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Coustillier
French historian, Philippe Contamine states that a coutilier was an "armed servant or swordsman" who had to carry a light lance or javelin and have a horse. Quoted from "War in the Middle Ages" p.127. It would appear that the coutilier was mounted, but perhaps there were instances when he would fight on foot. It also seems that his primary role was to protect the gendarme. So I would suppose that if the gendarme should fight in the vile manner of the foot soldier, then the coutilier would follow suit.

I just checked my copy of "Armies of the Middle ages, volume 1" by Ian Heath, and a coustillier is defenitely a llghtly armed (javelins a sword and sometimes a light lance), horse mounted man-at-arms (fig 121). In the Osprey MAA 144 (Armies of Burgundy) he is mounted on an unarmed horse (plate G,3). They were used as aides by their knights and for scouting. There are coustilliers in the French and Burgundian army, but I don't know if there were any in other armies. Unfortunately, I cannot help with origins of the word, except that it's a French word...

A coustillier, or coutilier, was a foot soldier in the late Middle Age. He was armed with a dagger and a spear with a large blade (in French a "langue de boeuf" litterally "ox's tongue".) The man riding behind a knight serving as a sword bearer and servant was "un écuyer". Hope that will help you.

Moirae?
Meros (plural:Merẽ)or rarely Moirae(Greek: Μοίρα) and considered interchangable with Turma was in the Byzantine Army analogous of a Division in the modern armies.

Organisation
The Commander of a Meros was given the title of Merarch or, in case he lead a Turma, Turmarch. One of these division was divided into multiple Banda (Battalions), ranging trough the ages from as little as 4 to as many as 25.

From Moira the later Greek word Moirarhia or Merarhia (meaning also Division) is derived.

Origins
Beyond Justinian's removal of frontier forces from the payroll, by the sixth century the Byzantine army had changed considerably. Although the legions and other regiments survived the reforms, a new command structure was introduced as where new regiments, called Bandum. These, as the Strategicon suggests, should of varied between 200-400 men. Such regiments would then have been grouped under a Chilliarch, who despite a title that implied a command of a thousand men (Chillias), commanded in reality between 2 000 and 3 000 men. These commands were then grouped into divisions under a Merarchs, who were to command Merẽ of no more than 7 000 men and on average commanded perhaps 5 000. This was later standerdized as the field armies became perferabily administered with multiples of 5.

With the advent of Thema under Constans II, based around the old armies, the divisions easily adapted to the administrative role. Eventually the Meros became nearly homogenous in strength with these administatrive units, whom grouped between 2 000 and 15 000 soldiers by 840. In the same counting, the larger Themes even comprised of Turma sub-divisions; the Armaniacs command had the Amasia, the Colonia and the Dazimon, the Bucellarians theme englobed the Ancyra and the Claudiopolis, the Anatolics Strategus overviewed the Federates, the Lycaonia and the Sozopolis, and lastly the Thracesians thema administered the Victores and the Theodosiaci.

Prussia
At the begining of the war, The Prussina army stood at 145 000 men, and was considered the most effective in Europe in linear formation combat. This was achieved by thorough training in tactics of marching, extending into line and fire contril, and the oblique oerder employed at Leuthen in 1757 ws the high-water mark of this very detailed and disciplined system. The Prussinas had a very organised system for maintaining the manpower of their army in the field. A conton system had been introduced in the 1720s-1730s that regularly forward all of the able-bodies men in a given district. The best men would proceed to a regular unit for service, and would serve and train with the regular regiment for a year, wile de rest would train with a garrison regiment in the area. After the campaign season, the regular troops wouldreturn home to farm, and would contignue to be called upon, undergoign retraining session each recall. The regularswould report first to their regiemtn in time of war, whjile the group who had trained with the garrison unit would act as a reserve for the regiment in the field. A second major source of manpower for the Prussian Army was foreigners. It is estimated that by 1756, up ot 25% of the army was made up of mercenaries, recruited from throughout Europe. As the war progressed, desertersand prisonners from other armies were also pressed into service to increase numbers. Frederick was innovative in develloping horse artilery and hte use of howitzers to increase the firepower of both h is infantry and cavalry in the field during the war.The major faillin of frederick and his army was their inability to deal with the Austrian light troops, the Genzer. Frederick failed to recognize the value of light troops, and thus the Austrians were able to wreak havoc among the Prussian troops, reconnoitering their positions and causing damage in hilly and wodded terrain. The Prussina army did survive the war. Its ability to wage war on different front and carry victory whiel sustaining defeat made it teh envy of the european armies ranged against it.

Great Britain
On the eve of war, the British army numbered around 90 000 men.This number would reach 150 000 men over the course of the war, but finding enough men for the army was a perennial problem, as was filling hte ranks of the royal navy and local malitias. Press gangs and prisons were important sources of recruits for both services. Most of the army was deployed overseas in the colonies or at home.

The greatest strength of the British army during hte Seven Year's war was the ability to adapt to conditions. When the army was required to wage war in North America, it became clear that traditionnal linear tactics were not suitable for fighting in heavily wooded terrain of the frontier. To be effective in the woods, soldiers needed to bel ightly armed and mobile. the needed to move quickly, in small groups, as well as in longl ines carrying heavy arms and baggage. After a number of reverses, the army began to adopt new tactics better suited to its enviroment, raising local ranger-style units and employingl ight infantry trained in skirmishing in the woods.The experience and tactics of these units were evaluated and conveyed to the rest of the army, and by1759 regular British army units had eaight line companies and one grenadier adn one light company. This innovation enabled the British army to match the French in both the woods and the open plains of Norht America. The British-allied army in Germany was chiefly organised along normal continental lines.There was a strong light infantry element, but it was mostly german in origin. The British did not send light troops to Germany until1760. The German light troops had proved their worth in various skirmishes with the Frenhc, and had also provided a wealth of intelligence to their commander. The British army units serving in India were also trained and fought alogn continetal lines. The officers and men were seconded to the varioous East India Company forces to stiffen them. The British lagged behind the French in Training and organising their native Sepoy troops along European lines, and this erro was not rectified until 1759. Henry Lloyd Criticized the British army for the practice of buying and selling commissions. He felt that the opurchase system should be abolished, but that with that innovation, combined with better discipline, "They would surpass any troops in the world"(Annual Register, 1766)

Russia
The Russian army's strength was 333 000, divided into 174 000 field forces and the rest militia and garrison troops. During the war, Rusia usually only committed between 60 000 and 90 000 men to any one campaign. The vast numerical superiority of the Russian state was teh Army's greatest asset. After a bloddy encounter, the Russinas were able to field more reinforcements than Prussia could ever hope to. Reforms had been drawn up to improve the army, but they were only implementad as the war began and idd not begin ot show results until the end. The RUssina army was perceived as a large, unwieldy, disorganized machine when it marched into battle. This perception was demonstrated in one part of the combined agreements between the Russinas and Austrians in 1759, which stated that when the Russians reached the Oder river, the Austrians would take over supplying their provisions. The inadequate supply network had playeda role in the Russin generals' planning and prevented them from following up their victory at Kunersdorf in 1759. Teh campaigns of 1758 and 1759 saw the Russinas being forced to pull back from the Oder region to their supply depots in POland, giving up any land gained. one of the first signs that reforms had begun to take hold was the improvment of the Russian supply train in the later years of the war. Most observers also had poor opinion of hte RUssin generla officers. The Russian generals themselves were contemptuous of one another for various reasons, and the general staff was not sufficiently well organised to offset the generals,ineptitude. The RUssina armies marched forward in large columns spread over vast areas, and it took a strong commander to bring all the forces together at one time of follow up a victory. At times teh number of officers of the low and middle rank was belwo strength for each regimetn, wich caused further command and control problems. The reforms caused organizational disruptions throughout the army. These were implemented through the formation of new units, which were organised differently to their odler counterparts. this caused great difficulty when units were maneuvering and deploying for battle, but the infantry and artillery benifited greatly in battle, especially defensively. As demonstrated at Zorndorf and Kunersdorf, the Russinas were excelletn soldiers in the defence.

Austria
The AUstrian army stood at 201 00 men in 1756. The Austrians ahd set up a reform commission after the defeats of the Silesian Wars in 1748 and, impressed by the disciplien and drill of hte Prussians, had written drill manuals and distributed them throughout the army. Intensive training was established for all of the various branches. Fire discipline of the regular line infantry was improved, although still not to the same level as that of the Prussinas. Prince Joseph Wenzel Liechtenstein, who ahd been appointed the Director of Artillery in 1744, published a trainning manual and generally made the artillery more professional, enabling it to play a signifigant rolle by applying devastating volleys against the Prussina infantry. The Austrian army changed considerably in eight years, and the British General Joseph Yorke noted that frederick was "very far from having contempt for the Austrians but the concontrary and I heard him several times call to his officers and bid them to take notice of what the ennemy did well in order to learn from it "(Yorke to earl Hardwicke, 31/7/58)

The Austian general were aware of the devastating firepower and maneuverability of the Prissian Army - one reason why they adopted a defencise strategy throughout most of the war, perferring ot fight among thehills and woods of Bohimia and Silesia. Frederick had a difficult time dealing with the Austrians in hilly fortified positions due to the lack of monility of his forces. Another signifigant reason for this defencise strategy wa hte Austrians' use of hte Genzer coprs. These troops, also refered to at Croates and Pandours by contemporaries, were made up of soldiers from the Balkan frontier regions. This region was a heavily militarized zone, and warfare called for small irregular corps to wage small -scale battles by constant skirmishing. The Austrians used this military corps as light troops, employing them to reconoiter, forage and skimish. They were deployed on the flanks of hte enemy as it marched, and would report on the movemtns and dispositions of the Prussians before battle.During battle, they woudl attack flanks of the prussina lines, trying to get them to fire and break ranks. The corps numbered 34 000 infantry and 6 000 hussar cavalry at the begining of the conflict.

Similar to the Russinas, the Austrians also suffered from inferior generals. While excelletn on the defence, the Austrians were often slow to carry out offencive, largely becuse of their generals failed to lauch offencive action in a coordinated fashion. Frederick noted tha one of the reasons for his survival was hte lack of unity between Russian and Austrian generals, wich made them circumspect when occasion required that they should act with vigor to overwhelm Prussia (Frederick II, History of the Seven Years War, II, p.268)

France
The Seven Years'War marked the low point of hte French army of hte eighteenth century. The total force numberes over 200 000 men and suffered from poor high-level leadership, lack of discipline, a lackluster officer class and delays in implementing necessary reforms. There were, however, some exceptions to the rule among the french forces in the colonies.

The French troops stationed in Norht America were excelletn frontier and linear formation soldiers. The British learned from early defeats at their hands to apply similar tactics to there own trainning strategies. The French East India Company troops were also of high wuality. IN the late 1740s they implemented the formal instruction of native troops in linear warfare. The British, as in North america, learned from defeat and applied French theories to their own troosp inteh region. the French were not able ot reinforce their colonial forces after 1758 because the Royal Navy had been successful in denying the Frenchnavy access top its own colonies. At the same tiem, the British heavily reinforced their colonies, outnumbering hte french.

Over the course of hte war, the decline in discipline among French army units in Norht America and India became a factor. In india, interruptions in Payment of hte soldiers'wages led to widespread disruption and desertion i nthe units of hte Compagny, relulars and marines.

The majority of hte regular French army was used to wagfe war against his Britannic majesty's Army in germany, and all of its major problems were apparent in the german campaign. As the armies went to war, the French Army was undergoing training in new tactics, but htese had not had the sufficient time to take efect and the French were ouclassed by hte ability of their opponents to deploy quickly. The tactical and organisational changes began to bear fruit late in the war, but by then it was far too late to cahnge the outcome in France's favor. During each campaign the army lost a fifth of tis strength to casualties, sickness and especially desertion. This was a serious problem for hte french army in germany because the pay systm collapsed repeatedly and on these occasion the relaxed discipline of the French army became glaringly aparent. To make htese matters worse, there was a serious shortage of officers in the field, who were needed to instill discipline and order to units during the campaign season.Highlevel commanders also failed to unite in strength at important times to overwhelm His Britannic Magesty's Army in germany. Troosp from several samll German states allied with the French army inGermany. However, these samll german states did not contribute the same number of qwuality of soldiers as those serving in his Britannic mAjesty's Army. The GErman troops did not train in peacetime and performed abysmally at Rossbach. they were only fit for garrion andl ines of communicatiosn duities.

The French did not recognise the value of light troops and various tactical changes of march and battle order, and theese were to be central pieces of the later «napoleonic French armies. However, they were not as successufly in their infancy during the Seven Years'war.

Cost of war
While still classifiable as a limited war of the eighteenth century, the Seven Years Wars had elements of total war. Notable are the crippling economic burdens that many of the combattants assumed to keep their armies in the field, yet effects upon the civilian populations were also significant.

Great Britain
Viewed as the principal victor in the war, the British victories cost dearly to the nation in terms of dept. The need to provide the sums to build up the fleet and kep armies in the field, progressively drove up spending. An exemple of the costs: 1 968 477£ was required to keep his Britannic Majesty's Army in the fields in 1759 (Naval and Military memoires, note 134), and that was only a fraction of the cost of the rest of the regular army and the Royal Navy deployed overseas. Annual tax revenue for 1760 was 15 million£, double the revenue of 1756, yet a shortfall contignued to creep up and the state turned to borrowing to keep the war going. National dept rose from 75 million£ in 1756 to 133 million£ in 1763.

Prussia
Prussia, a small state by comparison to the other key players of the conflict, was also brought to the breaking point as a result of the war. The government began with a reserve of 13 million Talers in 1756. During the course of the war, taxation in Prussia gathered 43 million talers, which was a concequently a heavy burden on the population. Frederick debased the currency of the state three times during the war, creating a further 29 million Talers. Introducing captured currency from Saxony, Silesia and Promerania relieve some of the pressure. Captured lands such as Saxony where stripped bare, which allowed him to raise an additionnal 53 million talers. A key element of Frederick's economic policy was the negotiation of an annual subsidy from Great Britain. Concluded on 11 april 1758, under which the British subsidises provided 27 million Talers, becoming a substantial part of the overall war budget (Duffy, Army of frederick the Great,pp. 95-99). In 1760, however, the annual subsidy ceased, as the leadership of the british government pased from Lord Bute.

Austria
The war cost for Austria eventually amounted to 392 million Gulden. The original estimates for military expenditure per year were 28 million Gulden. With the annual military budget during wartime reaching to three times the peacetime budget, forcing the government to raise taxes. This made up for 144 million Gulden over the course of the war, borne in its majority by the provinces of Austria and Bohemia. Similar to the British subsidy to Prussia, yet smaller in scale, the French provided about 25 million Gulden (Szabo, Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism, pp122-30). By 1760, France having lost New France and most of her commercial fleet had difficulty providing the anual subsidy halved to 12 million Gulden. In the web of treaties, Austria also promised a subsidy of 1 million rubles a year to Russia after signing the First Treaty of Versaille. As the war progressed it became inceasingly difficult to maintain. Enventually to gain revenue various assets of royal treasury were sold off, but the mountaing debt contignued to increase. By 1760, reductions in the officer corps were made to remady the financial situation. This persued to such a point that as of the end of 1761, each regiment had been reduced by two companies, and close to 12% of the army had been disbanded. Elsewere, Officers in Silesia where being paid with paper money that would be redeemable after the war had ended. htis left the a legacy that the depts and cost of the war would contignue to plague Austria well into the future.

Russia
Russians provided for there war with extreme harshness, various governmental organizations stripping the contry side of needed material and raising taxes on all levels of society. Not being highly centrally organized the actual system was plagued with corruption, especially in the areas far from imperial eyes. The severe governmental regulations provoked numerous local uprisings. Toward the end of the war, the lack of revenue was taking withering the war effort, to such a point the empress Elizabeth was quoted as saying that she would sell he diamonds and dresses, if necessary, to contignue the war.

France
France, as mentionned earlier, faced economic difficulties. The French state required 24.5 million Livres a year to field its armies. Maintaining foreign troops in the field: 12.5 milion livres a year. One respite for the French state included that it did not have to provide the supplies forces campaigning in German territories. This was provided by the various German states that where occupied or allied with France. Interestingly enough Louis XV took to financing the war via loans instead of raising taxes, as his counterparts did. As the government increased its borrowing interest rates proportionnally rose steadily. By this decision the national dept rose from 1 360 million livres in 1753 to 2 350 million livres by 1764 (Riley, The Seven Years War and the Old Regime in France, --pp.180-84). Defeats in naval and colonial theatres negatively affected trade and therfore finances, as did a massive shipbuilding program undertaken late in the war. Commercial intrests became destabilized, turning towards the continent to make up for the losses overseas, reducing France's ability to make war. Eventual forcing Louis to halve the annual subsidy to Austria, but more importantly submiting the troops in the field regular lacks of payment, reducing moral and efficiency.

-Daniel Marston, The Seven Years'War ,Osprey Publishing,2001,95 pages