User:Emilyelvish/sandbox

In political science, triangular diplomacy is a foreign policy, developed during the Vietnam War by US advisor Henry Kissinger, as a means to manage relations between contesting Communist powers, the Soviet Union and China. Connecting heavily with the correlating policy of linkage, the policy was intended to exploit the ongoing rivalry between the two Communist powers (following the Sino-Soviet split), as a means to strengthen American hegemony and diplomatic interest.

Terminology
In principle, the policy of triangular diplomacy seeks to link the interests of three powerful states in order to retain a balance of power within the international system. Most commonly, this involves an insecure state (or states) pursuing strategic alliances or economic deals in an attempt to both weaken the hegemony of a powerful adversary and strengthen their own position. First developed by US advisor Henry Kissinger during the Vietnam War era, the policy was argued to be most effective when reliant upon “the natural incentives and propensities of the players. ”

Conceived in a period of American political weakness, Kissinger’s doctrine argues that foreign policy needed to rely on a combination of diplomacy and military power in order to bring benefits to all relevant players, and subsequently ensure international stability. This doctrine heavily relates to a neorealist analysis of international politics, professed by scholars such as Kenneth Waltz. Kissinger’s desires to seek a “coalition” with China in order to stabilise the power of the Soviet Union reflects the neorealist balance of power theory, as insecure states are seeking to bring an equilibrium to the international order in an attempt to bring peace and benefit the relevant actors.

Vietnam War
Entering into the White House during the height of the Vietnam War, one of Kissinger’s primary intentions with his policy was to gain Soviet and Chinese assistance in softening North Vietnamese troops, and withdrawing from the conflict with dignity. The Sino-Soviet spilt offered a ripe opportunity for Kissinger and Nixon to enact such a policy, intended by offering integration into the international trade system, scientific and technological resources and a stabilization of bilateral relations. The first instance of this rapprochement and the beginnings of triangular diplomacy within US policy is reflected in a 14th August 1969 National Security meeting, in which Nixon positioned his intentions to victimise China within the Sino-Soviet spilt and seek to offer assistance.

The following 1972 Beijing and Moscow summits further exacerbated the existing tensions between China and the Soviet Union, allowing Nixon and Kissinger to gain Soviet co-operation on matters deemed important to US foreign policy. This can be examined in the outcome of the 1972 Spring Offensive, as the United States were able to gain diplomatic co-operation in reaching a peace with North Vietnamese forces. Many scholars contend that Nixon’s rapprochement with China, as part of the triangular diplomacy framework, was an instrumental facet in the dissolution of the Vietnam War. Historian Raymond Garthoff argues that triangular diplomacy held a significant bearing on the settlement of the Vietnam War, whilst Jussi Hanhimäki contends that the policy played a critical role in bringing about changes in North Vietnamese negotiation strategy.

However, triangular diplomacy did not ensure immediate stability and peaceful cooperation. The Vietnamese War continued in full force for three years after the emergence of the policy, with continued US-Soviet conflict evolving underneath. For Kissinger and Nixon, the policy was secondary to national interests and security concerns, as the nation needed to appear politically powerful against adversaries.

Détente
Following the Vietnam War, Kissinger sought to reshape US approach to international relations, seeking a balance of power which can produce stability between the three key players in the international system; the Soviet Union, the United States and China, and subsequently reduce military and political tensions. Triangular diplomacy consequently included the aim of achieving this balance of power and pursuing the policy of detente with the Soviet Union, as Nixon and Kissinger saw that correlating the interests of each power was instrumental in stabilising the international order.

In The White House Years, Kissinger argued that the opening to China and detente with the Soviets were connected policies, intended to exploit the pre-existing tensions between the states in American interest. Stating that it was better for the United States “to be closer to either Moscow or Peking than either was to the other”, as American bargaining power would strengthen two-fold.

Key outcomes of triangular diplomacy during this period include the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué and the Camp David Accords, each of which were achieved as a result of Kissinger and Nixon’s policy.

Post-Cold War
Following the Cold War, the definition of triangular diplomacy shifted from Nixon and Kissinger’s definition to a “coordinated action by two states (which, in keeping with the triangle metaphor, we refer to collectively as the base) to change behaviour of another state (the “target”). As nuclear capabilities became an established facet within international relations policy, so to did continued attempts by United States administration to enforce triangular diplomacy with China and the United States.

A key example of this dynamic is the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship, signed between President Vladimir Putin and President Jiang Zemin. The signing of this treaty represented a diplomatic effort to strengthen Russian and Chinese influence in dealings with the United States, and a subsequent return to the triangular diplomacy framework. Results of this treaty included; the modernisation of Chinese armed forces and stable levels of fuel shipments to aid the construction of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline, and the increase of Russian sources of capital following the dissolution of the Soviet state. The New York Times argued that whilst this manifestation of triangular diplomacy was “a new form…with diminished strategic significance, ” the treaty forces Washington to pay more regard to both nations and act in accordance with their wishes in order to ensure their unipolar political position, following the Cold War.

Ukraine Crisis
A contemporary reflection of triangular diplomacy can be examined through political interactions in regards to the Ukrainian Crisis. In particular, the interactions between the United States, the European Union and the Russian Federation. In attempts of the EU and US to balance the power of Russia, this policy can be examined through the correlation of the European Union and United States economic sanctions, the outsourcing of crisis resolution to the European Union, Ukraine’s efforts to increase transatlantic diplomacy and Russia’s efforts to undermine it. In addition to marking the rise of the EU as a major international actor in foreign policy, the Ukraine crisis marks a shift in triangular diplomacy away from its neorealist inclination, to more of a liberal position regarding international cooperation, as the US and EU sought to assist the Ukraine in an attempt to ensure peace as opposed to serving national interests.

Trump Administration
The foreign policy of the Trump administration has found similarities with that of triangular diplomacy. In particular, regarding American involvement in the Asia-Pacific region in an attempt to balance out the power of China. Washington advisors Alexander Gray and Peter Navarro have aligned their intentions to implement a more muscular foreign policy in the region, in order to manage the growing power of China through improved relations with Taiwan, hence implementing triangular diplomacy principles. Washington Post writer Marc Thiessen argues that this is to be achieved through free trade agreement and upgrading the state’s political representation, following Trump’s unstable position regarding the One China policy.

Websites

 * "China, Russia to honor commitments on oil pipeline". China Daily. 2003. Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-11/18/content_282626.htm
 * "Putin: oil pipeline will serve China first". China Daily. 2005. Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/08/content_476125.htm
 * "Triangular Diplomacy". The New York Times. 2001. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/18/opinion/triangular-diplomacy.html
 * Kuo, Kendrick (2013). "Nixon's Opening to China: The Misleading Apotheosis of Triangular Diplomacy". E-International Relations Students. Retrieved from https://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/28/nixons-opening-to-china-the-misleading-apotheosis-of-triangular-diplomacy/
 * Kuo, Raymond (2017). "Can Trumpian Triangular Diplomacy Work?". The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/can-trumpian-triangular-diplomacy-work/
 * Lukacsova, V. (2009). Kissinger's Triangular Diplomacy. [online] Available at: https://old.bisla.sk/sk/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Lukacsova_Veronika-Bakalarska-praca.pdf
 * Sempa, Francis (2016). "Is Kissinger's Triangular Diplomacy the answer to Sino Russian Rapprochement?". The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/is-kissingers-triangular-diplomacy-the-answer-to-sino-russian-rapprochement/
 * Thiessen, Marc (2016). "Trump's Taiwan call wasn't a blunder. It was brilliant". The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-taiwan-call-wasnt-a-blunder-it-was-brilliant/2016/12/05/d10169a2-bb00-11e6-ac85-094a21c44abc_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2ced820a3037

Books

 * Birchfield, Vicki; Young, Alisdair (2018). Triangular diplomacy among the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation: Responses to the Crisis in Ukraine. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG.
 * Garthoff, Raymond (1994). Détente and Confrontation. Washington: Brookings.
 * Kegley, Charles; Wittkopf, Eugene (2005). World Politics: Trend and Transformation. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s.
 * Kissinger, Henry (1979). The White House Years. Sydney: Hodder and Stoughton.
 * Morales, Gilbert (2005). Critical Perspectives on the Vietnam War. New York: The Rosen Publishing Group.
 * Waltz, Kenneth (2008). Realism and International Politics. New York: Routledge.

Journals

 * Hanhimaki, Jussi (2003). "Selling the 'Decent interval': Kissinger, triangular diplomacy, and the end of the Vietnam war, 1971-73". Diplomacy and Statecraft. 14:1, 159-194.
 * Keohane, Robert (2012). "Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism". International Relations. 26(2): 125–138.