User:Dustin Dyke/Action (philosophy)

"Some philosophers (e.g. Donald Davidson[3]) have argued that the mental states the agent invokes as justifying his action are physical states that cause the action.[citation needed] Problems have been raised for this view because the mental states seem to be reduced to mere physical causes.[citation needed] Their mental properties don't seem to be doing any work.[citation needed] If the reasons an agent cites as justifying his action, however, are not the cause of the action, they must explain the action in some other way or be causally impotent.[citation needed]"

I'm working on editing this section of the article. The author seems to be suggesting that Davidson is claiming that mental states really are just physical states, however, they continue to argue against Davidson's view using exactly that claim.

I plan on adding the following to the end of this section: Others have objected to the belief that mental states can cause physical action without asserting that mental properties can be reduced to physical properties. Such individuals suggest that mental states are epiphenomenal, in that they have no impact on physical states, but are nonetheless distinct entities.