of logical analysis scientific knowledge can be reduced to symbolic formulas constructed from 'atomic facts.' Certainly assertion (1) is nothing new; Socrates said as much when he distinguished 'scientific knowledge' (episteme) from a “practice” (empeiria); see Section 2.4.3. Furthermore, assertion (2) is implicit in Pythagorianism and is a continuous theme in most Western epistemology, from Plato and Aristotle, through Hobbes and Leibnitz, to Boole and Hilbert. In this sense logical positivism is just the continuation of this long tradition."

Truth
Inmaculada Perdomo says that empirical success, not truth, is the main goal of science: As pointed out by Hans-Johann Glock, a similar point was made by Quine:

It is interesting that Glock adds in that same context:

Given that pragmatism is a lot related to the notion of truth, let us mention how Glock continues:

Rorty wrote: Plantinga reaction is:

Belief
In addition to the views presented below, there is also the argument of Michael Williams in the section Scepticism, which can be seen as a rejection of the concept of belief that can become knowledge through any form of justification, even weak justification. The point here is that one must judge the concept of belief in terms of its purpose. If the purpose is to define knowledge, then Michael Williams (Agrippan skepticism) applies. Jack Ritchie's point in the section implies also a different view on belief. Similarly, since belief is related to truth, some of the views on truth, in particular the view of Inmaculada Perdomob in the section Truth shed some light on the notion of belief.

Is belief a fundamental concept?
Most of the points on belief are made under the assumption that belief is a fundamental concept of epistemology, because there is not much to say about belief when the concept is rejected as useless or outside the scope of epistemology from the start. The question whether belief is a fundamental concept is better translated as the question whether internalism and its counterpart, externalism, are fundamental concepts. The point being that as soon as we consider internal mental states that are a priori disconnected, not knowledge, unless some warrant is provided, then the notion of belief is needed to represent the mental states that need the warrant to become knowledge. The well-formed questions are whether epistemology is about objective knowledge or subjective knowledge and what is the role of cognitive science in epistemology.

General (or yet unclassified) points
In a section entitled "Theories of belief (Also known as ACCEPTANCE)". Jonathan Weisberg wrote:

Donald Davidson wrote:

He continues:

Anabela Pinto wrote:

Pavese in Knowledge how in SEP wrote:

He also wrote:

It is interesting that the first paragraph in an article of Jaegwon Kim about Naturalized Epistemology is about beliefs. In this article, the third sentence is:

It suggests that in naturalized epistemology, belief is a primary concept. Somehow in contrast, referring to Carnap, Wolfgang Stegmüller wrote:

A.W. Carus adds:

Shahid Rahman, Juan Redmond and Nicolas Clerbout argue that Popper's notion of objective knowledge is closely related to the (content) of belief:

Of course, it is well known that Popper's objective knowledge was independent of a relation to a particular subject. Therefore, the above passage refers to the content of a belief. Susan Haack wrote:

Konstantin Kolenda wrote:

David Papineau wrote:

C.J.Misak wrote:

Imre Lakatos wrote:

Richard C. Jeffrey wrote:

William P. Alston wrote:

Williamson wrote: Ya-Ting Chang wrote:

Here the view of D. M. Armstrong on belief:

This passage from Zagzebski:

Zagzebski wrote:

Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard suggest that (true) belief is what is valuable, but knowledge is valuable as the best way to secure true belief. They wrote:

Sandra Lapointe describes Bolzano's view on belief:

Alvin I. Goldman on belief
Alvin I. Goldman wrote:

In what follows, we see the openness of Goldman toward externalism:

It remains to see how metaphysical is Goldman. Next, Goldman makes reference to the notion of propositions being the objects of beliefs: and he presents his direction of thoughts:

Marshall Swain wrote:

Contradictory beliefs in one person
J.P. Smit wrote:

Halvor Nordby wrote:

Sarah Stroud wrote:

Ingmar Persson wrote:

Ingmar Persson adds something:

Belief and ascent
Alvin Platinga wrote:

Maria Rosa Antognazzza wrote: In what follows, Antognazza is not in the context of stoicism, but still emphasizes the distinction in kind between knowledge and belief. She does not use the expression "assent to knowledge", but she could have.

Belief and logic
Peter Gardenfors suggests the metaphysical view that human knowledge is a form of computer knowledge in which the computer only has access to internal propositional knowledge and other propositional knowledge as input: This is a big field in itself that does not seem so connected in practice to epistemology, not sure why. Floridi in The Philosophy of Information (2011) seems to make some link. It will be interesting to learn more about the link between epistemology and Floridi's philosophy of information. The link seems problematic. Floridi says But, the notion of objective knowledge of Voorbraak is not the objective knowledge of Popper or Pierce. He wrote: This notion of objective knowledge is infallible, but both Popper and Peirce are fallibilists.

Belief and inductive logic
Nick Chater, Mike Oaksford, Ulrike Hahn and Evan Heit wrote:

Later, they add:

and add more later:

Belief and desire
Paul Boghossian wrote:

Belief and doxa
Jessica Moss and Whitney Schwab wrote:

and in the last, concluding, chapter:

Jessica Moss wrote:

Gail Fine has a view on doxa as taken to be true, which makes it a component of knowledge:

It should be mentioned that Meno 98a is where Socrates recalls that the process of transformation of doxa to knowledge is recollection ("Anamnesis", which is almost always translated as recollection from things known in the past).

Belief and brain
Paul M. Churchland wrote:

and later:

Keith Lehrer understand Churchland as saying that:

Justification and realism
There is a misunderstanding here. The anti-realist does not say that an analysis will show that a belief, which is a concept within the realistic division internal/external, does not need justification. He says that there is a notion of knowledge that does not fit in the internal/external paradigm.

About knowing something that is not true
Martinich and Stroll wrote: "Second, it is agreed by all sides that one cannot have 'knowledge that' [propositional knowledge] of something that is not true." and later "however it is understood, skepticism represents a challenge to the claim that human beings possess or can acquire knowledge. In giving even that minimal characterization, it is important to emphasize that skeptics and nonskeptics alike accept the same definition of knowledge, one that implies two things: (1) if A knows that p, then p is true, and (2) if A knows that p, then A cannot be mistaken (i.e., it is logically impossible that A is wrong."

Nicholas Rescher considered that induction must be accepted pragmatically without further justification and that knowledge is standardly justified true belief. Here the qualifier "standardly" makes an important difference.

Kevin Meeker and Frederick F. Schmitt argue that even in David Hume we can see a view that knowledge is justified true belief. Kenneth R. Merrill rather says that Hume adopted a point of view similar to Quine who saw epistemology as a part of psychology. Schmitt's view on "justification" is not a logical justification: in this manner there is no contradiction.

Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske wrote that after Edmund Gettier raised a problem with the JTB definition of knowledge no epistemologists found an acceptable variation on this definition. Similarly, Conee and Feldman wrote "Although epistemologists have learned much about knowledge from this research, no consensus has emerged about the solution to the problem raised by examples like Gettier’s. On the other hand, Paul Boghossian  wrote that JTB is the standard, widely accepted Platonic definition of knowledge.

Rohit Parikh and Adriana Renero argued that the popular belief that plato adopted JTB as the definition of knowledge is incorrect. This is also a point made by Zina Giannopoulou.

Epistemics versus Cognitive Science
It seems that Epistemics existed and is still viewed by some as a field of study distinct from Cognitive Science. For example Kelly, wrote "To this end, epistemics incorporates everything that the personal epistemology tradition seeks, and then some. Its most significant informing  discipline is social epistemology but cognitive science and information science also play a  part as well in naturalizing artifacts produced in research (or distilled from lived experience)".

About epistemology as one of the four branches of philosophy
Tertiary sources say that philosophy is divided in four branches. I see a problem here, because Wikipedia is not about truth, but about what is the state of knowledge, what are the well known views, and this includes saying who has these views. Of course, in the case of the sky is blue, there is no need to say who has this view, but in the case of the four branches of philosophy, it seems to me that we cannot simply state that view as if it was the truth. The problem is that tertiary sources are not replacements for secondary sources. The NOR policy says that Wikipedia articles should be based on reliable, published secondary sources and, to a lesser extent, on tertiary sources and primary sources. So, I searched the literature in the hope to discover who are the primary proponents of this division of philosophy in four branches. The view points that I present look in the past, but they are found in recent sources about branches of philosophy. There is no original research here—I refer to sources. I ignored the views on philosophy before the Renaissance. Regarding the Renaissance,  I found this: This is not exactly the division that we see often nowadays, viz, epistemology, logic, metaphysics and ethics. It might not seem so different: instead of natural philosophy we have epistemology. Natural philosophy is now called science and is not a branch of philosophy any more. However, from the point of view of epistemology, it's a big difference. Somehow, it emerged as a branch of philosophy after science received its own status outside philosophy. If we believe Sidgwick, H., science  was still a branch of philosophy in 1772 up to 1876: OK, this is a very old source, more a primary source, but it might help to find recent sources. Perhaps the transition occurred at the end of the 19th century and we can find recent sources about that. If we could attribute the view that philosophy has the "standard" four branches to some well known source, that will accomplish what we want. However, this is perhaps too much to hope for. The branches are not always the same even in relatively recent sources. For example, I found this written in 1988: In this division, as expected, epistemology is now a branch of philosophy, but logic is not, whereas politics and esthetics are. I found the "standard" division in Those who Can, Teach. Here, a 1968 text, logic is not a branch of philosophy, but politics is. This one has the "standard" division. Given the fact that some divisions have five branches, I compared the Google Ngrams of "three branches of philosophy", "four branches of philosophy" and "five branches of philosophy" and in 2019, five branches was more frequent than four branches. In any case, the most frequent is three branches. So, clearly the division in four branches does not seem to be a standard division. This more recent source says explicitly that there are no unique division in branches. branches: logic, epistemology, axiology and metaphysics. This source says that this "standard division" is close to the division of philosophy that the American Philosophical Association uses. The difference in the APA division is that aesthetics is also a branch. This source subsumes ethics and aesthetics under axiology, but it says that in its discussion of axiology, ethics and aesthetic are separate subjects. So, in practice, the source uses five branches as does APA. In this 1998 source, epistemology is not mentioned as a branch of philosophy, only the other four branches used by APA are mentioned. This 2007 source, in a specific context, mentions other branches: This 2017 source has the five branches of the APA, but subsumes  ethics and aesthetics  under axiology. It refers to this 1999 dictionary of philosophy, which explicitly refers to the five branches.

Regarding the 5 branches of the APA, it seems that it has changed or the source I used was simply wrong. On the site of the APA, I found "The broadest subfields of philosophy are most commonly taken to be logic, ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and the history of philosophy. Here is a brief sketch of each."

Critic of the lead of Empirical evidence from a critical rationalism view
In the critical rationalist view, an observation is empirical evidence for a theory if it is in logical contradiction with known rival theories and not with the proposed theory. The evidence makes the focus move toward the theory, because it creates problems for the rival theories while leaving the considered theory as a valid alternative. If the observation is evidence for more than one theory, scientists have the tendency to adopt the one that is most falsifiable, i.e., more precise, less vague. Decisions are easier to make under a more precise law, but this is not a rule to justify a theory. In fact, because of the Duhem-Quine thesis, there is not even a rule that says that we should reject theories that have problems because of contradictions with evidence. In other words, evidence is not at all to justify a theory, but is only used to steer the nonrational creative process through problems. In critical rationalism, problems with theories typically support progress. For example, we propose a treatment for an illness, which is a real problem. The proposed theory is a positive effect. The rival theory is simply no effect. We see an effect. This is good and yet a problem with the rival theory. The general principle is that problems with theories are used to steer the nonrational creative process.

Statements that knowledge is justified true belief
Well, this includes those who claims it was the traditional analysis and criticises it. Louis Vervoort and  Alexander A. Shevchenko wrote: Here follows a few more citations.

The translators wrote that Bolzano came to reject that definition later when he developed a foundation for mathematics (published in Bernard-Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe in German).

This is a defense of justified true belief against the Gettier cases. and 15 pages later:

The following is part of a review of, I think.

In what follows, Richard Foley suggests that justification in justified true belief is some extra information (that one must have):

The myth of the traditional analysis of knowledge
Pierre Le Morvan (2017) wrote:

Floridi has the following translation of 208b and 210a in the Theaetetus:

Petter Sandstad in a review of the book of Michael T. Ferejohn'', Formal Causes. Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in Socratic and Aristotelian Thought,'' wrote:

Nathan Ballantyne in the book Knowing our limits wrote:

In the context of virtue epistemology, Ian M. Church wrote: Michael Ayers wrote:

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski in the book Epistemic Values makes a difference between two notions of knowledge: understanding and certainty (obtained from justification) and writes Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Matthias Steup wrote:

Burnyeat wrote:

Linda Zagzebski in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology wrote:

Metaphysical views in the JTB analysis of knowledge
An example of that is. Goldman first said that justifications are not needed, but later said that actually he meant epistemological justifications are not needed, but non epistemological justifications are needed. This resulted in a form of naturalised epistemology. Naturalised epistemology is a metaphysical view on knowledge. The following discusses the difficulty of explaining the notion of truth in this view.

There is an implicit metaphysical view in this analysis of JTB.

Here, we see an assumption that there is a reality out there independent of mental concepts in JTB.

The following says that knowledge and JTB could belong in different categories.

The view (see below) that Russell endorsed the justified true belief analysis should be considered with this in mind:   says that ordinary language philosophy is still in use in the modern analysis of knowledge in terms of justified true beliefs. In the next citation, Anthony Quinton says that epistemology is the foundation of Plato's dualistic ontology: Anthony Quinton continues by making a distinction between philosophy "as an ontological undertaking" versus "a critical inquiry, as a second-order discipline concerned with the claims of various concrete forms of intellectual activity". I believe the purpose is to say that in both cases epistemology is important.

Definition of knowledge in other approaches
Since Ferrier is the one who first used the term epistemology to present a philosophy, it is interesting to see his view on knowledge: Ferrier wrote (citation taken from ): also wrote, quoting James Frederick Ferrier, Philosophical Works of James Frederick Ferrier, Vol. 1 : The following discusses the relative priority of epistemology and metaphysics (or ontology). I find it strange that he speaks of a controversy, because they are only different aspects of philosophy. The fact that one of them, epistemology, was not recognized as a separate division makes it even more improbable. Sure, it was perhaps identified as the study of knowledge (in opposition to a study of what exists), but still I am not aware of debates around that. In the same entry, the relation with Logic is mentioned.

and with psychology.

We should mention that Kenneth R. Merrill says that Hume adopted a point of view similar to Quine who saw epistemology as a part of psychology. Also Russell saw epistemology as a mix of logic and psychology.

See also:

Here the relation with Ethics is discussed.

Here is the not less interesting view of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) :

Here are other views.

A good connection between Popper's philosophy and the traditional analysis of knowledge is given in :

David Miller in an unpublished paper available on the Internet since 2017 that he asks not to quote without permission mentions that people around the world say to him that they do not try to find a logic of induction or abduction, but to establish general knowledge that can help to discover laws. He says that if these are conjectural, he welcomes that and that it is not in contradiction with the non existence of a logic of induction or abduction. Actually, this seems to correspond to the old idea of metaphysical programs. Statistical laws and many mathematical theories help in this way. It's the most natural thing in a scientific program.

Given that practical knowledge is different than (pure) propositional knowledge, the comparison between these two kinds of knowledge made by Armstrong must be taken into account. Some discussion regarding the non necessity of justification is found in, and. argues that knowledge-how cannot be reduced to knowledge-that. Apparently, Jason Stanley claimed that it could. He did claim that in. See also on that subject. To have a link with the naturalistic approach of Popper, seems interesting. is a review.

Knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that
The following view is interesting, except that it seems to confuse a belief in the ability as a part of the ability, nothing at the level of proposition, with a belief in a proposition.

Assumption that knowledge is a kind of belief to justify justification
wrote

Know-how as distinct, not as a fundamental requirement
Ryle thought that know-how is logically prior to the concept of knowledge-that. In other words, know-that without know-how is like a scientific theory without its interpretation in technology : it is meaningless. This aspect of Ryle's view on know-how seems to have been ignored. For example, does not mention it at all. The followings say explicitly that it can be ignored.
 * discusses the distinction between know-how and know-that and says each can exist without the other:
 * in the entry The Value of Knowledge of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy wrote :
 * in the entry Different Constructions in Terms of 'Knows' of Dancy, Sosa A Companion to Epistemology wrote :

About Plato
This other passage from is particularly significant, because it makes the connection between the highly abstract notion of Forms and the practical notion of techne, both strongly associated with episteme.

Hintikka provides an analysis of Plato's argument, but the following quote focalizes on the Plato's conclusions acknowledged by Hintikka, not on Hintikka's analysis of the argument The followings are extracts of the book Plato on Knowledge and Forms : Selected Essays by Gail Fine. It is done in the context of the traditional analysis of knowledge. In that sense, it does not correspond to a background for the debate, but is a part of the debate.

About Aristotle
The next citation appears when Richard Parry discusses techne and episteme in the theaetetus. It is interesting that the idea that episteme is like doxa with an account has a similar counterpart in the relation between a practice and techne seen as episteme:

About the Stoics
Tsouna continues "The following passage indicates the complexity of the relation between technê and epistêmê and the diﬀerent ways in which the Stoics put these notions to use. She continues:

Stoicism and mark of truth
In the next citation, Dutant speaks of what can be considered a mark of truth. However, he refers to test and that goes beyond, I believe, the notion of mark of truth. After all, if it has a mark of truth, why should we test it, whatever it is.

does not use the terminology "mark of truth", but describes in different words this aspect in stoicism. He says stoics are dogmatic (and the Pyrrhonian are inductivist whereas the Academic skeptics are in another category : they adopt what he calls the "critical theory"). , comparing Peirce's theory of assent to the view of previous philosophers, says that Wittgenstein and John H. Newman held a psychological theory that some power explains the different degrees of belief, a view that was held in Stoicism, Saint Augustine's philosophy and other philosophies. The next one is misplaced because it is not about stoicism, but for now, I mention it here.

It is interesting that Ayers and Antognazza consider that episteme, even in the context of katalepsis is scientific knowledge, but they say "full scientific knowledge", whatever that means.

Stoicism and the three ways to assent to a phantasia
says that he is interested in the Stoic theory of cognition, not to their theory of episteme, which, in his understanding of stoicism, only wise men, if any, could have. He wrote The key point made by Dutant is that a cognitive impression is a discernible mark of truth for the knowledge it corresponds to. "Mark of truth" and "discernible mark of truth" are expressions introduced in the context of ancient Greek philosophies and subsequent philosophies. A knowledge (with a mark of truth) is necessarily the case. He wrote

Stoicism and foundationalism
views the "Stoic doctrine of kataleptic perceptions" as a "starter-set of basic truths" within an "essentially axiomatic concept of truth". For Rescher, Stoicism, as most past and even recent philosophies, adopts foundationalism in opposition to coherentism. He views the "wise man" of the Stoics as an idealization in the same category as the "ideal observers" [of some empiricists] or the “ideally rational agent” of the economists, or the like and considers that this option is utopian and unrealistic.

Stoicism and internalism
, mentions "Commonly (and correctly) thought of as the fountainheads of the tradition of classical foundationalism, Descartes and Locke are equally and perhaps even more significantly the fountainheads of the tradition of classical internalism." He adds a footnote :

Stoicism and induction
This indicates that Milton is concerned by the different meanings of induction. In that context, he wrote :

End of the school
According to, the schools for the Academics and the Stoics ended around 100 BCE (but the philosophy itself was studied by other schools after).

Knowledge-First
This is about Williamson's book (first published in 2000).

Relevant points from sources (to the History section)

 * To support the view that Locke did not consider knowledge as a kind of  belief,  wrote:
 * "[For Locke, the] distinction between assured true ‘belief ’ and ‘knowledge’ lies in the different kind and source of assurance, rather than simply in its degree."
 * To put the justified true belief approach into contexte, one of the most important concept is knowledge-how. Most sources on the traditional analysis of knowledge (as justified true belief) start by making this distinction and then focalize on knowledge-that or propositional knowledge.  mentions:
 * "The debate is partly epistemological: is knowledge-how an altogether distinct kind of knowledge, different from knowledge-that?"
 * "Brogaard (2009, 2011) argues that, in general, knowledge can have cognitive abilities or practical abilities as its justiﬁcatory grounds. In the latter case, agents know in virtue of ability states that are not subject to the usual epistemic constraints that characterize belief states generated by cognitive abilities. Correspondingly, knowledge-how ﬁts the bill for this practically grounded knowledge. argues that we should distinguish between theoretical knowledge-that and practical knowledge-that.
 * "Some have observed that knowledge-how may differ from propositional knowledge in that, whereas the latter plausibly entails belief, knowledge-how does not (Dreyfus 1991, 2005; Wallis 2008; Brownstein & Michaelson 2016)."
 * "The most recent debate on knowledge-how has intertwined with a debate on the nature of skills."
 * "The topic of skill and expertise is central since ancient philosophy through the notion of technē. Although both Plato and Aristotle took technē to be a kind of knowledge, there is significant controversy about their conceptions regarding the nature of this kind of knowledge and its relation to experience (empeiria) on one hand, and scientific knowledge (epistēmē) on the other (Johansen 2017; Lorenz & Morison 2019; Coope 2020)."
 * "Annas (1995, 2001, 2011) develops an interpretation on which skill and virtue (or phronēsis) are closer in Aristotle’s action theory than usually thought and they are both conceived along a broadly intellectualist model."
 * mentions :
 * "Ryle also thought that presence of knowledge-that requires knowledge-how. He said that he wanted to prove that “Knowledge-how is a concept logically prior to the concept of knowledge-that” (1945, 4–5). He argued that “knowing-that presupposes knowing-how,” saying, “To know a truth, I must have discovered or established it. But discovering and establishing are intelligent operations, requiring rules of method, checks, . . . etc.”
 * mentions :
 * "What cannot be denied, I think, is that animals and humans possess instinctive or innate know-how."
 * is mentioned in Pavese 2022.
 * With regard to the problem of justification, the issue of whether knowledge is know-how or know-that is a special case of the relativism issue mentioned in :
 * "The problem of justification may be illustrated by considering the two major sources of justificatory problems which relate to method. The first [...] is the problem of replying to the Humean skeptic [...]. The second  is the problem of epistemological relativism, which arises from the methodological variation and pluralism highlighted by Kuhn and other historical philosophers of science. [...] the solution may require a unified approach that addresses both the skeptic and the relativist [...] many philosophers [Popper, Quine, Piaget, etc.] have embraced a naturalistic approach to philosophical matters [...] In the context of the problem of the justification of method an epistemological naturalist approach has a great deal to offer [...] On such a naturalistic approach, the challenge of the epistemic skeptic is dissolved by noting that the skeptic sets unrealistically high standards of justification. [...] As for the threat of relativism, the naturalist may simply deny that no distinction may be drawn between right and wrong in relation to methodological matters. "

Epistemology in natural sciences, social sciences and religions
The Epistemology entry of Encyclopedia.com gathers 8 English encyclopedia articles (and 2 short dictionary entries) with title epistemology. One of these articles appears in an encyclopedia of sociology. The article explains that "the term epistemology is used with two separate meanings according to different cultural traditions." It says that the first meaning is associated with the English speaking contries, whereas the second is associated with continental Europe. It says that only the continental European meaning is directly concerned with social and natural sciences and the entire article adopts that second meaning of the term. Another of these articles is also about social sciences and it also ignores the first meaning that is associated with the English speaking countries. A third article (about epistemology) in the list belongs to an encyclopedia about the early modern world from 1450 to 1789. Given that it is about epistemology, it could have described the traditional analysis of knowledge that is supposed to have existed since Plato, but it does not say anything about knowledge as true belief. It does not even contain the word belief or opinion and the notion of justification is only mentioned once to say that David Hume rejected the idea that a rational justification of human laws exists. Among the five other articles in the list (,, , and ), only Parry and Murray  refer to the traditional analysis of knowledge.

About induction for the ancient Greeks
gives his view on the difference between the meaning of induction in Aristotle's texts and the meaning of induction in Hume's texts (and contemporary discussions) :

Value problem and virtue epistemology
First thing first, here is a view that suggests that solving the value problem is not a primary objective : Here, Zagzebski, who coined the expression "value problem", explains that the Gettier problem is a kind of value problem, but she does not propose any other way than being Gettierized for a proposal to fall short of knowledge. So, it could very well be that the Gettier problem is the only value problem, that is, the value problem would be the same as the Gettier problem, in practice. Here is some link with virtue epistemology.

This is a view point that seems to deny the value problem as described by Kvanvig. Hopefully, someone, maybe Kvanvig, has responded to this.

They raise their own issue here :

This is the key idea in Kvanvig's argument. It does not apply only on virtue epistemimology, but to any internalist condition for knowledge, because it does not take into account the environment. BTW, "robust" is better explained above. It means that the knowledge is the achievement of the knower, a skill must be involved.

Reliabilism
This section mentions reliabilism, but this view of Jack Ritchie is added because it says something more about it, which connects reliabilism with the notion of methodology of the logical positivists and Popper.

Descartes and virtue epistemology
Hilary Kornblith wrote: In both 1 (a) and 1 (b), the processes are available to the person and that is a subjective concept. The part that is objective in 1 (b) is that the process is conducive to truth. Kornblith says that, for Descartes, processes in 1 (a) are also in 1 (b): Descartes's position is that "the principles that seem right from one's present perspective, given sufficiently careful consideration, are objectively right as well." Moreover, Kornblith interprets Descartes as saying that we can choose any process that leads to a belief through an action and thus "Descartes runs the questions under (1) together with those under (2)". Kornblith continues with:

Two important principles against Descartes are stated here. The first one makes a distinction between the actions that one can decide to execute and the processes through which the person might go (to reach a belief or for any other outcome). One has control over his actions, but he does not have total control over the processes through which he goes. In particular, one does not control the beliefs that he gains from these processes. The second principle is that there is no a priori knowledge (and one has to rely on scientific knowledge).

Coherentism
The chapter Coherentism of Jonathan Kvanvig in The Bloomsbury Companion to Epistemology is a criticism of the subject that does not impose the burden of the proof to the coherentists in the sense that it concludes that there is hope that this research program might succeed. It sees three issues.

First issue: In fundamentalism, "the issue of exactly what is involved in basing a belief on a reason might still be a difficult question to answer, but identifying which particular item this relation must relate the target belief to is not difficult. Once we adopt a holistic account of justification, however, this simple answer is no longer available." But, Kvanvig says the holistic requirement can be additional to the usual fundamentalist approach.

Second issue: Kvanvig wrote "A second major objection to coherentism claims that coherentists cut off, or isolate, the story of justification from the story of the world, leaving the concept of justification too independent from reality itself." Kvanvig seems to argue in the same line as Popper who says that one can go deeper and includes the interpretation as needed.

Third issue: He wrote "Issues related to the truth connection arise initially when one notes that a good piece of fiction will display exceptional coherence in spite of having no connection at all to what is actually true." Kvanvig offers a seven pages response.

Coherentism and Plato
Franco Trabattoni wrote:

Coherentism and Hegel's idealism
W. J. Mander wrote:

Coherentism and correspondence theory: metaphysical considerations
Haig Khatchadourian wrote:

The raft vs swamp metaphor : coherentism vs critical rationalism
Neurath compared science to a raft that floats free of any anchor. Neurath indeed only required a coherence in the system. Popper criticized him for that reason. He also had a similar metaphor, but it was used differently. For Popper, objective knowledge was fundamental. This objective knowledge was like a building built on a swamp. The temporary foundation on this swamp was the empirical basis. He proposed in this way that scientific knowledge and its empirical basis was something external to the scientists. He accepted that, in principle, it could be a single scientist, like Robin Crusoe on his island, but that it was less likely to make science works. There was not necessarily a single building. Different groups of scientists could have different buildings or interact with different parts of a single building so that, in practice, they have like different buildings. The key point is that it was something external to the subjectivity of the scientists. This allowed Popper to add a material requirement to the empirical basis. This means that for Popper, knowledge was on the side of the environment and was linked to other parts of the environment by the material requirement. That requirement has a subjective aspect to it, because it refers to some intersubjectivity or communication between subjects, including communication between the same subject at different times, but a key point is that scientists could agree on it without having to reject as false or accept as true any particular observation at a given time and location. Nevertheless, this is something that would be unacceptable for both internalists and externalists in modern epistemology. The internalists insist that the warrant is subjective and usually discernible by the subject. The externalists also consider that knowledge is subjective, but they accept that the warrant can be external to the subject. Both groups require that knowledge itself is subjective. As we saw in the context of the material requirement, Popper is very much aware that, in general, this objective knowledge would have no life if it was not for the subjectivity of the scientists that interact with it and through it, but somehow we succeed through critical rationalism that only the best of our subjectivity makes this objective knowledge alive. In other words, Popper acknowledges an important interaction between the subjective world, which he calls world 2, and the world of objective knowledge, which he calls world 3. Moreover, Popper insists that he does not claim that these are real worlds. They are just a convenient way to model the progress of science. He says that one could add a fourth world, etc. if convenient. So, he has a model of science in which knowledge is objective and scientific knowledge respects a material requirement, which is a part of his falsifiability requirement for scientific knowledge. But he has also an important interaction with the subjective world. In this way, this is the key point, Popper does not have to deal with the internalisme/externalisme debate, because both the external and internal aspects are part of the model.

Traditional realism vs comtemporary physics realism
David Papineau wrote:

About moderated realism
This is somehow related :

This also:

Reversed realism
Henk Visser wrote:

Sources of knowledge
This one is from unpublished lecture notes.

Rejection of a priori and objective knowledge
Many philosophers have noted that naturalism was introduced in opposition to the notion of a priori knowledge. For example, Michael Fuerstein wrote the following about Philip Kitcher, British American philosopher notable for his wide-ranging development of naturalism, Jonathan Lieberson describes Popper's World 3 as metaphysical:

Rejection of idealism
This area of philosophy is hard to understand, perhaps because it is difficult to find a universally accepted definition of idealism. It is typically seen as opposed to realism, but that is often used to mean things like realists see the world as it is, whereas idealists see the word as dependent upon our thoughts. This is, of course, a biased view in favour of realism and against idealism. Both idealists and realists accept the same laws of nature. The way the variables in these laws are associated (often only indirectly) with our sensory experiences as well as with how we can set the state of a system is the same for idealists as for realists. From the point of view of the laws and their interpretation in science, one cannot distinguish between a realist and an idealist. The difference can only be explained in terms of the subjective experiences that we have through the senses. The realist believes that there is a reality "outside" these sensory experiences. The idealist prefers to say this reality is "inside" these subjective sensory experiences. Philosophers who do not care about that notion of inside versus outside somehow mysteriously created by our subjective sensory experiences are often classified as idealists, because it is a form of rejection of realism. A realist considers there is a reality outside that is responsible for the sensory experiences, which are, to a good approximation, the only connection with the reality. This view is useful to account for sensory experiences. However, it might be inadequate to fully explain the nature of knowledge and how it came to existence as much as it is useless to answer questions about how DNA and life came to existence. One can be a realist regarding sensory experiences and yet be an idealist regarding the possibility of knowledge that is a priori.

Skepticism
Skepticism is discussed at many places here. This is just a point that indicates that the role of skepticism is to make people change paradigm. I believe this is what is meant by Michael Williams in the following sentence by "declining the challenge": Here is the position of John Greco in his 2000 book Putting Skeptics in Their Place :

Guy Axtell wrote:

However, at the beginning of the section Pyrrhonian Skepticism and the Underdetermination Argument it is clear that Axtell, citing Pritchard, considers that "not internalistically justified in believing everyday propositions" implies "lack knowledge of everyday propositions", that is, there is the assumption that knowledge requires justification. In that context, Axtell later adds:

Solution to skepticism
Peter Klein wrote:

To be continued.