User:EnigmaMcmxc/archive1

Excellent quote
Pissed myself laughing when I read Lord Cranley's quote in the V-B article, bloody good show, sir. Feel free to uncensor it if you have the uncensored version, or does the source have the swear words omitted too? Geoff B (talk) 21:35, 14 February 2008 (UTC)

unfortually, the source has it censored. Laughed my head off when i read it too!--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:37, 14 February 2008 (UTC)

Brevity - Tobruk
I believe it's in the official histories, volume II, pg. 116. Oberiko (talk) 12:53, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

Thanks allot, can't believe i missed something like that!--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:34, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

RE: Verrieres Ridge
That's what I've been meaning to do. It's on my 'to do' list

Ah cool, hadnt seen it there :) --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 08:40, 14 March 2008 (UTC)


 * Okay, I spent the last several hours reformatting the refs. Could you do a quick check of the page to make sure I got the formatting right?

Thanks, Cam (Chat) 04:13, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

Sure thing, ill have a nosey later when am home :) --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 10:15, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

Looks good to me--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:52, 29 March 2008 (UTC)


 * Thanks for your help. Cam (Chat) 18:00, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

Thanks allot! :D
 * Hey, Enigma. Huge favour I'd like to ask of you: I'm about to take Verrières for the big ACN (A-Class-Nomination).  The problem is that there are quite a few refs that have yet to be fully consolidated.  would you be able to take a quick peek at it over the next few days, and just do some ref-consolidation for me?  Thanks for your help. Cheers! Cam (Chat) 05:58, 13 May 2008 (UTC)

Sure, ill take a look over the article soon :)--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 10:20, 13 May 2008 (UTC)
 * thanks. Cheers! Cam (Chat) 23:23, 13 May 2008 (UTC)


 * Just looked it over then, i dont think there is anything i can do, it looks good to me.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:51, 18 May 2008 (UTC)

Excellent work


Thanks allot! --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:34, 14 June 2008 (UTC)

re: Author names
Ping! -- R OGER D AVIES  talk 12:03, 15 June 2008 (UTC)

Congratulations
Hey Enigma... Congratulations on getting Operation Brevity to A-Class. Great work. --FactotEm (talk) 10:12, 19 June 2008 (UTC)


 * Thanks allot!--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:59, 19 June 2008 (UTC)
 * Yeah, congrats. I have no idea how to get an A-Class box.  It's probably fairly simple however.  You'd just have to tweak the code for the GA-Class one, change the background colour, and put the A-Class image where the GA-Class image is now. Cam (Chat) 21:43, 19 June 2008 (UTC)

Brevity CE
I've got the 'Preparations for battle' section into some sort of shape that I think works well. Can you take a look at User:Factotem/Sandbox when you get a chance, and let me know what you think? Also, can you look at the references given for second last para. ("The main Axis opposition..."). I've added Jentz pp. 128-9 as discussed yesterday, and there are now 3 citations. I'm wondering if one of them can't go. Small point, but they're out of numerical sequence, and I've seen comments at FAC about that(!). --FactotEm (talk) 11:35, 16 August 2008 (UTC)

Also, the Allied OOB includes 7th Armoured Brigade, 7th Support Group, and 11th Hussars. You have stated that Brevity involved elements of the 7th Armoured Brigade, but nowhere do you explain what those elements were, or what elements were missing. Did you mean to say elements of the 7th Armoured Division, which included the 3 units mentioned above, rather than Brigade? --FactotEm (talk) 12:13, 16 August 2008 (UTC)


 * Thanks for that. To answer your questions...
 * I'm not sure what you're getting at with the comma question. The sentences, however, look right as they are. The first sentence uses commas to distinguish 3 themes: capture (the pass), drive (the enemy out - of two locations that do not need to be separated by a comma), and inflict (losses). In the second sentence, 'elements' refers only to 7th Armd Div, and the comma acts to dis-associate this quantifier from the 22nd Gds Bde.
 * I did wonder about the capitalisation of 'group'. As you say they are not formal units, and it makes sense to use lower case.
 * We've tended to silently revert each other when it comes to using commas between sub-units and their parent units (A Sqdn, 2RTR; or A Sqn 2RTR), and I was going to ask you about this. I prefer not to, because the comma can make it appear that we are talking about different units. Take "In the centre, C Squadron, 4RTR and G Company of the 2nd Scots Guards..." as an example. You and I read this as "C Sqn of the 4RTR and G Coy of the 2nd Scots", but someone else might trip up on the comma after C Sqn and think we're listing 3 units: C Sqn, the whole of 4RTR, and G Coy 2nd Scots.
 * "order" or "ordered"? The subject of the sentence is actually Rommel's response, of which two actions are described. If you cut out the first action (strengthening the cordon around Tobruk), you'll see that "ordered" does not make sense ("Rommel's response was to [...] ordered Kampfgruppe von Herff to act..."). --FactotEm (talk) 07:53, 17 August 2008 (UTC)
 * Excellent points!--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 10:40, 17 August 2008 (UTC)

Operation Epsom
I'm sorry, but isn't this the book you've cited before - Normandy to the Baltics? I thought Jackson was only commenting within it. --Eurocopter (talk) 18:54, 15 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Nope, that Montys memoirs. The book i was quoting from is called "8 Corps: Normandy to the Baltic", which is a reprint and amalgamation of the two volumes from 1945 called: Operations of Eighth Corps Account of Operations from Normandy to the River Rhine and The River Rhine to the Baltic Sea.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:00, 15 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Ok, sorry mate, maybe I was rushing a little. However, my only purpose is to improve and promote this article, no way disrupting references. I have replaced some references and resolved some style issues (usage of footnotes), everything should be ok now. Cheers, --Eurocopter (talk) 19:49, 15 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Ok no foul, seems we both misunderstood each other :)--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 10:06, 16 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I think the article in its current shape would quite ready for a FA. Is there anything left to be done in your opinion or should I nominate it? It should worth a try.. Best, --Eurocopter (talk) 15:41, 4 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Well the article does need to be expanded somewhat to cover the operations other days, a few sidenotes about the progress of the XXX Corps attack and some extra info on the German counterattack. Am going to work on that today.
 * On top of that the lead needs to be rewritten and possibly the aftermath section. Not allot of work really but will most likely need a good Copy edit once am done with it lol :)
 * Maybe put it forth in a couple of days?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:29, 4 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Yep, maybe somewhere at the end of the next week. Best, --Eurocopter (talk) 22:19, 4 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Ok, this seems ready to undergo a successfull FAC now. I propose we nominate it sunday evening in order to allow some time for tweaks and last moment minor changes. Anything against it? Best, --Eurocopter (talk) 20:11, 15 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Sunday sounds good - that will leave time to tweak the few things in the planning section highlighted in the talk page and expand and ce the results section :) --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:35, 15 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Very well, speak to you sunday evening then, as i'm going to be away for the weekend. All the best, --Eurocopter (talk) 12:00, 16 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Congrats, Epsom just passed the FAC! I think we did a great team together and i'm confident we can continue with it. How about our next objective? Operation Goodwood seems interesting! All the best! --Eurocopter (talk) 22:46, 31 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Yep it was a great team effort which got us there. Goodwood sounds good, ive been meaning to go back to that article! :)--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:50, 31 October 2008 (UTC)

Brevity Copyedit
Hi Enigma... I have to apologise for not fully completing the copyedit of this article in preparation for another go at FAC. RLI. It is, however, pretty much there, and the only major outstanding issue is the lead, which was comprehensively critiqued during the first FAC. My suggestion to you would be to put it through a peer review and, if that is thorough enough, have another stab at FAC. It is a great article, worthy of another attempt. Cheers. --FactotEm (talk) 19:53, 6 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Thanks for the tips and help. I'll get a peer review going sometime this week.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:13, 6 October 2008 (UTC)

Re Falaise map
Oh bollocks, I believe you're right :( I've still got the svg version saved on the laptop, so I'll correct it and upload a new version tonight. Thanks for catching that ;) EyeSerene talk 07:11, 9 October 2008 (UTC)

Epsom Judgements
Clark p.100 'On the battlefield, Epsom ended, rather ignominiously, in a sort of draw.'

Daglish p.218 'So in its original conception, Epsom failed. The strategic goal was not achieved and tactical failings [were] all too evident.... In their turn, the Germans also failed. Strategically, ... a reaction to the British initiative. Operationally, the principal...offensive force...[was] cast into battle prematurely....'

p.219 'By provoking German counter-attacks they were drawing key German formations onto killing fields....' '...Normandy, a battle of attrition forcing the German army to commit force it could not afford to a locality it did not dare to give up'. (This is like a paraphrase of Falkenhayn's reasoning over the Verdun offensive.)

D'Este p.245 'No amount of pretence can conceal tha the real object had been a short pincer movement to outflank Caen from the west and,[sic] like the Villers-Bocage ploy, it was a dismal failure.'

D'este seems mesmerised by the German retention of Caen beyond the first day of the invasion, something he doesn't harp on about in respect of Carentan, Bayeux and St Lo. He quotes Dempsey, 'Monty had originally intended that Second Army should only be required to fight its holding battle for two or three weeks - just long enough to cover the period while the Americans were taking Cherbourg and were regrouping to attack southwards. (p.246) To 'seize and hold the critical terrain surrounding Caen'(p.246). He doesn't seem to account for US 'slowness' in his analysis, the failures to 'break out' before Cobra or describe what the Germans would have had to have done and what weather conditions were necessary to allow Caen et al to be captured on schedule (go for a picnic?). Keith-264 (talk) 09:37, 10 October 2008 (UTC)

Operation Edit Conflict
I think I'll wait until you're finished adding content; these are getting to be a bit of a nightmare ;) EyeSerene talk 16:18, 10 October 2008 (UTC)
 * lol, i should be finished within the next hour on the June 29 section and then its all yours! :D--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:30, 10 October 2008 (UTC)

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

The Buckley paperback is certainly worth the cash. He makes a creditable case for the view that looking at the details (like a proper historian not a polemicist) significantly modifies the view that British armoured forces in the Big Two were a bit rubbish, particularly in Normandy. I recently read 'Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces 1903-1939' by JP Harris and they fit together rather well. Harris maintains that the technical difficulties with British tanks sprang from the financial crisis of the early 30's and the reliance of the army on civilian industry, what with the military industrial base being so small. This meant using relatively underpowered commercial engines, which led to the split in functions between different designs. Buckley thinks that that plus the defeat in 1940 with the loss of so much equipment took until 1943 to put right. Harris also shows that the armour theorists of the RTC were often their own worst enemies (not only in hindsight) and that the more orthodox thinkers outside of it were often proved right. It rather reminds me of the RAF twisting everything round the concept of strategic bombing since this justified its independent existence.

Buckley makes much of the circumstances that the Anglo-Canadian armoured forces faced in Normandy 'they had battled hard against canny and determined opponents, often through difficult and unhelpful terrain and in less than three months helped to win a spectacular victory' p.209. Critics blame them for not fighting a blitzkrieg - J. Ellis, D'Este, Jarymowycz and Liddell-Hart. Buckley says that their views are distorted by an assumption that the allied forces could have fought the campaign differently. In this he largely follows S A Hart.

Noticing that this reply is turning into another essay I've looked for a quote, p. 104 has 'They demonstrated considerable tactical flexibility and adaptability, more so than their much admired and esteemed counterparts, the Germans, who continued to employ a doctrine of immediate counter-attack much longer than they should, that merely hastened their defeat by playing to the strengths of the Allies.' P.212 'When they attempted to attack, German units encountered as many and arguably more difficulties than the British and suffered often appalling casualties at the hands of Allied firepower. Senior German commanders...proved less willing to accept that a modification in tactics was required...and frontline German units began to disintegrate as a consequence.'

Buckley also questions TH Place's criticism of British 'doctrine' on the ground that non-rigid enforcement allowed units to adapt quickly rather than waiting for it to come from above. They were also able to spontaneously dump theory which wasn't helping. I must say I am intrigued by the idea that the British army was clever enough not to need spoon feeding! [8-)Keith-264 (talk) 10:54, 21 October 2008 (UTC) _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

PS Has anyone thanked you for your efforts on Epsom? I think it's turned out a model essay. I've enjoyed making a modest contribution. It's also given me a chance to examine my thinking on this and several other subjects.Keith-264 (talk) 11:20, 21 October 2008 (UTC)

---

Buckley 'The Normandy Campaign 1944 - Sixty years on.'

Ch1. The 21st Army Group in Normandy: towards a new balance sheet, Terry Copp.

P.15 'Again, it is clear that those who criticise the Commonwealth forces for failing to develop the kind of integrated tank-infantry battlegroup doctrine practiced by the German army are correct. The British approach, as it was understood in May 1944, allowed everything and forbade nothing. It was up to individual comanders to develop methods of employing their tanks effectively....'

'The ...army...was well prepared....The...surprise was the enemy's stubborn, almost mindless persistence in continuing to mount counter-attacks after it was evident that the Allies were well prepared to deal with them. Willing soldiers led by courageous leaders were repeatedly sacrificed in obedience to a doctrine that the German army ought to have abandoned. In Normandy it was the Allies not the Germans who worked out new ways of carrying out the intent of their orders.' Keith-264 (talk) 12:20, 21 October 2008 (UTC) ---

Terry Copp has tried to explain the varying interpretations of Epsom by suggesting that too much emphasis is given to a ‘win – lose’ narrative and that a ‘cost – benefit’ analysis gives opposite conclusions: ‘One such counter-attack on 22 July resulted in 10SS regaining control of the Bon Repas[sic]-Evrecy road, a clear victory in a win-lose narrative but a typical German defeat in any cost – benefit analysis. (The Normandy Campaign 1944 Ed Buckley J. 2006 Ch 1 p. 18 Copp T.)

I added this to your draft as a note since I think it sums up the debate between the attritionists and the manoeuvrists. The more I look at the quote you put in from D'Este about the German losses being 'purely in men and material' the higher my sardonic eyebrow rises. Keith-264 (talk) 18:15, 21 October 2008 (UTC)

--- This is my meddlesome draft of your draft

VIII Corps, in battle for the first time, had broken through well dug in German forces and advanced nearly six miles during Operation Epsom.[1] The Germans committed all their reserves and (operationally) achieved a defensive success, containing the British advance. The German forces inflicted over 4,000 casualties on the British[3] and lost over 3,000.[4] The Germans had been forced to commit their armoured forces piecemeal to meet threats as they developed and to counterattack at a disadvantage,[5]losing more than 120 tanks[6] and their forces were significantly disrupted and worn down.[5] As there were few infantry divisions available, the panzer divisions had to remain in the front line rather than going into reserve.[7] It has been stated that the most logical point to launch an attack, at this stage of the campaign, was from the Orne bridgehead on the eastern flank of the beachhead.[8] An attack in this area had been vetoed by Montgomery, Dempsey and O’Connor as impractical. Second Army then turned its attention to the west of Caen.[9] The intentions of the operation have been much debated; some historians claiming that the operation was to gain ground, others that due to ULTRA intercepts Montgomery was aware of the Germans' plan to attack towards Bayeux and Epsom was launched to forestall the German offensive,[10] while another has stated that the operation was to draw the I SS Panzer Corps and the (newly arrived) II SS Panzer Corps into battle around Caen.[11] Another historian has noted that Montgomery wanted to retain the initiative operationally and strategically, to prevent German armoured forces being moved to face the American forces or being relieved and passed into reserve. The arrival of the II SS Panzer Corps was an incentive to launch Epsom, (despite delays in the delivery of troops and supplies to Normandy caused by the weather) forcing the Germans to commit the II SS Panzer Corps to battle rather than use it for their intended attack.[12] These views are dismissed by a writer who claims that "no sane commander" would mount an attack on the scale of Epsom without "every hope of breaking through the German defences, or at least of causing the enemy to make substantial withdrawals".[13] Another historian stated “No amount of pretence can conceal that the real object had been a short pincer movement to outflank Caen”[14][nb 1] "On the battlefield, Epsom ended, rather ignominiously, in a sort of draw."[16] There have been several conclusions about the effect of the operation and one historian notes that examining this is difficult; while the written orders (to advance across the Orne River and capture the high ground south of Caen) were not achieved it could be argued there were implicit objectives which far outweighed the capture of Bretteville-sur-Laize.[17] The operation is seen by some as deviating from the original plan[18] while others have said that Epsom was “an operation of immense intentions which were not attained”[19] and the entire operation was a “dismal failure”.[20] A failure in which as one historian notes "It took most of six Panzer Divisions to stop Epsom short of its final objectives"[21] Another historian has noted that without the commitment of these divisions that it was highly likely the British offensive would have reached Bretteville-sur-Laize.[22] Other historians have it that while the advance beyond the Orne River had failed, a strategic victory had been won.[23] The German command lost the initiative by committing their reserves to battle to contain Epsom, losing the chance to launch their counteroffensive.[24] By withdrawing the 11th Armoured Division across the Odon and then into reserve the 21st Army Group had re-created the threat of a major offensive in the Caen sector.[25] By the end of June all German armoured forces were concentrated on the Second Army front.[26][27] A historian has stated that with the defeat of the second of only two German armoured counterattacks during June, the German command had lost their best troops[28] while another admits that though the operation was costly for the British, it “caused grievous losses” to the Germans.[29] VIII Corps in their analysis of the operation, concluded that Operation Epsom failed to reach its geographical goal but “when seen as part of Montgomery's series of rapid and consecutive blows against the German Army in Normandy, the importance of Epsom becomes more apparent and there is little doubt that it did play a significant part in the Allies' eventual success in the region."[30] Another historian has dismissed these strategic considerations, while admitting the British inflicted a sharp defeat on the German armoured forces and claims that the defeat “was purely in terms of men and material”.[31][nb 2] The Germans had thrown everything into trying to contain the offensive, while the British were preparing for the next.[7] Keith-264 (talk) 19:12, 21 October 2008 (UTC)

—Preceding unsigned comment added by Keith-264 (talk • contribs) 19:09, 21 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Thanks for all the comments Keith - i have ordered myself a copy of that book and cant wait to get hold of it! :)--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:12, 23 October 2008 (UTC)

Re Epsom conclusion
Cheers, I'll take a look. I started to do something with it, but my time has been so limited over the last few days I never really got going. EyeSerene talk 08:24, 22 October 2008 (UTC)

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Alright geezah? It occurs that between us we a pretty good library. If it's any help I recently got Terry Copp's book with the operational research from ORS2 with 2nd Army ('Montgomery's scientists'). It has the original work on the relative vulnerability of British and German tanks and analyses of strategic bombing like before Charnwood.

Desert War
I notice that you have done a lot on Operation Brevity and as usual I have a few thoughts on British methods in the desert war. If you're interested let me know.[;-)Keith-264 (talk) 19:19, 24 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Am absloute obessed with the desert war so yea lets discuss! :)--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:55, 24 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I noticed that the critics of the British army in the Great War complain about faulty technique but seem to overlook the fact that the army wasn't well equipped for firepower warfare until early 1917 when, surprise surprise the army adopted a division of labour in the infantry platoon. I have the impression that something similar happened in the desert in the B2. It's noticeable that as soon as the 6pdr arrived in quantity the 25pdr was reconcentrated and used like proper artillery. It makes me wonder how much of the obvious failings in technique of the 8th Army were determined by its equipment rather than bad leadership. I'm also a bit of a partisan of the Valentine tank and the 2pdr! I got a dvd hire of Desert Victory and to my dismay there were only two pics of Valentines in the lot. Keith-264 (talk) 21:12, 24 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Well the 2 pounder was effective agaisnt the Italian tanks but i believe there are numerous examples of the 25 pounders (possibly the old 60 pounders too although i have never seen direct mention to that) being used in the AT role.
 * Histoian Thomas Jentz when commenting on the defence of Halfaya Pass during Operation Skorpian notes that when forced to the British armoured forces fought in a combind fashion - one could see this as a rather overlooked example - likewise the Germans used field arty and AA guns in the AT role. (well the former was an example mentioned by General Raus during the invasion of the USSR).--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:20, 24 October 2008 (UTC)

I read Carver's book this year 'Dilemmas of the Desert War' which I found suited my tendency towards structuralism because after reading it I ended up thinking that Gazala was Crusader in reverse - a bit of a dog's dinner where the side that attacked first won a score draw because the other side ran out of steam. Looked at like that, the organisational, leadership and equipment failings of the 8th army don't look quite as elementary as they are cracked up to be. I even thought more of Ritchie. I also had a greater respect for Monty's achievement in supplying his advance to TunisiaKeith-264 (talk) 22:20, 24 October 2008 (UTC) One does wonder what would have happened if th e8th Army had of had that extra bit of time it needed to launch its own offensive - would it have ended up stuck somewhere in the middle of Tripolitana with a supply crisis on its hands or would have it been the war turning attack? What one does get a real impression from Gazala is just how lucky the Axis forces were - from reading Niall Barrs Pendelum of War the gives the impression that Rommels attack managed to reach Egypt because of the vast ammount of stores, equipment etc that he captured during Gazala and the conquest of Tobruk. It has been a long time since ive actually read anything on Gazala but what i do remember reading is that it was a battle that really should not have been lost.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 02:04, 27 October 2008 (UTC)

I found that the mid-war period got more interesting - when the Allies didn't have such an extensive material superiority and were still hampered by ratshit equipment. I wonder whether the 8th Army got a better wireless in late 1942 or that convoys got bigger or something. These mundane matters seem to be much more influential than "tally ho! Chaps" derring do. Did the 8th have a big increase in its lorry fleet to enable the advance to Tunisia? If so does it mean that previous to that the fighting in Libya was about as much as could be achieved? Have you seen much reference in your reading to 'close support' tanks? They seem to be anonymous which is odd considering that they were similar to the PzIV.

I watched the Desert Victory dvd's again yesterday and there were still distressingly few Valentines.[;-).

I thought Barr's book was pretty good (2nd hand Amazons are a godsend!), I got one by Latimer and recently the abridged version of Hinsley's history of Intelligence - a bit vapid sadly. I've been tempted by Douglas Porch's book but I gather that he is a bit Corelli Barnett, hmmm. Keith-264 (talk) 08:49, 27 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I dont recall seeing much in the texts about the close support tanks - what i do know of them is from the Combat Mission games lol - the 2 pounder stripped out and a 3inch howizter installed instead capable of firing smoke rounds but in the early years unable to fire HE - never figures that one out myself.
 * As for the truck fleet, i think there are few other factors to be looked out. Since the start of the desert war the British had taken great mesaures to increase the docking facilties along the Suez canal and in the Red Sea area. They had also extended the rail network and brought in thousands of rear area personnel. (see Playfair, Official History, Volume I for more exact details) I believe they also increased the capacity to transfer oil etc from the ME to Egypt. I believe Barr, early on in his book, makes the point that a bit of an industry base had also popped up in Egypt.
 * So i dont think it was as simple as increasing the truck fleet but increasing the ability to supply, refit etc
 * What i have noticed is that the Allied force had the ability to rather reequip itself very quickly even during the beginning stages. i.e. stripped of equipment and men the Western Desert Force was drove back by Rommel losing allot of what little they had, leaving more men and equipment in Tobruk and a scratch force on the border. This scratch force was quickly rebuilt for Battleaxe - rebuilt for Crusader, rebuilt for Gazala and El Alamein etc--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:35, 27 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Ah, smoke only. Would this be like the 95mm gun (On the Centaur?) that also only had smoke, due to its hopeless inaccuracy? No wonder they don't get much press. The infrastructure in the ME does seem to reflect a fundamental decision about priorities. We hear a lot about the desert war being a bargain for Hitler - an armoured corps and some aircraft keep the British busy for 2 1/2 years in a sideshow but if the supply foundations took a long time to build (Singapore in the ME) the to and fro war may have suited British strategic concerns as much as the Germans. The speed of rebuilding does look crucial doesn't it? The most important part of this of course is the delivery of Valentines because they look like KV1's [;-). Both sides manage to keep defeating the other in detail until the German-Italians get isolated from Europe by a blockade that the Germans never managed to bring off against Britain.Keith-264 (talk) 15:21, 27 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I believe that is correct - a 95mm gun. Although its actual combat preformance i have no idea about. They also put that in the bow of the Churchill mk I if memory serves. Although i believe the latter models of the churchills there was some close support versions with a simlar calibre sized gun alas again no ideas of there combat preformance.
 * When talking of priorities you can see how the British government viewed the med basin as being at the top of the priority list. The second our island is secure they have troops by the thousands being shipped out (not all front line infantry though) – including dominion troops who had been shipped to the UK when the Red Sea was closed. Shipments of tanks, AA guns, artillery etc are increased. They set up the air route from west to east Africa and in certain operations they appear to be willing to endanger the Royal Navy to get the job done – the Tiger Convoy, Tobruk along with the more obvious Crete/Greece evacuation jobs.
 * As you said though, it seems the Germans regarded it as only a sideshow although Rommel dreamed of grandeur and the capture of the oil fields of the Middle East.
 * As for the Valentine I always thought they looked “cooler” than the Matildas but I have to admit ever since I was a kid the Crusader as been the tank, which has been the iconic item of the Desert War. It’s a shame they didn’t slap a 6 pounder of them sooner.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:09, 27 October 2008 (UTC)

As a lad I rather fancied the Crusader, particularly the little machine gun turret. As I got older I found that the Valentine's staying power and pugnacious profile more attractive. I'm not quite certain about the 'strategic diversion' for Hitler because apparently the unloading capacity of African ports limited the flow of material from Germany and Italy more than a desire to limit the German commitment. That would help explain the increase in the commitment after Torch began rather than the tired cliche that Hitler kept reinforcing failure. Keith-264 (talk) 16:59, 27 October 2008 (UTC)
 * You have to admit it does look like he was reinforcing failure - what logical reason can be used to jusitfy flooding in troops to a doomed theatre of war?
 * I feel that the Valentine imo is a bit of an overlooked tank - sure it gets a mention but it does seem to be in the shadow of the medium tanks and the Matildas.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 08:35, 28 October 2008 (UTC)

I think that Germany was playing for time after the Stalingrad debacle. It would make sense to delay the inevitable in Africa rather than abandoning it and trying to defend southern Europe on the north shore. It occurred to me earlier that the diversion of troops to Greece in 1941 (which seems so wrong headed) may seem less so as an anti-Soviet rather than an anti-German move.Keith-264 (talk) 17:08, 28 October 2008 (UTC)
 * One would think that the troops diverted to Tunsia could have been better employed in a defensive role in Italy/Greece - the two logical next points of attack. You never know, they may have been enough to serious hamper the invasion.
 * Diversion to Greece, you referring to the British involvment?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:59, 28 October 2008 (UTC) YesKeith-264 (talk) 19:08, 28 October 2008 (UTC)

Civility
Some of what you recently wrote on the talk page of Talk:Middle East Theatre of World War II is a clear breach of WP:CIVIL. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 09:08, 25 October 2008 (UTC)
 * When you ignore all logic (i.e. yourself and one other person who made a breif comment then disappeared is not complete support to revert months of work), ignore all reason (i made several strong points which you have blaently ignored) and ignore the facts (i.e. all the people who supported the creation of a new article) you are indeed being an ass.
 * I think you should go and read Ownership of articles, Consensus - i.e. the past concsensus reached regarding the creation of a new level article has not been supassed - all you have done is raise objection to the decission reached and have not gathered enough support to revert the decission made - you could also be clearly in breech of Do not create hoaxes -what West African Campaign? what Middle East Campaign?
 * If anything i have been working off Be bold - i saw three articles covering the same theatre - which mulptiple sources call one theatre (even if they do have mulpitple names for it) which could be merged into one article for simplicity sake - i gathered consensus and then started the process. You come along months later and decide because you do not agree it should all be reverted.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:35, 25 October 2008 (UTC)

The reason for Civility is to aid in consensus building do you really think that statements such as "you are indeed being an ass." is likely to persuade me that you point of view is the correct one or is it more likely to make me oppose you because I feel slighted? You need to assume good faith because like civility it helps to build consensus editing. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 22:44, 26 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Telling you that you are acting like an ass is not in any way shape or form attempting to pursade you to do anything. Stop trying to martyr yourself. It was a statement made regarding your attitute - as stated above basically ignoring anything which doesnt go your way. While you keep falling back on wiki policy it should be noted that according to the policy i havent actually breeched it : "Editors are human, capable of mistakes, so a few, minor, isolated incidents of incivility are not in themselves a concern."
 * Now talking of "consensus building" - need i remind you yet again that all actions taken thus far have been made with the consensus of the community (i.e. the creation of one article to cover the entire Med/ME theatre), which you come along about a month or so after it has all happened and decide you dont like what has happened and you plan on reverting it all - when you gained no consensus what so ever. Attempts to invole the wider community - considering they dont all sit looking at paticular userpages or article talk pages all day long - you have been rather opposed to.
 * I think you should ought to assume good faith too, and stop attempting to block all progress being made by popping up weeks/months down the line of events happening and reverting those decissions or threating to revert them.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 01:48, 27 October 2008 (UTC)

India in World War II
I hope you don't mind but I've moved your post and ensuing discussion to the Talk:British Raj page-section. It is more relevant there. Regards, Fowler&amp;fowler  «Talk»  20:57, 29 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Sure thing :) --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:39, 29 October 2008 (UTC)

Dilemmas of the Desert War
Dilemmas of the Desert War: The Libyan Campaign of 1940-1942 by Michael Carver.

A careful study of the 8th Army and the battle of Gazala with a brief description of the Desert War up to the battle and its consequences at Mersa Matruh and Alamein.

Carver demonstrates the value of an education in written English in this monograph as he elegantly anatomises the command of the 8th Army. He rehabilitates Ritchie as a maligned and scapegoated figure who was much more than the cipher of much post-war writing which blamed Ritchie for decisions taken by the Auk. It seems that he was badly let down by Auchinleck who allowed false claims about Ritchie to go uncorrected. Much of the criticism was that Ritchie was inexperienced in field command (true) and that he was a mere post box for Auchinleck (untrue). Carver states that the worst mistake Ritchie made was in loyally carrying out Auk's order countermanding his order to evacuate Benghazi (after Rommel repulsed the covering forces near El Agheila in early 1942). From then on Ritchie had a burden of distrust which rightly belonged to the Auk from the divisional Generals involved like Tuker (Indian 4th Infantry Div). Some of them later felt that this was the start of the corrosive loss of confidence in command arrangements which did much to reduce the effectiveness of 8th Army at Gazala and beyond.

As far as Gazala is concerned your intrepid reader formed the impression that it was remarkably similar to Crusader and that in the end, it was (like Crusader) the side which attacked first which succeeded by forcing the defender to fight at an initial disadvantage when the deciding damage was done to its fighting power.

Carver shows with signals from Auk, Ritchie and others that at the crucial time when Rommel was regrouping east of the minefields and sending transport back through them for supplies, the British thought that this movement was a pell-mell retreat and put their energies into plans for a 'left hook' through the desert to cut Rommel off. This misunderstanding deprived the British commanders of the incentive to attack the Afrika Korps when it was crippled by fuel shortage since their plans were much more ambitious. None of this was helped by sandstorms which hampered British air reconnaissance at what turned out to be crucial moments.

Both sides benefitted from signals intelligence but this didn't always reveal enemy intentions and at times allowed mistaken impressions to flourish. Carver explains that although many records were lost in the chaos and others weren't kept (unit signals logs etc) it is possible to construct a narrative with the remainder which in his view is far more critical of Auchinleck and Norrie (XXX Corps commander) than Ritchie.

Some of the details that emerge are consistent with the 'apres-post-revisionist' view of the British army in WWII, such as that the inferiority of British tank armament is exaggerated. The 2pdr gun was superior to the short 50mm and 75mm guns carried by Pz III and IV. Carver points out that there were few MkIII/IV Specials in the desert at the time and a considerable number of Grants and the first 6pdr anti-tank guns. Even with extra armour on German tanks the 2pdr was effective at up to 1000yds. It was the long 50mm anti tank gun and the few 88mm that did most damage to British tanks. Chronic dispersion is put into context - it was the dispersal of armoured regiments relative to each other that was faulty far more than armoured brigades being separated.

Carver makes a compelling claim that it was the vulnerability of infantry divisions on terrain where they needed pneumatic machinery (which was in short supply) to dig in and which was pointless if it couldn't be done all-round being the greater dilemma in deciding 8th Army dispositions. Clearly the clever answer was to attack, which would make defences superfluous and this was Rommel's main advantage. Because he struck first the British were always looking over their shoulder and trying to anticipate threats to the great supply dump they had built at the railhead outside Tobruk. For much of the Battle he made as many mistakes as the British who could have finished him off several times but for bad luck and unfortunate coincidences. As mentioned above, the British had benefitted from this in Operation Crusader since it had begun with the British seizing the initiative which forced these pressures on Rommel.

Since Carver was there he ventures several judgements which make interesting reading - He found the Corps Commander Norrie a consummate diplomat, popular with others but indecisive and tending to wait for Gott to tell him what to think. He found Gott to be an inspiration but so exhausted by the time he was appointed to command 8th Army that his death was a stroke of luck. Monty makes his entrance after Alam Halfa (more by coup d'etat than bureaucratic ritual) and purges the higher commanders much to Carver's satisfaction. The ability of Rommel with about 25 tanks and 2,500 men to rout the 8th Army from Mersa Matruh was a disgrace rather than a defeat and by then Ritchie had been sacked so was beyond blame.

He is rather waspish about Pienaar, commander of 1st South African Div, all but accusing him of shirking his duty and leaving 8th Army in the lurch several times. It makes a refreshing change for an Englishman to read of Dominion troops being criticised as feeble buck passers.

On the controversy over who made the decisions which led to the defeat of Rommel at Alamein Carver finds in favour of Monty for realising that by bringing up infantry from the Delta a continuous front could be manned. Auchinleck's plan was for infantry to be held in positions along the coast with armoured forces in between, similar to Gazala during the battle there.

Any good?
 * It sure sounds it! Some intresting points have been raised there indeed.
 * Although i have the thought in the back of my head that, am sure, he made a few dodgy comments about the 1944 campaign - is he doing the same here? When reading the book did you feel he was being as honest as possible and not basing his anyalis on bais?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:30, 30 October 2008 (UTC)

He was there so his judgements of people have to be taken like chips (with a pinch of salt) but his analysis seems based on an accumulation of mundane details which I find more convincing than intellectual pyrotechnics these days.Keith-264 (talk) 13:20, 30 October 2008 (UTC)

WWII tag
ooohh I see, sorry about that. Do you want me to remove the tags from those articles? Noneforall (talk) 21:21, 3 November 2008 (UTC)


 * No worries. If you could replace them with the portal link that would be great. Ive done so for a couple of the articles that i watch over but not the rest of them.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:22, 3 November 2008 (UTC)

Stuff
Congrats on the FA - I've been on a week's holiday, so inactive, but I kept an eye on things. Excellent :) I've also added Operation Brevity to my pending pile, though I'm not sure when I'll get to it. Best regards, EyeSerene talk 09:59, 4 November 2008 (UTC)

PS I always preferred the Matilda II, although the Churchill comes a close second (as a kid I was fascinated by Hobart's 'Funnies'). For 'right time, right place' design though, I think the Firefly takes my award ;)


 * Cheers, it was a great effort by all! Thanks also for taking a look at Brevity, ive put it through a few peer reviews and 1 FAC review and strived to make all the changes suggested but the article needs a new set of eyes to give a bit of a going over.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:41, 4 November 2008 (UTC)

Villers Bocage
I've been having a look at the Villers Bocage page. I've been having second thoughts about the 'defeat' of 7th AmdDiv. Is the withdrawal to the Brigade Box a sign of defeat or tactical skill? We didn't call the withdrawal from Hill 112 or Gavrus a defeat for VIII Corps, more a sensible preparation for the expected German riposte which was duly seen off. The fight at the Brigade Box now looks to me to be similar to the defence of the Rauray Spur, retention of Baron, Grainville etc and lots of other cases. Could the conventional popular view be a matter of the 'withdrawal=defeat' school rather than a stand being made on ground of the defender's choosing?Keith-264 (talk) 15:08, 7 November 2008 (UTC)

PS I've decided to plunge on Ellis' Official History so I may have more to add when it arrives.Keith-264 (talk) 15:08, 7 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Well i was facing allot of resistance when editing that article and it is one i need to go back to - now armed with even more sources and get it up to scratch.
 * I think it was Buckly who stated that the Allied command was being over optimistic that a single brigade group could achieve anything spectacular - but i do think they could have won the battle at Villers-Bocage; it was just touch and go and the Germans got the better of it. Perhaps the decision to withdraw was hasty; as far as i can remember there was an extra battalion and armoured regt which could have been pushed in while a 3rd battalion and armoured regt was further back guarding the lines of communication - i understand they couldn’t be pushed in. The talk of throwing in the 50th Divisions uncommitted infantry brigade seems to be not looking at the facts - it took a more mobile force quite some time to advance on there overnight position and then push onto the town - could these 3 battalions be pushed down that route that day and be committed decisively to battle?
 * When asking that question - if there wasnt the chance to reinforce the battle that day - and then pondering weather commiting another battalion and tank battalion would not been decisive then yes i think the decission to pull back was correct and at that point the comparison to the decission during Epsom does become apparant. The brigade group kicked the fucking shit out of the attacking force the next day but alas that is always overlooked.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:55, 7 November 2008 (UTC)
 * PS: Regarding Ellis's book - there is a number of critasims of his work and it has been labeled the worst of the British official histories - i love the ones by Playfair and his doesnt seem to stand up to that quality.
 * He avoids any sort of discussion on the controversy surrounding the campaign and does tone down the critaism of allied forces for an example - he states the brigade group had no chance of suceeding when 2nd Panzer showed up on the scene while Reynold states this is an excuse and 2nd Panzer didnt play such a big role (iirc).
 * To sum really, a good book giving great insight into the campaign and its been used allot by other sources over the years - but obviosuly not perfect.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:59, 7 November 2008 (UTC)
 * Hmmm, let me guess, there is a big investment in the 'Monty/2nd Army/7th ArmdDiv were a load of rubbish and Wittmann had a big knob' school. [;-)

I've seen some criticism of Ellis but it's on grounds that I don't mind, what I want is a good chronology, particularly the minor operations so if he doesn't get his hands dirty over controversy that's ok, there's plenty of others who do. The advance of part of the 7th strikes me as a small version of Epsom (like a Worthington Force that went right) - using the same method of short-range manoeuvres intended to flush out the German counter-attack. Anyway, we'll see.Keith-264 (talk) 18:36, 7 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Having had another look at 'Goodwood' I notice that it is described as being reduced in importance relative to Atlantic (before it began). Doesn't this clinch the matter of Goodwood's intent? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Keith-264 (talk • contribs) 18:36, 8 November 2008 (UTC)


 * When you even look at the original idea: a strike towards Falaise by 7th Armour and the 11th Armour supporting its right flank; then compare that to the revised plan; 11th armour capturing Bourgoubus and 7th armour covering its flank.
 * One notices the original plan looked for a bold strike south while the revised plan is having a sweeping attack around Caen - how is that a breakout? Add on to that, as you have commented that Atlantic was given the main role of the operaiton how is Goodwood some breakout attempt?

Given the difficult terrain east of Caen and what we know about Ultra, the British infantry shortage affecting Dempsey and Monty's calculations and his emphasis on 'balance', wouldn't a collapse of the German defence have been highly embarassing for Monty, considering that the numbers game meant that the US preponderance was needed for the breakout? One of the criticisms of Allied troops was lack of enterprise yet if my thinking about attrition has any merit there would always be a terrain feature in front of advancing troops which it would be desirable to take but which would be hard to hold. The more I look at the operations in Normandy the more impressed I am of the desire as well as the need to conserve men. I would have loved to be a fly on the wall when Tedder realised he'd been had.Keith-264 (talk) 21:00, 8 November 2008 (UTC)


 * I believe i read one historian/writer state the campaign in Italy was a series of battles to capture one hill only to find there to be another more dominating one beyond which would then have to be captured. When you look at the Normandy fighting this always reflects in the operations - to take Caen the D-Day force need to take some small ridge to be able to advance; in later operations it was a series of highground and villages etc before able to attack Caen proper.
 * I have pondered what some sort of collospe or an attack as SHAEF visioned it; i.e. Second Army making the dash for Paris or brakeout, would effect the campaign - wouldnt this be if you will a massive version of Epsom with 2nd Army playing VIII Corps but starting head of "XXX Corps" - the Americans. Wouldnt the British exposed flank have a serious effect on operations? then of course there would be no Brittany ports being invested or captured, a bunch of troops would be missing meaning there would be no activation of 1st Canadian Army - who would nab the Channel Ports? Then of course what about the Battleplan of the encirclement of German forces, with the Americans lagging behind due to braking out later or still being held up by German forces - the main body could escape surely not?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:16, 8 November 2008 (UTC)

It could have been as helpful as the Ardennes Offensive turned out for Hitler.Keith-264 (talk) 21:57, 8 November 2008 (UTC)

Oh no, I've been thinking again. Does Operation Lightfoot have a suspicious resemblance to Totalise?Keith-264 (talk) 09:29, 10 November 2008 (UTC)


 * You mean the night attack? A lot of attacks during the first and second battle of el alamien where launched with night attacks due the lack of cover - most of which in the first battle iirc went tits up when daylight arrvied due to poor tank co-operation. Although i dont really know the speifics of Lightfoot off my heart to provide a discussion to your question. Why do you think they are simlar?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:35, 10 November 2008 (UTC)
 * Superficially they appear similar - using night for cover to get through man-made obstacles beng used to enhance the defensive potential of the terrain, being ready(!) by morning to take the German counter-attack to the cleaners, air operations in support...I wonder if some of the differences are those allowed by different circumstances - half-tracks for infantry and the Kangaroos etc. As for the traffic jams in the minefields, that's pure Goodwood!Keith-264 (talk) 13:25, 10 November 2008 (UTC)
 * I got vol 1 of the Official History delivered a couple of days ago. The lack of footnoting is a drag and there wasn't as much as I'd hoped on the lesser operations; our tendency to periodise events as 'Operation Epsom' etc perhaps needs to be seen as artificial. The narrative seems ok except that there is clearly an awareness of controversy. I'm pleased that Tedder gets it in the neck though. The maps are really good - relief maps explain so much more than diagrammatic ones.Keith-264 (talk) 13:06, 14 November 2008 (UTC)


 * The lack of footnotes is a recurring item in all of the British series. A couple of other points, ive been told in no nice words that Ellis messed up the Canadian casuatly figures for the Canadians at Juno and from my own experiance he has gave a rather ambigious figure for the 1st Airborne losses at Arnhem.
 * Another intresting note, Ellis calls Operation Martlet - Operation Dauntless; a title i have seen a few other works have used but the vast majority of works use the former. That one is realy confusing for me - how can a bunch of historians discuss the same operation and come out with two names and no one seems to explain where the discripency arises from.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:33, 14 November 2008 (UTC)

Goodwood
Thanks babe, I do get a bit English about such things.Keith-264 (talk) 21:08, 14 November 2008 (UTC)
 * Sorry for the delay. Nope, the ref is certainly misplaced there, no mention of Dempsey at all on that page. All the best, --Eurocopter (talk) 17:02, 15 November 2008 (UTC)

Tanks for the memories
You could stop posting everywhere that this a "World War Two Tank" and state more correctly that is a "Seocnd World War British Churchill Infantry Tank"; its more descriptive, lets people know the name of the tank, which country it came from etc.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 01:11, 9 November 2008 (UTC)

Err - thanks for the rather terse message. No. --Tufacave (talk) 01:15, 9 November 2008 (UTC)


 * well ive had enough of writing big essays this week for class so being brief and to the point is more easier on my now frazzeled mind :)--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 01:19, 9 November 2008 (UTC)

Pomegranate and Greenline
Nice to see something of them in the Goodwood artice. Is the reference in [to] Daglish's book about Goodwood?Keith-264 (talk) 15:17, 16 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Yea there isnt allot about these two operations and Reynold thinks, or at least thought, they were both one and the same operation entitled Greenline. Strange.
 * You have confused me though regarding what you mean about Daglish's book - which referance?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:34, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

The reference given on the page leads to Daglish but not which book. Is it from the one he did about Goodwood?Keith-264 (talk) 15:54, 16 November 2008 (UTC) PS you might like this http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/results.php?CISOOP1=any&CISOFIELD1=CISOSEARCHALL&CISOROOT=/p4013coll2&CISOBOX1=isolating There's a good essay about 50th Infantry Div at the top of the pageKeith-264 (talk) 16:34, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

Perch
I've been looking at the description of the battle of the Brigade Box. Is it me or is there a distinct resemblance to the course of Epsom? The furthest penetration is the point of greatest confrontation with the German reply, the British withdraw after a hard fight (eg pt112) to ground with good defensive features then proceed to swamp the German attack with firepower. Same as with Goodwood and Bluecoat. Could it be that in the circumstances of Normandy, an army equipped and organised like the Anglo-Canadians would tend to obtain these results against a German army equipped and organised the way it was - as long as the British kept to the practice of moving short distances to capture ground the Germans couldn't afford to concede in order to compel them to commit forces they couldn't afford to lose? On the other hand could it be that there was a tactical culminating point at 2-3 days when the advantages of superior firepower waned (German reinforcements arrived, the air force was grounded by poor weather, flanking fire got heavier...) so it made sense to consolidate and take any German counter-attack to the cleaners? Doesn't this model go back to mid-late 1918 with Foch's series of attacks dispersed along the line.Keith-264 (talk) 00:30, 17 November 2008 (UTC)

Not Vandalism
You have called me a vandal, so let me explain something- German losses in the battle of El Alamein stand at 34,000 killed, wounded, or captured, while Italian losses stand at 25,000 killed, wounded, or captured. I got this from two sources- a guide to World War II, part of a series, and an encyclopedia, meaning that total Axis casualties amount to 59,000 killed, wounded, or captured. Reenem (user talk:Reenem) 25 November 2008

El Agheila
Was this the main base of the Axis forces in the Western Desert? If so doesn't it's capture or arrival of British forces there equate to the Axis reaching El Alamein?Keith-264 (talk) 10:44, 26 November 2008 (UTC)

The axis main base as far as ive always understood it was Tripolii - i see El Agheila as more of a staging area; although this impression may be wrong. But yea i think you could sort of relate the two - isnt the El Agheila area a bit of a bottleneck just like El Alamein?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:06, 26 November 2008 (UTC)
 * I was thinking of the 'narrative' of constant defeat until Monty arrived on the scene. If El Alamein-the Delta and El Agheila-Tripoli are equivalent then the desert war before 8th army's final advance was evenly balanced rather than a desperate struggle by the British.Keith-264 (talk) 13:12, 26 November 2008 (UTC)

MECOM
Hi man, you look like you have some good references for this. Would you mind placing one or two smack bang in the middle of the unref'd section so that we can remove that tag? Best regards from Shrivenham, Buckshot06(prof) 17:33, 30 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Dont worry, i will be getting around to it - athough i dont have the portion of the series, which covers the fighting in the Axis held islands in the last part of that section - but probably not all of it today.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:52, 30 November 2008 (UTC)

Question
I noticed you know quite a bit of military history, so let me ask you this, how can you edit the campaignbox, which displays the major battles in an article? Best regards-(User:Reenem)

Operation Cobra
Hi, i've just overhauled this article but as my sources are quite limited few sectors are incompletely covered. Check-out my edits in the main article and notes left on the talk page. Cheers, --Eurocopter (talk) 17:15, 1 December 2008 (UTC)


 * Cheers, but i'm not sure how to proceed now. I've taken this image from this site (http://montormel.evl.pl/?id=64) which states the image is from US National Archives. --Eurocopter (talk) 15:35, 15 January 2009 (UTC)


 * Hmm, searched through that site and couldn't find anything. Do we have any other possibility? --Eurocopter (talk) 21:58, 15 January 2009 (UTC)


 * Yes, hope that would do. --Eurocopter (talk) 15:23, 16 January 2009 (UTC)

Redirect
It's tagged because it shows up as a redirect from another page. (That one's a capitalization change, IIRC.) Use "view article" from here & you'll see what I mean. TREKphiler  hit me ♠  20:59, 4 December 2008 (UTC)

My mistakere. Kingcol and the Arab Legion
It was not Kingcol, the flying column, but Habforce, the main force from Palestine that had elements of the Arab Legion included. The Arab Legion was an Arab manned force commanded by British officers. It was nominally under the control of the Emir of Transjordan which was part of the British Mandate of Palestine. Dabbler (talk) 12:21, 12 December 2008 (UTC)
 * I have added a reference to a small 1972 Osprey book on the Arab Legion, it is not a weighty tome but it contains a good description of the Arab Legion and details of its participation in the Anglo-Iraqi war and also can be googled on Google Books. Dabbler (talk) 15:43, 12 December 2008 (UTC)

Brevity
Thanks for your note - I was incommunicado over Christmas, but I'll get back on it. Only really the lead left to do, although I'm forever tweaking stuff when I re-read it ;) EyeSerene talk 18:47, 5 January 2009 (UTC)


 * OK, I think that's everything. Sorry about the wait ;) EyeSerene talk 14:35, 8 January 2009 (UTC)


 * I don't see why not; I believe it's as good as any other FA candidates I've had the pleasure of working on. It's on my watchlist anyway, so I'll certainly be glad to help respond to reviewer concerns. EyeSerene talk 14:57, 8 January 2009 (UTC)


 * All the best with the nom ;) EyeSerene talk 15:00, 8 January 2009 (UTC)


 * Noted and watchlisted. EyeSerene talk 17:30, 8 January 2009 (UTC)

AHF
Looks like I was wrong about there being room there for all of us. [;-)Keith-264 (talk) 22:38, 5 January 2009 (UTC) Eh? lol :) --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 01:43, 6 January 2009 (UTC)
 * Mysteriously, I can't get on to the A History Forum in my guise as 'Attrition'. Something I said?[;-)Keith-264 (talk) 08:13, 6 January 2009 (UTC)
 * Dunno, ive been having problems accessing the site for past 24 hours.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:23, 6 January 2009 (UTC)

Re: SVGs
Just download Inkscape and use it to create them. It is fairly easy if you have a knack for graphical suites. Just import or paste the image into a new file in Inkscape and start tracing out the details with the Node tool (freehand or bezier, I prefer the latter). There are other details to getting an acceptable SVG out the door but the basics is what I have stated. Jappalang (talk) 13:45, 9 January 2009 (UTC)
 * Can the sources you use for File:Operation Brevity.jpg be used for File:BattleaxeContestedArea.JPG? I see no point for Pt. 206 and 208 (they are not mentioned in the article), and the towns can be easily sourced with Google Maps (except perhaps for some of the "Sidis").  The crucial ones are the locations of Fort Capuzzo, border line, and the wire.  Jappalang (talk) 13:49, 9 January 2009 (UTC)
 * Found Tobruk 1941, which should be broad enough for the border and towns. I have to remove the frontier wire and a southern town but I doubt they are going to detract from the purpose of the map.  File:BattleaxeContestedArea.svg is now in use.  Jappalang (talk) 14:20, 9 January 2009 (UTC)


 * Thanks allot! Ill sort out the other one later with a bit of luck.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:53, 9 January 2009 (UTC)

EgnimaMcmxc, you are not to just paste the jpg into the program and save it as an SVG. The files created by Inkscape are simply scripts; they contain co-ordinates and script-functions. They cannot contain the data format of JPGs, GIFS, etc; they just contain a local link to the file (i.e. as a path). What I do is: I can render an SVG of File:Operation Brevity.jpg for you, but I need some time as I am currently busy with some stuff and my kid. Jappalang (talk) 14:05, 10 January 2009 (UTC)
 * 1) Create new document in Inkscape
 * 2) Import in the image
 * 3) Create layers and such; draw on these layers the SVG nodes to form the vector lines
 * In other words, I am retracing the image details with the SVG tools
 * 1) After all details have been traced over and colors filled in, delete the imported image
 * 2) Create a frame (some prefer the box tool, I have other methods) that contains what you want the SVG to display and select it
 * 3) File -> Document Properties -> uncheck "Show page border", and click "Fit page to selection"
 * 4) Save
 * 5) Upload to Commons
 * I uploaded the SVG of this image. Have a look.  Jappalang (talk) 04:15, 12 January 2009 (UTC)
 * I think it depends on how you look at what "from scratch" means. As above, I just pasted the image as a base layer, then traced all the details.  It is not an original work per se.  Glad to hear you like it.  Jappalang (talk) 09:33, 12 January 2009 (UTC)

If you could upload the scan and message me the link to have a look (as well as giving its page number in Jentz'), I can use it to vouch for Paterson's and fill in the details for the overall map. Jappalang (talk) 09:39, 12 January 2009 (UTC)

Middle East AFD
Hi mate, the AFD closed as merge. Dunno if you knew, but it was a bit of a close run thing there at one point. Anyway, as you seem to know most about the subject I think you should perform the merge. Obviously don't merge in the duplicated content, even if that means merging nothing at all. :) Ryan 4314   (talk) 00:54, 11 January 2009 (UTC)

Re Epsom
Made a few tweaks - hope they're ok (mainly avoiding repetition of "secure" and attributing the 'considered' bit. This is actually really serendipitous, as it explains something that was bothering me on the Cobra article ;) EyeSerene talk 20:40, 15 January 2009 (UTC)

The capture of Caen, while "ambitious", has been described by historian L F Ellis as the most important D-Day objective assigned to Lieutenant-General Crockers's I Corps. Operation Overlord called for Second Army to secure the city and then form a front line from Caumont-l'Éventé to the south-east of Caen, in order to acquire airfields and protect the left flank of the United States First Army while it moved on Cherbourg. Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give Second Army a suitable staging area for a push south to capture Falaise, which could itself be used as the pivot for a swing right to advance on Argentan and then towards the Touques River.
 * Footnotes


 * Citations

Navboxes
Help yourself. I'm not going to pretend the markup's neat or logical though ;) EyeSerene talk 21:34, 15 January 2009 (UTC)

Playfair Histories
I see you've been busy formatting Vols I and 2 in the References sections of most of the 1940-1 articles - Bravo. Unfortunately you've changed the isbn #s. If you try to follow the new ISBN numbers to the search page at World Cat you get the message "The page you tried was not found. You may have used an outdated link or may have typed the address (URL) incorrectly." My N&M editions of Playfair 1 & 2 have ISBNs 1-845740-65-3 and 1-845740-66-1 - these numbers are recognised by World Cat and come up with the correct books. Stephen Kirragetalk - contribs 21:42, 15 January 2009 (UTC)


 * Thanks for your response. I hate to say this....but there's another thing. I see that occasionally you've put in a CBE (for Toomer and Gleave I notice). The convention is that no honours and awards should be in book reference. I've seen arguments against titles as well (General etc) but I think here the context demands the inclusion of military ranks. However the CBE should go. (I'm interested though that since you put in Toomer's CBE, why not his CB & DFC and indeed Playfair's CB, DSO & MC?). Regards Stephen Kirragetalk - contribs 00:07, 16 January 2009 (UTC)


 * Excellent!....although I have to say that if we're going to leave the ranks in then we have to retain the RN for the navy captains to avoid confusion. Good luck with the manflu, I had it last week. Stephen Kirragetalk - contribs 14:29, 16 January 2009 (UTC)


 * I don't think so. The RN is only there to distinguish between army captains (=junior officer) and navy captains (=senior officer). RA etc adds nothing because the army rank is inferred. But RM.....? Actually Royal Marine ranks are exact equivalents to the army so prob not needed. Stephen Kirragetalk - contribs 15:43, 16 January 2009 (UTC)


 * So you'd only put RN in for a captain but not any other rank which is unique to the navy. Stephen Kirragetalk - contribs 15:44, 16 January 2009 (UTC)

Falaise pocket
Hi there, i've just overhauled this article and copied it from my sandbox today. Of course DMorpheus helped me with a copyedit tag almost instantly. Maybe you could have a look and see if you can help me with any corrections. Cheers, --Eurocopter (talk) 15:47, 16 January 2009 (UTC)


 * Seems ok, go ahead and post it. Thanks, --Eurocopter (talk) 16:34, 16 January 2009 (UTC)

Re: Brevity
Hi, unfortunately, he is rather busy, and said that it might take a few days for him to have a look. We could go with what Awadewit said, i.e. use commons:Template:PD-reason before then, I think. Jappalang (talk) 03:27, 20 January 2009 (UTC)

RE: Normandy Team
Don't count your eggs just yet. we've still got quite a bit of work to do. Operation Charnwood, the invasion beach articles, and the overall Battle of Normandy page are nowhere close to being complete. That said, with enough work on them, I think that we could possibly have a Featured Topic Drive ready by the time April or May rolls around. Cam (Chat) 20:00, 21 January 2009 (UTC)

RE:Goodwood
''It was a bomb carpet... The Germans had cowered in their tanks and slit trenches as the inferno burst around them - there were many casualties, but many survived too. It was an echo of the monstrous bombardments on the Western Front nearly thirty years before, and again the Allies had expected too much. The Germans began to crawl out of the ground to take up stations on the guns that remained.'' Best, --Eurocopter (talk) 13:05, 26 January 2009 (UTC)

Re Brevity etc
Thank you very much, and congratulations on the FA! As always, it's been a pleasure working with you. EyeSerene talk 08:21, 28 January 2009 (UTC)

Operation Perch
Why was the 'failure to take Caen early in the campaign' a failure? If Monty was playing an attritional game in the east end the placing of the front line was of less importance than the cost of moving it. The size of the bridgehead is a bit of a red herring since the Allies could keep the surplus in England. Airfields for the Air Force barons were low on Monty's shopping list, rightly as it turned out.Keith-264 (talk) 19:47, 1 February 2009 (UTC)
 * I agree i dont believe it was a failure - it was an operational failure as in it didnt achieve the capture of Caen etc but a complete and utter strategic victory.* Am working my way through the article, am aiming to finishing off fleshing out the opening moves section and within the next few days sort out the rest of the article.
 * I believe there is enough material here to provide aperspective which doesnt paint the entire operation as a failure, but to keep it balanced i do have a copy of D'Este (loaned) to throw in the British were shite as usual bit :)
 * for example the Panzer Lehr lost over 100 vehicles en route to the area, the 101st SS Heavy Panzer lost a bunch of Tigers from two companies etc--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:24, 1 February 2009 (UTC)
 * Well said that man[;-). Wasn't it around that time when PzLehr wrote a sniffy report about British soldiers being a bit rubbish after mysteriously giving the Germans a drubbing?Keith-264 (talk) 08:34, 2 February 2009 (UTC)
 * I'm sure I read somewhere that PzLehr's losses were around 1800 vehicles (including 'soft' ones). I like the job you're doing on the article though ;) EyeSerene talk 10:18, 3 February 2009 (UTC)
 * Oops, I meant 180! Just checked Hastings which was where I thought I'd read it; he claims that by 9 June, Pz Lehr had lost 130 trucks, five tanks and 84 other armoured vehicles (inc. assault guns) to allied air attack during the division's 90-mile drive from Chartres to take up its positions in front of Caen (of a total of 3000 vehicles, all types)... so I was still wrong :P EyeSerene talk 18:13, 3 February 2009 (UTC)

Perch
Had a look through my sources, sadly, no figures for Perch.Keith-264 (talk) 17:33, 4 February 2009 (UTC)

Normandy
Thanks, I do have more info, see User:Jackyd101/Workbox7 for all British and Commonwealth battle honours issued for the campaign up to the end of the Battle of Falaise. I've had a lot of difficulty identifying which of the various British offensives during ther period each action was part of (the British honours system recognises only the broader campaigns of: Normandy Landings, Breakout, Odon, Caen, Verrieres Ridge, Mont Pincon and the Falaise Gap, not the individual operations that made up each campaign. Perhaps you can help match the dates and places to the operations?--Jackyd101 (talk) 21:51, 11 February 2009 (UTC)


 * Hi there, would you mind having a look over Hill 262 for a slight copyedit (especially within the lead), as i've finished overhauling it and willing to put it under ACR as soon as possible. It shouldn't be such a big deal given that it's a quite short article. Cheers, --Eurocopter (talk) 18:04, 16 February 2009 (UTC)


 * I've just created Operation Cobra order of battle due to a request at the FAC. Would you mind compare it with your sources and see what units are missing (my source would be Hastings, but there are differences between the total number of divs. stated in the infobox and the order of battle). Any comments within the FAC would also be appreciated, considering comments of a good faith editor well-known by us... Cheers, --Eurocopter (talk) 17:00, 18 February 2009 (UTC)

Heer Infantry Template
To my knowledge yes. The most well known was probaly "Infanterie-Division Großdeutschland". A number of named divisions were founded late in the war and sometimes came from the RAD. MisterBee1966 (talk) 10:28, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

Cobra FAC
Hi there, a little help with the image issues within Cobra's FAC would be more than welcome, as i'm not sure what to do with them (especially those from National Archives - I just searched them and no such images found within them). Just have a look and see if you can do something when you have some time. Cheers, --Eurocopter (talk) 13:26, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

SS Divisions
Waffe means weapon. I think we should take this up with User:Jim Sweeney he has more insight into how and what the divisions actually did. It ws his suggestion to have a section label Waffen divisions. MisterBee1966 (talk) 13:33, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

SS DIVISIONS
Hi

See MisterBee1966 we were talking about this when you posted on my page. Th Order of Battle for Panzer Div was one Armoured Battalion in one of their Panzergrenadier Regiments the rest were motorised. Same for most of the Pz Gren Divisions when we get to the Waffen Grenadier I believe [OR] that theyhad to rely on walking and what ever trucks they could lay there hands on Jim Sweeney (talk) 13:52, 20 February 2009 (UTC)


 * I think we all agree on Infantry Jim Sweeney (talk) 13:59, 20 February 2009 (UTC)


 * I have made some changes to Template:SS Divisions if you want to check thanks Jim Sweeney (talk) 10:24, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

Operation Perch
Sorry for buggering up a spelling correction Enigma, it was careless of me. Just to make sure you know, I think that the person who does the most writing ought to have the last word about literary revisions. Sometimes I cross the line between changing a spelling or putting an apostrophe in the right place and changing something because I don't like it - 'however' at the start of a sentence, a comma before 'and' or an ugly Americanism like 'problematic' (write 'difficult' you fkrs!). This is the first time I've changed 'brake' to 'break' and forgotten to cut the 'e' at the end. What a berk eh? PS Happy new year. Keith-264 (talk) 19:35, 22 February 2009 (UTC)
 * lol no need to appolgise. I was on the whole happy with the changes you made. I did wonder what was going on there with that wierd spelling but that was it. As noted though i wasnt really using the correct word myself.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:38, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

[;-) I like the extra detail you've put in. I think it does justice to the people who did the deeds. It also puts the Wittmann fetishists in their place somewhat, which is about time. Well done that man.Keith-264 (talk) 19:58, 22 February 2009 (UTC)
 * After reading, think it was some guy called, Wolfgang comments i am very much under the impression that Wittmann was a rash commander. Did he cotact Mobius before hand to see how long it would take for him to move in on the town? Why didnt he concentrate his resources instead of splitting his force up? And rolling into town on his own lost a tank that should not have been lost - i think its very probable that he could have repositioned his own tank to cause further destruction either via holding up the British occupation of the town or via engaging the force on the hill.
 * But i agree too much focuses on the Tiger tanks and the "defeat" suffered at Villers - not enough is on the bloodshed in the Orne Valley or the efforts made by the 50th Division.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:06, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Re Perch copyedit, will do as soon as I have the time, which may not be very soon! Re Wittman, :D EyeSerene talk 20:47, 24 February 2009 (UTC)