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= Government Failure research needed =
 * Horse trading/Logrolling – The process by which legislators trade votes such that 2 or more unrelated policies which could not draw a majority and pass on their own can be passed in tandem. If a majority had wanted the actions, logrolling would not be required.
 * The Calculus of Consent, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock
 * Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Foodstamp Legislation, Ferejohn John, Congress and Policy Change edited by Gerald C. Wright, Leroy N. Rieselbach, Lawrence C. Dodd, pp 253, 1986, Agathon Press
 * The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence, Scott H. Ainsworth, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Nov., 1997), pp. 517-533
 * Compromise and logroll: Comparing the efficiency of two bargaining processes, Lewis A. Froman Jr., Michael D. Cohen, Behavioral Science, Volume 15, Issue 2, pages 180–183, March 1970
 * Counterpoint? Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Donald Wittman, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, No. 6 (Dec., 1989), pp. 1395-1424
 * Logrolling 1, Thomas Stratmann, The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider, editors, 2004, Springer US, pp 696-699, 978-0-7923-8607-0
 * Logrolling 2, Joe Oppenheimer, The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider, editors, 2004, Springer US, pp 699-701, 978-0-7923-8607-0
 * Relevant? Asymmetric Information, Delegation, and the Structure of Policy-Making, David Epstein, Sharyn O'Halloran, Journal of Theoretical Politics January 1999 vol. 11 no. 1 37-56
 * Counterpoint: Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, Michael D. Gilbert, University of Virginia School of Law, August 12, 2009, University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 61, p. 803, 2006
 * Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs, Gary S. Becker, Journal of Public Economics, Volume 28, Issue 3, December 1985, Pages 329–347
 * Mancur Olson (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, & Social Rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press.
 * Log-rolling and economic interests in the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, Douglas A. Irwin, Randall S. Kroszner, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Volume 45, December 1996, Pages 173–200
 * Federalist No. 10: Are Factions the Problem in Creating Democratic Accountability in the Public Interest?, Jack H. Knott, Public Administration Review, Special Issue: The Federalist Papers Revised for Twenty-First-Century Reality Edited by Paul C. Light, Volume 71, Issue Supplement s1, pages s29–s36, December 2011


 * Pork barrel spending – The tendency by legislators to encourage government spending in their own constituencies, whether or not it is efficient or even useful. Senior legislators, with greater status and ability to "bring home the bacon", may be reelected for this reason, even if their policy views are at odds with their constituency.


 * Rational ignorance – because there are monetary and time costs associated with gathering information
 * From rational ignorance page
 * "Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?" by Cesar Martinelli, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 129, Issue 1, July 2006, pp. 225-251 (subscription required)
 * "Rational Ignorance and Voting Behavior" by Cesar Martinelli, International Journal of Game Theory. Vol. 35, Issue 3, February 2007, pp. 315-335
 * Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W. and Stokes. D. (1960), 'The American Voter', Wiley, N.Y.
 * Nie, N., Verba, S. and Petrocik, J. (1976), 'The Changing American Voter', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
 * The Myth of the Rational Voter, Bryan Caplan,

Administrative

 * Self-Interested Administrators – It is possible, if not likely, that administrators are self-interested, wanting to build their own power and prestige. They will sometimes enact public policies that are popular or lucrative, but are not best for the polity or the people.
 * William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government introduced the Budget-maximizing model
 * The New Economics of Organization, Terry M. Moe, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Nov., 1984), pp. 739-777
 * Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, No. 5 (Oct., 1983), pp. 765-800
 * A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Bureaucratic Politics and Autonomy, Brian A. Ellison, The American Review of Public Administration June 1995 vol. 25 no. 2 161-182
 * Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, Michael Lipsky, Social Service Review, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Mar., 1984), pp. 3-27
 * Nonuse of Prenatal Care, Implications for Social Work Involvement, Health Social Work (1994) 19 (2): 84-92. doi: 10.1093/hsw/19.2.84
 * Child welfare and people of color: denial of equal access, Social Work Research Abstracts (1983) 19 (4): 13-20. doi: 10.1093/swra/19.4.13, Mary M. Close
 * The Perils of Transparency in Bureaucracies, Alessandro Gavazza and Alessandro Lizzeri, The American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 2 (May, 2007), pp. 300-305
 * Emotional Bureaucracies: Emotions Civil Servants, and Immigrants in the Swedish Welfare State, Mark Graham, Article first published online: 3 JAN 2008
 * Creaming the poor, Society journal, S. M. Miller, Pamela Roby, Alwine A. de Vos van Steenwijk, June 1970, Volume 7, Issue 8, pp 38-45


 * Public Monopolies – Government operates like a monopoly because it does not have to face market competition, as proposed by libertarian scholars Murray Rothbard and Milton Friedman. The negative effect on Allocative efficiency is questionable if the government can be prevented from pursuing the largest potential profit.


 * Multiple conflicting goals – Government administration is often asked to meet conflicting goals. One example of this in the United States is the Federal Reserve, which is tasked with keeping both interest rates and inflation at manageable levels, even though it can only do so by manipulating the money supply. If it wants to lower (or increase) interest rates, it must create (destroy) money in order to increase the supply of loanable funds, but this will increase (decrease) the inflation rate. It influences the Federal Funds Rate through open market operations.
 * Chapter on Nova Scotian inshore fisheries in Ostrom, Elinor, Governing the Commons, ...

Information assessment

 * Environmental impact – Public support for roads lowers the cost of operating a vehicle; farm subsidies and programs like the Soil Conservation program encourage farmers to use fields which require more intense application of fertilizer and irrigation. Both of these have an adverse impact on the environment.
 * http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/others/pdf/ehs_sum_report.pdf
 * Agri-environmental policies in the EU and United States: A comparison, Ecological Economics, Volume 65, Issue 4, 1 May 2008, Pages 753–764, argues that US ag policy fails to acknowledge positive externalities


 * Imperfect information – Especially in Pigouvian application, gathering sufficient information is no easier for the regulatory agency than for individual actors


 * Market distortion


 * By tax structures – by organizing taxation in a particular way, investments may be directed so as to avoid those taxes even though the investments are inferior
 * Taxes, subsidies, and insurance as drivers of United States coastal development, Kenneth J. Bagstad, Kevin Stapleton, John R. D'Agostino, Ecological Economics, Volume 63, Issues 2–3, 1 August 2007, Pages 285–298, Ecological Economics of Coastal Disasters — Coastal Disasters Special Section


 * By regulatory ordering – mandating a particular solution may prohibit all other solutions, some of which may be superior
 * Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 89, No. 8 (Jul., 1980), pp. 1466-1571


 * By subsidization – by subsidizing particular goods, these may force other, nonsubsidized, but superior substitutes from the market
 * Taxes, subsidies, and insurance as drivers of United States coastal development, Kenneth J. Bagstad, Kevin Stapleton, John R. D'Agostino, Ecological Economics, Volume 63, Issues 2–3, 1 August 2007, Pages 285–298, Ecological Economics of Coastal Disasters — Coastal Disasters Special Section


 * Risk assumption – by promising to relieve risk-takers, the government encourages risk-taking whose benefits accrue to a minority while spreading the assumption of that risk across the populace. The Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s is one example; federal assumption of responsibility for the Mississippi River levee system. See also moral hazard


 * Moral Hazard, Social Catastrophe: The Changing Face of Vulnerability along the Hurricane Coasts, Susan L. Cutter, Christopher T. Emrich, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science March 2006 vol. 604 no. 1 102-112
 * Real Interest Rates and the Savings and Loan Crisis: The Moral Hazard Premium, John B. Shoven, Scott B. Smart, Joel Waldfogel, NBER Working Paper No. 3754, Issued in June 1991 (Published: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 6, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 155-167)
 * Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, Raymond J. Burby, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science March 2006 vol. 604 no. 1 171-191
 * Katrinanomics: The politics and economics of disaster relief, William F. Shughart II, Public Choice, Volume 127, Issue 1-2, pp 31-53, Kluwer Academic Publishers
 * Taxes, subsidies, and insurance as drivers of United States coastal development, Kenneth J. Bagstad, Kevin Stapleton, John R. D'Agostino, Ecological Economics, Volume 63, Issues 2–3, 1 August 2007, Pages 285–298, Ecological Economics of Coastal Disasters — Coastal Disasters Special Section
 * Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit, George A. Akerlof, Paul M. Romer. NBER Reprint No. 1869. Issued in April 1994


 * Unintended consequence – An unintended consequence comes about when a mechanism that has been installed with the intention of producing one result is used to produce a different (and often conflicting) result. (e.g. rent control leads to shortages in housing)