User:Eric.mehnert/sandbox


 * Simkin, John. “Blitzkreig.” Spartacus Educational. Spartacus Educational, August 2014. https://spartacus-educational.com/2WWblitzkreig.htm.
 * Papilla, Ove. "Rommel and the German 7th Panzer Division in France 1940". Swedish National Defense College.
 * Harding, David P. "Heinz Guderian As the Agent of Change: His Significant Impact on the Development of German Armored Forces Between the World Wars." Army History, no. 31 (1994): 26-34. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26304190.
 * Vitek. “German Half-Track.” Russian Tanks of World War II, April 19, 2013. http://russian-tanks.com/german-half-track.php.
 * Hutcheson, John M. “Of Tank and Infantry: Lessons of Heavy-Light Integration Learned, Forgotten and Relearned,” April 5, 1991, 42–44. https://doi.org/10.21236/ada235149.
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Germany[edit]
Guderian (right edge) guides armoured force in Poland

By the beginning of World War II, the German armoured forces had developed a much more profound and more flexible doctrine than that of the Allies on the tactical and operational level. German tanks operated in close radio communication with one another, which allowed tank commanders to take full advantage of the speed of their vehicles. At the time, "Blitzkreig" was not defined on the strategic level, but concentrated Panzer divisions in 1940 in the Battle of France nevertheless managed to exploit breaches in the allied defensive lines, to great effect. German tanks could carry with them enough fuel and supplies to go almost 200 Kilometers, and enough food to last 3-9 days. They could also be resupplied by airdrops. This independence from supply lines proved effective, and allowed them to advance on critical targets much faster and without hesitation. Another factor in the success of panzer divisions was the ability of commanders to make tactical decisions in the field and without much consultation with their headquarters. Erwin Rommel led the 7th Panzer division in the battle of France, where his knack for tactics was instrumental in his tanks' success.

The development of Blitzkreig tactics, largely under the influence of Heinz Guderian's Achtung–Panzer!,[citation needed] was facilitated by the fact that, for political reasons, a Tank Arm had been formed. The Panzertruppe, later referred to as the Panzerwaffe, was a distinct branch of the military from the Infantry and Cavalry.[citation needed] The Panzertruppe was, until 1940, overshadowed by the much more influential Infantry, as exemplified by the low priority given to tank production and the fact tanks were between 1936 and 1939 also divided among the Infantry and Cavalry.[citation needed]

Heinz Guderian, with the help of others, established the armoured combined arms team, distinct from a purely infantry or cavalry formation. The panzer divisions were not solely composed of tanks, but integrated the other arms in it as well — most notably, mechanised infantry (riding in halftracks to be protected from small-arms fire while being transported) and self-propelled artillery (howitzers fitted on a tank chassis). This allowed the panzer division to become a complete and independent combat force, and overcome the problems that tanks had in attaining a breakthrough against strong opposition. Entrenched enemy infantry equipped with large numbers of anti-tank guns, which would be very costly without direct infantry support. Unsupported armored units have suffered heavy losses time and again when deployed without infantry. Though ground troops had always had problems keeping up with the speedy tanks, they could now simply drive along with them, somewhat solving the issue of mutual infantry-armor support. However, this development was hampered until 1941 by the lack of half-tracks vehicles to equip the mechanised infantry.

The in-depth research through theoretical approaches, wargaming and exercises developed a confidence within the Panzertruppe itself (and political support by Hitler) in the armoured formation as the key battlefield formation — although this view was before 1940 not shared by the other Arms of Service.[citation needed] A key part of this doctrine was improved communications by having radios in all tanks — and again this ideal suffered from technical limitations as most tanks had receiver sets only.[citation needed] The superior tactical and operational doctrine, combined with an appropriate strategic implementation, enabled the Germans in 1940 to defeat forces quantitatively superior in armour, infantry and artillery during their campaign in France. Blitzkreig was eventually adopted by German high command as an official strategy in 1941, but enjoyed only brief success in the early stages of Operation Barbarossa. However, harsh conditions on the Eastern front coupled with the recovery of Soviet industry halted the Panzer's advance, and eventually pushed them back to Berlin.