User:Dr.Jstor/Treaty of Rapallo (1922)

Background of the Author-Signatories
Georgy Chicherin's childhood experiences living abroad enabled him to be fluent in 6 languages. His knowledge of European diplomacy paved the way for his position and his role in Russo-German relationships. Chicherin perceived both Germany and the Soviet Union as threatened by the victors of World War I and strongly endorsed Lenin's directive to capitalize on divisions among Western capitalist nations. Thus in his mind the treaty served both immediate objectives and future strategic goals.

Walther Rathenau, the signer from the German side, was regarded as “the founder of Germany’s new foreign policy and of the post-war rationalization of German industry.”  Harry Kessler, a German diplomat himself, in his 1929 biography of Rathenau, stated that the Rapallo Treaty was a peace treaty. Only those people who were still filling their heads with feelings related to war would perceive the treaty as a threat. However, Kessler's account is not without limitations, as it does not anticipate later developments, such as the 1939 German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which retrospectively altered perceptions of the treaty's intent.

Contemporary Views of the Treaty
At the time of its signing during the 1922 Genoa Conference, the treaty was regarded as a sign of aggression rather than peace. The reaction from other countries displayed a range of sensed threats from both Germany and Soviet Russia. For France, according to The New York Times in April 1922, the treaty was perceived as “upsetting the balance in Europe.” Collaboration and potential friendship between Berlin and Moscow were dangerous signs, and immediate action from all Genoa conference participants was needed to resolve the issue. For Britain, Lloyd George was more than disappointed by the friendship, which went entirely in the opposite direction than he had anticipated for his aims of international relations. Yet, Britain presented a comparatively less intense attitude towards the treaty. Calling him an impractical idealist, in a 2003 assessment Salzmann argues that Lloyd George failed to foresee the Russo-German relationship and was blinded by bureaucratic reports, which had successfully deceived British politicians, and overlooked the danger and the continuous impact of the Treaty of Rapallo until crises began to reemerge in the international arena.

In contrast, the German perspective, as articulated in a May 1922 article titled "Gloomy German View of Rapallo Treaty," The New York Times portrayed the treaty primarily as an economic measure aimed at facilitating the rehabilitation of Russia with German assistance. Germany believed that Russia's rehabilitation couldn't occur without its involvement. The treaty was seen as a last resort due to the undesirable post-war economic situation. In contrast to France's call for collective assistance from the Allies to end the relationship, Germany called for collective assistance to enhance its relationship. As a United States newspaper, The New York Times also implicitly displayed a suspicious attitude from the U.S., allying with Britain and France, which regarded the treaty as a demonstration of German faith in Soviet Russia and anticipation of future cooperation. A different perspective is offered by a 1993 article by Peter Krüger, who argues that the U.S. was worried about Germany's monopoly of the Russian market because of the treaty.

Secondary analyses of the reasons for the treaty’s emergence have not changed much over time. There is a general consensus that, as outsiders of European politics, Germany and the Soviet Union felt a common threat from other countries, which drove them to cement their relationship with this treaty. Supporters of this argument, such as Lionel Kochan, argue that the treaty was “inevitable.” In his 1954 book Russia and the Weimar Republic, Kochan provides a compelling argument regarding the inevitability of the Treaty of Rapallo and the profound sense of threat experienced by both Germany and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War I. The author emphasizes how these nations were perceived as outcasts in the 1922 meetings, leading to a shared sense of alienation that fueled their cooperation. Kochan suggests that neither Germany nor the Soviet Union fully grasped the implications of the treaty, viewing it primarily as a diplomatic and economic agreement. Despite protests and complaints from France and Britain to the commission, no decisive action was taken. The book presents multiple perspectives on the treaty, including views of power politics, the treaty as a prototype agreement for Russia's relations with other states, and critiques from figures like Trotsky, who viewed it as a strategic mistake, advocating for a focus on internal economic development instead. Notably, Kochan introduces the perspective of Walther Rathenau, who harbored fears about the reception of the treaty by Western powers, highlighting a nuanced attitude distinct from other sources.

Similarly, Vourkoutiotis contends that the alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union was not a spontaneous decision prompted solely by their circumstances in 1922. Rather, he argues that the seeds of their friendship had been sown earlier during the inter-war period. This functional relationship proved mutually beneficial, although the exact trajectory of their relationship and its implications for future events had not been fully realized at the time of the treaty's signing. Additionally, the Entente powers were unable to accurately perceive the evolving dynamics between Germany and the Soviet Union. France relied heavily on rumors, while Britain only sporadically received reliable information and was often influenced by the German foreign office.

Nevertheless, more novel perspectives are being brought up. For instance, Peter Krüger emphasizes the initial reluctance of German officials towards the treaty, highlighting the lack of clarity regarding its benefits in domestic discourse. According to him, the treaty stemmed from a political struggle among German officials involving figures like Walther Rathenau and Adolf von Maltzan. Krüger also notes U.S. concerns about a potential German monopoly in the Russian market, leading to significant objections to the treaty. Overall, Krüger concludes that while the treaty posed a greater threat to smaller European states, larger powers were focused primarily on safeguarding their own interests in the aftermath of the war.