User:Domitori/Russian-Georgian war(2008)

Warning! This is sandnox, not part of wikipedia! If you want to read or edit the wikipedia article, go to 2008 South Ossetia war. I begin to work with this sandbox, because the article 2008 South Ossetia war represents mainly the point of view of the Russian government, and it should be completely rewritten. In the present state, the article provides a lot of background details, without to answer the basic and very important questions:

1. Why the thousands of Russians gone to Georgia namely in time, when the ethnic ossetians used to move oud from that region?

2. Did those thousands of Russian have the Военный билет, as the most of other Russian citizen?

3. Did those thousands of Russian have the valid entry permit, which would allow their staying and labor at Georgia?

The war between Russia and Georgia took place mainly 7 August 2008 – 13 August 2008.

Russian officials claimed, that August 8, Georgian military forces had attacked the sity Tzkhinvali and killed thousands Russian citisen. So, the war was raised with pretext of defence of the Russian citisen. Later, some tens among those thousands were identified as civilians.

Georgia claims that thousands Russian military forces invided the country and the Georgian army tried to recover the constirutional order.

Also, durnig the conflict, the separatists in Abkhasia and South Ossetia fighted on the side of Russia, claiming, that tha war is mainly between Georgia and the "indelendent Republic South Ossetia".

Prehistory
The 1991–1992 South Ossetia War between Georgians and Ossetians left most of South Ossetia under control of an unrecognized government backed by Russia. Some Georgian inhabited parts remained under the control of Georgia. This mirrored the situation in Abkhazia. Already increasing tensions escalated during the summer months of 2008. In order to prevent the ethnic conflicts, the so-called piece-keepers from Georgian and Russia soldiers were installes at the boundaties of territories controlled by the Ossetina rebels, The Georgian

On the evening of August 7, 2008, Georgia launched a large-scale ground- and air-based military attack on the Russian troops, South Ossetia's capital, Tskhinvali. Georgia claims that it was responding to the movement of Russian troops penetrating South Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel and a reaction to heavy shelling of Georgian-controlled villages by Ossetians, which caused the death of Georgian peacekeepers. Later on Tbilisi's version of the events has been put into doubt. Russia responded by sending troops into South Ossetia and launching bombing raids farther into Georgia. On August 8, Russian naval forces blocked Georgia's coast and landed ground forces and paratroopers on Georgian coast. Russian and Abkhazian forces opened a second front by attacking the Kodori Gorge, held by Georgia, and entered western parts of Georgia's interior. After five days of heavy fighting, Georgian forces were ejected from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian troops entered Georgia proper, occupying the cities of Poti and Gori among others.

Following mediation by the French presidency of the European Union, the parties reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement on August 12, signed by Georgia on August 15 in Tbilisi and by Russia on August 16 in Moscow. On August 12, President Medvedev had already ordered a halt to Russian military operations in Georgia but fighting did not stop immediately. After the signing of the ceasefire Russia pulled most of its troops out of Georgia proper. However, "buffer zones" were established around Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russia created check points in Georgia's interior (Poti, Senaki, Perevi).

On August 26, 2008 Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Following international agreements, Russia completed its withdrawal from Georgia on October 8. Russian troops remain stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including areas under Georgian control before the war, under bilateral agreements with respective governments. Georgia declared Abkhazia and South Ossetia "Russian-occupied territories" on August 28, 2008.

A number of incidents have occurred in both conflict zones since the war ended, and tensions between the belligerents remain high.

Background


Amidst rising ethnic tensions, in 1989, the South Ossetian Supreme Soviet approved a decision to unite South Ossetia, an autonomous region within the Georgian SSR, with the North Ossetian ASSR, part of Russia. In its turn, Georgia's Supreme Council revoked the decision and abolished South Ossetian autonomy. The government in Tbilisi also established Georgian as the country's principal language, whereas the Ossetians' first two languages were Russian and Ossetian. A military conflict broke out in January 1991 when Georgia sent in troops to crush the separatist movement in South Ossetia. The South Ossetian secessionists were helped by former Soviet military units, who by now had come under Russian command. Estimates of deaths in this fighting exceed 2,000 people. During the war several atrocities occurred on both sides. Approximately 100,000 Ossetians fled Georgia and South Ossetia, while 23,000 Georgians left South Ossetia. The war resulted in South Ossetia, which had a Georgian ethnic minority of around 29% of the total population of 98,500 in 1989, breaking away from Georgia and gaining de facto independence. After the Sochi agreement in 1992, Tskhinvali was isolated from the Georgian territory around it and Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian peacekeepers were stationed in South Ossetia under the Joint Control Commission's (JCC) mandate of demilitarization. The 1992 ceasefire also defined both a zone of conflict around the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali and a security corridor along the border of South Ossetian territories. In May, 2008, there were about 2,000 Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia, and about 1,000 Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia under the JCC's mandate.

The conflict remained frozen until 2003 when Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in the Rose Revolution which ousted president Eduard Shevardnadze. In the years that followed, Saakashvili's government pushed a program to strengthen failing state institutions, including security and military, created "passably democratic institutions" and implemented a pro-US foreign policy. One of Saakashvili's main goals has been Georgian NATO membership, which Russia opposes. This has been one of the main stumbling blocks in Georgia-Russia relations. In 2007, Georgia spent 6% of GDP on its military and had the highest average growth rate of military spending in the world. Restoring South Ossetia and Abkhazia (a region with a similar movement) to Georgian control has been a top-priority goal of Saakashvili since he came to power.

Emboldened by the success of restoring control in Adjara in early 2004, the Georgian government now launched a push to retake South Ossetia, sending 300 special task force fighters into the territory. Georgia said its aim was to combat smuggling, but JCC participants branded the move as a breach of the Sochi agreement of 1992. Intense fighting took place between Georgian forces and South Ossetian militia on August 8-19, 2004. According to researcher Sergei Markedonov, the brief war in 2004 was a turning point for Russian policy in the region. Russia, who had previously aimed only to preserve the status-quo, now realized that the security of the whole Caucasus depended on the situation in South Ossetia, and took side of the self-proclaimed republic.

In the 2006 South Ossetian independence referendum, 99% of those voting supported full independence. Simultaneously, ethnic Georgians voted just as emphatically to stay with Tbilisi in a referendum among the region's ethnic Georgians. Georgia accused Russia of the annexation of its internationally recognised territory and installing a puppet government led by Eduard Kokoity and several officials who previously served in the Russian FSB and Army. From 2004 to 2008, Georgia has repeatedly proposed broad autonomy for Abkhazia and South Ossetia within the unified Georgian state, but the proposals have been rejected by the secessionist authorities, who demanded full indepence for the territory. In 2006, the Georgian government helped set up an “alternative government” led by the former South Ossetian prime minister Dmitry Sanakoyev and granted to it a status of a provisional administration, alarming Tskhinvali and Moscow. In what Sergei Markedonov has described as the culmination of Georgian "unfreezing" policy, the control of the Georgian peacekeeping battalion was transferred from the joint command of the peacekeeping forces to the Georgian Defense Ministry.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stated that he would "protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they are". The proportion of Russians living in South Ossetia has always been low (in 1989, Ossetians accounted for around 60 percent, Georgians 20 percent, Armenians 10 percent and Russians 5 percent of the population), but about 7/8 of South Ossetians have been issued with Russian passports. Reuters describes the government as "dependent on Russia, [supplier of] two thirds of [its] annual budget", and reports that "Russia's state-controlled gas giant Gazprom is building new gas pipelines and infrastructure" worth hundreds of millions of dollars to supply its cities with energy. In mid-April, 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that Prime Minister Putin had given instructions to the federal government whereby Moscow would pursue economic, diplomatic, and administrative relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as with the subjects of Russia. When President Saakashvili was re-elected in early 2008, he promised to bring the breakaway regions back under Georgian control.

While Russia has allied itself with the separatist regions, Georgia, on its part, has a close relationship with the United States, which has helped to train and arm the Georgian military. Although Georgia has no significant oil or gas reserves on its own, it is an important transit route that supplies the West. The pipeline has been a key factor for the United States' support for Georgia, allowing the West to reduce its reliance on Middle Eastern oil while bypassing Russia and Iran.

Military buildup
During 2008, both Georgia and Russia accused each other of preparing a war. In April, 2008, Russia said that Georgia was massing 1,500 soldiers and police in the upper Kodori Gorge area and planning to invade the breakaway region of Abkhazia. Russia said it was boosting its forces there and in the South Ossetia region as a response. Later, UNOMIG denied any build up in the Kodori Gorge or near the Abkhazian border by either sides.

In the same month, Russia increased the number of its peacekeepers in Abkhazia to 2,542 by deploying hundreds of paratroopers into the region. Even after the increase, troop levels were still within the 3,000 limit imposed by a 1994 decision of CIS head of states. Sergey Lavrov said, that his his country was not preparing for war but would "retaliate" against any attack.

On April 20, a Russian jet shot down a Georgian unmanned spy plane flying over Abkhazia. After the incident Saakashvili deployed 12,000 Georgian troops to Senaki. Georgian interior ministry officials showed the BBC video footage, which Georgia said showed Russian troops deploying heavy military hardware in the breakaway region of Abkhazia. According to Georgia, "it proved the Russians were a fighting force, not just peacekeepers." Russia strongly denied the accusations. Both countries also accused each other of flying jets over South Ossetia, violating the ceasefire.

From July to early August, Georgia and Russia conducted two parallel military exercises, the joint US-Georgian Immediate Response 2008 and the Russian Caucasus Frontier 2008. According to a paper published by Institute for Security and Development Policy shortly after the war, the Russian troops remained by the Georgian border instead of returning to their bases after the end of their exercise on August 2. The Georgian 4th Brigade, which later spearheaded the attack into Tskhinvali, took part in the Georgian exercise along with 1,000 American troops. This caused Russia to accuse the United States of helping Georgian attack preparations. After the exercise, the Georgian Artillery Brigade, normally based in two locations, in Senaki and in Gori, was now moved completely to Gori, 25 km from the South Ossetian border. According to Colonel Wolfgang Richter, a leading military expert to the German OSCE mission, Georgia concentrated troops at the South Ossetian border in July.

On August 5, Russian ambassador-at-large Yuri Popov reiterated the Russian claim that the country would intervene in the event of military conflict. The Ambassador of South Ossetia to Moscow, Dmitry Medoyev, declared that volunteers were already arriving, primarily "from North Ossetia," in the Republic of South Ossetia to offer help in the event of Georgian aggression.

According to Moscow Defense Brief, an English-language defense magazine published by the Russian NGO Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, the Georgians appear to have secretly concentrated a significant number of troops and equipment to the South Ossetian border in early August, under the cover of providing support for the exchange of fire with South Ossetian formations. The Georgian forces included the full 2nd, 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades, the Artillery Brigade, elements of the 1st Infantry Brigade, and the separate Gori Tank Battalion, plus special forces and Ministry of the Internal Affairs troops – all in all, up to 16,000 men, according to the publication. International Institute for Strategic Studies and Western intelligence experts give a lower estimate, saying that the Georgians had amassed about 12,000 troops on the South Ossetian border by August 7. On the opposite side, there were just 1,000 Russian peacekeepers and 500 South Ossetian fighters ready to defend Tskhinvali, according to an estimate quoted by Der Spiegel.

Pre-war clashes
Clashes and shelling between the Georgian and Ossetian forces in early August led to the deaths of six Ossetians and five Georgians; both sides accused the other of opening fire first, in what was the worst violence in years. During the week the fighting intensified. On August 3, the Russian foreign ministry warned that an extensive military conflict was about to erupt. According to a Spiegel article, officials in European governments and intelligence agencies assume that the warning concerns Saakashvili's plans for invasion of South Ossetia, which had been completed earlier. Three days later, the evacuation of Ossetian women and children to Russia was completed. Starting with the night of August 6 to 7th there were continuous artillery fire exchanges between the two sides. At 3 p.m. on August 7, OSCE monitors on patrol saw large numbers of Georgian artillery and Grad rocket launchers massing on roads north of Gori, just south of the South Ossetian border.

On August 5, both sides had agreed to hold meetings in the presence of chief Russian negotiator over South Ossetia Yuri Popov on August 7. However, a day later, the South Ossetian side refused to participate in the talks, demanding a JCC session (consisting of Georgia, Russia, North and South Ossetia) instead. Tbilisi had withdrawn from the JCC in march, demanding the format include the EU, the OSCE and the Provisional Administrative Entity of South Ossetia. The meeting on August 7 went ahead, but the Ossetian side did not show up. The Russian commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPFK), General Marat Kulakhmetov, advised the Georgians to declare a ceasefire. During the afternoon of August 7, Georgia withdrew its personnel from the JPFK Headquarters in Tskhinvali.

Evening of August 7


At about 7 p.m., President Mikheil Saakashvili ordered a unilateral ceasefire, advised earlier that day by Kulakhmetov. According to the Georgian military, fighting intensified despite the declared ceasefire. Georgian armor continued to move to the South Ossetian line even after Saakashvili's ceasefire, and the Russian and Ossetian governments claimed that the ceasefire was just as an attempt to buy time while Georgian forces positioned themselves for a major attack.

During a news broadcast that began at 11 p.m., Mikheil Saakashvili announced that Georgian villages were being shelled, and vowed to restore Tbilisi's control by force over what he called the "criminal regime" in South Ossetia and to "restore constitutional order." An OSCE monitoring group in Tskhinvali did not record outgoing artillery fire from the South Ossetian side in the hours before the start of Georgian bombardment, and NATO officials attest to minor skirmishes but nothing that amounted to a provocation, according to Der Spiegel.

At 11:30 p.m. on August 7, Georgian forces began a major artillery assault on Tskhinvali. At 11:45 p.m. OSCE monitors reported, that shells were falling on Tskhinvali every 15–20 seconds. The Georgians used 27 rocket launchers, including 152-millimeter guns as well as cluster bombs. According to Georgian intelligence and several Russian sources, parts of 58th Russian Army moved to South Ossetian territory through the Roki Tunnel before the Georgian attack. No conclusive evidence has been as yet presented by Georgia or its Western allies that Russia was invading the country before the Georgian attack (the Russians claim the it was simply a routine logistics train or troop rotation) or that the situation for Georgians in the Ossetian zone was so dire that a large-scale military attack was necessary.

The Battle of Tskhinvali


Early in the morning of August 8, Georgia launched a military offensive, codenamed Operation Clear Field to capture Tskhinvali. The Georgian 4th Brigade spearheaded the infantry attack, while the 2nd and 3rd Brigades provided support. Georgian forces soon seized several South Ossetian controlled villages located on higher ground around the city.

At 12:15 a.m. Kulakhmetov reported to the OSCE monitors that the JPFK peacekeepers had come under fire and that they had casualties. 18 Russian Peacekeeping force soldiers were killed in the Georgian artillery onslaught. The peacekeepers' cafeteria was completely destroyed and all of their buildings went up in flames. Parts of the capital city were left in ruins. The Georgian shelling was extensively covered by Russian media prior to the military reaction that followed. Russia claimed to have responded to an attack on the peacekeepers base and in defense of South Ossetian civilians against what they called "a genocide by Georgian forces." There were claims casualties may amount up to 2,000 dead in Tskhinvali following the Georgian shelling. The extent of civilian casualties was later disputed in a number of sources, with a doctor in Tskhinvali's hospital speaking of 44 dead bodies being brought there. According to the doctor, the hospital, was under fire for 18 hours. HRW documented the severe damage done to the hospital by a Grad multiple rocket launcher.

By 8 am. on August 8, Georgian infantry and tanks had entered Tskhinvali and engaged in a fierce battle with Ossetian forces and the Russian peacekeeping battalion stationed in the city. 1,500 Georgian ground troops had reached the centre of Tskhinvali by 10 a.m. on August 8, but were pushed back three hours later by Russian artillery and air attacks, according to Georgian officials.

The BBC has discovered evidence that Georgia may have committed war crimes during its attack and occupation of Tskhinvali, including possible deliberate targeting of civilians. The Human Rights Watch found some evidence of firing being directed into basements, locations which civilians frequently choose as a place of shelter.

According to Georgia, Russian military aircraft violated Georgian airspace around 10 a.m. on 8 August. Starting around 2 a.m., international press agencies began running reports of Russian tanks in the Roki tunnel. According to a senior Russian official, the first Russian combat unit, the First Battalion of the 135th Regiment, was ordered at around dawn of August 8 to move through the Roki Tunnel and reinforce the Russian forces in Tshkinvali. According to him, the unit passed through the tunnel at 2:30 p.m. It reached Tshkinvali at the evening, meeting heavy resistance from Georgian troops. Georgia disputes the account, saying that it was in heavy combat with Russian forces near the tunnel long before dawn of 8 August. Western intelligence experts believe, that Russian troops did not begin marching through the tunnel until roughly 11 a.m. on August 8.

During the evening of August 8, vicious fighting took place in the area of Tskhinvali and in South Ossetia. The fighting in South Ossetian towns and villages was done by the local militia and volunteers, while Russian troops concentrated on engaging larger Georgian army groups. Russia also undertook action to suppress the Georgian artillery and the Russian Air Force launched strikes on Georgia's logistical infrastructure. Russian special units reportedly prevented Georgian saboteurs from blowing up the Roki Tunnel, which could have hindered the sending of reinforcements to South Ossetia.

The passage of Russian forces through the narrow Roki Tunnel and along the mountain roads was slow and the Russians had difficulties in concentrating their troops, forcing them to bring their forces into battle battalion by battalion. Because of this, a fierce battle took place on August 9 in the region of Tskhinvali and the Georgians were able to mount several counterattacks, including some with tanks. Due to the gradual increase in troops, the combined Russian and South Ossetian forces in South Ossetia outnumbered the Georgians for the first time on August 9-10. The Russians moved between 5,500 and 10,000 troops to South Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel, according to Der Spiegel.

According to Moscow Defense Brief, by the morning of August 10, the Georgians had captured almost the whole of Tskhinvali, forcing the Ossetian forces and the Russian peacekeeping battalion to retreat to the northern reaches of the city. "However, on this very day the accumulation of Russian forces in the region finally bore fruit and the fighting in South Ossetia reached a turning point. Toward the evening of August 10, Tskhinvali was completely cleared of Georgian forces, which retreated to the south of the city. Georgian forces were also repelled from the key Prisi heights. The bulk of Georgia’s artillery was defeated. Meanwhile, Ossetian forces, with the support of Russian divisions, took Achabeti, Kekhvi, Kurta and Tamarasheni on the approach to Tskhinvali from the north. Georgian forces in several of Georgian enclaves were eliminated." Only in the area around the village of Zemo-Nikosi Georgian units stubbornly resisted, repelling the Russian attack for a short time, but were soon defeated. Georgian units and artillery continued to shell Tskhinvali from a number of high points. By the end of August 11 South Ossetia was completely cleared of Georgian forces, and Russian units had moved into Georgia proper by the next morning. Having retreated from South Ossetia, the Georgian forces regrouped at Gori.

According to the Georgian Defense Minister, the Georgian military tried to push into Tskhinvali three times in all. During the last one, they got a very heavy counter attack which Georgian officials described as "something like hell." In total, the fighting in the Tskhinval area lasted for three days and nights, by the end of which Georgian artillery was either destroyed or had left its positions, from which it could shell the city and Georgian ground troops pulled out of the city.

Bombing and occupation of Gori


Gori is a major Georgian city close to the border with the de facto independent republic of South Ossetia, about 25 km from Tskhinvali. It was the staging area for the Georgian army during the fighting for the capital of South Ossetia and was bombed several times by the Russian Air Force.

According to western intelligence the Russian bombings began at 7:30 a.m. August 8, when it launched the first SS-21 short-range missile, apparently at military or government bunker positions in the city of Borzhomi, southwest of Gori. Around 6 a.m. on August 9, Reuters reported that two Russian fighters had bombed a Georgian artillery position near Gori. A later attack hit the central district of the city, killing one Dutch journalist. An air-to-ground missile also hit the Gori hospital. Human Rights Watch (HRW), an international rights group, accused Russia of deploying controversial and indiscriminately deadly cluster bombs on civilian areas of Georgia. According to HRW at least eight civilians were killed and dozens injured when a Russian aircraft dropped cluster bombs in the centre of Gori on August 12. According to the Russian military, three bombs hit an armament depot and the façade of one of the adjacent 5-storey apartment buildings suffered as a result exploding ammunition from the depot. The Georgian government reported that 60 civilians were killed when at least one bomb hit an apartment in Gori.

On the evening of August 10, large numbers of the civilian population began to flee the city. By the next day 56,000 people fled the district. The next day, at 5 p.m., the Georgian army started to abandon the city in disarray, without firing a shot, following their defeat at Tskhinvali. A Times reporter described the Georgian withdrawal as "sudden and dramatic", saying that the Gori residents watched in horror as their army abandoned their positions. According to Moscow Defense Brief, the retreat of the Georgian army from Gori soon grew into a panicked flight almost all the way to Tbilisi. During this flight, Al Jazeera's cameras caught a Georgian tank hit by a Russian potshot exploding while the reporters fled with the column.

Russian troops fought their way through flimsy Georgian defenses at Gori. Around August 13 Russian ground forces entered Gori. Since the Georgian defenders of the city were in full retreat, Gori was completely clear of Georgan troops when the Russians entered. On August 14, the Russian commander in charge of Gori, General Major Vyacheslav Borisov claimed that the city of Gori was controlled jointly by Georgian Police and Russian troops. He further said that Russian troops would start leaving Gori in two days. Russian troops said they were removing military hardware and ammunition from an arms depot outside Gori. Russian troops were also seen on the road from Gori to Tbilisi, but they turned off to the north, about an hour from Tbilisi, and encamped. Georgian troops occupied the road six miles (about 10 km) closer to Tbilisi.

The Russian forces denied access to some humanitarian aid missions seeking to assist civilians. The United Nations, which has described the humanitarian situation in Gori as "desperate," was able to deliver only limited food supplies to the city. On August 15, Russian troops allowed a number of humanitarian supplies into the city but continued their blockade of the strategically located city. In the August 17 report, HRW said the organization's researchers interviewed ethnic Georgians from the city of Gori and surrounding villages who described how armed South Ossetian militias attacked their cars and kidnapped civilians as people tried to flee in response to militia attacks on their homes following the Russian advance into the area. In phone interviews, people remaining in Gori region villages told HRW that they had witnessed looting and arson attacks by South Ossetian militias in their villages, but were afraid to leave after learning about militia attacks on those who fled. A Russian liutenant said on August 14: "We have to be honest. The Ossetians are marauding." Vyacheslav Borisov admitted, that "now Ossetians are running around and killing poor Georgians in their enclaves." Answering a journalist's question, a Russian liutenant colonel said: "We're not a police force, we're a military force. It's not our job to do police work." The New York Times noted, that Russia was probably making at least some effort to to stop the rampaging. According to the Hague Convention, an occupying power has to insure public order and safety in the occupied areas. The Russian human rights group Memorial called the attacks by South Ossetian militia "pogroms".

The occupation lasted until August 22.

Abkhazian front
The Russian Black Sea Fleet left Sevastopol on the evening of August 8 and established a de-facto sea blockade of the Georgian coast. On the evening of August 9, a naval skirmish between Russian and Georgian forces took place. The Russian Nanuchka III class corvette Mirazh probably sank one Georgian patrol cutter with two Malakhit (SS-N-9) anti-ship missiles. This was the Russian Navy's first real sea battle since 1945, according to Moscow Defense Brief. The Russians claimed that Georgian ships had violated the security zone of the Black Sea Fleet and therefore the action was in accordance with international law. Following the action, the remaining Georgian ships withdrew to a nearby harbor.

On August 9 2008 Russia opened a second front in Abkhazia, deploying up to 9,000 men from the 7th Novorossiysk and 76th Pskov Air Assault Divisions, the elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division and two battalions of the Black Sea Fleet Marines. With their support, Abkhaz forces began to dislodge the Georgian forces from the Kodori Gorge.

On August 10 Abkhazia declared a full military mobilization to drive out the 1,000 Georgian troops from their remaining stronghold in the Kodori Valley.

The next day, Russian paratroopers deployed in Abkhazia carried out raids deep inside Georgian territory to destroy military bases from where Georgia could send reinforcements to its troops sealed off in South Ossetia. Russian forces, meeting virtually no opposition, reached the military base near the town of Senaki outside Abkhazia on the 11th, leaving the base there destroyed. Russian aircraft also shot down two Georgian helicopters at the airbase at Senaki. Russian troops also drove through the port of Poti, and took up positions around it. On August 12, the Abkhazian authorities announced the beginning of military operations against Georgian troops in the Kodori Gorge area. On the same day, Georgia said it was withdrawing its troops from the Kodori Gorge "as a gesture of goodwill". The battle between Georgian and Abkhazian forces lasted until August 13, when all of the remaining Georgian forces, including at least 1,500 civilians in the Kodori Valley, retreated from Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Occupation of Poti
On August 14, Russian troops entered Poti and sunk several Georgian naval vessels moored in the harbor, as well as removing or destroying military equipment. They also controlled the highway linking Poti to Tbilisi. Four days later, Russian forces in Poti took prisoner 22 Georgian troops who had approached the city. They were taken to a Georgian military base occupied by Russian troops at Senaki. From August 13 to 15, according to Moscow Defense Brief, "Russian paratroops raided Poti again and again, destroying almost all of the docked ships and boats of the Georgian Navy, and took away a quantity of valuable military equipment."

Six-point peace plan


On August 10, most international observers began calling for a peaceful solution to the conflict. The European Union and the United States expressed a willingness to send a joint delegation to try and negotiate a ceasefire. Russia, however, ruled out peace talks with Georgia until the latter withdrew from South Ossetia and signed a legally binding pact renouncing the use of force against South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

On August 12, Russian President Medvedev said that he had ordered an end to military operations in Georgia, saying that "the operation has achieved its goal, security for peacekeepers and civilians has been restored. The aggressor was punished, suffering huge losses." Later on the same day, he met the President-in-Office of the European Union, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and approved a six-point peace plan. Late that night Georgian President Saakashvili agreed to the text. Sarkozy's plan originally had just the first four points. Russia added the fifth and sixth points. Georgia asked for the additions in parentheses, but Russia rejected them, and Sarkozy convinced Georgia to agree to the unchanged text. On August 14, South Ossetia President Eduard Kokoity and Abkhazia President Sergei Bagapsh signed the peace plan as well.

"#No recourse to the use of force.
 * 1) Definitive cessation of hostilities.
 * 2) Free access to humanitarian aid (addition rejected: and to allow the return of refugees).
 * 3) The Armed Forces of Georgia must withdraw to their permanent positions.
 * 4) The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation must withdraw to the line where they were stationed prior to the beginning of hostilities. Prior to the establishment of international mechanisms the Russian peacekeeping forces will take additional security measures. (addition rejected: six months)
 * 5) An international debate on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and ways to ensure their lasting security will take place. (addition rejected: based on the decisions of the UN and the OSCE)."

After the cease fire had been signed, hostilities did not immediately stop. According to Moscow Defense Brief, active raids on Georgian territory to capture and destroy Georgian weapons, and the "demilitarization of the Georgian armed forces" continued. Noting that people were fleeing before the still advancing Russian tanks and soldiers and the following "irregulars", a reporter for the UK The Guardian stated on August 13, "the idea there is a ceasefire is ridiculous." On August 14, efforts to institute joint patrols of Georgian and Russian police in Gori broke down due to apparent discord among personnel. Reuters stated on August 15, that Russian forces had pushed to 34 miles (55 km) from Tbilisi, the closest during the war; they stopped in Igoeti 41.98944°N, 44.41778°W, an important crossroads. That day, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also traveled to Tbilisi, where Saakashvili signed the 6-point peace plan in her presence. Russian and Georgian forces exchanged prisoners of war on August 19. Georgia said it handed over 5 Russian servicemen, in exchange for 15 Georgians, including two civilians.

Russian withdrawal
Despite numerous calls for a quick withdrawal from Georgia by western leaders, Russian troops occupied some parts of Georgia proper for about two months. In late August, some troops were withdrawn, however Russian troops and checkpoints remained near Gori and Poti, as well as in so called "buffer zones" around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Withdrawal from the buffer zones around South Ossetia and Abkhazia was completed when control was handed over to a EU observer mission on 9 October. On 9 September, 2008, Russia officially announced that its troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia would "henceforth be considered foreign troops stationed in independent states under bilateral agreements". Russia maintains 3,700 soldiers in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia and is planning to open military bases in Java, Tskhinvali, and Gudauta in 2010. Russia is planning to spend $400 million on the bases.

International monitors
As of January, 2009, there are 200 EU ceasefire monitors operating in Georgia. The mandate of OSCE monitors expired on 1 January, and the organization began withdrawing its personnel from Georgia. According to Russia, the extension of the mandate in its current format was impossible because it would be illegal under the Russian law that recognises South Ossetia as an independent state. The United Nations observer mission to the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict zone, formerly known as UNOMIG, continues. Its mandate was extended on February 14, 2009.

A number of incidents have occurred in both border conflict zones since the war ended, and tensions between the belligerents remain high.



Casualties
According to South Ossetian and Russian officials identities and circumstances of death of 365 victims were collected. During the conflict, number of deceased victims was initially claimed to be much higher, at 1,492 civilians. These numbers were disputed by Human Rights Watch, Memorial and the Georgian side. Human Rights Watch believes Russian and South Ossetian figure of 300-400 civilians is a "useful starting point". South Ossetian military and militia deaths, including various voluenteers, are estimated at 150. An additional 41 South Ossetian militiamen were captured. Russia confirmed its military casualties as being 64 soldiers killed, 283 soldiers wounded, and 3 soldiers missing. Russia also confirmed that 6 of its soldiers, 4 of them ground troops and 2 of them pilots, had been captured. Abkhazia confirmed its military casualties as being 1 soldier killed and 2 soldiers wounded. Georgia confirmed the loss of 169 soldiers killed, 17 soldiers missing, 42 soldiers captured, and 1,964 wounded. The Georgian police, which also fought in the conflict, suffered the loss of 14 policemen killed and 22 policemen missing. Georgian officials initially claimed that 228 Georgian civilians had died, but later lowered the figure to 69. An additional 872 Georgian civilians are listed as missing. One Dutch journalist was killed in the conflict and another 3 foreign civilians were wounded.

Humanitarian impact and war crimes
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), all parties committed serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, resulting in many civilian deaths and injuries. Georgian forces used indiscriminate force during their attack on South Ossetia, directing tanks and machine gun fire at buildings in Tskhinvali, including at apartment buildings where civilians sheltered. South Ossetian forces had fired on Georgian forces from at least some of these buildings. The Georgian military used Grad multiple rocket launchers, an indiscriminate weapon, to destroy targets situated in civilian areas. The Russian military has also used indiscriminate force in attacks in South Ossetia and in the Gori district, and has apparently targeted convoys of civilians attempting to flee the conflict zones. Armed criminal gangs and Ossetian militia have committed looting, arson attacks, rape and abductions, terrorizing the civilian population, forcing them to flee their homes and preventing displaced people from returning home.

HRW further reports that both Georgians and Russians used cluster bombs of the types M85S and RBK 250, resulting in civilian casualties. Georgia admits using cluster bombs against Russian troops and the Roki tunnel but is accused of also hitting civilians fleeing from the battle zone. Russia denies the use of cluster bombs, but is accused of having used them in its attacks against Gori and Ruisi. The organisation called the conflict a disaster for civilians. HRW also called for international organisations to send fact-finding missions to establish the facts, report on human rights, and urged the authorities to account for any crimes.

On September 8, Thomas Hammarberg, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, issued a report titled "Human Rights in Areas Affected by the South Ossetia Conflict" stating that during the conflict "a very large number of people had been victimised. More than half of the population in South Ossetia fled, the overwhelming majority of them after the Georgian artillery and tank attack on Tskhinvali and the assaults on Georgian villages by South Ossetian militia and criminal gangs." The report also states that the main Tskhinvali hospital had been hit by rockets, that some "residential areas in the city" of Tskhinvali were "completely destroyed" and "the main building of the Russian peace keeping force as well as the base’s medical dispensary had been hit by heavy artillery." Furthermore, the villages with ethnic Georgian majority between Tskhinvali and Java "have been destroyed, reportedly by South Ossetian militia and criminal gangs."

According to Human Rights Watch, during the August war, South Ossetian militias burned and looted most ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia, effectively preventing 20,000 residents displaced by the conflict from returning. Furthermore, the civilians willing to live in South Ossetia are obliged to accept a russian passport in order to be authorised to. The South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity stated in an interview that Georgian villages were successfully demolished and none of the Georgian refugees will be allowed to return back.

In November 2008, Amnesty International released a 69 page report citing both Georgia and Russia of serious international law violations on the conduct of war.

Infrastructure damage
On August 12 local authorities stated that approximately 70% of Tskhinvali's buildings, both municipal and private, have suffered damage during Georgian offensive. According to later statements made by Russian and Ossetian sources, about 20% of the Tskhinvali's buildings have suffered various damage, including an estimate of 700, or 10% of city's buildings of "beyond repair".

The Georgian side maintains that the Russian Army should be held reponsible for heavy damage and destruction of buildings and infrastructure in Tskhinvali, as it was bombing the city for three days. "When aircraft started bombing our positions in Tskhinvali, this is when most civilian buildings were burned", explained Davit Kezerashvili. Some Russian journalists are also blaming Russia for damaging the city. According to a Georgian police officer, "the city was unimpaired" when they entered into it.

Georgia claimed Russia had bombed airfields and economic infrastructure, including the Black Sea port of Poti. Between eight and eleven Russian jets reportedly hit container tanks and a shipbuilding plant at the port.

From August 19 onwards the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) released a series of detailed satellite maps of the regions affected by the war via its Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT). All damage is assessed from satellite images (with a resolution of up to 60 cm), however it is not independently validated on the ground. For Tskhinvali, UNOSAT reports 230 (5.5% of the total) of buildings either destroyed or severly damaged. In the villages to the north of Tskhinvali (controlled by Georgia previous to the war ) between 5.4% and 51.9% of the total buildings was affected. Human Rights Watch (HRW) used the images to support the claim that widespread torching of ethnic Georgian villages by Ossetian militia had occurred inside South Ossetia. With regard to the city of Poti, UNOSAT provided imagery that witnesses a total of 6 Georgian naval vessels either "partially or completely submerged". "No other damage to physical infrastructure or vessel-related oil spills" were detected.

Interfax.ru reported that retreating Georgian forces mined civilian infrastructure in South Ossetia, including some private house basements civilians used to hide in during the Georgian offensive.

On August 10 Reuters reported that "a Reuters witness and the Georgian interior ministry" claimed an attack on the civilian Tbilisi International Airport. Later, Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temur Iakobashvili admitted that the attack had not taken place, stating, "There was no attack on the airport in Tbilisi. It was a factory that produces combat airplanes" (most likely referring to Tbliaviamsheni, a military avionics plant near Tbilisi).

Many countries and institutions promised reconstruction aid for the affected regions,.

The combatants' positions
On August 7, Saakashvili gave two reasons for his decision to go to war: the need to defend Georgian villages from Ossetian shelling and to "restore constitutional order" in South Ossetia, following repeated incidents that had lead to several deaths in the region. Later Saakashvili said the aim of the Georgian attack was to counter a Russian invasion. During a United Nations Security Council meeting on August 8, Georgia said that the first Russian troops entered South Ossetia at 05:30 am on August 8. The Georgian government later changed it position, saying that around 11:30 p.m. on August 7 intelligence information was received that 150 Russian army vehicles had entered Georgian territory through the Roki Tunnel. In an interview with Der Spiegel, Mikheil Saakashvili said "we wanted to stop the Russian troops before they could reach Georgian villages. When our tanks moved toward Tskhinvali, the Russians bombed the city. They were the ones -- not us -- who reduced Tskhinvali to rubble." During another interview, answering to a question of the CNN ancor, "Are you denying Georgian forces used artillery and tanks to shell Tskhinvali?" he claimed "Georgian troops responded to the fire from Tskhinvali and from the Russian border" and "They fired only at the positions, and that was my strict instruction," adding that the evacuation of women and children from Tskhinvali prior to the conflict is a proof of the intent of the Russian and Ossetian side to start the Battle of Tskhinvali.

Russia says it acted to defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia, and its own peacekeepers stationed there. The Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia suffered casualties during the initial Georgian artillery barrage on Tskhinvali and were besieged by Georgian troops for two days until a Russian unit broke through to their camp and started evacuating the wounded at 5 a.m. on 9 August. According to a senior Russian official, the first Russian combat unit was ordered to move through the Roki Tunnel at around dawn of 8 August well after the Georgian attack. Defending Russia's decision to launch attacks on Georgia proper, Foreign Minister of Russia Sergey Lavrov has said that Russia had no choice but to target the military infrastructure being used to sustain the Georgian offensive. Initially, Russia went as far as accused Georgia of genocide of Ossetians, noting that Georgia codenamed their attack "Operation Clear Field" Russia codenamed their operation as "Operation to force Georgia to peace".