User:Erictheenquirer/sandbox

=2014 Israel-Gaza Conflict=

Background
Israel carried out Operation Cast Lead in December 2008 with the stated aim of stopping rocket attacks from Hamas militants. It lead to a decrease in Palestinian rocket attacks. The UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict concluded that the operation was "a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population, radically diminish its local economic capacity both to work and to provide for itself, and to force upon it an ever increasing sense of dependency and vulnerability". The Israeli government's analysis concludes that the report perverts international law to serve a political agenda and sends a "legally unfounded message to states everywhere confronting terrorism that international law has no effective response to offer them".

First Hamas–Fatah reconciliation (2011)
Influenced in the Arab Spring and by demonstrations in Ramallah and Gaza, the gap between Hamas and Fatah was bridged in 2011. After the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas declared his willingness to travel to Gaza and sign an agreement, the IDF killed two Hamas activists in Gaza; the IDF stated the killings were in response to the launching of a single Qassam rocket, which hit no one, but Yedioth Ahronoth's Alex Fishman argued they were a "premeditated escalation" by Israel. In an interview with CNN, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that the reconciliation talks were calls for Israel's destruction, and strongly opposed the idea of a unity government.

The November 2012 ceasefire and its violations
On 14 November 2012, Israel launched Operation Pillar of Defense with the assassination of the commander of Hamas's military wing, Ahmed Jabari, following hundreds of rocket attacks from Gaza and Israeli shelling and airstrikes on Gaza. A week later, on 21 November, Egypt brokered a ceasefire to the conflict which contained the following agreements:
 * 1) Israel should stop all hostilities in the Gaza Strip land, sea and air, including incursions and targeting of individuals.
 * 2) All Palestinian factions shall stop all hostilities from the Gaza Strip against Israel, including rocket attacks and all attacks along the border.
 * 3) The crossings should be opened, facilitating the movement of people and goods; Israel should refrain from restricting residents' movements and from targeting residents in border areas; procedures of implementation should be dealt with 24 hours after the start of the ceasefire.

Violations
Both Israel and Hamas argue that the other violated the 2012 ceasefire agreement, resulting in 1 Israeli and 8 Gazan deaths and 5 Israeli and 66 Gazan injuries. According to the Israeli Security Agency (Shabak) there was a sharp decrease in attacks from Gaza in 2013. Nevertheless, 63 rockets (average 5 per month) were launched in 36 rocket attacks in addition to various mortar attacks, all prohibited by the November 2012 ceasefire. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) reported monthly Israeli attacks involving drones, missiles, small arms fire and airstrikes. Six of the deaths in Gaza occurred in the border area's Access Restricted Areas (ARAs, non-demarcated zones within Gazan territory unilaterally defined by Israel as being of restricted access), despite the ceasefire's prohibition on Israeli attacks on these areas. OCHAO, more broadly sourced data, reported 11 deaths in Gaza and 81 injuries for 2013.

In the first three months after the IDF Operation Pillar of Defense, according to Ben White, two mortar shells struck Israeli territory, while four Gazans were shot dead and 91 were wounded by Israeli forces who fired inside Gazan territory on 63 occasions, made 13 incursions into the Strip, and attacked the Gazan fishing fleet 30 times. Israeli attacks on Gaza steadily increased during the second half of 2013, notwithstanding the decrease in attacks from Gaza.

From December 2012 to late June/early July 2014, Hamas did not fire rockets into Israel, and tried to police other groups doing so. These efforts were largely successful; Netanyahu stated in March 2014 that the rocket fire in the past year was the "lowest in a decade." According to Shabak, in the first half of 2014 there were 181 rocket attacks compared to 55 rocket attacks in whole 2013.

However, while the ceasefire generally held, the blockade of Gaza continued in direct violation of the ceasefire agreement. "Crossings were repeatedly shut and buffer zones were reinstated. Imports declined, exports were blocked, and fewer Gazans were given exit permits to Israel and the West Bank."

Israel halted construction material going to Gaza after it stated that it had discovered a tunnel leading into Israel, some 300 m from a kibbutz. The IDF said it was the third tunnel discovered that year and that the previous two were packed with explosives.

According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there were 85 rocket attacks in the first five months of 2014. Most of the 85 rockets were fired in March, after the IDF killed 3 members of Islamic Jihad. The members of the PIJ say they were firing rockets in response to an incursion by Israeli tanks and bulldozers into Gazan territory east of the Khan Yunis area. The IDF said they were conducting routine military patrols near the Gaza border when they came under fire, and thus responded with airstrikes.

Second Hamas–Fatah reconciliation
Leading up to the collapse of the 2013–14 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks, in the face of Netanyahu's perceived reluctance to make desired concessions, Mahmoud Abbas decided to forge a deal with Hamas. With its alliance with Syria and Iran weakened, the loss of power by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after a coup d’ètat in Egypt, and the economic impact of the closure of its Rafah tunnels by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, on 23 April 2014, ending seven divisive years, Hamas agreed to reconciliation under a unity government with the other main Palestinian faction, Fatah. The government accepted by Hamas was to be run exclusively by PNA technocrats. This Palestinian unity government was sworn in by 2 June 2014 and Israel announced it would not negotiate any peace deal with the new government and would push punitive measures. Netanyahu took Palestinian unity as a threat rather than an opportunity. On the eve of the agreement he stated that the proposed reconciliation would "strengthen terrorism", and called on the international community to avoid embracing it. Most of the outside world, including the European Union, Russia, China, India, Turkey, France and the United Kingdom, proved cautiously optimistic, and subsequently expressed their support for new arrangement. The United States, more skeptical, announced it would continue to work with the PNA-directed unity government. Israel itself suspended negotiations with the PNA and, just after the announcement, launched an airstrike, which missed its target and wounded a family of three bystanders. Netanyahu had warned before the deal that it would be incompatible with Israeli–Palestinian peace and that Abbas had to choose between peace with Hamas and peace with Israel. When a reconciliation deal was signed, opening the way to the appointment of the new government, Netanyahu chaired a security cabinet which voted to authorise Netanyahu to impose unspecified sanctions against the Palestinian Authority. On 4 June, the day before Naksa Day, the Israeli Housing and Construction Ministry published tenders for 1,500 settlement units in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in a move Minister Uri Ariel said was an "appropriate Zionist response to the Palestinian terror government." Marwan Bishara, senior political analyst at Al Jazeera, alleged that Israel had hoped to disrupt the Palestinian national unity government between Fatah and Hamas by its operation.

Immediate events
On 12 June 2014, three Israeli teenagers were abducted in the West Bank: Naftali Fraenkel, Gilad Shaer, and Eyal Yifrah. Israel blamed Hamas, with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu saying that he had "unequivocal proof" that Hamas was involved and that the abduction was linked to Palestinian reconciliation, and the IDF stated that the two men Israel suspected of having kidnapped the teenagers were known members of Hamas. No evidence of Hamas involvement was offered by the Israeli authorities, possibly due to sensitivity of the source being within Hamas' ranks. High-ranking members of Hamas denied the group had any involvement in the incident, and ex-Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin doubted Hamas had any involvement. The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank attributed the abductions to the Qawasameh clan, notorious for acting against Hamas's policies and any attempts to reach an entente with Israel. Hamas political chief Khaled Meshal said he could neither confirm nor deny the kidnapping of the three Israelis, but congratulated the abductors. The kidnappings were condemned by human rights organizations. Documents released by Israel suggest that Hamas member Hussam Qawasmeh organized the kidnappings with $60,000 provided by his brother Mahmoud through a Hamas association in Gaza, after requesting support for a "military operation". On 20 August, Saleh al-Arouri, an exiled Hamas leader based in Turkey, claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of the three Israeli teens: "Our goal was to ignite an intifada in the West Bank and Jerusalem, as well as within the 1948 borders... Your brothers in the Al-Qassam Brigades carried out this operation to support their imprisoned brothers, who were on a hunger strike... The mujahideen captured these settlers in order to have a swap deal." Palestinian security forces said the kidnappings were organized by Saleh al-Arouri. Khalid Meshaal, head in exile of Hamas's political wing since 2004, acknowledged that Hamas members were responsible, but stated that its political leaders had no prior knowledge of the abduction, were not involved in military details and learnt of it through the ensuing Israeli investigations. He also said that while Hamas was opposed to targeting civilians, he understood that Palestinians "frustrated with oppression" were exercising a "legitimate right of resistance" against the occupation by undertaking such operations. Israel states that the IDF and the Shin Bet have foiled between 54 and 64 kidnapping plots since 2013. The PA said it had foiled 43 of them.

Withholding evidence in its possession suggesting that the teens had been killed immediately until 1 July, Israel launched Operation Brother's Keeper, a large-scale crackdown of what it called Hamas's terrorist infrastructure and personnel in the West Bank, ostensibly aimed at securing the release of the kidnapped teenagers. 10 Palestinians were killed in numerous raids and clashes, and between 350 and 600 Palestinians,  including nearly all of Hamas's West Bank leaders,  were arrested. Among those arrested were many people who had only recently been freed under the terms of the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange. Israeli military spokesman Lt. Col. Peter Lerner defended the arrests, stating that Hamas members had carried out 60 abduction attempts on Israelis in the West Bank "in the last year and a half", and that "Hamas does not need to give a direct order." The arrests yielded no information about the abduction. Amnesty International has stated that certain aspects of the operation amounted to collective punishment, and B'tselem said in a press release that the actions have caused "disproportionate harm to the basic rights of Palestinians". During the course of the operation, Israel said it had uncovered a Hamas plot to launch a massive wave of violence throughout the West Bank, with the goal of overthrowing the Palestinian Authority. The alleged coup plotters were arrested and their weapons stockpiles were seized

On 30 June, search teams found the bodies of the three missing teenagers near Hebron. After their burial, an anti-Arab riot broke out, and a Palestinian teenager was killed in revenge. His killing sparked Arab rioting. Israel police arrested six suspects belonging to the Beitar Jerusalem F.C. supporters' group La Familia and charged three of them with murder.

As part of its crackdown, Israel conducted air strikes against Hamas facilities in the Gaza Strip, while Hamas apparently refrained from retaliating, though it did not impede other factions from firing rockets towards Israel. From 1 May to 11 June, six rockets and three mortar shells were launched from Gaza towards Israel. From 12 to 30 June 44 rockets and 3 mortar shells were launched from Gaza. On 29 June, an Israeli airstrike on a rocket crew killed a Hamas operative, while at least 18 rockets were launched from Gaza through the next day by Hamas according to both J.J. Goldberg and Assaf Sharon, with Goldberg stating that it was the first time Hamas directly launched rockets since the conflict in 2012. Overnight, on 30 June – 1 July, Israeli airstrikes struck 34 Gaza targets in what officials stated was a response to the Sunday rocketry, while Stuart Greer reported the strikes were revenge for the deaths of the three youths. From the day of the abductions on 12 June through 5 July 117 rockets were launched from Gaza and there were approximately 80 Israeli airstrikes on Gaza.

Israel sought a ceasefire but refused to accept Hamas's condition that Palestinians arrested in the West Bank crackdown be released. In a meeting held on 2 July to discuss the crisis, Hamas reportedly tried but failed to persuade armed factions in Gaza to uphold the truce with Israel. Following escalating rocket fire from Gaza, Israel issued a warning on 4 July that it "would only be able to sustain militant rocket fire for another 24, or maximum 48, hours before undertaking a major military offensive." Hamas declared it was prepared to halt the rocket fire in exchange for an agreement by Israel to stop airstrikes. Netanyahu said Israel would only act against further rocket attacks. On 5 July, Hamas official Osama Hamdan said rocket fire would continue until Israel lifted its import restrictions on Gaza and the Palestinian Authority transferred money to pay Hamas civil servants. Between 4 and 6 July, a total of 62 rockets where fired from Gaza and the IAF attacked several targets in Gaza. The following day, Hamas assumed formal responsibility for launching rocket attacks on Israel. Hamas increased rocket attacks on Israel, and by 7 July had fired 100 rockets from Gaza at Israeli territory; at the same time, the Israeli Air Force had bombed several sites in Gaza. Early on 8 July, the IAF bombed 50 targets in the Gaza Strip. Israel's military also stopped a militant infiltration from the sea. Brigadier General Moti Almoz, the chief spokesman of the Israeli military, said: "We have been instructed by the political echelon to hit Hamas hard." Hamas insisted that Israel end all attacks on Gaza, release those re-arrested during the crackdown in the West Bank, lift the blockade on Gaza and return to the cease-fire conditions of 2012 as conditions for a ceasefire.

Text inappropriate to "Background" - incorporate in main section
--
 * 2012-13: “… and 85 in the first five months of 2014.[67] Most of the 85 rockets were fired in March, after the IDF killed 3 members of Islamic Jihad who were attempting to fire rockets.” – does not belong in a background to 2014; move to main text; incorporate on a sub-section “January to June 2014” (i.e. prior to the conflict explosion)?
 * “Second Hamas–Fatah reconciliation” – Entirely focussed on 2014 = does not belong in a background to 2014; move to main text.
 * “Immediate events” ” – Entirely focussed on 2014 = does not belong in a background to 2014; move to main text.


 * November 2012 Gaza Ceasefire and the agreed responsibilities for each party
 * Israeli and Palestinian violations of the ceasefire in December 2012
 * Annual summary of 2013 Israeli and Palestinian and Palestinian attacks involving Gaza
 * Annual summary of deaths and injuries by both parties
 * 2013 non-military ceasefire violations by Palestinians
 * 2013 non-military violations of the ceasefire by the Israelis
 * New 2013 developments against the spirit of the 2012 ceasefire agreement
 * Annual summary of deaths and injuries by both parties

- To Be Reposted


 * The topics are fine as they go, but what about the other 3 things I mentioned earlier? The Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, the kidnapping of three teenagers and the West Bank crackdown and finally the attack on Gaza with resultant Hamas rocket fire? That should be included in the background, like it is now. Currently, the 2012-2013 tries to cover the ceasefire violations, though it can be expanded for sure. It does not include summary of deaths/injuries, that can perhaps be added. Kingsindian (talk) 16:15, 13 August 2014 (UTC)
 * One cannot write a background section without RS at hand which name the salient points to be outlined. To make a list without reference to such an RS is to risk violating WP:OR. We have several such sources so far. The list above does not appear to come from a relevant reliable source analysing the background to this war.Nishidani (talk) 17:23, 13 August 2014 (UTC)
 * To clarify some of the points that you make (tyvm for the pleasant civil tone) the bullet points that I presented are for a framework for the background to the topic "2014 Israeli-Gaza Conflict" and no other topic.Nishidani, the detail and the sources will come; I repeat, those points are just a framework structure. KingsIndian, in a day or two I hope to provide you with a draft of the full Background text. Nishidani, you will see the "detail" there. I will endeavour to incorporate the Fatah-Hamas reconciliations. Regarding the teenager killings and the Gaza escalation, those are integral parts of the 2014 conflict and as such belong in the main text and have no place in the Background. I must repeat that I am approaching this strictly according to the current title - 2014 Conflict - and not as a surrogate for some future intended title revision. In that regard, should someone wish to create a topic called "Operation Preferred Edge" that has MUCH merit - the detail can go there and a far more condensed version be reflected in this 2014 Conflict article. This issue of having an article spanning 2014, but writing it as though it has Operation Preferred Edge as the topic, is complicating the cleaning up of the 2014 topic unnecessarily, if you don't mind me saying so.


 * As a solution, may I suggest that we accept the need for a detailed page devoted to and formatted specifically for Operation Preferred Edge, but that that place is not here in the 2014 annual summary. There are already separate articles such as Beitunia Killings, 2014 kidnapping and murder of Israeli teenagers, and Erictheenquirer (talk) 11:34, 12 August 2017 (UTC)

To Be Reposted

=Gaza Beach Killings=

The current article format in Wiki groups the evidence according to the source (e.g. HRW; IDF; German newspaper; etc.), and not according to the various controversial themes (e.g. shrapnel; craters; timing of shelling; etc.). As such the format is not conducive to facilitating a core Wiki objective, namely to provide for a convenient contrasting of various facets of a controversy. This draft rewrites the event accordingly, by theme.

Eyewitness Reports
Eyewitnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch described between five and six explosions on the beach between 4:30 p.m. to 5 p.m., the general timeframe during which the IDF fired artillery shells onto the beach and when the seven civilians were killed. Survivors said they heard the sound of an incoming projectile and saw a blur of motion in the sky before the explosion that killed the seven civilians. Residents of northern Gaza are familiar with the sounds of regular artillery fire.

Sayid Abu Rabia, a 46-year-old construction worker, had taken 14 members of his family to the beach that day. As he was preparing for prayers, the first shell fell. “When the first shell hit…we left the car behind, we left our cell phones, and ran away,” When the shell that killed the Ghalyas exploded, he was about 20 meters away.

Huda Ghalia, one of the surviving Ghalias, related the events: "'While I was swimming with my siblings I heard the sound of an explosion. I looked to the north and saw dust blowing approximately 100 metres away. My father started shouting to us “Get out of the sea quickly! We want to go back.” ... Then about another four shells fell, the second of which was about 100 metres away from us- closer than the first one. We were confused. Some of the ships were approaching the beach. The fourth artillery fell while I was sitting on the chair. I couldn't move and I didn’t know what was going on. It fell amongst us. I didn't see anything because there was dust everywhere. ... I looked towards the place where my father had been standing with my brother in law. There was a small hill to the south. I looked towards it and I saw my father lying on the ground. It looked like he was sleeping so I rushed towards him. I was trembling not because of the cold but because I was so scared. I saw his intestines outside his stomach.'"

Major General Kalifi, the IDF spokesperson, discounted these reports, saying that Palestinians “have no problem lying,”

Video Recording of the Aftermath
Zakaria Abu Harbid (Arabid) filmed video footage of the immediate aftermath. ““I found people’s flesh scattered everywhere. I didn’t know what to do, but I immediately began filming the child (Huda) hysterically crying. I cried while I was filming, seeing children’s clothes and all things mixed with flesh and blood”. A section of the video, showing 12-year old Huda running hysterically looking for her father and finding him lying on his back with his eyes closed, was shown around the world.

On 16 June 2006, the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung questioned the reliability of the video footage following the incident, alleging that one of the dead bodies next to Huda's father is later seen alive and carrying a gun. Citing alleged cases of Palestinian doctoring of video footage, the report suggested that both the footage and the site of the blast may have been manipulated. An American pro-Israel pressure group, Camera, went so far as to suggest that the film of Huda Ghalia's trauma was faked. Some media commentators criticized the video by suggesting that there was no crater at the site of the deaths, whereas Human Rights Watch subsequently published an analysis of the fatal crater, including position, size and explosive compound coating.

Haaretz showed that commentary was flawed. “The German newspaper Suddeutsche Zeitung cast doubt on the authenticity of the picture and made its own determinations without checking the facts: Why were bodies covered with sheets?, it asked - although they were not. Why were Huda's clothes dry? - although they were actually wet." Abu Harbid, the video cameraman, commented, "If a foreign photographer had taken the pictures, no one would have had doubts. Because we are Palestinian journalists they immediately claimed we staged it," Abu Harbid's boss added: "How can one stage such horror?"

Claims, Counterclaims and Investigations
The Israeli army claimed it was targeting Qassam rocket launchers, shelling the beach 250 metres away from the blast, ten minutes prior to it. Its initial response was that the shelling did not come from a gunship, but was more likely to have been fired by Israeli ground forces. The Israeli military said it “regretted the harm done to innocent civilians”.

The initial IDF acknowledgement was changed in a meeting four days later, on 13 June 2006, when an IDF committee, with Major General Meir Kalifi (also Khalifi and Klifi) as spokesperson, concluded that the deaths were not caused by an errant IDF artillery shell: "'We can say, surely, that the IDF is not responsible for the incident. We checked each and every shell that was fired from the sea, the air and from the artillery on the land and we found out that we can track each and every one according to a timetable and according to the accuracy of where they hit the ground. … The probe concludes that the blast was probably caused by an explosive device buried in the sand.' …No clear explanation was provided for what caused the explosion, but Kalifi suggested Palestinian militants might have been responsible." The IDF committee acknowledged that the army had fired six shells on and around Beit Lahia beach from artillery inside Israel. But it said that by coincidence a separate explosion - probably a mine planted by Hamas or a buried old shell - occurred in the same area at about the same time, killing the family. The IDF justification for this conclusion was multiple. The presentation concluded, “So, all possibilities that the cause of the explosion was an artillery shell fired on that Friday have been disproved.” Defense Minister Amir Perez repeated the findings, the evidence being presented first to the Israeli people. He said “We owe it to ourselves to know that we did not cause these deaths.”

This conclusion was to be challenged on multiple grounds by an on-site Human Rights Watch (HRW) investigation led by its senior military advisor, Marc Garlasco, an ex-defense contractor and later senior professional with the Pentagon, and by other on-site investigations.

Number of IDF shells fired
During the 13 June meeting, Maj Gen Kalifi of the IDF explained that six artillery shells were fired around the time of the ‘incident’, but they landed 580-600 meters north of the target. The location of the first shell was not determined, but it was launched at 16:30, well before the time of the ‘incident’, and that “naval shells were only fired between 11:00 AM and 12:00 noon”. “We have documentation of where all the (naval) shells landed. It proves that all shells were launched approximately four hours before the incident.” This conclusion was repeated by Major General Dan Halutz, IDF Chief of Staff and former Israeli Air Force Commander "We can say, surely, that the IDF is not responsible for the incident," and that, "We checked each and every shell that was fired from the sea, the air and from the artillery on the land and we found out that we can track every one according to a timetable and according to the accuracy of where they hit the ground."

On 17 June the IDF admitted that the revised analysis presented by Kalifi was flawed. Instead of only six artillery shells, “Israeli officials have now told The Times that two naval shells were fired at about the time of the deaths 'at 4.24pm and 4.55pm' but that they were too far away to matter." HRW subsequently reported that Khalifi acknowledged that two 76mm naval shells had also been fired.

Shrapnel identification
During the 13 June meeting, Major General Kalifi of the IDF reported: “In addition a piece of shrapnel was found in the wound of one of the Palestinians who was injured and received medical treatment in Israel. The shrapnel was taken for examination in a laboratory. The examination showed that, without a doubt, the shrapnel was not a part of an IDF artillery shell.” The IDF said the fragment resembled explosives used by Palestinian organizations.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) offered rebuttal to this key IDF claim of absolution. The organization had investigated the blast site and had examined shrapnel from four sources:
 * First, it found an approximately 15-centimeter piece of shrapnel near a crater on the beach itself. It was stamped “155mm.” The fact that it had not yet oxidized indicated that it was fresh and not from an earlier attack. A week later, the shell fragment had begun to oxidize.
 * Second, HRW found a small copper shell fragment deep in the back of the front seat of Hani Azanin’s car. The explosion on the beach that killed the Ghalyas had seriously damaged the vehicle. By the time Human Rights Watch talked to Hani Azanin, three days after the incident, he had cleaned the car of human flesh and most of the shrapnel. The copper fragment found by Human Rights Watch definitely came from the blast that killed the Ghalyas because this was the blast that caused all the damage to the Azanin car. In all likelihood it came from the copper ring of an artillery shell.
 * The third piece of shrapnel evidence had been removed from the body of Mahmud Abu Rabia, the 19-year-old-who suffered severe internal injuries, by doctors at the Kamal `Udwan Hospital. HRW reported that this piece, covered in blood, was a range setting for the timing of an artillery shell fuze.
 * The explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team of the Palestinian police found dozens of pieces of shrapnel in the crater of the explosion that killed the Ghalyas. “From our experience and analysis, the [shell fragments] we found belong to 155mm Israeli artillery. It is used by artillery every day in northern Gaza,” said Gen. Salah Abu `Azum, head of the EOD team.259 He and his staff had matched up each fragment with a part of a 155mm shell. For comparison, General Abu `Azum also showed Human Rights Watch Qassam-type rocket fragments, which are visibly much thinner. The EOD team, which was trained in the United States and Europe, indicated it had a high level of familiarity with these and other types of munitions.

Palestinian doctors additionally confirmed that the injuries from the attack, which were primarily to the head and torso, were consistent with the heavy shrapnel of artillery shells used by the IDF.

During a 19 June 2006 meeting, Major General Kalifi confirmed that the IDF had removed and tested one piece of shrapnel from one of three injured Palestinians moved to Israel and that the test results revealed that it was weapons-grade alloy, but not from a 155mm shell. He stated that the IDF was not removing shrapnel from the other injured Palestinians. However, that night an Israeli news report contradicted this information, stating that the IDF had removed two additional pieces of shrapnel from one of the other injured and found them likely to have come from a 155mm shell. The next day Kalifi acknowledged the removal and testing of one additional piece of shrapnel, but claimed that there were no test results yet.

On the evening of the same day, 19 June 2006, Israeli Channel 10's Shlomo Eldar reported that a second fragment, removed the previous week by Israeli doctors from a different Palestinian wounded in the incident, was from a 155mm shell. Kalifi rejected the Channel 10 report as a "falsehood". On 22 June, he reported that a second piece of shrapnel, removed from Adham Ralya, had proved conclusively that this was not a 155mm shell … based on analysis of the composition and content of the shrapnel, and of the explosive compound found on it.

A fragment of shrapnel, marked with numbers and two letters, was removed by Palestinian doctors from the abdomen of a teenage boy caught up in the blast. Garlasco identified it as “definitely part of an artillery fuse”. The IDF’s Kalifi also dismissed the artillery fuse shrapnel evidence, questioning the chain of custody, stating that anyone could take shrapnel and dip it into the blood of the injured.

HRW's battlefield expert, Garlasco, responded in rebuttal: “If the Israeli allegations of tampered evidence are to be believed, many Palestinians would have to have engaged in a massive and immediate conspiracy to falsify the data. The conspirators – witnesses, victims, medical personnel and bomb disposal staff – would have had to falsify their testimony, amend digital and hand-written records, and dip shrapnel into a victim’s blood. It beggars belief that such a huge conspiracy could be orchestrated so quickly.”

On 21 June, Maj.-Gen. Kalifi reported the test results on the additional fragment. While the shrapnel did not match artillery shells fired by the IDF that day, it did, he said, match other types of ordnance in IDF use. During the shelling on the fatal afternoon, an Israeli gunboat fired two 76mm rounds. According to Khalifi, "The examination of a second piece of shrapnel retrieved from the body of a boy who was wounded in the blast unequivocally shows that the explosion was not caused by a 155 mm artillery shell."

Shrapnel removal
Kalifi questioned the decision of Palestinian doctors to remove shrapnel from the injured, who were later sent to Israel, saying he assumed it was to “cover evidence” that might help the IDF. The victims had initially been treated by Palestinian doctors who removed almost all shrapnel from the bodies of victims before they arrived at Israeli hospitals for treatment. Representatives of the Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center said that Palestinian doctors at al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza, who had treated a woman wounded during the blast, had made unnecessary cuts all over her body in an effort to remove all the surgically reachable shrapnel. The Israeli hospital said they had never before received a patient from which all possible shrapnel had been removed." The hospital stopped short of accusing Shifa’s doctors directly of removing shrapnel for no medical reason.

The Relative timing of bombardment and the fatal explosion
All parties believed that the timing of the IDF shelling was a key issue, Major General Meir Kalifi of the IDF confirming in the meeting of 13 June that the time span of the IDF shelling was the most important factor absolving the IDF of responsibility. According to Kalifi, the eight civilians were killed after the IDF shelling ceased at 4:50 p.m. on June 9, 2006. In support of these claims, Kalifi produced IDF surveillance videos, three of which were published. These were viewed by HRW, which concluded that there were a range of possible hypotheses. The HRW report mentions specifically that video footage from the time of the blast was not provided by the IDF.

The Times (quoted by YNet) reported a UN radio call recording that IDF shelling had started at 04:33pm and that by 04:43 one shell had fallen at the coast west of the old Dugit settlement, causing “casualties among the people spending their day at the … .” Presented with the evidence of the UN transmission, Maj Gen Kalifi said the 4:33 P.M. report was an earlier incident, near the abandoned settlement of Dugit. Israeli sources had previously reported that the fatal beach shelling had started at 4:30pm. Evidence collected by Human Rights Watch researchers and many independent journalists on the ground in Gaza indicates that the civilians were killed within the time period of the shelling. HRW concluded: “That evidence includes computerized hospital records that show children injured at the beach were treated by 5:12 p.m., and hand-written hospital records that show they were admitted at 5:05 p.m. This evidence suggests that the blast that caused the family’s death occurred during the time of the IDF shelling.”

A Guardian investigation into the sequence of events on 16 June 2006, reached similar conclusions as to those of HRW, namely that the fatal explosion must have occurred just before 5.00pm: "The Alwada's anaesthetist, Dr Ahmed Mouhana, was woken by a call from a fellow doctor calling him to the hospital. 'I looked at the time. That's what you do when someone wakes you up. It was 4.55pm. Dr Nasser couldn't tell me what was going on so I called Abu Jihad [Mr Abu Sada] and asked him. He said he didn't know but I should get to the hospital quickly as it sounded bad,' he said. Mr Abu Sada remembered receiving the call while driving to the beach. Dr Mouhana left for the hospital immediately. 'It only takes 10 minutes from my house so I was there by 5.10pm or 5.15pm at the latest. I went to reception and they had already done triage on the children,' he said."

YNET News synthesized the various claims. The IDF’s version was that the last shell had landed at 4.48pm and that between 4:54 and 4:57 there was normal activity on the beach, with the first ambulance arriving at 5:15pm. The ‘Palestinian’ version was that at 4:45-4:46 Palestinian paramedic Khaled Abu Sada telephoned confirmation of an emergency. At 4:50 Abu Sada drove to the beach, his ambulance arriving at 5:00. IDF officials said that the army shelled the area between 4:30 p.m. and 4:48 p.m., while the deadly blast occurred between 4:57 p.m. and 5:10 p.m. However, according to hospital records and testimonies given by doctors and ambulance crews and obtained by the two newspapers, the blast which killed the Ghalia family members took place earlier than the army reported, while the shelling was still underway. The next day, 17 June, The Times reported that the IDF had admitted the firing of the naval shell at 4:55pm. Major General Kalifi rejected the report, saying that naval shelling had only taken place earlier in the day, and that “the Times made use of incomplete information, and added that the quote in its story attributed to an IDF officer was inaccurate and taken out of context.”

At the 18 June meeting, HRW provided evidence which contradicted the IDF claim regarding the timing. The evidence demonstrated that the time of firing of the ultimate IDF shell was consistent with the fatal blast. It included digital and hand-written hospital records, the UN recording, telephone records reporting the incident, the ambulance driver's testimony, and various eye-witness reports,. Three days later, on 21 June, the IDF spokesperson, Maj.-Gen. Kalifi, repeated the conclusion that the fatal explosion occurred 10-15 minutes after artillery cannons had stopped firing shells at a target next to the beach - "conclusively exonerating the IDF from responsibility for the blast". A Knight Ridder review of medical logs, cell phone records and other evidence suggested that the explosion took place during the barrage and probably was due to an artillery round, supporting the HRW conclusion.

Craters
During the original 13 June meeting, Kalifi had stated that the six IDF artillery shells had targeted an area 580 to 600 meters away (from the fatal site), with earlier midday naval bombardments taking place 2.5 kilometers away. "Using a special system we can precisely account for the places where five of the six shells landed." But according to readings from a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) taken by Human Rights Watch, one crater was 100 meters away from the fatal crater, and the rest were 250 to 300 meters away. The crater where the victims were killed was therefore within the vicinity of the other artillery craters created by the IDF’s June 9 artillery attack, and was also the same shape and size. While the powder in the many old craters in the area had grayed over time, the powder in the crater of June 9 was bright white, indicating its freshness.

The second issue concerned the nature of the craters. During the 13 June meeting, Kalifi reported that "the probe (the IDF investigation) concludes that the blast was probably caused by an explosive device buried in the sand, but does not determine categorically whether it was planted by Palestinians or was an old IDF dud." Haaretz elaborated: "Based on photographs, the crater left on the beach by the blast seems to have been made by an explosion from below (a mine), not a hit from above (a shell). But the HRW investigation found that, not only were the craters in the same general location, but the fatal crater was also the same shape and size. The Guardian reported that the HRW battlefield analyst believed that the crater size, shrapnel, types of injuries and their location on the victims' bodies (particularly to the head and torso) pointed to a shell dropping from the sky, not explosives under the sand. Witnesses spoke of hearing other blasts at the time, consistent with a pattern of shells falling at the beach.

Nature of the Injuries
Doctors who attended the injured in Gaza confirmed to Human Rights Watch researchers that the injuries from the attack were primarily to the head and torso. The IDF said that aerial pictures of the blast crater show it is more likely to have been made by a mine under the sand than an explosion from above, with some Israeli officials suggesting that such a mine was placed by Palestinian militants, rather than by one of its artillery shells. However, according to on-site investigations by Human Rights Watch, the size of the craters and the type of injuries to the victims are not consistent with the theory that a mine caused the explosion. After investigating the scene, Mr Garlasco concluded that the army's explanation was deeply flawed. The head and torso injuries were consistent with a shell exploding above the ground not a mine under it. If it were a mine or kids playing with an old shell you would expect severe leg injuries as well, even legs blown off."

The craters were too large to be made by bounding mines, the only type of landmines capable of producing head and torso injuries of the type suffered by the victims on 9 June. Additionally, Palestinian armed groups are not known to have, or to have used, bounding mines; the Palestinian government bomb squad said it has never uncovered a bounding mine in any explosive incident.

Completeness of evidence examined by IDF
In a meeting on 19 June between HRW and Major-General Meir Kalifi, the latter revealed that the IDF’s conclusion that it was not responsible for the deaths on the beach was based exclusively on information gathered by the IDF and excluded all evidence gathered by other sources. Marc Garlasco, chief military advisor for HRW commented: “An investigation that refuses to look at contradictory evidence can hardly be considered credible.” Kalifi told HRW that the IDF discounted information gathered from any Palestinian information sources in its investigation. The day after the incident, the IDF asked the official Palestinian security liaison office to provide evidence for testing, but later dismissed the evidence provided, which consisted of 155mm shrapnel, both new and old, and dirt from the beach and crater. When offered evidence collected first-hand by Human Rights Watch researchers in Gaza, the general either called it into question or declined to accept it. The IDF also dismissed as “unimportant” evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch indicating that the IDF’s suggested timeline surrounding the fatal incident is flawed, which thee IDF originally claimed was the most important factor absolving it of responsibility.

Report that a Victim set off the Explosion
Israeli dailies reported that, on 21 June, Major General Kalifi said that the security establishment had received information that Ilham Ghalia had said that the explosion took place when her father touched something on the beach. Kalifi concluded that the new evidence proved that “it was not Israeli fire that had hit the Ghalia family”. Ilham Ghalia was widely reported to have been one of the original fatalities. On 23 June Haaretz reported that the statement attributed to Ilham had been made while hospitalized at Ichilov Hospital, Tel Aviv. Although this new information strengthened the IDF’s version of events, that the deaths were not caused by an Israeli shell, the degree of reliability of the information was unclear: “A senior General Staff (member) admitted yesterday that this is unsubstantiated information, and that the army does not have a recording of the girl saying these things.” Three years later Haaretz observed that: “Decision makers in the government and IDF for some reason shelved (Ilham’s) admission”.

Reversal of Positions
In contrast to previous Israeli claims that the shrapnel recovered by Israeli doctors from victims definitely did not come from a 155mm shell, during a two-and-a-half hour meeting between HRW and Major General Kalifi on 18 June, the IDF agreed with Human Rights Watch that it was possible that unexploded ordnance from a 155mm artillery shell fired earlier in the day could have caused the fatal injuries. The IDF fired more than 80 155mm shells in the area of the beach on the morning of the incident. Sand would increase the possibility of a fuse malfunction leading to a dud shell that may have sat in the sand waiting to be set off. The shelling between 4:31 p.m. and 4:50 p.m. could have triggered a dud shell, as could the human traffic on the beach that afternoon. This IDF agreement that 155mm ordnance could have been responsible for the fatal blast contradicted Kalifi’s previous claims that the shrapnel analysis showed it was not from a 155mm shell, that the blast was not caused by an IDF shell , that shrapnel removal from a victim by Palestinian doctors was done so as to “cover evidence” , and that the IDF had not been shelling at the time of the blast.

According to The Jerusalem Post (19 June), in agreeing to the possibility, Garlasco had ”conceded for the first time since the incident that it could not contradict the IDF's exonerating findings”, and that it was Galasco who had reversed his opinion after further examination of the evidence, concluding that the blast was "most likely caused by unexploded Israeli ordinance left laying on the beach." Silverstein criticized the Jerusalem Post article, in particular for writing that HRW had conceded that it could not contradict the IDF’s exonerating findings, for ignoring that the HRW had instead said that it was ‘possible’ that a piece of unexploded IDF ordnance had killed the Palestinians, and also for ignoring the contrary evidence. He pointed to a new HRW report of 19 June which contained the HRW version of the meeting, which had as its main theme that the IDF ignored all evidence gathered by other sources, and which concluded that the deaths occurred during the period of shelling of the beach by the IDF.

Contrasting ultimate analysis and Interpretations
On 22 June the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided its last summary, declaring that “All new evidence obtained to date thus confirms the central conclusion of the Investigative Committee: that the event did not result from IDF fire during the day's operations.”

In contrast to the last IDF summary, the HRW 2007 synthesis was more in line with the mutual agreement from the 18 June IDF/HRW meeting, concluding that the two most likely scenarios, which could explain the shell’s explosion on the beach that afternoon, were:
 * It could have been a live shell that exploded on the beach as it struck.
 * It could have been an unexploded artillery shell fired earlier that lay in the sand before being detonated by the reverberations of nearby shelling that afternoon—the IDF had shelled the beach area on previous occasions.

A third hypothesis, advanced by the IDF, is that Palestinian militants may have taken an unexploded IDF shell they found elsewhere and rigged it up as an improvised explosive device (IED) that then exploded, with fatal consequences, on June 9. The IDF suggested that militants might have placed an IED on the beach in order to thwart an IDF landing from the sea. Major General Kalifi did not suggest, however, why the Palestinians might fear an amphibious landing when the IDF has unrestricted access across the 51 kilometer Israel/Gaza land border. The nature of the injuries casts further doubt on the IED explanation.

In a report dated 1 July 2007 in which the Gaza beach explosion (2006) was used as a case study, Human Rights Watch summarized the opposing views, and concluded that: “The availability of significant evidence that the IDF has not examined or taken into account casts serious doubt on its conclusions and underscores the need for an independent investigation of the incident.” The Palestinian Authority welcomed such an investigation, while the Israeli government did not support it, saying “We don't need the assistance of anyone”.

Media Reporting and Opinion
Initially the foreign media unequivocally blamed Israel for the deaths, and the Israel media tended to do the same. After the 13 June meeting, in which the results of the IDF investigation were made known, Israeli and Western media outlets switched to acceptance of the IDF version.

Some current affairs commentators branded the Palestinian version as "Pallywood", going so far as to refer to this opposing version as 'libel'. Three years later, an organization dedicated to monitoring NGO's discounted all of the HRW evidence and criticisms, concluding that "HRW reported 'facts' based only on Palestinian claims and pseudo-technical analysis".

Electronic Intifada reported that “the US corporate media has highlighted Israeli denials of responsibility for the Gaza beach killings, while providing much less space to Palestinian and third party assertions of Israeli responsibility.”

Aftermath
Following the IDF assassination on 8th June of the recently appointed Palestinian head of the security forces of Hamas' Interior Ministry, Jamal Abu Samhadana, and three others, and the 9th June Palestinian beach deaths, described in this article, Hamas broke its self-proclaimed February 2005 ceasefire on 10th June and, together with Islamic Jihad, recommenced rocket attacks on southern Israel. This 'chronology of crisis' evolved into mutual responses, with rocket fire from Gaza increasing. On 13 June Israel responded further when an IAF aircraft fired a missile into a busy Gaza City street, killing 11 people, including two children and two medics. Subsequent responses led to the IDF increasing incursions into Gaza, and on 23 August abducting two Palestinians alleged to be Hamas militants. In response Hamas and others abducted IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit on 25 June, which led to the IDF's Operation Summer Rains, in which 416 Palestinians were killed versus 11 Israelis.